Exceptional

by Dick Cheney

  And what were the consequences of the Kremlin’s objectives? NSC-68 put it this way:

  The design . . . calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

  To defend against the expanded Soviet threat, NSC-68 called for the rapid buildup by the United States and its allies of the “political, economic, and military strength” of the free world. Though some argued that America should retreat into isolation, Secretary of State Acheson memorably pointed out the flaw in this thinking:

  We should not pull down the blinds and sit in the parlor with a loaded shotgun, waiting. Isolation was not a realistic course of action. It did not work and it had not been cheap. Appeasement of Soviet ambitions was, in fact, only an alternative form of isolation. It would lead to a final struggle for survival with both our moral and our military position weakened.

  Put another way, in cautionary words from the document itself that seem particularly relevant sixty-five years later, “No people in history have preserved their freedom who thought that by not being strong enough to protect themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.”

  IN THE POWER STRUGGLE that followed Soviet premier Stalin’s 1953 death, Nikita Khrushchev emerged victorious, becoming first secretary of the Communist Party and, in 1958, premier of the Soviet Union. In 1956 Khrushchev took the unprecedented step of condemning Stalin and some of his harshest tactics in a secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

  Despite this, Khrushchev remained an unrepentant Marxist-Leninist and was certainly no friend to the United States. He did not bother to hide his bellicosity. In November 1956 at a cocktail party at the Polish embassy in Moscow, “red-faced and gesticulating,” he famously told the assembled Western diplomats, “We will bury you . . . whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.”

  His threats became more specific as he bragged about the progress Moscow was making in the area of missile technology. President Eisenhower, who took office in 1953, had doubled the rate of B-52 bomber production. Khrushchev knew his bomber force could not match America’s, so he changed the subject. “Bombers are useless,” he said, “compared to rockets.”

  Time reported: “Every day of every week, Moscow rolls out pronouncements about the successes of its experiments with intercontinental ballistic missiles.” The magazine quoted Khrushchev saying, “In the day of the missile, Europe might become ‘a veritable cemetery,’ and the US is just as vulnerable.”

  Khrushchev’s threats did not appear to be idle. In May 1957, the Soviets launched the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile and, in October of that year, the world’s first satellite, Sputnik. Because the Soviet Union was a closed society, the West could not be sure just how large Khrushchev’s arsenal was. Nor could they know the economic deprivation the Soviet government was willing to force on its people in order to free up money to spend on defense.

  On a visit to Moscow in July 1959, Vice President Richard Nixon met with Khrushchev, and together they toured the first-ever American trade exhibit in the Soviet Union. Beginning in a model of an American kitchen and then carrying on into a modern television studio, Khrushchev and Nixon conducted a spontaneous debate about the merits of communism versus capitalism. It was an extraordinary event, portions of it captured on film, all of it conducted with the press corps hanging on every word. The two men sparred about everything from standards of living to kitchen appliances to missiles.

  In response to Khrushchev’s assertion that the Soviet Union met the needs of all of its citizens, Nixon explained the merits of freedom and choice. “Diversity, the right to choose, the fact that we have 1,000 builders building 1,000 different houses is the most important thing. We don’t have one decision made at the top by one government official.” Khrushchev argued that the American exhibit really wasn’t that impressive. “It’s clear to me,” he said, “that the construction workers didn’t manage to finish their work.” It didn’t matter, though, because, Khrushchev explained, the Soviets would soon be passing the Americans by in every way.

  In response, Nixon echoed a theme to which he returned throughout the day, the importance of people communicating freely: “I can only say that if this competition which you have described so effectively, in which you plan to outstrip us, particularly in the production of consumer goods . . . If this competition is to do the best for both of our peoples and for people everywhere, there must be a free exchange of ideas.” There were some areas where the Soviets were ahead of the United States and others where the situation was reversed, said Nixon. As Khrushchev interrupted to assert Soviet predominance in rocket technology, Nixon smiled, put his hand on Khrushchev’s shoulder, and said, “You must not be afraid of ideas.”

  IN HIS FAREWELL ADDRESS to the nation on January 17, 1961, President Eisenhower issued a warning about the “military-industrial complex.” His warning has sometimes been distorted by those claiming he opposed the establishment of such a complex. A full reading of his remarks reveals something quite different. “A vital element in keeping the peace,” Eisenhower said, “is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.” The threat America faced was so great that “we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense.” It had become necessary, he said, to create “a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment.” In other words, the military-industrial complex was created of necessity for the defense of the nation.

