Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  Whatever the truth of the matter, it was an extremely complicated move, one that depended on the enemy doing nothing but watch it unfold. As Liddell Hart says, “The only defence is that Scipio managed to carry it off…. Scipio ran the risk, hoping Hasdrubal would hesitate, which, in fact, he did.”41

  So why did the Carthaginians do nothing? Livy describes Hasdrubal as “the greatest and most famous general of the Carthaginians after the Barcas.”42 His most recent translator, J. C. Yardley, however, blames Hasdrubal, asking why he simply stood in position and allowed all this to be done in front of him. All the fancy maneuvering had left gaps in the Roman line, and exposed their flanks to the Carthaginians. “But on all the evidence Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was a hopeless general.”43 Just the fact that his army had been wrong-footed by the early Roman deployment may have paralyzed Hasdrubal, as possibly he feared some other deception and simply bided his time when he should have been launching an attack of his own.44

  Scipio’s Generalship

  SPACE DOES NOT ALLOW ANY FURTHER DESCRIPTION of Scipio’s actions in other battles, though he continued to show originality in battles around Carthage in 204–202. The epitome of his career was his confrontation with the master, Hannibal himself, at Zama, not far from Carthage. The student won, perhaps fittingly, with a double envelopment of Hannibal’s army, though some sources opine that had the two armies been of equal quality the outcome may have been different. He fought in Gaul after that and spent much time in Roman politics. Politics proved his ultimate undoing. As Goldsworthy recounts, “Africanus was a poor politician who had difficulty achieving his objectives in the Senate quietly and without confrontation.… Depressed by the ingratitude of the State he had served so well, [he] went into voluntary exile in his villa in Liternum, where he died soon afterwards in 187.”45

  Scipio fulfills so many of the eleven principles of war that it is very difficult to pick two or three as examples. Perhaps one of the most important is his focus on the objective. When he arrived in Spain, many in Rome may have been expecting him to do little more than engage in a holding action to keep supplies and reinforcements from reaching Hannibal in Italy. If so, he disappointed them. He grasped two major concepts about how to fight in Spain. First, he knew that he could not win without a strong and secure base to maintain his lines of communication with Rome. Second, he knew that he could not defeat a united Carthaginian army. Object number one was accomplished with the capture of Novo Carthago. To achieve the second objective, he made sure he fought only separated armies: Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula and Hasdrubal Gisgo at Ilipa. After both victories he withdrew to the east coast rather than try to stretch his logistics by operating in the countryside at too great a distance from his base. Winning a series of limited objectives added up to the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain.

  In addition, Scipio mastered the art of the maneuver. By breaking with traditional Roman tactics he caught the enemy unaware of what a new Roman army could do. The Battle of Ilipa was a tactical masterpiece, showing how a small army can defeat a larger one by shaking things up and using maneuver to keep it off balance, a capability he developed by introducing a more flexible formation.46 Though the capture of Novo Carthago did not involve innovation, the surprise attack across the lagoon was at the time a most un-Roman thing to have done. Still, all three of the battles discussed here show a single theme, as described by Liddell Hart: “In the sphere of tactics there is a lesson in his consummate blending of the principles of surprise and security.”47

  That brings us to security. Scipio illustrated from the beginning that he understood this concept fully. It was almost certainly driven home for him by the father’s and uncle’s deaths by desertion. So before the march on Novo Carthago he shared his plan with no one but Laelius, his chief of staff, who happened to be a childhood friend. Even as he accepted the pledges of tribe after tribe in the months and years following, he never fully trusted them. This is best shown at Ilipa, where he needed the Spaniards but determined not to depend on them. As Polybius observes, “He was obliged to yield to the force of circumstances so far as to employ the Iberians; but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers to the enemy, while he really fought the action with his own legions.”48 Also, by withdrawing to his base after his victories, he made it much more difficult for the Carthaginians to gather intelligence on Roman actions or plans.

  SCIPIO’S SUCCESS WITH his new tactics proved to be vital to the overall change in the Roman military. The fighting style Hannibal introduced was embraced by Scipio’s generation. By the end of the Second Punic War, the Roman army had developed from an unwieldy hoplite-style phalanx into a highly mobile force in which even heavy infantry were capable of rapid and independent maneuvers. The Romans learned the use of lightly armed troops and cavalry, and, above all, the concept and practice of combined arms.49 Not just fighting style but the craft of generalship itself blossomed, and Scipio was the first to illustrate its advantages. Scipio learned well, so well that he never became predictable. Polybius said it best: “For while a general ought to be quite alive to what is taking place, and rightly so, he ought to use whatever movements suit the circumstances.”50

  6

  Gaius Julius Caesar (100–48 BC)

  Roman General

  ‘Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world

  Like a Colossus, and we petty men

  Walk under his huge legs and peep about

  To find ourselves dishonourable graves.’

