Rosewater (Movie Tie-in Edition)

by Maziar Bahari

  The regime has managed to remain in power through violence. The opposition knows that Khamenei and his cronies are willing to go to any length to stay in power, and they have asked people not to resort to violence. Yet the regime itself resorts to more violence every day. The number of executions has multiplied since the 2009 presidential election, and many people have been thrown in jail for writing an article or giving an interview. The people, so far, have shown incredible self-discipline, but they are becoming more disenchanted with Khamenei’s regime. The two big questions, for which no one yet has any answers, are: When are people going to reach a boiling point? And, once that happens, what will the people and the government do?

  No one can answer these questions. But many officials in Iran have realized that the situation has become unsustainable, so they’ve implicitly tried to distance themselves from Khamenei. Even Ahmadinejad, who became president only because of Khamenei’s support, is now trying ever so discreetly to dissociate himself from his master before it is too late. Since his reelection in 2009, Ahmadinejad and his gang, including some members of the Guards, have expanded their Mafia-like grip on power by replacing more moderate supporters of Khamenei with their own, while presenting themselves as an alternative to the clerical establishment.

  The next phase of infighting in Iran will be a clash between conservative supporters of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad’s hard-line, Mafia-like supporters. The main difference between the two groups is their revolutionary backgrounds. The conservatives are generally people who either fought themselves during the revolution or belong to families that rose to prominence in the government or the Guards. The hard-liners are low-ranking members of the Guards or junior officials from those years. The main point of contention between the two groups is less ideological and has simply to do with their desire to be in power, and in charge of spending the nation’s significant oil revenue. Many Iranians dismiss the differences by saying that “conservatives ruined the country for three decades and now it is the hard-liners’ turn to finish the job!” Both groups despise the reformists and have their own supporters within the Guards.

  The number of Guards supporting different factions is not clear, but the general understanding is that many Guards commanders look at Ahmadinejad’s policies and actions with suspicion, and in case of any possible future clash between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, they will support their master, Khamenei.

  Ahmadinejad and his people know this and have been very careful not to voice any explicit criticism of Khamenei. But they have been developing a long-term plan that involves undermining Khamenei and the clerical establishment by manipulating Iranians’ nationalist sentiments, which has traditionally been the best way to stay in power. They challenge the regime’s policy of emphasizing Iranians’ Shia identity by putting forward new theories about “Iranian Islam.” They glorify ancient Iranian traditions, claiming that Islam as a religion has benefited from Iranian culture. The hard-liners refer to conservatives as reactionaries, calling them out of touch with the modern world. If this new brand of nationalism were presented by a group of scholars, it would be worthy of an academic debate, but as presented by a group of thugs with little knowledge of the religion who have shown very little respect for the people of Iran, these revisionist theories can only be seen as a political ploy to remain in power.

  The infighting within his regime has put Khamenei in a difficult position. He has chastised individual members of Ahmadinejad’s cabal, while continuing to tolerate them and support Ahmadinejad’s presidency, if only to take every opportunity to maintain an image of a unity among his people. Khamenei should look at his supporters’ infighting with worry. Before the fall, every dictator’s supporters bicker with one another first, then eventually turn against their master.

  In order to prolong his reign, Khamenei is bestowing more power to the Guards and transforming the Islamic Republic into a military dictatorship. Recently, retired Revolutionary Guards have been filling many official posts and entering the parliament, and they are taking over Iranian industry as much as they can. Almost every day we hear that the Guards have won a lucrative contract to build a road, pipeline, or refinery by pushing aside the competition. Many Iranian businessmen and industrialists have told me that sometimes even if the Guards are not in charge of a project, they still demand a commission to let the construction go ahead.

  Iranians are becoming more suppressed and poorer at the same time. Facing an ideological and industrial military monster, many young Iranians have come to believe that violence is the only language the regime can understand.

  But using violence to defy the regime will not result in progress. This military Islamic regime is prepared to defend itself by force, and even if a group can manage to topple it through violent means, that future government will just be another tyranny in the history of tyrannies in Iran. I often remind young Iranians of the betrayed ideals of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and tell them that nothing good can be achieved through violence. Nothing.

  Alongside the horrifying specter of mayhem inside the country, there is also the danger of a military confrontation between Iran and the United States or Iran and Israel, prompted by Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Khamenei has repeatedly declared that Iran doesn’t want to build a nuclear bomb, and he has even asserted that doing so would be against Islamic principles. But he lies. Khamenei may not want to develop a nuclear weapon, but he does want to be one turn of a screw away from a bomb. He needs nuclear capability to threaten the West and the countries in the region and prevent them from helping the opposition inside the country. To Khamenei, giving up the nuclear program equals surrendering to the will of foreigners, and to a tyrant nothing is more important than his power.

