Sky Spy, Memoirs of a U-2 Pilot

by Jim Carter

  Some high officials in the USAF favored the CL-282 because of its higher potential altitude and smaller radar cross section. These officials recommended the design to the CIA. The CIA looked at the design and told the Intelligence Systems Panel, a civilian group advising the USAF on aerial reconnaissance, about the CL-282. Aspects of its design that the USAF saw as flaws appealed to the panel.

  Edwin Land, the father of instant photography, and also a member of the panel, proposed to the CIA that they should fund and operate the aircraft. CIA Director Allen Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA conduct its own overflights. Land told President Eisenhower about the aircraft and Eisenhower agreed with Land that the CIA should operate the aircraft. Dulles finally agreed with the President. Meanwhile Seaburg helped persuade USAF to support the CL-282, but with the higher performance J-57 engine. Final approval for the joint CIA-USAF project came in November 1954. Funding came from the CIA, which used un-vouchered government money.

  Lockheed received a $22.5 million contract in March of 1955 for the first 20 aircraft, with the first $1.26 million mailed directly to Johnson’s home in February 1955 to keep work going during negotiations. Lockheed agreed to deliver the first aircraft by July and the last one by November 1956. Lockheed delivered at $3.5 million under budget because the aircraft was based on the F-104; only the wings, tail and landing gear were different.

  Procurement of the aircraft’s components occurred secretly. When Johnson ordered altimeters calibrated to 80,000 feet from a company whose instruments only went to 45,000 feet, the CIA set up a cover story involving experimental rocket aircraft. Shell Oil developed a new low-volatility, low vapor pressure jet fuel that would not evaporate at high altitudes. This fuel became known as JP-7. Due to the commonality of the ingredients in JP-7 and Flit, a Shell insect repellent, manufacturing several thousand gallons of JP-7 for the CL-282 in 1955 caused a nationwide shortage of Flit. Shell had no comment about the cause of the shortage.

  The CL-282 was renamed the U-2 in July 1955. The “U” referred to the deliberately vague designation “Utility” instead of “R,” the normal designation for reconnaissance aircraft. The U-1 and U-3 already existed, so the U-2 was chosen. The joint CIA-USAF project was called Project Dragon Lady.

  The USAF sought to take total control of the project but President Eisenhower was opposed to military personnel flying the aircraft. USAF recruited pilots for the program but they had to resign their military commissions before joining the agency as civilians. The program offered high salaries and the USAF promised that pilots could return to their units at their former ranks when their U-2 duties ended.

  On August 1, 1955, the first flight occurred at Groom Lake, a salt flat in Nevada on the north side of Area 51. The test pilot, Tony LeVier, was only supposed to do a high-speed taxi. The wings were so efficient that the aircraft became airborne at 70 knots. On August 8, the aircraft flew on purpose and reached 32,000 feet. By August 16, it reached 52,000 feet, an altitude never before reached in sustained flight. By September 8, it reached 65,000 feet. Testing continued with eight overflights in the United States. By April 1956 the project leaders were convinced that the aircraft was ready for actual deployment.

  A committee of Army, Navy, USAF, CIA, NSA, and State Department representatives created lists of priority targets for the aircraft. The U-2 project received the list, drew up flight plans, and the committee provided a detailed rationale for presidential approval.

  With approval from the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), the CIA developed a cover story for the U-2 that described the aircraft as a high altitude weather research plane. The cover story would be used if the aircraft were lost over hostile territory. To support the story, U-2s took weather photos that appeared in the press.

  Some advisors disagreed with the cover story. They believed that if the U-2 was lost, the U.S. should acknowledge its use as prevention against surprise attacks. This advice was not followed and the weather cover story led to the diplomatic disaster that followed the downing of a U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers in May of 1960.

  President Eisenhower worried that overflights of the Soviet Union might cause a war. While the U-2 was under development, Eisenhower proposed to Khrushchev that the Soviet Union and the U.S. should grant each other access to airfields to photograph military installations. Khrushchev rejected this “Open Skies” policy. Meanwhile, the CIA told Eisenhower that the Soviets could not track the U-2. The CIA belief was based on old Soviet radar systems, which were not as effective at high altitudes as current Soviet systems. CIA Director Dulles also told Eisenhower that if an aircraft were lost, the pilot would almost certainly not survive. For all of these reasons, Eisenhower approved 10 days of overflights.

