Emperor of Japan
Page 75
Reaction to the attempted assassination was not the same as that to the attack on the Russian crown prince in Ōtsu, as the Chinese were unlikely to take vengeance. But there was the danger that Japan’s reputation abroad, established by victories during the war, might be tarnished and that Li might use the incident to gain the West’s sympathy. This would provide the perfect opportunity for intervention in the war by a third power.26
Mutsu felt that some grand gesture was required in order to convince China and the rest of the world that Japan sincerely regretted the attack. He urged that Li’s original request for an armistice for a period of several weeks be granted unconditionally. Itō Hirobumi, agreeing with Mutsu, persuaded cabinet members and imperial headquarters to accept a cease-fire, even though some believed that this would work to the disadvantage of Japan. The emperor’s consent was obtained, and on March 28 Mutsu brought to Li’s bedside a draft of the cease-fire convention. The preamble began: “His Majesty the emperor of Japan, in consideration of the fact that the progress of the peace negotiations has been interrupted by an untoward incident, issues instructions to the empire’s peace plenipotentiaries to agree to a temporary armistice.”27
Mutsu commented, “The convention thus declared that the cease-fire was entirely the product of His Majesty’s gracious will.” It is clear, however, that the emperor’s role was minimal; he merely accepted the plan, originally conceived by Mutsu, that Itō had offered him. The intent of the preamble may have been to augment the authority of the emperor in the eyes of the Chinese.28 In any case, Li accepted the armistice with evident pleasure and said that although he was physically unable to be present at the conference table, he would gladly open talks in his bedroom. The armistice, signed on March 30, provided that all naval and army units would cease fire for three weeks from that day.
On April 1 the Japanese forwarded to Li Hung-chang a draft of their treaty proposals. The terms were severe. Apart from the recognition of Korea as an independent country, already accepted by the Chinese months earlier, the treaty required China to cede to Japan the southern part of Feng-t’ien Province, Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands. China would also pay Japan an indemnity of 300 million taels. Commercial privileges for Japanese subjects in China were also specified.
Li tried every line of approach to reduce the Japanese demands. Earlier, he had unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Japanese that the Chinese and Japanese peoples must “formulate a common approach to preventing our inundation and preparing for the union of the yellow races against the white man.”29 Now he warned that if Chinese territory were ceded to Japan, it would arouse indignation and hostility among the Chinese people, leading to a desire for revenge, and would prevent any future amelioration of relations between the two countries.
Li next questioned the huge sum the Japanese were demanding in indemnities, reminding them that the Japanese had started the war and invaded Chinese territory. He was nevertheless willing (as he had previously informed the American minister) to pay an indemnity, but the sum had to be reasonable. Setting so high a price for peace was dangerous: if the Chinese were unable to pay the sum demanded, it might lead to a fresh outbreak of hostilities with Japan. He closed his memorandum with an appeal for mercy:
I have served my country for half a century, and it may be that I am nearing the end of my days. This mission of peace is probably the last important service I will be permitted to render my sovereign and his subjects…. Our efforts here will determine whether our two great East Asian nations can henceforth live together in enduring friendship, mutual security, and prosperity. I pray, therefore, that Your Excellencies will take the greatest care to exercise mature judgment in your policies.30
The Japanese were unmoved by these arguments and reminded Li that the Japanese were the victors and the Chinese the losers. If the talks should fail, sixty or seventy Japanese ships were loaded with troops awaiting the command to head toward the battle area, and the fate of Peking itself was in doubt. Itō demanded an answer of yes or no to the Japanese demands.
