Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World

by Samantha Power

  38 Rose, Fighting for Peace, p. 62.

  39 A key turning point came on February 17 when, on British urging, Russia presented the Serbs with an option for retreating without losing face: The Serbs would withdraw as NATO had demanded, but four hundred Russian troops stationed in Croatia would take their place around Sarajevo. On February 20, with Karadžić among them, Serb crowds flooded the streets to shake hands with their arriving Slavic Russian “brothers,” who gave the three-fingered Serb salute. Rose later admitted that “our common determination not to allow air strikes placed me in some kind of unholy alliance with the Russians against NATO.” Ibid., p. 88.

  40 Ibid., p. 89.

  41 Trevor Huggins, “Weather Could Prevent Full Control of Some Weapons,” Agence France-Presse, February 20, 1994.

  42 Nightline, ABC News, February 21, 1994.

  43 Akashi to Secretary-General, “Situation in Sarajevo,” February 20, 1994, no. CCZ 263.

  44 “Tenuous Peace Reigns in Sarajevo after Deadline Passage,” CNN News, February 20, 1994.

  45 SVDM to Akashi, “Meetings with President Izetbegović, Ministers Ljubijankic and Muratović,” February 21, 1994.

  46 Alija Izetbegović, Summary of Statement for Bosnia and Herzégovina Television, February 21, 1994.

  47 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York : Penguin Books, 1997), p. 318.

  48 In the immediate aftermath of the NATO ultimatum, Washington brokered a landmark deal between Bosnian and Croat forces, bringing an end to some of the most vicious fighting and ethnic cleansing of the war. And on February 28, when four Serb Galeb jets bombed a Bosnian factory, violating a UN no-fly zone, two U.S. F-16s acting for NATO shot them down. Peace enforcement, rather than merely peacekeeping, appeared to be the wave of the future.

  49 David B. Ottaway, "Sarajevo Exit Route to Open; Muslims, Serbs Sign Access Pact,” Washington Post, March 18, 1994, p. A1.

  50 SVDM, interview by De Frente Com Gabi, 2002.

  51 All told, on the first day, forty-one people crossed the bridge, nine people traveled by bus into central Bosnia, fifteen Bosnians crossed the airport, and ninety Serbs ventured between their two suburbs. Chuck Sudetic, “Siege of Sarajevo Lifts Briefly as 83 Leave the City,” New York Times, March 24, 1994, p. A5.

  52 David B. Ottaway, “Routes out of Sarajevo Are Opened; A Few Risk Dangers to Reunite with Kin,” Washington Post, March 24, 1994, p. A21.

  53 Emma Daly, "’I Think the Dark Days Are Almost Over,’” Independent, March 23, 1994, p. 1.

  CHAPTER 8. "SERBIO” 1 UN Joint Commission Officers Reporting, on Gorazde Pocket, April 6-7, 1994.

  2 Chuck Sudetic, “Serbs Propose Bosnia Cease-Fire as They Pound Enclave,” New York Times, April 7, 1994, p. A3.

  3 Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia (New York: Warner Books, 1998), p. 156.

  4 Vladislav Guerassev to SVDM, “Reactions to Gorazde Events: View from Belgrade,” Most Immediate Code Cable, April 11, 1994.

  5 Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: Penguin, 1999), p. 233.

  6 Jonathan Randal, “Bosnian Serbs Seize, Harass UN Troops,” Washington Post, April 15, 1994, p. A1.

  7 Michael R. Gordon, “Conflict in the Balkans: The Bluff That Failed; Serbs Around Gorazde Are Undeterred by NATO’s Policy of Limited Air Strikes,” New York Times, April 19, 1994.

  8 Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Is Telling Serbs That NATO and UN Are Neutral,” New York Times, April 15, 1994, p. A8.

  9 Roger Cohen, “Conflict in the Balkans: United Nations; U.N.’s Bosnia Dilemma: Press Serbs or Pull Out?” New York Times, April 17, 1994, p. A12; Viktor Andreev to SVDM (drafted by Harland), “Weekly BH Political Assessment (#62),” Restricted Cable, April 16, 1994.

  10 Christopher Bellamy,“Rose Fears ‘Tragedy’ as Serbs Take Gorazde,” Independent, April 19, 1994, p. 9.

  11 Ruth Marcus, “NATO Powers Consider Expanding Bosnia Role,” Washington Post, April 19, 1994, p. A1.

  12 Muhamed Sacirbey, Security Council Open Debate, April 21, 1994.

  13 UN official (anonymous), handwritten notes on the meeting, May 18, 1994.

  14 Guerassev to SVDM, “Aftermath of Gorazde: View from Belgrade,” Most Immediate Code Cable, April 18, 1994.

  15 Chuck Sudetic,“Serbian Soldiers Seize Guns Held by UN, Then Return Most,” New York Times, April 20, 1994, p. A13.

  16 Laura Silber and Bruce Clark, “City Where the Dead Are Lucky: UN Aid Group Describes the ‘Living Hell’ of Gorazde,” Financial Times, April 23, 1994, p. 2; Peter Jennings (reporter) and David Gelber (producer), No Peace to Keep, ABC News, 1995.