  Khamenei knows that he can always rely on the mistakes of his enemies, especially the United States, to expand his power. The American misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq led to the toppling of two of Iran’s biggest regional enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Their demise has helped make Iran a regional superpower. Through proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, Iran can always challenge the United States and Israel outside of its borders. As Rosewater said, Hamas, in Gaza, and Hezbollah, in Lebanon, are in a sense two branches of the Revolutionary Guards.

  Yet Khamenei’s plans, devised in the isolation of his house under the protection of thousands of guardsmen, can backfire, with disastrous consequences for both Iran and his regime. Israel will never tolerate a nuclear Iran. Ahmadinejad denies the Jewish Holocaust and promises to wipe the Jewish state off the map. Furthermore, Israel feels an existential threat from any country in the region, friend or foe, that has a stronger military capability than it does. Israel objected to Iran’s nuclear program even when the shah—a friend to Israel—was in power in the 1970s. The Israelis, hitherto, have been patient and have backed negotiations and sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear program, but they may soon change their tactics.

  Of course, Israel will not take action without the blessing of its major ally, the United States, which has so much to lose if Iran becomes a nuclear state. There are thousands of American troops stationed in the region, and many American allies feel threatened by Iran’s rogue behavior. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain buy arms and other products and services from the United States and, in turn, provide it with crude oil and/or military bases. The unpopular authoritarian regimes in these countries are rattled by Ahmadinejad’s and Khamenei’s extremist rhetoric, and the prospect of a nuclear Iran instills fear in them. As secret U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks revealed, many American allies in the Middle East have repeatedly asked the United States to attack Iran in order to stop its nuclear program. The American government has so far adopted a diplomatic approach to handling Iran. But the situation is untenable. These countries are important allies in America’s war against terrorism, and protecting them from Iran is integral to the United States as a military and economic superpower.

  So far, the United S
tates has been trying to stop Iran’s nuclear program through financial and economic sanctions. But Iranians have lived with sanctions since the beginning of the revolution, and shrewd Iranian officials know quite well how to use legal and financial loopholes in the international system to their own advantage. Opening front companies and bank accounts and laundering money to acquire arms—in other words, employing the same methods used by international criminal cartels—has become second nature to them. Iran has also managed to divide the international community by making strategic alliances with America’s main rivals, Russia and China, as well as such emerging powers as Turkey and Brazil. But even those countries’ patience has a limit, and they too are becoming increasingly frustrated with Iran’s intransigence. They also understand that eventually they will have to choose between supporting Iran and doing business with the United States. It is not a difficult choice, and more countries have started to support American policies against Iran.

  The idea of an American or Israeli attack against Iran is, at the moment, a nightmare, but it could quickly turn into reality, with disastrous results for both Iran and the rest of the world. I can understand other countries’ frustration with the lack of development in nuclear negotiations with Iran. After all, many Iranian diplomats and officials are erratic thugs like Rosewater (incidentally, some Iranian diplomats are former interrogators and torturers). I also know that many American politicians seek reelection by displays of saber rattling with Iran. But a military attack against Iran will militarize the regime further, and will encourage even nationalist pro-Western Iranians to side with the government against a foreign enemy.

  My nightmare scenario of a violent crushing of all remnants of the democratic movement in Iran and a foreign military attack would also mean jeopardizing Western interests in the region for the foreseeable future.

  On my more optimistic days, I think of a positive scenario: one in which Iran can change peacefully with the help of the rest of the world. As the democratic changes in the rest of the Middle East have shown, pro-Western tyranny and Islamic fundamentalism are not the only choices for Iranians. The West, especially the United States, should respect Iran’s independence and the nationalist sentiments of Iranians. A democratic, independent government in Iran that respects the people’s religious and cultural traditions will most likely have serious disagreements with the West, but those issues can be negotiated in a civilized manner without recourse to violence by either side.

  Change toward a more democratic Iran cannot, and should not, happen overnight. I am proud of the maturity and the restraint shown by a generation of educated young Iranians who refuse to become the mirror image of the brutes who rule them. The current despotic system is based on ignorance and backwardness, and given enough time and support by the international community, young Iranians can move their country toward democracy. I am not sure how long it will take, but I often remind myself that it took the Soviet Union more than seventy years to collapse.

  My optimism is not a foolish hopefulness. It is based on facts. The Islamic regime has two main weak spots: information and the economy. The West can help Iranians by manipulating these weaknesses over a period of time to bring about a peaceful change in the country. With Iran’s history of tyranny and monarchy, many people are used to being the subjects of a despot; democracy is a foreign concept to them. But the number of extremist religious Iranians who want a monarch to rule them is rapidly shrinking. More young Iranians are becoming better educated every year, with greater access to the outside world through satellite TV and the Internet. These enlightened Iranians are the West’s most important allies in the region. The international community should continue targeted sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and Iranian human-rights violators while lifting some of the current sanctions that hurt ordinary Iranians, such as sanctions on medical facilities and airplane spare parts. Through investing in satellite television channels and the Internet, the West can help these young Iranians learn even more about the outside world and question the legitimacy of their government.

