Tom Barry

by Meda Ryan

Cadet C. D. W. Bayley, late Royal Air Force.

  Temporary Constable A. F. Poole, late West Kent Regiment.

  Wounded

  Cadet H. F. Forde, MC, late Royal Air Force.

  Missing

  Cadet C. J. Guthrie, late Royal Air Force.

  Proclamation by General Neville Macready,

  Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in Ireland, December 10, 1920

  Extracts:

  NOTE WELL:

  That a state of armed insurrection exists. The forces of the crown in Ireland are hereby declared on active service.

  Any unauthorised person found in possession of arms, ammunition or explosives will be liable on conviction by a Military Court to suffer Death.

  Harbouring any person who has taken part ... is guilty of levying war against His Majesty the King, and is liable on conviction by a Military Court to suffer Death.

  No person may stand or loiter in the streets except in pursuit of his lawful occupation.

  All meetings of assemblies in public places are forbidden and for the purpose of this Order six adults will be considered a meeting.

  All occupiers of houses must keep affixed to the inner side of the outer door a list of the occupants setting forth their names, sex, age and occupation.

  The Decree of his Lordship, Most Reverend Dr Daniel Coholan, Bishop of Cork.

  Published in a letter to the Cork Examiner:

  Dear Sir – Kindly give me space to publish and thus promulgate the following decree:

  DECREE OF BISHOP OF CORK IN REFERENCE TO AMBUSHES, KIDNAPPING AND MURDER

  Beside the guilt involved in these acts by reason of their opposition to the law of God, anyone who shall within these spaces of Cork, organise or take part in an ambush or kidnapping or otherwise be guilty of murder or attempted murder shall incur by the very fact the censure of excommunication.

  (Signed)

  Daniel Coholan, Bishop of Cork.

  (Witness)

  Patrick Canon Sexton, Farranferris, Cork.

  18 December 1920

  British mistakes at Crossbarry

  No action has ever been won in any war except for mistakes or omissions by the losing side – General Tom Barry.

  1. The OC of the Essex made the stupid error of having his lorries travel in advance of his ground forces, thus allowing three or four lorries to be attacked by the IRA. Had his ground forces met O’Connell’s flankers before the lorries were attacked, a very serious situation would have arisen; several hundred British could have been deployed on our right flank to attack while the Kinsale, Cork and Ballincollig troops, close by, were closing in from the south, east and north-east.

  2. Whoever was in charge of the Essex cannot have made any attempt to rally or control his troops. I, and many others, saw them race away from at least seven or eight lorries beyond those attacked and outside our range of fire, and make off cross-country to the south. The Essex were no problem after the first five minutes; perhaps, too, they had memories of a few hammerings and of our contempt for them as fighters.

  3. The efforts of the British from the south, east and north-east appeared to have been completely unco-ordinated. Their north-eastern units, estimated at 200, made an attempt to narrowly encircle Kelleher and Spud, which was quickly countered. Instead of this, any OC worthy of the rank would have sent half his troops northward, direct from their positions, for a quarter of a mile, with instructions to turn west there, and extend westward to cut off any escape to the north.

  4. All the British seemed to have been mesmerised by the IRA going over to the offensive, thus destroying the plans they had for a complete encirclement of the Brigade Flying Column and its destruction when one of our lines was smashed.

  Mistakes of the Flying Column at Crossbarry

  1. The man who exposed our presence lost us at least three more lorries.

  2. Our hardest-hit section commanded by Denis Lordan was in a bad position. The cover was bad, but when I first saw it at daybreak, it was too late to seek another to command the road from Crossbarry Cross, as the British from the west were already on us.

  Our Advantages

  1. The far superior qualities of our troops as fighting men and the excellence of the officers and their section commanders who could out-think and out-fight any of the enemy commanders. I did not see one man over-excited during the day.

  2. Our sections were properly deployed to counter encirclement, as events proved.

  3. Our luck in getting in the first half dozen blows.

  4. When the IRA commenced its retirement in column of sections in extended order, they moved as if on a parade ground.

  The following order reproduced by courtesy of the Cork Public Museum, is typical of the written communications which were circulated by headquarters of Cork No. 3 Brigade to its battalions:

  ÓGLAIGH NA hÉIREANN

  HEADQUARTERS

  CORK NO. 3 BRIGADE

  15/6/21

  Dept. of Intelligence

  Divisional Intelligence Memo No. 2.

  To:

  OC …………..

  Cases have occurred recently of spies, generally of the ex-soldier type, moving freely round the country on the pretence of looking for work but in reality getting information for the enemy. It is clear that many Volunteers have lost their lives as the result of the activities of these persons.

  All officers must take steps to ensure that a strict watch is kept for strangers in every Company area, that unknown persons coming into any district will be arrested and detained pending inquiries if the local officer is not satisfied as to their identity and business, and all Volunteers must be constantly on the alert regarding strangers and report the presence of such to their superior officers.

