Emperor of Japan

by Donald Keene

  When Hoshi learned of the formation of a new political party (the Kenseitō), he decided to return at once to Japan, hoping for the post of foreign minister in the next cabinet. He telegraphed the ministry that he was returning, only to be ordered by the ministry to remain at his post. Although Hoshi paid no attention to this directive, he failed in the end to obtain the coveted post of foreign minister, mainly because of Ōkuma’s opposition.

  Hoshi later helped organize the Seiyūkai and, as the strongest figure within that party, was rewarded in 1900 with the post of minister of communications in the fourth Itō cabinet. This was not a major cabinet post, but never before had a man of Hoshi’s birth, without domain connections, been appointed to such an exalted position. In addition to being a member of the cabinet, Hoshi was elected in 1899 to the Tōkyō Municipal Assembly and served as its presiding officer. It was widely believed that he ran the city government mainly for the profit of himself and his faction.35 This rumor was not substantiated, but he had clearly built up a political machine, and some of his underlings did not hesitate to use strong-arm methods. Hoshi himself did not profit by his alleged crimes. Despite accusations by the newspapers that he made a fortune out of government contracts, he left only debts when he died.

  Hoshi was forced to resign in October 1900 as a member of the Tōkyō Municipal Assembly and in December as minister of communications, although he insisted to the end that he had committed no wrongdoing. All the same, public indignation against him continued to mount, and in June a fencing teacher named Iba Sōtarō, a devout believer in Confucian morality, was so enraged by the corruption he sensed in the government that he waylaid Hoshi and stabbed him to death.36

  Many people unquestioningly believed the rumors of corruption, but there were also many who still admired Hoshi, and thousands of them followed the funeral cortege as it advanced to the solemn strains of music provided by a company of the emperor’s guards. Hara Takashi and Matsuda Masahisa, two major politicians of the next generation, headed the funeral committee, and Itagaki Taisuke gave the eulogy.37 Despite the accusations (and the bad reputation that has lasted to this day), Hoshi, more than any other man, had shaped the future of modern, Japanese-style party politics. The emperor promoted Hoshi to the junior third rank and posthumously bestowed on him the Order of the Sacred Treasure.38

  The emperor was kept abreast of the controversy surrounding Hoshi Tōru, and on occasion his decision was sought. Even after the House of Representatives had passed a vote of no confidence in November 1893, Hoshi continued to occupy the president’s chair. On December 2 the vice president, Kusumoto Masataka, visited the palace with a petition reporting to the emperor the vote of no confidence and apologizing for having recommended Hoshi to the emperor. After reading the petition, Meiji summoned Kusumoto and said it was not clear what was being asked of him. Was he being requested to replace the president? Or were the members of the House apologizing for having made a mistake?

  The emperor wished to avoid being put in the position of commanding Hoshi to vacate the president’s chair. His response had the effect of making Kusumoto abandon the hope that the emperor would personally expel Hoshi. It is not known what the emperor thought of Hoshi, but his decision to decorate him posthumously suggests that he recognized Hoshi’s contributions to the state.

  On July 6 the emperor and empress visited the crown prince’s palace, where they inspected the wedding gifts the crown prince and princess had received the previous year. They also visited their grandson, Hirohito. On the following day the infant was taken to the residence of Admiral Kawamura Sumiyoshi in Mamiana. The emperor and empress gave 100 yen to the admiral, asking him to watch over the infant prince during his childhood. It was announced that the crown prince requested this arrangement, but in fact it was the emperor’s wish.39 This survival of an old practice perplexed Erwin Baelz, the emperor’s personal physician, who wrote,

  At five to call on Count Kawamura. The crown prince’s son has been put under the care of this elderly admiral, who must be nearly seventy. What a strange idea! I hoped that the unnatural and cruel custom of taking little princes away from their parents and handing them over to strangers had fallen into desuetude. It is not so, however. The poor crown princess was compelled to hand over her baby, which cost her many tears. Now the parents can see their child only for a brief period once or twice a month…. Why can they not in this matter follow the example of the German or the English royal family as they do in so many others? Little Prince Michinomiya is a lively and good-looking youngster.40