The Chinese made a counterproposal that reduced the amount of territory to be ceded to Japan and cut the indemnity to 100 million taels. Li also proposed that if in the future disputes should arise between Japan and China, a third nation would be requested to arbitrate. If a nation could not be agreed on, the president of the United States would be suitable.31
The Japanese delivered their final proposal on April 10. Once again, they required a yes or no answer. They reduced their territorial demands to the Liaotung Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands and cut the indemnity to 200 million taels. Other provisions were left intact. After one more, futile, attempt to secure greater concessions, Li accepted the Japanese conditions. The treaty of peace was signed on April 17. Mutsu commented, “Thanks to the might and virtue of His Majesty, our nation’s prestige has been enhanced, our people’s happiness has been augmented, and East Asia was once again blessed with peace.”32
On April 21 the emperor issued a rescript on the resumption of friendly relations between Japan and China. He opened by stating his conviction that the fortunes of a country could be enhanced only in times of peace; and it was his belief, passed down from his ancestors, that it was his mission to preserve peace. This had been his aim ever since he succeeded to the throne, but hostilities had unfortunately broken out between the two countries and he had been unable to terminate the warfare that had lasted more than ten months. He expressed his gratitude to all who had made victory possible, especially the troops, who had endured innumerable hardships: “Although this result may be attributed to the spirits of my ancestors, how could it have been attained without the extraordinary devotion, bravery, and sincerity of my officials and subjects?”33
The rescript concluded with the warning that the Japanese must not let victory make them arrogant, despising others without reason and losing the trust of friendly countries. He expressed the hope that once the peace treaty with China was signed, friendly relations between the two countries would be resumed, and neighborly feelings would become stronger than ever.34
This statement, regardless of whether the emperor himself composed it, probably accorded with his real feelings. He was saying, in effect, that it was not (as official statements had declared) thanks solely to his might and virtue that the war had been won and Japanese prestige abroad enhanced; rather, victory could not have been attained without the efforts and sacrifices of his people. He did not express pleasure in having triumphed over a hateful enemy (in the manner of twentieth-century Western rulers) or in having removed the Chinese threat to Korean independence. Instead, he prayed that the two countries would resume the traditional ties of friendship that had been interrupted by an unavoidable war. This expression of hope that neighborly relations between Japan and China would become stronger than ever may explain his anger when he first heard of the decision to go to war with China.
After the peace treaty was signed in Shimonoseki, the emperor expressed his intention of proceeding to Kyōto. He had always been fond of the old capital, and he may have looked forward to a stay at the Gosho after his cramped life in Hiroshima. The departure for Kyōto would be on April 27.
On April 23 the ministers of Russia, Germany, and France called on Hayashi Tadasu, the vice minister of foreign affairs, and informed him that their three governments were opposed to the cession to Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula. The message from the czar of Russia stated that Japan’s possession of this territory would destroy Korean independence and that the threat to Peking posed by the occupation of Liaotung would be a perpetual obstacle to peace in the Far East. The czar urged, in his capacity as a sincere friend of the emperor, that Japan give up the Liaotung Peninsula.35 Needless to say, the Japanese did not take this profession of friendship at face value.
All three European powers had territorial ambitions in China and were suspicious of Japanese expansion on the continent. Russia was the leader of the coalition. On April 11 at a special meeting to deter
mine Russian policy toward Japan, Count Sergei Witte, the finance minister, said that as the victor, Japan was entitled to a considerable indemnity and that Russia was prepared to allow the cession of Taiwan to Japan, as provided in the peace treaty. However, at all costs (with military force, if necessary), Japanese troops must be driven from the Liaotung Peninsula.36 He advised taking direct action if the Japanese failed to agree. Since the end of March, reports had reached Japan of a massing of Russian naval strength in Vladivostok and of troop convoys being readied in Odessa.37
The Russian government invited France and Germany to join the alliance. The decision of the French to join was, on the surface at least, puzzling, as French interest in China had hitherto been almost entirely confined to the south. When the French learned that the British had refused to join the coalition, for a time they debated whether to withdraw; but in the end they decided they could not oppose their ally, Russia. The British, normally the leaders in developments in the East, did not join the coalition because they believed that as it stood, the peace treaty was not harmful to their interests. The Germans joined, hoping that closer relations with Russia might weaken the Franco-Russian alliance. They also hoped that a pro-Chinese action might earn them a military base from the grateful Chinese.