  “We recognize the imperative need for this development,” Eisenhower continued. “Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications.” These included the possibility of undue influence on our government. Eisenhower warned:

  In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. . . . We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

  Every president since has had to grapple with this fundamental issue. Without our armed forces, there would be no liberty. They are the ultimate guarantor and protector of our freedoms. But as our civilian leaders adopt policies to provide for our security, they must also keep in mind their sacred duty to safeguard the civil liberties of the American people.

  IN JANUARY 1961 A new American president took the oath of office. The first president born in the twentieth century, John F. Kennedy carried an aura of glamour, vigor, intellect, and energy. A handsome war hero, he had prevailed in 1960 in part by portraying the Eisenhower-Nixon administration as weak on communism. Throughout the campaign he criticized the “missile gap,” the superiority in missiles that Eisenhower had purportedly allowed the Soviets to achieve.

  Expectations for the new president were high, but the first months did not go well. Kennedy approved a plan, inherited from the Eisenhower administration, to use Cuban exiles to spark an uprising aimed at ousting Cuba’s communist dictator, Fidel Castro. At the last minute, however, Kennedy canceled the U.S. air support the exiles were counting on. The invasion failed, the CIA-backed guerrillas were ca
ptured, and the Bay of Pigs operation went down in history as a fiasco.

  In Moscow, Khrushchev followed events closely. He was sizing up America’s new president, and he wasn’t impressed. This seemed to be a man he could get the better of, and he planned to do just that at their upcoming summit in Vienna.

  Documents in the Soviet archives released since the collapse of the Soviet Union detail Khrushchev’s plan. In a meeting with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on May 26, 1961, Khrushchev laid out his scheme for isolating West Berlin and shutting off the flow of refugees from the East. He did not believe the Americans or any of the other Western powers would stop him, and as he saw it the situation was dire: thousands of East German citizens were fleeing the Soviet Bloc through West Berlin. Khrushchev planned to notify Kennedy that the Soviets and the East Germans would sign a treaty by the end of the year closing all corridors of access to West Berlin, with or without U.S. approval.

  Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna June 3–4, 1961. The two-day meeting was tense throughout, but it was over the issue of Berlin that Khrushchev’s bullying reached its peak. Kennedy explained to Khrushchev that America would not accept the loss of access to West Berlin. In the aftermath of World War II, the Allies had agreed on arrangements for the governing of Berlin, and Kennedy told Khrushchev that the Soviets could not unilaterally change that agreement by denying access to the other powers. Khrushchev threatened that if the Americans attempted to exercise those rights after the treaty with East Germany had been signed, the Soviets would respond militarily.

  New York Times reporter James “Scotty” Reston had an interview scheduled with Kennedy at the end of the second day of meetings. Reston reported that the president entered the room, sank down on a couch, and sighed. Reston said to him, “Pretty rough?” Kennedy replied, “Roughest thing in my life.” Reston wrote:

  Kennedy said just enough in that room to convince me of the following:

  Khrushchev had studied the events of the Bay of Pigs; he would have understood if Kennedy had left Castro alone or destroyed him; but when Kennedy was rash enough to strike at Cuba and not bold enough to finish the job, Khrushchev decided he was dealing with an inexperienced young leader who could be intimidated and blackmailed.

  Khrushchev left Vienna and went to East Berlin, where he announced a treaty would be concluded by December 31. As the pace of the exodus from the East increased that summer—16,500 refugees fled into West Berlin in the first eleven days of August alone—Khrushchev decided more immediate action was needed. In the early morning hours of August 13, 1961, Time reported, East Berliners were awakened by “the scream of sirens and the clank of steel on cobblestones” as military convoys spread across their portion of the city, sealing off all access points to the West:

  As the troops arrived at scores of border points, cargo trucks were already unloading rolls of barbed wire, concrete posts, wooden horses, stone blocks, picks and shovels. When dawn came four hours later, a wall divided East Berlin from the West.

  Would Khrushchev have risked the wall if Eisenhower had still been in office? It seems unlikely. Khrushchev had issued threats to shut off Western access to Berlin in 1958 and then backed down after meeting with Eisenhower in the United States. Khrushchev’s assessment of Kennedy as weak and inexperienced clearly played into his decision making.

  It is also true that the building of the Berlin Wall was an admission of the failure of the communist system. There is nothing one can say in defense of a system of government that can keep its people within its borders only by what Time described as “bullets, bayonets, and barricades.” Those aspects of communist systems—the secret police, the persecution, the murder, the oppression, the absence of freedom—that required a wall across the heart of Berlin to imprison its people would also be the characteristics that brought about communism’s ultimate collapse thirty years later.

  ONCE THE WALL WENT up, the world wondered what the Soviets would do next. Would Khrushchev back down or would he provoke a larger crisis between the two nuclear-armed nations by carrying out his pledge to prevent Western access to the entire city?

