The Good Book

by A. C. Grayling

  11. ‘Well,’ replied Laelius, ‘all I can do is to urge you to regard friendship as indeed the greatest thing in the world,

  12. ‘For there is nothing which so fits human nature, or is so exactly what we both desire and need, whether in prosperity or adversity.

  13. ‘But I must at the very beginning lay down this principle: that true friendship can only exist between good people.

  14. ‘I do not, however, press this too closely, like those who give their definitions a pedantic accuracy.

  15. ‘There is no practical use in doing that: we must concern ourselves with the facts of everyday life as we find it, not imaginary and ideal perfections.

  16. ‘Let us mean by “good people” those whose actions and lives leave no question as to their honour, sense of justice, and generosity both of hand and heart;

  17. ‘Who have the courage to stand by their principles, and who are free from greed, intemperance and violence.

  18. ‘Such people as these are generally accounted “good”, so let us agree to call them that,

  19. ‘On the ground that to the best of their ability they take nature and human fellow-feeling as the true guides to an honourable and well-lived life.’

  Chapter 2

  1. ‘Now this truth seems clear to me, that nature has so formed us that a certain tie unites us all, but that this tie becomes stronger with proximity.

  2. ‘So it is that we prefer our fellow-citizens to foreigners, relations to strangers;

  3. ‘For in their case nature herself has caused a kind of friendship to exist, though it is one which lacks some of the elements of permanence.

  4. ‘Friendship excels mere acquaintanceship in this, that whereas you may eliminate affection from acquaintanceship,

  5. ‘You cannot do so from friendship. Without affection, acquaintanceship still exists in name; but friendship does not.

  6. ‘You may best understand friendship by considering that, whereas merely social ties uniting people are indefinite,

  7. ‘Friendship is a tie concentrated into affection, which is the bond one shares most deeply only with a few.

  8. ‘And now we can try to define friendship, as: enjoyment of the other’s company, accord on many things, mutual goodwill and liking.

  9. ‘With the exception of wisdom, I am inclined to think nothing better than this can be found in human experience.

  10. ‘There are people who give the palm to riches or to good health, or to power and office;

  11. ‘Many give the name of the best thing in life to sensual pleasures.

  12. ‘But all these we may say are frail and uncertain, and depend less on our own prudence than on the caprice of fortune.

  13. ‘Then there are those who find the “chief good” in virtue. And that is a noble doctrine.

  14. ‘But the very virtue they talk of is the parent and preserver of friendship, and without it friendship cannot exist.’

  Chapter 3

  1. ‘I repeat: let us account as good the persons usually considered so; such as are good in the true sense of everyday life;

  2. ‘And we need not trouble ourselves about ideal characters who are nowhere to be met.

  3. ‘Between people like these, Fannius, the advantages of friendship are almost more than I can say.

  4. ‘To begin with, how can life be worth living, which lacks the repose to be found in the companionship and goodwill of a friend?

  5. ‘What can be more delightful than to have someone you can say anything to, with the same absolute confidence as to yourself?

  6. ‘Is not prosperity robbed of half its value if you have no one to share your joy?

  7. ‘On the other hand, misfortunes would be hard to bear if there were no one to feel them even more acutely than yourself.

  8. ‘In a word, other objects of ambition serve for particular ends:

  9. ‘Thus, riches for use, power for securing homage, office for reputation,

  10. ‘Pleasure for enjoyment, health for freedom from pain and the full use of the functions of the body.

  11. ‘But friendship alone embraces all advantages. Turn which way you please, you will find it at hand;

  12. ‘It is everywhere; and yet never out of place, never unwelcome. Fire and water themselves are not of more universal value.

  13. ‘I am not now speaking of the common or modified form of friendship, Fannius, though even that is a source of pleasure and profit,

  14. ‘But of that true and complete friendship which enhances prosperity, and relieves adversity of its burden by halving and sharing it.

  15. ‘And great and numerous as are the blessings of friendship, this certainly is the sovereign one, that it gives us bright hopes for the future, supports our weakness, and banishes despair.

  16. ‘In the face of a true friend we see as it were a second self. So that where a man’s friend is, he is; if his friend be rich, he is not poor;

  17. ‘Though he be weak, his friend’s strength is his; and in his friend’s life he enjoys a second life after his own is finished.

  18. ‘This last is perhaps the most difficult to understand. But such is the effect of the respect, the loving remembrance, and the regret of friends which follow us to the grave.

  19. ‘While they take the sting out of death, they add a glory to the life of the survivors.

  20. ‘And indeed: if you eliminate from nature the tie of affection, there will be an end of house and city, nor will so much as the cultivation of the soil be left.’

  Chapter 4

  1. ‘Anyone who does not see the virtue of friendship for its own sake, Fannius, may learn it by observing the effects of quarrels and feuds.

  2. ‘Was any family ever so well established, any state so firmly settled, as to be beyond destruction by animosities and factions?

  3. ‘This may teach the immense advantage of friendship; a truth which everybody understands through experience.

  4. ‘For if any instance of loyal friendship in confronting or sharing danger becomes apparent, everyone applauds it greatly.