  I am often asked if the green movement is dead. My answer is no. People may not be able to demonstrate their anger at the government, but the movement is getting stronger every day. The protests I witnessed in the streets of Tehran in June 2009 were part of a civil rights movement, through which people peacefully demanded their rights as citizens of the country. Those who expected the green movement to topple Khamenei’s government and bring a Western-style democracy to power were wrong.

  The green movement is a collective cry among Iranians for a normal life. In fact, for the first time in the history of Iran, this political movement is based on a fundamental respect for life, rather than an ideological notion that people must sacrifice themselves for a cause. My parents’ and even Maryam’s generation believed that there was nothing more sacred than martyrdom, but the new generation of young Iranians do not believe that any idea or cause is worth dying for; they want to remain alive and celebrate life.

  · · ·

  Soon after my release, many of my friends and more than a few strangers with connections inside the government started to contact me to tell me the details that had eventually led to my arrest and the arrest of hundreds of other people. Fearing the government’s reprisal, they contacted me by email and Skype using pseudonyms, or called me from temporary cell phone numbers so that their identities could not be tracked. In some cases, they risked losing their jobs or being incarcerated to tell me what they knew; they did it, they said, because they felt that what happened to me was wrong.

  According to these accounts, the Revolutionary Guards came up with a plan to incriminate the reformists a year before the election, and received Khamenei’s blessing to carry it out. The Guards’ plan was to crack down on the reformists by connecting them with Western powers. The Guards knew that many Iranians resented Western interference in Iran and the Middle East region, and they shrewdly wanted to take advantage of it.

  By getting rid of reformists through a smear campaign, the Guards hoped to guarantee the survival of Khamenei’s regime for the foreseeable future. “In fact, many of the Guards did not think they were concocting a plot,” a government insider told me. “They genuinely believed that the reformists received money and guidance from the West, and that under sufficient pressure they would spill the beans.”

  This information, which was told to me off the record, was later corroborated by certain courageous, anonymous Iranian journalists and regime insiders, who exposed the Guards’ secret plan on the Internet.

  According to the Guards’ scenario, three people would act as interlocutors with the West: Hossein Rassam, a political analyst with the British embassy, was supposed to be the diplomatic contact with the West; Kian Tajbakhsh, the Open Society Institute’s representative in Iran, was given the role of nongovernmental go-between; and I was the connection between the evil Western media and the reformists.

  The half-baked script didn’t work, because there was no such connection between the reformists and the West, and most Iranians simply did not believe the regime’s propaganda. Within a few months of our arrests, therefore, the Guards gave up the plan and had to release all three of us. Rassam and Tajbakhsh are still prohibited from leaving Iran. “You were lucky your wife was pregnant,” a friend told me. The Guards were worried that Paola could die because of the stress of my incarceration. “The last thing the Guards wanted was to have a dead British mother or baby on their hands. That’s why they let you leave the country.”

  Since my release I have been trying to find out why I was let go, beyond the government worrying about Paola’s situation. According to a story corroborated by multiple sources, the Islamic government finally decided to release me after Ahmadinejad’s visit to the United Nations in September 2009. During that trip, Ahmadinejad and the Iranian foreign minister at the time, Manouchehr Mottaki, were bombarded with questions about me. Newsweek made sure that journalists asked about me in their interviews with Ahm
adinejad, as did diplomats from all around the world and in every level of government. After Ahmadinejad returned to Iran, my name and questions regarding my fate were mentioned in his reports to Khamenei.

  Khamenei had heard my name several times before and had asked his office to look into my case; he wanted to know if there was any advantage in holding me. By September, the Guards had realized that I was not going to be much help to the regime and would never name names. The answer to Khamenei’s office was that I was an espionage suspect, but that my case would be coming to a close very soon. That answer was not good enough for Khamenei’s people.

  A few days later, Iranian diplomats asked Guards personnel to make a decision about me as soon as they could. “We’re hearing Bahari’s name everywhere,” one envoy said. “This Bahari has become more of a liability than an asset. Isn’t it about time to let him go?”

  At the time, Khamenei had put Hossein Taeb, the commander of the Basij during the postelection crackdown, in charge of the Guards’ intelligence unit, the unit that had arrested me. Once the Guards’ plan to incriminate the reformists through me had failed, Rosewater and his team could not convince Taeb that there was any point in keeping me.

  Rosewater and the Boss had to let me go, but they had to find a graceful way to do so. As I’d suspected at the time, my commitment to spy for them upon release was a face-saving measure. That way, Rosewater’s team could claim that they had transformed me during my time in Evin and that my reporting on the opposition was going to benefit the regime.

  According to several sources, Rosewater argued against my release until an hour before I was let go. He allegedly tried to convince his superiors that if they allowed him to exert more pressure on me, I would sing like a canary and admit that I was a spy. “I’m not sure what you did to him,” a government source told me, “but he really wanted to hold on to you.” I’m not sure either, and I’m glad that I never found out. But I imagine one of his reasons was to learn more about New Jersey or Thailand!