  —Julius Caesar, 1.2.134–37

  William Shakespeare

  JULIUS CAESAR WAS BORN IN 100 BC into a politically prominent family. His uncle Marius had recently made a name for himself by organizing a new kind of Roman army and defeating an invasion of Gauls. Early in Caesar’s life, his father was elected praetor, a judicial magistrate; a year later he was appointed to a governorship in Asia Minor. In 91 BC, a number of Latin provinces revolted against Rome, complaining of poor treatment after all their support over the years of Rome’s growing power. This Social War lasted until 88 BC, and Marius, one of the primary figures involved, enjoyed the support of the common people, the populares. During the war, however, another general performed well: Lucius Sulla, a favorite of the upper classes, the optimates. A rivalry began between the two men, one that reflected the rivalry of the two social classes. An attempt by both to lead an expedition to suppress a rebellion in Asia Minor (the so-called Mithradatic War) resulted in a civil war in Italy, with Marius forced to flee. While Sulla went to fight in Asia Minor, Marius returned to Rome and killed his enemies, but died of natural causes soon thereafter. This political violence left Marius’s supporters and family in serious danger.

  When Sulla returned from victory in the East, he had himself named dictator and proceeded to use his position to severely limit the political role of the populares. He considered having Caesar killed since he was a part of Marius’s extended family, but, admiring the young man’s spirit, let him live. He did so reluctantly. When some assured him that Caesar, at only eighteen, could do no harm, “he declared that they had no sense if they did not see in this boy many Mariuses.”1

  Fearful for his life, however, Caesar fled Rome to the region of the Sabines (modern Umbria), then further to the Adriatic, from whence he sailed to Bithynia (north-central Asia Minor). In the two years he was there, he served with the Roman governor and fought in the siege of Miletus, where he was decorated for bravery. He had other adventures (including being held for ransom by pirates and later killing them) and then went to Rhodes to study oratory. Plutarch says he was naturally gifted and could have been famous for that skill alone (like his fellow student Cicero), but that instead he pursued politics and military affairs.2

  With Sulla’s influence gradually declining, Caesar returned to Rome in 78 BC to practice law, a profession often used as an avenue to enter politics.3 He did not, however, ignore potential military glory. In 74 BC he raised a force to travel to Asia Minor for the Second Mithradatic War.
His troops defended various Roman towns and gave the local governor time to raise a full army. Caesar returned to Rome a full-fledged war hero. Now well known, he began dabbling in political affairs.

  In 68 BC, Caesar became a quaestor (comptroller) in the Spanish province of Baetica. In 65 he was named an aedile in Rome, a kind of a city manager. Responsible for taking care of the temples and overseeing the games, Casear ingratiated himself to the populares; he planned to succeed his uncle Marius as their champion. He was elected high priest (pontifex maximus) two years later and continued to curry influence with the common people. A year later he was elected praetor, a high judge. By this point, the optimate party had started to become concerned by his stature. An accusation was leveled against him for conspiracy to commit sacrilege while he had been high priest, and it took a sizable number of bribes to make that problem disappear. Indeed, by 61 BC Caesar was broke; he had spent lavishly to acquire each of his elected positions, for his ultimate goal was the top office, that of consul, and the path to higher office was often determined by one’s display of extravagance while an aedile.4

  At this point, however, Caesar’s fortunes changed. Marcus Licinius Crassus, the richest man in Rome, paid his debts. Crassus was sure it was an investment that would pay off in the future—and he was right. Caesar quickly left Italy and went back to Baetica, where he got himself appointed governor. There he seized the opportunity to suppress several rebellious towns, which he looted for the immense profit of himself and his troops. He returned to Rome a very wealthy man. He repaid Crassus and, with his wealth and popularity with the people, was able to get himself elected consul.

  Caesar was in constant dispute with his co-consul, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus, and, after using his bodyguard to rough up his opponents, decided to strengthen his position by allying himself with the two leading lights of Rome. Crassus he had already befriended; he now gained the favor of the greatest living war hero, Cnaeus Pompeius Magnus—Pompey the Great. Caesar mediated a disagreement between the two (who had been coconsuls in 70–69 BC), and then forced a land law through the Senate that favored Pompey’s retired veterans. Caesar also married off his daughter to Pompey, making a son-in-law of a man six years his elder. Together, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus became the first Triumvirate, a three-headed political beast that exercised enormous political influence over the Roman political scene. For Caesar this was a master stroke.5

  Caesar’s term as consul was marked by a mixture of reform and intimidation. He made sure that all records of the Senate and Popular Assemblies were made public, and he strengthened a law against extortion in the provinces. When he ran into opposition on other bills, he did not hesitate to use physical force to frighten or remove those voting against him. He also enriched himself with bribes. Most importantly, he secured a five-year appointment to govern Cisapline Gaul, followed soon thereafter with the addition of a one-year term as governor of Transalpine Gaul. At age forty-three, Caesar was ready to assume the highest political position. Although he had enriched himself in Spain, in Rome he had been a busy yet relatively unmemorable political player. His ambition now demanded new challenges and new frontiers in order to fulfill what he believed was his destiny.6 What he had learned in battle and in politics were both put to good use in the next ten years.