  5. ‘One can easily see what a natural feeling it is, when men who would not have the courage to help a friend, themselves show how right they think it when another does so.

  6. ‘And it often occurs to me, when thinking about friendship, to ask: is it weakness and want of means that make friendship desired?

  7. ‘Is its aim an exchange of services, so that each may give that in which he is strong, and receive that in which he is weak?

  8. ‘Or is it not rather true that, although mutual help is an advantage naturally belonging to friendship,

  9. ‘Yet its original cause is quite other, prior in time, more noble in character, and springing more directly from human nature itself?

  10. ‘The Latin word for friendship, “amicitia”, is derived from the word for love, “amor”, and affection is the prime mover in forming bonds.

  11. ‘For as to material advantages, it often happens that they are obtained by people merely pretending friendship, who treat others with respect only from self-interest.

  12. ‘But friendship by its nature admits of no feigning, no pretence: it is both genuine and spontaneous.

  13. ‘Therefore, Fannius, I say that friendship springs from a natural impulse rather than a wish for help:

  14. ‘From an inclination of the heart, combined with a feeling of affection, rather than from calculation of the material advantage.

  15. ‘The strength of this feeling you may notice in animals. They show such love to their offspring for a time, and are so beloved by them, that they clearly display the bond of affection.

  16. ‘But this is even more evident in the case of humanity: first, in the affection between children and parents, an affection which only shocking wickedness can sunder;

  17. ‘Next, when the passion of love has attained mutual strength, on our finding someone with whose character and nature we are in full sympathy,

  18. ‘Because we think that we perceive i
n him the beacon-light of what we cherish or admire, respect or like.

  19. ‘For nothing inspires love, nothing conciliates affection, like the answering chord of what we see is good.

  20. ‘Why, in a certain sense we may be said to feel affection even for people we have never seen, owing to their reputation for honesty and virtue.

  21. ‘If the attraction of probity is so great that we can love it not only in those we have never seen,

  22. ‘But even in an enemy we respect, we need not be surprised if affections are roused when they meet goodness in those with whom intimacy is possible.’

  Chapter 5

  1. ‘I do not deny that affection is strengthened by the receipt of benefits, Fannius, as well as by the perception of a wish to render service,

  2. ‘But when these are added to the original impulse of the heart, a great warmth of feeling springs up.

  3. ‘And if anyone thinks that this comes from a sense of weakness, based on a need for help or security,

  4. ‘All I can say is that he who thinks so gives friendship an origin very base, and an ignoble pedigree.

  5. ‘For if this were the case, a man’s inclination to friendship would be exactly proportional to his low opinion of his own resources. Whereas the truth is quite the other way.

  6. ‘For when a man’s confidence in himself is greatest, when he is so fortified by virtue and wisdom as to want nothing and to feel absolutely self-dependent,

  7. ‘It is then that he is most conspicuous for seeking out and keeping up friendships.

  8. ‘Did Scipio, for example, want anything of me? Not the least in the world! Neither did I of him.

  9. ‘In my case it was an admiration of his virtue, in his case it was perhaps the opinion he entertained of my character, that caused our affection.

  10. ‘Closer intimacy added to the warmth of our feelings. But though many great advantages ensued, they were not the source of our affection.

  11. ‘For as we are not beneficent and liberal with a view to receiving gratitude, and do not regard kindness as an investment, but follow a natural inclination to liberality;

  12. ‘So we looked on friendship as worth seeking, not for ulterior gain, but in the conviction that what it had to give was from first to last included in the feeling itself.

  13. ‘When once people have found a friend, their aim is to be on the same footing in regard to affection, and be more inclined to do a good service than to ask a return.’

  Chapter 6

  1. ‘Scipio and I frequently discussed friendship. He used to say that the most difficult thing in the world was for a friendship to remain unimpaired to the end of life:

  2. ‘So many things might intervene, as for example conflicting interests, differences of opinion in politics,

  3. ‘Frequent changes in character, whether owing to misfortunes or to advancing years.

  4. ‘He used to illustrate these facts from the analogy of childhood, since the warmest affections between children are often laid aside with their toys;

  5. ‘And even if they managed to keep friendships into adolescence, they were sometimes broken by a rivalry in courtship,

  6. ‘Or for some other advantage to which their mutual claims were incompatible.

  7. ‘Even if the friendship was prolonged beyond that time, yet it frequently received a shock should the two happen to be competitors for office.

  8. ‘For while the most fatal blow to friendship in the majority of cases was the lust of money,

  9. ‘In the case of the best people it was rivalry for office and reputation,

  10. ‘By which it had often happened that the most violent enmity had arisen between the closest friends.

  11. ‘Again, wide and justifiable breaches were caused by an immoral request made by one friend of another, to pander to someone’s desire to assist him in doing wrong.

  12. ‘A refusal, though perfectly right, is attacked by the asker as a violation of the laws of friendship.

  13. ‘Now the people who have no scruples about the requests they make to their friends, thereby allow that they are ready to have no scruples about what they will do for their friends;

  14. ‘And it is the recriminations of such people which commonly not only quench friendships, but give rise to lasting enmities.