  On August 1 Baron Hayashi Tadasu (1850–1913), the minister plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James, sent a telegram to Sone Arasuke, the foreign minister, reporting that after conferring about China with Lord Henry Lansdowne, the British foreign minister, he had learned that the British government wished to conclude an alliance with Japan. He asked, “Is the Japanese government prepared to sign a treaty with them? If they are willing to accept our conditions, are we ready to enter an alliance with them? Please send the government’s reply as soon as possible.”41

  The proposal to create an alliance between England and Japan had its origins in Russian policy in the Far East. As noted earlier, after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese had been forced by three European powers to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China. However, Russia not long afterward leased this territory, signed a secret treaty with China, and began constructing a railway. The Russians now administered Port Arthur and Dairen and were steadily expanding their hold over northwestern China. Russian towns had been founded along the railway line. Other countries with interests in East Asia were concerned about Russia’s moves in Korea, and many believed that a clash between Russia and Japan was inevitable. However, the Japanese were by no means adequately prepared for such a conflict, and it was obvious that it would be extremely difficult for the country, unaided, to dislodge the Russians.

  Japan had two possible courses of action. One (favored by Itō Hirobumi) was to reach an understanding with Russia whereby Manchuria would be yielded to the Russians. In return, Japanese predominance in Korea would be recognized.42 The other (favored by most other Japanese officials) was for Japan to act in concert with major European powers in order to contain Russia. It was unlikely that France would join an anti-Russian coalition, as France and Russia had recently concluded an alliance. Japan’s most likely partners were Germany and England, both of which were convinced that the Russians were infringing on their rights in East Asia. In April 1901, in conversation with Lansdowne, Hayashi had voiced the opinion that in order for there to be permanent peace in East Asia, a firm relationship between Japan and England was essential. Lansdowne agreed, but this was only the private opinion of the two men.43

  Even before this time, men in Japan and England had advocated such an alliance. In 1895 Fukuzawa Yukichi had written an editorial proposing an alliance;44 and in England Joseph Chamberlain, the minister for the colonies, had informally discussed the subject with the Japanese minister.45 In 1898 the Japanese government, about to end the occupation of Weihaiwei, consented to the British proposal to lease the city from the Chinese, adding that it hoped that the British would in return be sympathetic and offer help if Japan needed to take action to ensure its security or promote its interests.46 A pro-Japanese mood swept England in 1900 after the Japanese army rescued British subjects in Peking besieged by the Boxers. Hayashi Tadasu, who became minister to Great Britain that year, concluded that England was the only country with which Japan could form an alliance against Russia.47

  The discussions between Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne reached agreement on six points:

  1. An open door must be maintained in China.

  2. Apart from concessions already made by treaty, no further acquisition of Chinese territory was to be permitted.

  3. Japan’s freedom to act in Korea was recognized because Japan had greater interests there than any other country.

  4. If one member of the alliance engaged
in hostilities with another country, the other member would preserve neutrality, but if a third power helped the enemy, the other member would enter the war.

  5. The Anglo-German agreement on China would remain in force.

  6. The alliance would be restricted to the Far East.48

  After much discussion and some apparent setbacks to the alliance, the British prepared a draft of the proposed treaty and asked for a prompt Japanese reply.49 Japanese revisions to the text, telegraphed to London on November 30, mainly concerned language. The telegram mentioned that when shown the proposed treaty, the emperor had asked it be shown to the genrō and to Itō for their opinions.50

  After a heated debate the genrō approved of the treaty as revised and recommended that it be made effective as soon as possible. Only Inoue Kaoru, who had favored an alliance with Russia rather than England, expressed dissatisfaction on the grounds that Itō’s opinion had still not been heard. The awaited telegram from Itō, received on December 8, raised objections to the treaty. He declared that the wording left many points obscure and noted that it was not known what Germany would think of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. It was possible also that negotiations with Russia would result in a treaty. He urged extremely careful consideration and requested that his opinions be conveyed to the emperor.51