  17 Jonathan Randal, “Serb Forces Rain Fire on Gorazde,” Washington Post, April 19, 1994, p. A10.

  18 Srecko Latal, "U.N. Says Little Left to Do, ’Catastrophe’ Awaits Gorazde,” Associated Press Worldstream, April 18, 1994.

  19 Michael Specter,“Yeltsin Warns Bosnian Serbs to Stop Assault on Gorazde,” New York Times, April 20, 1994, p. A12.

  20 Michael Specter, “Moscow Withdraws Its Objections to NATO Strikes Near Gorazde,” New York Times, April 24, 1994, p. A13.

  21 Rick Atkinson, “NATO Has Plan for Massive Air Strikes Against Bosnian Serb Forces,” Washington Post, April 25, 1994, p. A14.

  22 Shitakha to Akashi, “Meeting in Belgrade with Bosnian Serb Civil and Military Authorities, 22 April 94,” April 23, 1994, no. Z630.

  23 Rose, Fighting for Peace, p. 176.

  24 Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 234.

  25 UN Military Observer, Gorazde to UNMO HQ, Situation Report, April 23, 1994.

  26 Ian Traynor, “The Inscrutable Face of a Man Who Said No to NATO,” Guardian, April 25, 1994, p. 9.

  27 Rose, Fighting for Peace, p. 179.

  28 Roger Cohen, "U.N. and Bosnians at Odds on Serb Pullout,” New York Times, April 28, 1994, p. A10.

  29 Jonathan Randal, “Bosnian Serbs Meet Weapons Deadline,” Washington Post, April 27, 1994, p. A25.

  30 Milan Jelovac, “Hrvatska ne može biti cipar” (Croatia Cannot Be Like Cyprus),” Danas, June 21, 1994, pp. 7-9.

  31 Akashi to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, April 27, 1994, no. Z646.

  32 Roger Cohen, “Man in the Middle Calls on Confucius,” New York Times, April 26, 1994, p. A6.

  33 Paul Lewis, “Serbs Complying with NATO Demand on Arms Pullouts; U.N. Mediator Rebuked,” New York Times, April 27, 1994, p. A6. Albright said: “The position of my government on the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia is well known. We believe that this position is correct and consistent with our national interest. If Mr. Akashi believed that we should become involved on the ground, he should have made that view known to U.S. officials. He should not, however, have publicly insulted my president.”

  34 Jonathan Randal, "U.N., in Double Reverse, Again Blocks Serb Tanks; Muslims Call Akashi Partner in Aggression,” Washington Post, May 7, 1994, p. A12.

  35 Robert Dole, “Lift Bosnia Arms Embargo,” press release, May 10, 1994.

  36 Akashi to Annan,“HCA’s Meetings with PM Silajdžić and Dr. Karadžić on 7 May in Vienna and Pale Respectively, and with President Izetbegović on 8 May in Sarajevo,” Immediate Code Cable, May 8, 1994.

  37 Akashi to Karadžić, May 10, 1994.

  38 Dr. Jovan Zametica to Akashi, May 10, 1994.

  39 John Pomfret, “Serbs Move Guns from Gorazde—Possibly for a New Offensive,” Washington Post, April 28, 1994, p. A20.

  40 UN official (anonymous), handwritten notes, May 10, 1994.

  41 "U.S. Troops in UN Peacekeeping,” New York Times, April 25, 1994, p. A14.

  42 Roger Cohen, "U.N. and Bosnians at Odds on Serb Pullout,” New York Times, April 28, 1994, p. A10.

  43 Chris Stephen, “A Sheriff Being Driven Out of Town,” Guardian, April 30, 1994, p. 24.

  44 Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 908, United Nations Security Council, September 17, 1994.

  45
“UN Official Predicts Progress on Sarajevo Demilitarization,” Agence France-Presse, September 8, 1994.

  46 Ibid.

  47 Akashi to Annan, “Bosnia and Herzegovina—HCA Meetings with Authorities in Pale and Sarajevo,” September 26, 1994, no. Z-1473.

  48 Milan Jelovac, "O planu za hrvatsku znam koliko i Globus” (I Know as Much as Globus About a Plan for Croatia), Danas, November 1, 1994, pp. 8, 9, 11.

  CHAPTER 9. IN RETROSPECT 1 Sadako Ogata to Kofi Annan, August 23, 1994. 1 Sadako Ogata to Kofi Annan, August 23, 1994.