  The first overflight of hostile territory covered Poland and East Germany in June 1956. The first Soviet overflight was on July 4, 1956. The main target was the Soviet submarine construction program in Leningrad. The next flights overflew both Moscow and Leningrad searching for “Bison” bombers and rocket factories. The U.S. intelligence community feared that the Soviets were outbuilding us in bombers, creating what came to be known as the “Bomber Gap.”

  The CIA found that the Soviets could not consistently track the U-2s so the Soviets didn’t know that Moscow and Leningrad had been overflown. The U-2s’ photos showed images of MIG-15s and MIG-17s attempting and failing to intercept the aircraft. This strengthened the CIA’s belief that the Soviets could not shoot down a U-2.

  The Soviets protested the overflights. The U.S. replied that no American military planes had overflown Soviet territory. The Soviet protest showed that they could track the U-2 for extended periods and this caused Eisenhower to halt the overflights. The eight overflights had already shown that a “Bomber Gap” did not exist, but because the Eisenhower Administration could not disclose the source of its intelligence, congressional and public debate over the supposed bomber gap continued.

  In May 1957, the President again authorized overflights over certain important soviet missile and atomic facilities. Eisenhower personally authorized each flight. Lockheed meanwhile, painted the U-2 in a blue-black color that helped it blend against the darkness of space.

  In April 1958, The CIA concluded that the U-2 project had a security leak. The source of the leak was never identified, but it was speculated that Lee Harvey Oswald, then a radar operator at a U-2 base in Japan, was the source.

  The Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957 gave credence to claims of a missile gap between the Soviets and the United States. Some claimed the Soviets might have a three-to-one advantage in ICBMs (InterContinental Ballistic Missiles). The concern over the missile gap caused Eisenhower to reauthorize one Soviet overflight as well as many electronic intelligence gathering (ELINT) flights along the Soviet border. These missions could not confirm or deny the missile gap and Eisenhower authorized one overflight in April 1960. The Soviets, with their advanced radar, were able to quickly track this flight. But despite the greater risk now, the CIA failed to stop the overflights because of overconfidence from the years of successful missions. Eisenhower authorized one more overflight to occur no later than May 1, 1960 because the important Paris Summit would begin May 16.

  The 24th deep penetration Soviet overflight occurred on May 1, 1960. It was an ambitious flight plan crossing the Soviet Union. The flight launched from Peshawar, Pakistan, and was to land in Bodo, Norway. Previous flights had always exited in the direction from which they originated. Francis Gary Powers, the most experienced pilot with 27 missions flown, was chosen to fly. The Soviets began tracking the U-2 15 miles outside the border. Over Sverdlovsk, 4 ½ hours into the flight, one of three SA-2 missiles detonated behind the aircraft at 70,000 feet. Another missile hit a Soviet interceptor attempting to reach the U-2. Powers’ aircraft was disabled by the missile blast and because of transverse “G” forces he was unable to reach the plane’s self-destruct mechanism. He ejected, parachuted to the ground and was quickly captured. The crash did not destr
oy the U-2 and the Soviets were able to identify much of the equipment. The CIA knew none of this.

  The CIA, believing that a U-2 crash would not be survivable, used the pre-existing cover story. On May 3, NASA (the successor to NACA) announced that one of its aircraft, making a highaltitude research flight in Turkey, was missing. It stated that a “weather plane” had strayed off course after its pilot had oxygen difficulties.

  By remaining silent, Khrushchev lured the Americans into reinforcing the cover story until he revealed on May 7 that Powers was alive. Eisenhower publicly took full responsibility for the incident on May 11. The Paris Summit collapsed after Khrushchev demanded an apology from the U.S., which Eisenhower refused.

  Powers confessed after months of extensive interrogation. In August 1960, he was convicted of espionage and sentenced to three years of prison followed by seven years of hard labor. In February of 1962, Powers was exchanged for Russian spy Rudolf Abel.