  Prime Minister Katsura took Itō’s telegram to the emperor the next day. The emperor always placed great value on Itō’s opinions, but he said now that in view of the treaty’s approval by both the cabinet and the genrō, he thought that Japanese consent could not be delayed. He asked Katsura to ascertain the reactions of the genrō to Itō’s message. Katsura went to the genrō but, before asking their views, pointed out that there was no guarantee that a treaty would be concluded with Russia and that any delay might cause the British to withdraw its offer of an alliance. On December 10 he reported to the emperor that the majority supported the treaty with England. With the authorization of the emperor, a telegram was sent to Hayashi on the twelfth stating that Japan had accepted the revised treaty.52 On January 30, 1902, Hayashi and Lansdowne signed the treaty in London., and it was announced to the public on February 12.

  It is difficult to appraise the benefits to Japan brought by the treaty. Hayashi believed that the alliance enabled Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War.53 It accounted for Japan’s participation in World War I and its acquisition of an overseas empire when it captured former German colonies in the South Pacific. More important than material benefits was the joy felt by the Japanese, from the emperor on down, that Japan had been recognized as an equal partner of the strongest nation in the world, a nation that in the past had humiliated Japan again and again.54

  Chapter 52

  The year 1902 opened with a minimum of ceremonial. The one-day postponement of the New Year banquet, normally held on January 5, typified the steady erosion of New Year rituals: that day was a Sunday, and it was judged to be more important to observe the Christian day of rest than Japanese tradition. A few days later, the emperor heard the usual three New Year lectures, one each on Japanese, Chinese, and Western history. The lecture on the West this year was devoted to parliamentary reform in England, possibly because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

  On January 10 the court lady Muromachi Kiyoko died in her sixty-third year. Soon after entering palace service in 1856, she had been appointed as governess to the future emperor, then a child of four. On his accession to the throne in 1867, she had been given the position of tenji (lady-in-waiting) and had served the emperor in this capacity for forty-six years. If ever she disapproved of anything the emperor said or did, she did not hesitate to scold him. He would invariably reject her advice, calling her otafuku, a Kyōto word for an ugly woman; but there was affection in his tone. To this rebuke she would respond, “I was born an otafuku. There’s nothing I can do about it, no matter what Your Majesty may command. But I beg you to take the advice I offer.” The emperor would not reply but in the end did what she suggested. In recognition of Kiyoko’s long service, the emperor and empress donated 2,000 yen for her funeral, an unprecedented amount for someone of her position.1

  So few of Meiji’s “human” contacts with the people who served him have been recorded that this trifling anecdote is endearing. The use of the word otafuku suggests also that the emperor in private used Kyōto language, even though other anecdotes always transmit his words in standard Japanese.

  The one traditional ceremony observed that spring was the first poetry meeting. The emperor did not like the two topics (“Cockcrows Herald the Dawn” and “Prayers to the Gods”) proposed by the head of the Imperial Poetry Office, Takasaki Masakaze, who then had to supply a more conventional topic. The emperor composed this tanka on the theme “New Year Plum Blossoms”:

  tachikaeru Blossoms of the plum

  toshi no asahi ni Returning with the new year

  ume no hana In morning sunlight

  kaorisometari Have begun to be fragrant

  yukima nagara ni In between breaks in the snow.2

  The poem is felicitous but hardly memorable. All the same, the emperor was about to enter his most fruitful period as a poet, as most of his best-known poems were composed from this time until the end of his reign.

  The festive New Year mood was harshly interrupted when on January 28 a report was received that a battalion of the Fifth Infantry Regiment had been buried in a blizzard. The emperor had retired for the night when the news arrived, but a chamberlain immediately went to inform him.