  2 Claire Messina and Oleg Shamshur,“Conference Reports: Regional Conference to Address the Problems of Refugees, Displaced Persons, Other Forms of Involuntary Displacement, and Returnees in the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Relevant Neighboring Countries,” International Migration Review 31, no. 2 (1997), p. 464. Holly Cartner of Human Rights Watch said the draft program of action had “no teeth, no mechanisms for accountability,” and she described the meeting as “a serious abdication of responsibility and the squandering of a valuable opportunity.” See “Human Rights Group Faults U.N. Conference on CIS Refugees,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, May 30, 1996.

  3 Paolo Lembo, “Lest We Forget: The UN in Iraq—Sergio Vieira de Mello (1948- 2003)” Azerbaijan International 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).

  4 SVDM, “Humanitarian Aspects of Peacekeeping,” in Daniel Warner, ed., New Dimensionsof Peacekeeping (New York: Springer, 1995), p. 142.

  5 SVDM, “The Evolution of UN Humanitarian Operations,” in Stuarte Gordon, ed., Aspects of Peacekeeping (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 124.

  6 David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Touchstone 1996), p. 203.

  7 SVDM, interview with Philip Gourevitch, November 22, 2002.

  8 Adrian Brown, “Serbs Expel 3,000 Civilians from Fallen Srebrenica,”Agence France-Presse, July 12, 1995.

  9 Report of the UN Panel on Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), August 21, 2000, p. ix. The report continues: “In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so ... Impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement” (part II, E, 50).

  10 Tom Squitieri, “History’s Longest Airlift Ends with Food Delivery to Sarajevo,” USA Today, January 10, 1996, p. A4.

  11 The Berlin airlift ran from June 26, 1948, through September 30, 1949. Its 277,000 flights delivered 2.3 million tons of cargo, and sixty-five pilots were killed.

  12 UNHCR also delivered some 950,000 tons of food via land convoys, which reached some 2.7 million beneficiaries. Sadako Ogata, The Turbulent Decade (New York: Norton, 2005), p. 330.

  CHAPTER 10. DAMNED IF YOU DO 1 The Goma area was home to six impromptu “camps” containing 850,000 refugees; the Bukavu area contained twenty-eight camps with 290,000 refugees; and the Uvira area housed twenty-five camps with 250,000 refugees.

  2 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 8-10.

  3 Keith B. Richburg, "U.N. Report Urges Foreign Forces to Protect Rwandans,” WashingtonPost, November 18, 1994, p. A1. The refugee leaders urged patience, pointing to their RPF (mainly Tutsi) foes who had been in exile for thirty years but had eventually reclaimed power in Rwanda by force of arms.

  4 The Goma camps were about 1 mile from the border; Kibumba was 1.5 miles away; Bukavu was along the border; Mugunga was about 16 miles away; Camp Benaco in Tanzania was around 6 miles away.

  5 Vieira de Mello was in fact interested in Mozambique and Sudan, the two countries where he had worked as a young UNHCR field officer.

  6 Some 5,800 UN peacekeepers were present in Rwanda, but the Security Council expressly prohibited the blue helmets from helping out in Zaire. UN rules prohibited them from crossing an international border. Kofi Annan, the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, suggested hiring a private security firm called DSL, but Ogata did not think she could persuade the United States, Japan, or other rich countries to pay the fee of $250 million for two years. Sadako Ogata, The Turbulent Decade (New York: Norton, 2005), pp. 203-4.

  7 John Pomfret, “Aid Dilemma: Keeping It from the Oppressors; U.N., Charities Find Crises Make Them Tools of War,” Washington Post, September 23, 1997, p. A1.

  8 SVDM to Ogata, “My Mission to Eastern Zaire: 29 to 31 July 1996,” August 6, 1996, no. AHC/96/0231.

  9 Sadako Ogata,“End of Year Statement to Staff,” December 14, 1994, online at www. .

  10 Ray Wilkinson, “The Heart of Darkness,” Refugees 110 (December 1, 1997), p. 9.

  11 Back in December 1935, the League of Nations high commissioner for German refugees, James G. McDonald, resigned to protest international inaction to aid the flight of Jewish refugees. McDonald, who had been appointed in 1933, stepped down after Hitler’s Germany passed the Nuremberg Laws. Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 42-44.

  12 Reuters, “Zairean Security Force Enters Rwandan Refugee Camps,”Agence France-Presse, February 12, 1995; "Zairians Begin a U.N. Mission for Rwandans,” New York Times, February 13, 1995, p. A6.

  13 CZSC, the acronym for the Zairean force, comes from the French Contingent Zairois pour la Sécurité des Camps.

  14 Reuters, “Zairians Begin a U.N. Mission for Rwandans.”

  15 "U.N. Official Praises Refugee Action Plan,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, February 19, 1995.