  15. ‘“In fact,” Cato used to say, “these fatalities overhang friendship in such numbers that it requires not only wisdom but good luck to escape them all.”

  16. ‘With these premises, then, let us first, if you please Fannius, examine the question: how far ought personal feeling to go in friendship?

  17. ‘I think that the plea of having acted in the interests of a friend is not a valid excuse for a wrong action.

  18. ‘For, seeing that a belief in a person’s virtue is the original cause of friendship, friendship can hardly remain if virtue is abandoned.

  19. ‘But if we decide it is right to grant our friends whatever they wish, and to ask them for whatever we wish,

  20. ‘Perfect wisdom must be assumed on both sides if no mischief is to follow.

  21. ‘But we cannot assume this perfect wisdom; for we are speaking only of such friends as are ordinarily met with,

  22. ‘Whether we have actually seen them or have been told about them: people, that is to say, of everyday life.

  23. ‘We may then lay down this rule of friendship: neither ask nor consent to do what is wrong.

  24. ‘For the plea “for friendship’s sake” is a discreditable one, and not to be allowed.’

  Chapter 7

  1. ‘Let this, then, be laid down as the first law of friendship, that we should ask from friends, and do for friends, only what is good.

  2. ‘But do not let us wait to be asked either: let there always be an eager readiness, and an absence of hesitation.

  3. ‘Let us have the courage to give advice with candour. In friendship, let the influence of friends who give good advice be paramount.

  4. ‘I offer you these rules, Fannius, because I believe that remarkable opinions are held by some, who say we should avoid close friendships, for fear that one person should have to endure the anxieties of several.

  5. ‘Each person, they say, has enough and to spare on his own hands; it is too bad to be involved in the cares of other people.

  6. ‘The wisest course is to hold the reins of friendship as loose as possible; you can then tighten or slacken them at your will.

  7. ‘For the first condition of a happy life, they say, is freedom from care, which no one can enjoy if he has to worry for others as well as himself.

  8. ‘Another opinion is still less generous: that friendships should be sought solely for the sake of the profit they give, not from motives of feeling and affection;

  9. ‘And that therefore just in proportion as a man’s power and means of support are lowest, he is most eager to gain friendships.

  10. ‘What ignoble philosophy! For let us examine these two doctrines.

  11. ‘What is the value of this “freedom from care”? It might seem tempting at first sight, but in practice it has often to be put on one side.

  12. ‘For there is no business and no course of action demanded from us by our honour which we can consistently avoid from a mere wish to escape anxiety.

  13. ‘No, if we wish to avoid anxiety we must avoid virtue itself, which necessarily involves some anxious thoughts in abhorring qualities that are opposite to itself,

  14. ‘As for example kindness for ill-nature, self-control for licentiousness, courage for cowardice.

  15. ‘Thus you may notice that it is the just who are most pained by injustice,

  16. ‘The brave who are most pained by cowardly actions,

  17. ‘The temperate who are most pained by depravity.

  18. ‘It is then characteristic of a rightly ordered mind to be pleased at what is good and grieved at the reverse.’

  Chapter 8

  1. ‘Seeing then that the wise are not exempt from heartache, why
should we banish friendship from our lives, for fear of its involving us in some amount of distress?

  2. ‘If you take away emotion, what difference remains, I do not say between a man and a beast, but between a man and a stone or a log of wood?

  3. ‘So I say again, the clear indication of virtue, to which a mind of like character is naturally attracted, is the beginning of friendship.

  4. ‘When that is the case the rise of affection is a necessity.

  5. ‘For what can be more irrational than to take delight in objects incapable of response,

  6. ‘Such as office, fame, splendid buildings and personal decoration,

  7. ‘And yet to take little or no delight in a sentient being endowed with virtue, who has the faculty of loving and returning love?

  8. ‘For nothing gives more pleasure than a return of affection, and the mutual interchange of kind feeling and good offices.

  9. ‘And if we add, as we may fairly do, that nothing so powerfully attracts one thing to itself as likeness does to friendship,

  10. ‘It will at once be recognised that the good love the good, and attach them to themselves as though they were united by blood and nature.

  11. ‘For nothing can be more eager for what is like itself than nature.

  12. ‘So, my dear Fannius, we may look upon this as an established fact, that between good people there is, as if of necessity, a kindly feeling, which is the true source of friendship.

  13. ‘Again, the believers in the “interest” theory appear to me to destroy the most attractive link in the chain of friendship.

  14. ‘For it is not so much what one gets from a friendship that gives one pleasure, as the warmth of the friend’s feeling;

  15. ‘And we only care for a friend’s service if it has been prompted by affection.

  16. ‘And so far from its being true that lack of means is a motive for seeking friendship, it is usually those who possess sufficient means,

  17. ‘And above all who possess virtue (which is a man’s best support; so the virtuous are least in need of others), who are most open-handed and beneficent.

  18. ‘Indeed I am inclined to think that friends ought at times to be in want of something.