  Telegrams sent back and forth between Tōkyō and Aomori gradually revealed the terrible story. The battalion of more than 200 men, out on a winter maneuver, had been caught on January 23 in a sudden fierce snowstorm near Mount Hakkōda. Maneuvers at more clement times of the year had familiarized the soldiers with the terrain of the region, but they were not equipped for such weather and lost their way in the blinding snow and lacerating wind. Rescue parties, sent out when the battalion failed to return to its base, were hampered in their search by the unrelenting storm. On the twenty-seventh, a survivor was found, all but dead from exposure. He described to the rescuers what had happened, and they battled their way through the snow to reach the site of the disaster. They found a handful of survivors and the bodies of about three-quarters of the victims. It was not until the snow melted in May that the last bodies were found.3

  The emperor, deeply distressed to learn of the tragic event, at once sent his military attaché, Miyamoto Teruaki, to the scene. Word came from Miyamoto on February 7 that ninety-four rifles had been recovered, but only much later was the full extent of the disaster known: 199 officers and men had perished, and only eleven had survived.4

  The first reaction when the tragedy became generally known was an outcry against the military for its recklessness in subjecting troops to maneuvers in a raging storm without proper winter uniforms, but when the full details of the tragedy were released, the prevailing sentiment shifted from anger to sympathy. The families of the victims were even said to have rejoiced, convinced that the deaths of their sons or grandsons were not in vain but would contribute to future victories of the imperial forces.5

  On April 8 Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō reported to the Diet that Russia and China had signed an agreement providing for the restitution of Manchuria to China. This development was highly welcome to the Japanese, especially because they themselves had been forced by the Three Power Intervention, headed by Russia, to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China.

  Negotiations on Manchuria between Russia and China went back to 1896, when Li Hung-chang traveled to Moscow to attend the coronation of Nicholas II.6 A secret treaty signed between Russia and China provided for (1) mutual assistance in the event of aggression by a foreign power, (2) the use of Chinese ports by Russian warships in emergencies, and (3) the construction of a railway, administered by Russian personnel with extraterritorial rights, through northern Manchuria to Vladivostok, to be used by Russia to transport troops and supplies. The treaty was to remai
n in force for fifteen years.7

  Although the framers of the treaty had assumed that aggression against China would be Japanese, the German seizure of Kiaochow Bay in 1897 was clearly aggression and therefore (under the treaty) involved the Russians as well as the Chinese. Ian Nish described the situation:

  China reacted to Germany’s action in the only way she knew, by calling on Russia to neutralize and discourage the Germans. When news reached Peking that the Germans had landed at Kiaochow, Li Hung-chang issued under the Russo-Chinese alliance of 1896 a direct invitation to Russia to occupy temporarily a Chinese port as a countermeasure to German action.8

  This was exactly what the Russians had hoped for, and they soon forgot their own claim to Kiaochow. The Russians secured from China the right to lease Port Arthur and Dairen and to build a railway through southern Manchuria. They now possessed the long-desired ice-free harbor on the Pacific. By the end of the year, the Chinese realized that their tactic of setting one barbarian off against another had failed.9

  On April 25, 1898, Japan and Russia signed a protocol confirming the independence of Korea and agreeing to abstain from interference in that country’s internal affairs. In the event that Korea requested counsel and assistance on military or financial matters from either Japan or Russia, that country should not take any measures without consulting the other. Russia agreed not to obstruct commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea. The agreement was the first to recognize the particular role of Japan in the economic development of Korea.10

  Two years later, in 1900, destruction of the tracks of the Trans-Siberian Railway in Manchuria by Boxer insurgents gave the Russians an excuse to send an army to occupy three eastern provinces of Manchuria. They insisted that they had no intention of annexing Manchuria and that once order had been restored, they would immediately withdraw their troops.11 The Russian occupation naturally upset the Japanese. In February 1901 they warned China not to yield to further Russian demands, but Li Hung-chang seemed willing to sacrifice Chinese rights in Manchuria in exchange for the Russian alliance. In the autumn of 1901, other countries that had participated in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion withdrew their troops from Peking, but the Russians continued to occupy Manchuria.