  Kennedy decided to call Khrushchev’s bluff. Since taking office, Kennedy had learned that the missile gap on which he had campaigned did not exist. In fact, U.S. satellite images had confirmed the Soviets’ arsenal was smaller than America’s. Kennedy decided to send a clear message to Khrushchev about America’s strategic superiority, as a warning against escalation of the Berlin crisis.

  He authorized his deputy secretary of defense, Roswell Gilpatric, to give a speech detailing America’s military advantage. After listing the immediate steps America had taken in response to Soviet actions in Berlin, Gilpatric continued, “But our real strength in Berlin—and at any other point in the perimeter of the free world’s defenses that might tempt Communist probes—is much more broadly based.” America was confident in its ability to deter communist action because of “a sober appreciation of the relative military power of the two sides.” Despite the Soviet bluster about their superiority, Gilpatric said he suspected they actually knew the truth. He wanted to be sure they knew that we knew it, too:

  While the Soviets use rigid security as a military weapon, their Iron Curtain is not so impenetrable as to force us to accept at face value the Kremlin’s boasts. The fact is that this nation has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part.

  Describing the land-, air-, and sea-based platforms that constituted America’s nuclear triad, Gilpatric explained, “The total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles, tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thousands; and, of course, we have more than one warhead for each vehicle.” Summing up, Gilpatric said, “In short, we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first. Therefore, we are confident that the Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear conflict.” In closing, Gilpatric issued one more clear warning to Khrushchev:

  Those who would impose a totalitarian world order and deny men and nations the right to pursue their own destinies should understand one point very clearly. The United States does not seek to resolve disputes by violence. But if forceful interference with our rights and obligations should lead to violent conflict—as it well might—the United States does not intend to be defeated.

  Khrushchev decided not to escalate the crisis in Berlin. He would, however, test American resolve a year later when he installed SS-4 and SS-5 ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba. Missile sites in Cuba gave him the ability to directly threaten the United States. He was also interested in expanding the Soviet sphere of influence and supporting Castro’s Marxist-Leninist regime. As Khrushchev claimed later, “The fate of Cuba and the maintenance of Soviet prestige in that part of the world pre-occupied me. We had to think of some way of confronting America with more than words. . . . The logical answer was missiles.”

  Khrushchev likely assumed he could take advantage of a president he had judged to be weak, but he was wrong. Speaking to the nation on October 22, 1962, Kennedy reminded his audience, “The 1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war.” Therefore, America had to secure “the withdrawal or elimination” of the Soviet missiles. He announced he would impose a quarantine on shipments of all offensive military equipment to Cuba. He ordered the armed forces to “prepare for any eventualities,” and he made clear he would hold the Soviets responsible: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”

  Kennedy addressed Premier Khrushchev and said he now had an opportunity to “move the world back from the abyss of destruction” by removing the missiles. Over the next few days, the crisis built. On October 24, twenty Russian ships lo
oked set to challenge the quarantine. Instead, they turned around.

  On October 26, Khrushchev transmitted a long letter to Kennedy. If Kennedy promised not to invade Cuba, Khrushchev would remove the missiles. While the Americans were preparing a response, a second letter arrived. This one added a new condition. Kennedy must also agree to remove NATO missiles from Turkey. The Americans decided to publicly ignore the second letter and respond to the first. At the same time, Attorney General Robert Kennedy met secretly with the Soviet ambassador and agreed to withdraw the missiles from Turkey within six months. The next day, Radio Moscow announced that the order had been given to dismantle and remove the missiles from Cuba. Because the Turkish agreement was secret, Khrushchev appeared to have been the one who blinked.

  The Cuban Missile Crisis reminded officials and citizens alike of the reality of the nuclear threat. In its aftermath the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. A new doctrine was developed that would govern America’s nuclear policy for the next twenty years, mutual assured destruction, or MAD, which meant that our own nuclear arsenal had to be of sufficient size and quality that the Soviets would know, were they ever to strike first, that we would survive the attack and strike back with devastating force. In their first strike on us, they would be sowing the seeds of their own annihilation.

  IN BERLIN IN 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets used military force to crush opposition movements within the Soviet Bloc. They were simultaneously providing military and economic support for insurgents and guerrilla movements in noncommunist countries around the globe, including for the Viet Cong guerrillas, who were attempting a communist takeover of South Vietnam. In response, in 1961, President Kennedy sent 500 U.S. military advisors to train the South Vietnamese. By the end of 1963, there were more than 16,000 American military advisors in Vietnam. At the height of the war, in 1968, President Lyndon Johnson had deployed 563,000 American troops to Vietnam.