  Powers returned home but he was criticized for failing to activate the self-destruct system, which would have destroyed the camera, the film, and the classified parts of the airplane. Some officials also criticized him for not using an optional CIA suicide pin hidden inside a hollowed out silver dollar. The CIA, USAF, and Lockheed debriefed Powers extensively. He appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee. They determined that Powers had followed orders, had not divulged any critical information to the Soviets, and had conducted himself “as a fine young man under dangerous circumstances.”

  Powers took a job with Lockheed as a test pilot from 1963 to 1970. In 1970, he wrote a book titled “Operation Overflight: a Memoir of the U-2 Incident.” The book cast negative publicity on the CIA and Lockheed fired him. He eventually got a job with KNBC, Los Angeles, as a helicopter pilot.

  I had gone out to Beale AFB in July 1977 to interview for the U-2 job. While standing around the squadron, we were asked to assemble in the common U-2/SR-71 briefing room to hear a guest speaker. Our mystery guest that day was Francis Gary Powers. He briefed us on his part in the development of the U-2 program and I had a chance to talk to him after the meeting. He felt that it was possible that someone sabotaged his airplane on the ground in Peshawar, Pakistan and that’s what brought down his aircraft, not the SA-2 missiles.

  About a week later, on August 1, 1977, Powers died in a helicopter crash in the Sepulveda Dam recreation area; he had run out of fuel. According to Powers’s son, a mechanic had replaced a faulty fuel gauge without telling Powers, who misread it. At the last moment, he noticed children playing in the area and directed the helicopter away from them. Had he not done this, he might have landed safely.

  The U-2 played a prominent role in another Cold War event, The Cuban Missile Crisis. This crisis was the moment the Cold War came closest to turning into nuclear conflict.

  In the late summer of 1962, Khrushchev and Castro made a secret agreement to construct several missile sites in Cuba. Scholars have argued about the reason why these missiles were placed there. Some say that Khrushchev didn’t really want the missiles in Cuba but was just using them to pressure the U.S. to remove its missiles from Turkey and Italy. Others believe that Castro pressured the Russians to place the missiles there in order to bolster his security against an impending U.S. invasion. Whatever the reason for their placement, they were noticed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which tasked a U-2 to scan suspected sites. The U-2 brought back evidence of medium and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles only 90 miles from U.S. soil.

  The crisis caused by the evidence of this film brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. President Kennedy ordered a blockade of Cuba to prevent any more arms from entering the country. Several Russian vessels tried to run the blockade, increasing the chance of war between the super powers. Both countries refused to back down, but meanwhile, back-channel negotiations were ongoing between the U.S. and Russia. During these negotiations, a U-2, flown by Major Rudolf Anderson, was shot down over Cuba by a Soviet SA-2 missile. All of President Kennedy’s Joint Chiefs called for an invasion of Cuba because of the shoot down. The President did not retaliate and allowed negotiations to continue. The crisis was resolved when the Russians agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba and in return the U.S. secretly agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey and Italy. Major Anderson’s body was recovered from Cuba and brought back to his home in South Carolina for burial. He was the first recipient of the Air Force Cross, the second highest military award that the USAF can give. It’s awarded for extraordinary heroism to an individual who distinguishes him or herself in combat.

  Chapter 3

  In July of 1977 my wait was over. I received notice to report to Beale for evaluation. Normally, I was always in good physical condition. I ran, lifted weights, waterskied, and played tennis and racquetball. To prepare for the U-2 medical evaluation, I ramped it up. I increased my running mileage and started running stadium steps as well. I was now training hard six days a week. By the time I left for Beale, I was in the best shape of my life.

  The U-2 medical evaluation was essentially the same as NASA’s astronaut physical. Everything was evaluated: Cardiovascular health, balance, blood work, vision, and urine were tested. We were even tested to see if we were susceptible to flicker vertigo. This is an imbalance in brain cell activity caused by exposure to low frequency flickering of a bright light. This flickering can cause disorientation, vertigo and nausea. The effects of it are similar to seizures caused by epilepsy. Scientists investigating a series of unexplained helicopter crashes first noticed this phenomenon. Flicker vertigo in a helicopter occurs when the pilot looks up through the blades of the main rotor as it turns in the sun causing the light to strobe. Some people are vulnerable to flicker vertigo and a vulnerable pilot may lose control of his aircraft and/or have a seizure.