The general reaction of the Japanese, needless to say, was utter dismay. The euphoria of the victory and the peace treaty had been chilled by threats from three of the strongest countries in Europe. On April 24 Itō listed the following options for the Japanese:
1. The advice of the three powers should be firmly rejected, even if this had the unhappy result of creating new enemies.
2. A conference of the major powers should be called to settle the question of the Liaotung Peninsula.
3. The proposal of the intervening three powers should be accepted and the Liaotung Peninsula returned to China as a benevolent gesture.38
Members of the cabinet who considered the three options unanimously rejected the first. The main strength of the navy and army was now in China, and the Japanese islands were almost defenseless. The troops were, moreover, exhausted by ten months of war, and supplies were low. Japan was in no position to oppose Russia, let alone three foreign countries. The third option would certainly show that the Japanese were generous of spirit, but it might be interpreted as a sign they feared the Europeans and, for this reason, had to be rejected. It was privately agreed to follow the second option, but no conference was ever arranged.39 The third option was eventually followed, distasteful though it was.
Both Britain and America insisted on remaining neutral, although the Japanese judged that America was basically in sympathy with them. Italy, to Japan’s surprise, announced unqualified support, but it was not in a position to assist Japan.
There were differences among the three nations. Although insistent on their demands, the Russians and French expressed them politely, but the German minister delivered an angry tirade to the effect that Japan, ignoring Germany’s well-intentioned advice, had signed a treaty demanding excessive concessions, and it was only to be expected that his country should protest. When Hayashi Tadasu asked if Germany was threatening war if Japan did not comply, the minister backed down, saying that his heated remarks should be expunged from the record. But the threat remained.40
On April 27 the emperor left Hiroshima for Kyōto, where the imperial headquarters would henceforth be located. He expressed no reactions to the Three Power Intervention, apparently resigned to the loss of the Liaotung Peninsula.41 The public was still unaware of the three foreign powers’ demands, and in celebration of the victory, every house between Hiroshima to Kyōto flew the flag. People greeted the emperor’s train with heartfelt shouts of “Banzai,” and at every station great crowds acclaimed the emperor.
The empress, who had arrived in Kyōto the day before, welcomed him by the steps of Hall of Audiences. This was the emperor’s first visit to the Gosho in years, and he happily toured the buildings and gardens. He related to the chamberlains accompanying him the histories of the different sites, pointing out where he had played as a child. Climbing to a little hill in a garden originally planned by his father, Emperor Kōmei, he picked up a stone, brushed off the dirt, and gave it to his military attaché, urging him to preserve it. The man wept at the display of filial piety.42
Meiji obviously loved being back in Kyōto, and when it was announced that the imperial headquarters would move back to Tōkyō on May 29, he resisted leaving, saying that some major figures in the victory over China had not yet had their triumphal return. But when the last of the heroes of the war had returned in triumph, there was no longer any excuse for remaining in Kyōto, and the emperor left for Tōkyō on May 29.
The war, however, was not quite over. According to the terms of the peace treaty, Japan was to receive the island of Taiwan as part of the settlement, but as yet no Japanese troops had landed there. Naval General Staff Admiral Kabayama Sukenori (1837–1922) was designated to accept control of the island from the Chinese administrators. It was essential that Japanese ownership of the island be asserted as soon as possible. The Chinese, hoping that there would be a repetition of the Three Power Intervention, asked that Kabayama’s departure for Taiwan be delayed, but the Japanese government, guessing their reasons, refused, saying that the case of Taiwan was quite different from that of Liaotung, Kabayama left Kyōto on May 17 to take up his post.43
The inhabitants of Taiwan were by no means eager for their island to become a Japanese possession. Once the provisions of the peace treaty were learned, there were numerous outbreaks of violence. The Japanese expected some resistance, but they had no idea how many men would be needed to quell it. The government decided to send the Household Guards division, which had reached China too late to see action. It would leave China on May 22 and 23 for Taiwan, where it would serve as a garrison. Just at this time the Japanese received a report that the Chinese government was recalling on May 20 its civil and military officials from Taiwan, so there would be nobody with whom to negotiate.44
When the Taiwanese realized there would be no Three Power Intervention on their behalf, one group decided to establish a republic with a military man, T’ang Ching-sung, as its president. A flag (a yellow tiger on a blue background) was devised, and the independence of the new republic was declared to both the island and the countries of the West. At the time, there were about 50,000 Chinese soldiers on the island, plus nearly that number of irregulars—farmers who took up arms in emergencies.