  16 One U.S. government source estimated that in a single camp the Hutu authorities’ appropriation and resale of humanitarian aid generated an additional $6 million a year for arms purchases. Pomfret, “Aid Dilemma.” A month before Vieira de Mello’s arrival, UNHCR had attempted to register the inhabitants of the camps, but the Hutu militants had spread the rumor that the ink used for registration would cause sterility or death. The propaganda worked: at least 700,000 refugees boycotted the registration, which then made it easy for camp leaders to continue to inflate the numbers so as to divert excess rations to their gunmen. See “UN Locates Missing Hutus,” Financial Times, November 22, 1996, p. 4.

  17 Joel Boutroue, Missed Opportunities: The Role of the International Community in the Returnof the Rwandan Refugees from Eastern Zaire, July 1994-December 1996 (Cambridge, MA: MIT, June 1998), p. 70.

  18 SVDM to Ogata, “My Mission to Eastern Zaire: 29 to 31 July 1996.”

  19 Kurt Mills, “Refugee Return from Zaire to Rwanda: The Role of UNHCR,” in Howard Adelman and Govind C. Rao, eds., War and Peace in Zaire-Congo: Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention, 1996-1997 (Africa World Press, 2004).

  20 Boutroue, Missed Opportunities, p. 75.

  21 UNHCR, Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region, April 1997, no. EVAL/01/97, pp. 12-13, 25.

  22 Buchizya Mseteka, “Rwanda Says It Seeks Orderly Return of Refugees,” Reuters, August 23, 1996.

  23 Xinhua News Agency, "62 Dead in Sweep Against Rwandan Rebels,” July 14, 1996.

  24 SVDM to Ogata, “My Mission to Eastern Zaire: 29 to 31 July 1996.”

  25 Elif Kaban, “Rwanda Strongman Blasts Zaire,Wants Refugees Home,” Reuters, April 6, 1996.

  26 Mahmoud Mamdani, “Why Rwanda Admitted to Its Role in Zaire,” Weekly Mail and Guardian (South Africa), August 8, 1997.

  27 SVDM to Ogata, “My Mission to Eastern Zaire: 29 to 31 July 1996.”

  28 Chris McGreal, “Rwanda Warns of Looming War; Kigali’s Forces Cross into Zaire in Retaliation for Border Shelling,” Guardian, October 31, 1996. Kagame defended Rwanda’s raid across the border and said there was “no question” that his army would press on. “If you slap me in the face,” he said, “when I hit back I may not hit in the face. I may hit somewhere else.”

  29 “Another Congo Crisis,” Africa Confidential 39, no. 16 (August 7, 1998).

&n
bsp; 30 Stephen Buckley, “Rwandans Strike Town Inside Zaire; Officer Tells of Raid ‘To Destabilize Them,’ ” Washington Post, October 31, 1996, p. A26.

  31 Amnesty International, "Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Zaire,” December 19, 1996.

  32 “Une Situation humanitaire désespérées s’installe dans l’est du Zaire” (Eastern Zaire Faces Desperate Humanitarian Situation), Le Monde, October 30, 1996.

  33 From 1978 to 1981 Chrétien had served as Canada’s ambassador to the Great Lakes countries, jointly accredited to Zaire, Rwanda, and the Congo Republic.

  34 Jimmy Burns and Frances Williams, “Refugees’ Agency Lost in Wilderness of Bungling and Waste,” Financial Times, July 29, 1998, p. 7.

  35 SVDM to Benon Sevan, November 12, 1996, no. AHC/GL/006.

  36 Tony Smith, “Rwandan Hutu Refugees Dare to Go Home; World Cannot Decide How to Help,” Associated Press, November 9, 1996.

  37 Jim Wolf, "Africa-Bound U.S.Troops Will Not Disarm Factions,” Reuters, November 14, 1996.

  38 Jessen-Petersen to Ogata, “Situation in Eastern Zaire,” November 14, 1996.

  39 Luis Arreaga to A. Mahiga, “Redefining the Role of a Multinational Force,” November 21, 1996.

  40 SVDM to Akashi, Ogata, and Chrétien, “Situation in Burundi—Visit to Bujumbura, 6-7 December 1996,” December 9, 1996. Vieira de Mello met with Colonel Firmin Siuzoyiheba, who was expelling Burundians, who were pouring into Tanzania.

  41 George Gordon-Lennox and Annick Stevenson, Sergio Vieira de Mello: An Exceptional Man (Geneva: Editions du Tricorne, 2004), p. 85.

  42 SVDM to Akashi, Ogata, and Chrétien, “Meeting with General M. Baril—Entebbe, 27 November 1996,” November 27, 1996.

  43 In the two years since the genocide, very little repatriation had occurred. Only 6,427 Hutu refugees returned to Rwanda from Tanzania in 1995, and half that number went home in 1996. UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 265.