  To ensure I was mentally healthy, I was thoroughly evaluated by an Air Force psychiatrist. I passed all of his tests.

  The most thorough tests were saved for the heart. In addition to all the normal cardiac tests, I was also subjected to a stress EKG. I was hooked up with wires to an EKG machine and placed on a treadmill. The treadmill inclination was set to “0” and I started out with a walking pace. Every three minutes, the treadmill speed increased, as did the incline. I was told to go as long as I could and, since I wanted in this program, I did. After 18 minutes I was running full bore up a steep hill. I had enough and signaled the operator to cut it. He lowered the angle and slowed the speed. When the treadmill stopped I got off but remained attached to the EKG machine. They continued to monitor me for about five more minutes just to see how long it took for my heart to return to normal. The EKG technician said he’d never seen anyone go so long on this test. I was feeling pretty good about the test after that remark. My attitude was about to change.

  The cardiologist met with me after the test to go over the results. I expected the doctor would praise my excellent conditioning. Instead he shocked me by telling me that I had the heart of a 45-year old with cardiac ischemia. In layman’s terms, it meant that my heart muscle was receiving insufficient blood flow. I was stunned. He showed me the little blips on the paper. Then he calmly told me that I was grounded and I probably would never fly for the Air Force again. I was 29 years old, in the best shape of my life, and my future was crumbling before me. Up to this point, I had passed every physical and mental test they had thrown at me. This made no sense at all. Before leaving the room, the doctor said there might be a way for me to fly again. If I wanted to get back on flying status badly enough, I would have to go to the Brooks Army Medical Center in San Antonio Texas for a “thorough” evaluation. If I passed all of their tests, I would be allowed to fly again. I had no choice. I packed my bags for San Antonio.

  The best word I can come up with to describe the process at Brooks would be “exhaustive.” This physical lasted two weeks. You can do a lot of testing in two weeks and I had them all. I was at Brooks to have my heart problem evaluated and even though I had passed every other t
est given at Beale, I still had to undergo every test they had. Every hearing, vision, blood, balance, and mental test was retaken. Plus a few more I hadn’t taken previously. One of the additional tests was a radioisotope scan. Radioisotopes were injected into my blood stream. Then I was inserted into what looked like a drawer at the morgue. When the drawer was closed I was in total darkness with my body pressed up against the sides and only a few inches between my face and the lid. They did give me a panic button to use just in case. But now I know what it feels like to be buried alive. I was never really sure if this was really a radioisotope test or a test to measure my panic quotient. I didn’t hit the panic button but my thumb remained on it throughout.

  One of the lighter moments during those two weeks occurred when I ran across a navigator I had flown with in the C-130. He was at Brooks for an evaluation of an eye problem. We met in the lobby of our temporary quarters and I hardly recognized him. My eyes had been dilated for a macular degeneration test and I couldn’t see much of anything. His vision was fine and he called me over when he spotted me. Once I got close enough to him I knew who he was and we caught up on old times. He had a heart monitor attached for a 24-hour EKG. Within a few minutes, the irony of the situation had us both laughing.

  No matter what your medical condition is, when you get to Brooks, everything is looked at so they could build their database. So a heart patient with dilated eyes talking to an eye patient with a heart monitor was not unusual.

  I retook the stress EKG and once again went 18 minutes. This time the cardiologist who monitored the test told me my heart was perfectly fine. He attributed the previous negative results to an over-developed heart muscle wall. He said this happened frequently in competitive athletes. The wall of the heart thickens and gives off erroneous electrical signals. The next test, an echocardiogram, confirmed this. The echocardiogram showed a view of my beating heart on a video screen. The video screen showed a healthy heart. I was relieved that these tests came out positive, but as my doctor explained to me, they couldn’t release me to fly again until I had a cardiac catherization. Even though that first doctor at Beale had been proven wrong, his evaluation was part of my permanent medical record and there was only one way the Air Force would let me fly again. I had to pass the cardiac catherization.