  APPENDIX III: Meeting to end Civil War, March 1923

  The meeting to end the Civil War continued through 24, 25, and 26 March. Being interrupted by hostile raiding forces on 25 March the members were obliged to move into the Nire Valley, where the session was continued and concluded at John Wall’s of Glenanore. No minutes of these meetings are available. The written record came from captured documents published in the Irish Independent of 9 April, 1923.

  Three points of view emerged in the long conferences:

  1. Liam Lynch’s view, which was simply to fight on, notwithstanding any losses or disasters, until their opponents were forced to negotiate. He believed they were still quite capable of offering serious resistance to the imposition of the Treaty and that they were in duty bound to do so. There was little unqualified support for that view.

  2. The point of view which believed that a continuation of the armed struggle was no longer the best means of advancing the cause of the Republic, and that by negotiation the Free State authorities could be got to agree to certain principles in the sphere of government which would leave the Irish people uncommitted to the Treaty and Republicans free to advocate and advance their cause without restriction. Specifically, this meant finding some way of making it possible for Republicans to participate in the political and parliamentary life of the nation without taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign monarch.

  3. The point of view which recognised that the Free State authorities were not willing to negotiate at all, that the maximum military effort had been made and had failed, and that the war should be ended, because further sacrifices of life would not advance the cause of the Republic. From this point of view a dumping of arms was the most acceptable way of ending armed resistance.

  Three significant aspects of the situation were considered in relation to these points of view. First, the heavy losses by death or capture of officers and men; second, the policy of executions which had been suspended by the Free State authorities in February, but resumed again in March; and third, the lack of weapons which would enable attacks on posts to be made successfully.

  The total strength of the army was then about 8,000 all ranks. Jails and internment camps held an estimated 13,000 prisoners. Against the 8,000 still
in the field the Free State government could muster 38,000 combat troops. There was no effective answer to the executions’ policy short of retaliation equally lawless and cruel, and Liam had forbidden any such action. Michael Cremin was negotiating the purchase of mountain artillery on the Continent, but there was no indication that he would be successful.

  Two resolutions were considered. Frank Aiken proposed and Seán MacSwiney seconded:

  That Government be empowered to enter into negotiations roughly on the basis of principles 1, 2 and 3 of President’s memo. Dated 9/2/23. Report to be laid before executive at next meeting.

  APPENDIX IV: Proclamation, 27 April 1923

  Dáil Eireann (Government of the Republic of Ireland)

  Proclamation

  The government of the Republic anxious to contribute its share to the movement for peace, and to found it on principles that will give governmental stability and otherwise prove of value to the nation, hereby proclaims its readiness to negotiate an immediate cessation of hostilities on the basis of the following:

  1. That the sovereign rights of this nation are indefeasible and inalienable.

  2. That all legitimate governmental authority in Ireland, legislative, executive, and judicial, is derived exclusively from the people of Ireland.

  3. That the ultimate court of appeal for deciding disputed questions of national expediency and policy is the people of Ireland – the judgement being by majority vote of the adult citizenry and the decision to be submitted to, and resistance by violence excluded, not because the decision is necessarily right or just or permanent, but because acceptance of this rule makes for peace, order and unity in national action, and is the democratic alternative to arbitrament by force. Adequate opportunities and facilities must of course be afforded for a full and proper presentation to the Court of all facts and issues involved, and it must be understood that 1 and 2 are fundamental and non-judicable.

  4. That no individual, or class of individual, who subscribe to these principles, of national right, order and good citizenship can be justly excluded by any political oath test or other device, from their proper share and influence in determining national policy, or from the councils and parliament of the nation.

  5. That freedom to express political or economic opinions, or advocate political or economic programmes, freedom to assemble in public meetings, and freedom of all press, are rights of citizenship and of the community which must not be abrogated.

  6. That the military forces of the nation are the servants of the nation and, subject to the foregoing, amenable to the national assembly when freely elected by the people.

  We are informed that many in the ranks of our opponents will accept these principle, as we accept them. If that be so, peace can be arranged forthwith.

  We hope that this advance will be met in the spirit in which we make it, and that it will be supported by all who love our country and who desire a speedy and just ending to the present national troubles.

  As evidence of our good-will, the army council is issuing an Order to all Units to suspend aggressive action – the Order to take effect as soon as may be, but not later than noon, Monday, 30 April.

  EAMON DE VALERA

  President

  Dublin

  27 April 1923

  APPENDIX V: Tom Barry's opinion on 'The Revolution'

  Correspondence with Rev. Father Henry, OFM, The Capuchin Annual

  (16/9/1963 [from Tom Barry’s papers])

  1. In all fairness to the British Empire in 1916 there were no disabilities for Catholics in Ireland, instead they were perfectly free to practice their Faith. It was different altogether in the Penal Days, in 1798 and up to Catholic Emancipation when all disabilities for Catholics were removed.

  2. Leadership down through the ages since the Penal Days, i.e. 1798. 1867, even Land Fights was essentially by Protestants.