The landing of the Household Guards under Prince Yoshihisa began on May 29 near Keelung, and the town was occupied on June 3. There was resistance from the “bandits,” as the Japanese termed the irregulars, estimated to number between 2,000 and 3,000 men. The Japanese killed at least 200 in this first engagement. When the leader of the rebels heard the news of the defeat, he and some 1,000 Chinese soldiers fled the island on June 6 to Amoy. The chief city, Taipei, fell to the Japanese on June 7. The north of the island was pacified by June 25, but in the south, resistance against the Japanese continued. Admiral Kabayama, deploring the hardships that the fighting was causing the people of the island, sent a letter to the rebel leader suggesting that he surrender, but he refused.45
The Japanese seem not to have anticipated that the warfare on Taiwan would last so long. Casualties mounted steadily, and on July 9 the empress presented 3,000 bandages she had made for wounded soldiers. Not until August 3 were irregulars cleared from the area between Taipei and Hsin-chu. Another 20,000 rebels were estimated to be in southern Taiwan. On October 21 advance units of the Japanese forces entered Tainan, the last remaining rebel stronghold. The entire island had been pacified.46
The cost had been heavy. Only 396 men were killed in action, but 10,236 men had died of tropical diseases.47 Among those who died of malaria was Prince Yoshihisa.48 His death was kept a secret until November 4. In the meantime, he was praised by the emperor for bravery on the battlefield as if he were still alive, awarded the Order of the Chrysanthem
um and the Order of the Golden Kite, and promoted to general. After the official announcement of his death, the emperor ordered a state funeral for the erstwhile renegade and issued a eulogy praising a life devoted to the military.49
As the result of the fighting, Japan had acquired a major possession, the island of Taiwan. The loss of the Liaotung Peninsula had enraged patriots, and the bitterness lingered, but Japan was now more of an “empire” than ever before in its history. The emperor was acclaimed in every proclamation as the source of the victory, and undoubtedly most Japanese accepted this as true. Abroad, too, he was praised as never before. An editorial in the New York Sun published in December 1894 opened,
At the beginning of this year little still was known about the Emperor, but now, at the end of the year, he has come to occupy the highest place among the rulers of the world. No one acquainted with the facts will doubt that he is an extraordinarily enlightened ruler. He completed the great achievement of the Restoration and ended the feudal system. Next, he promulgated a constitution, and inaugurated a parliament. He adopted European civilization while maintaining the traditional customs of his country. He put his Navy and Army in order, and made Japan the strongest country in the East. He encouraged industry.
The conclusion was that the world in all its history had never seen such a monarch.50
Another American newspaper reported in April 1895,
Ever since the Chicago Exposition [of 1892–93] foreigners have gradually acquired some knowledge of Japanese culture, but it was limited to the fact that Japan produces beautiful pottery, tea and silk. Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War last year, however, an attitude of respect for Japan may be felt everywhere, and there is talk of nothing but Japan this and Japan that…. Most amusing is the craze for Japanese women’s clothes. Many American women wear them to parties, although they are most unbecoming, and the praise they lavish on the Japanese victories sounds exactly as if they were boasting about their own country.51