  3. The Vatican (I know their difficulties) had never lent a helping hand since the Bull issued by Pope Adrian IV, gave the British the Right of conquest in Ireland. In fact, you will find that even in 1921, Mr. De Valera had to publicly correct a message sent by the Pope on the signing of the Treaty. The Vatican has always been concerned for the status quo and has never taken a stand against revolution. Indeed, when Catholic Nuns and Priests during the Penal Days were being hunted, caught and executed, the then Powers of the Vatican gave them no help whatever.

  4. In the plantation did the Bench of Bishops of Ireland back any other attempt at freeing this country. You will remember Bishop Moriarty’s statement that ‘Hell is not hot enough nor eternity strong enough to punish the Fenians’. There has never been from any Bishop a proclamation in support of any armed attempt to give Ireland freedom.

  5. In my own days, with a few honourable exceptions like Archbishop Walsh, Bishop O’Dwyer and Bishop Fogarty, there was no support for the men of 1916. Although the Hierarchy backed the Anti-Conscription movement in 1918. I do not have to remind you of Bishop Daniel Coholan’s excommunication against the I.R.A. when he had to look at Volunteers dying without the benefit of Confession. At that period, I myself, was on several occasions refused Absolution. Most of the Clergy of the Country backed the ban on the fighting men. There were, however, many who supported us and gave us the benefit of the Sacraments.

  Despite this, I am not confusing members of the Vatican, Bishops and Priests with the Catholic Church, because I know quite well that the Catholic Church can not be wrong, whereas its members, from the Vatican down, can and have been throughout the ages on Ireland’s armed efforts for freedom. In the years of the 1920–23 struggle we continued saying our prayers, attending Mass and receiving the Sacraments when and where possible.

  ... the Irish Revolution had been going on spasmodically for over seven hundred years before the Rising of 1916. It had manifested itself many times throughout the centuries against confiscation of lands and properties of the Gael; the destruction of the Catholic religion; the maintaining of the ascendancy; the keeping in check and subjection the peasant and the worker – even the strike of the Dublin workers or rather lock out of those men in 1913 was part and parcel of the Revolution. The Irish Revolution did not start in 1916. The Rising of Easter of that year was but a continuation of previous struggles deep rooted in the minds of those great leaders who decreed it and saw to the resurrection of a subject people at the cost of their own lives.

  How does one judge the success or failure of a revolution? There has never in all the histories of all the Nations been a completely successful revolution. Each mind within the revolutionary forces has its own set of values of the degrees of importance of the results achieved. I had never the honour of knowing the dead leaders who made 1916 but I have read enough about them and spoken with those who knew them well to venture the assertion that if they had lived through the Anglo-Irish fight, and the Treaty aftermath they quite possibly would have divided into two or more parties. Clarke, the man of steel, Connolly, the social Revolutionary, Pearse the Gael, the dreamer and the romantic who had written ‘The Sovereign People’, Plunkett the religious mystic and all the others can only have been agreed on the dominant aim of the 1916 Rising – To drive the British occupation forces from the land; to establish a Republic and to undo the Conquest, and it is necessary to remark here that the armed struggle was only one phase of the Revolution. Had the I.R.A. on the 11th July, 1921, driven the invader from our shores (and it certainly had not been strong enough militarily to do so) the Republic would not have been established nor the conquest undone. It would take many years more of planning and working before one could decide whether the revolution has succeeded or indeed failed ...

  Those of us who lived through the period of struggle and were engaged in armed action were a rather immature twenty-two or twenty-three years of age, with no training in philosophy or economics ... the I.R.A. were not fighting for material and spiritual conditions ... There could be men within the movement imbued with those high motives but I never met one of them. The trut
h is that the issue was knit again because of 1916 and the General Election of 1918 and those men of the I.R.A. trained and armed to fight the British to force their evacuation. Those who were actively engaged were fully occupied in defending their own lives and the institutions set up by the Republic, attacking the British Forces and attempting to destroy the machinery of the British dominion over Ireland. There was little time to think of anything else.

  APPENDIX VI: Letter re Tom Barry's pension

  Letter from Tom Crofts to Pension Board in relation to Tom Barry’s pension

  Grattan Hill,

  Cork.

  23rd, April, 1940.

  Oscar Traynor Esq T.D.

  Minister of Defence.

  A Chara,

  Tom Barry was called before the Service Pensions Board in January 1939 for examination on his claim to a service pension. In January 1940 – one year afterwards – he received the scandalous award of 5¾ years Rank B.

  He appealed and submitted statements in support of Rank and Service from the following: – An Taoiseach, P. J. Rutledge, Gearóid O’Sullivan, Pa Murray, Bill Quirke, Seán Moylan, Florrie O’Donoghue, Tom Hales, Seán Buckley, Dan Holland, Con Crowley, Michael O’Herlihy and myself.

  About a month ago, Tom was called before the Board for oral examination on oath. On the same day Bill Quirke, Gearóid O’Sullivan, and myself were also examined on oath. Since then Ernie O’Malley, Florrie O’Donoghue and Seán Buckley have also given evidence on oath. All this evidence was given on oath and in the hundreds of cases which I previously verified, I was never even once put on my oath. Neither I am informed were any of the others. This in itself is an extraordinary feature of the case especially coming on top of Tom’s peculiar award.