  Warfare of the Time

  ALTHOUGH THE WEAPONRY OF THE ROMAN SOLDIERS had not changed significantly since the time of Scipio Africanus and the Punic Wars, the organization of the army had. The manipular legion of the third and second centuries BC gave way to the legions made up of cohorts, a unit organization attributed to Marius around the turn of the first century BC. The previously divided lines of hastati, principes, and triarii were consolidated into a single unit. Historian of the Roman army Lawrence Keppie writes, “[The cohort] was a convenient subdivision of the legion, capable of independent action. The idea seems likely to derive from the organization of the allied contingents which were provided annually to serve with the legion.”7 The legion came to consist often cohorts made up of three maniples of two centuries of around 80 men, giving a total of roughly 4,800 men.8 Legions could, as in the days of the Punic Wars, number as many as 6,000 men under emergency conditions. With aspects both of the phalanx and the maniple, the legion made of cohorts could work both in mass and in parts, making it able to both meet large enemy formations and to respond to an attack from any direction.9 The auxiliary troops, like skirmishers and cavalry, fast were becoming exclusively foreign mercenaries or allies.

  Cohorts, unlike maniples, were not divided into three ranks based on age or experience. The reason for this stemmed from two major changes to the Roman military during Marius’s time. First, extended enlistments became common as more distant conflicts made single-season campaigns impossible. This coincided with a renewed use of the urban poor rather than landowners as recruits. Without the necessary income for the city dweller to purchase his own equipment, the state began to provide arms and armor, which promoted standardization. Thus, all soldiers got the same gear: the pilum (throwing spear), the oval scutum (shield), and short gladius (sword), along with a helmet and mail shirt.10 With all infantrymen armed alike, as noted earlier, this necessitated getting auxiliaries from foreign populations that specialized in archery, cavalry, and so on. Additionally, Marius is credited with introducing the practice of having each soldier carry a large amount of supplies in order to cut down on the baggage train, as well as the requirement that soldiers undergo intense training and drill. Keppie argues that this was not original with Marius, but a return to traditional Roman toughness.11

  In addition to changes in the organization of the army, warfare in Caesar’s time involved more technological complexity. Caesar was a great advocate of engineers and looked to them to provide additional support to the army of Rome. Since he often fought enemies far superior in numbers, he depended on not just the standard daily Roman entrenched camps but also on field fortifications. In his work on ancient warfare, John Warry observes that in Caesar’s battle against the Belgic confederacy, the battle front was coextensive with the adjacent wall of his camp, and he protected his flanks with an earthwork on either side. “Caesar was able to develop their use on account of the astounding speed and efficiency with which his technical arm did its work.… Caesar himself says that the siege of Alesia could not have been undertaken without recourse to elaborate fortifications.”12

  In the Social War of 91–89 BC, the Latin provinces fought for and achieved recognition as Roman citizens. Once their citizenship went into effect, legions became even more heterogeneous in their makeup, since units were no longer “allies” bound by loyalty to a particular region. The number of legions also rose to the point that there were usually at least a dozen in existence at all times. The longer service coupled with the standardized training that came with the standardized weaponry translated into an increased professionalism, which flew in the face of Roman citizen-soldier traditions. Further, and more dangerous to the state, the more time spent away from the center of power meant a closer bond with one’s comrades and commander. Adrian Goldsworthy notes, “The army ceased to represent the whole Roman people under arms and became more and more separate from the rest of society, their loyalty focusing more on their legion than on Rome.… This added an increasingly violent dimension to Rome’s competitive politics.”13

  In the first half of the first century BC there was plenty of opportunity for combat experience. Not only was the northern Gallic frontier often lively, but civil wars in both Italy and in Spain (as well as the major slave revolt under Spartacus) and regular confrontations against Mithradates VI of Pontus in Asia Minor meant that war was more the rule than the exception.

  Romans had fought Gauls (or Celts) for centuries. The Gauls were technologically much the same as in the days of Scipio. Spiritually they had not changed much either: they still seemed to love a good war, although many had settled lives and were engaged in trade. All the northern tribes, whether Gauls, Belgians, Germans, or Bri
tish, varied only in their chosen weaponry, but not in their will to fight. The principal weapon of the Germans was the long spear, as was that of the Helvetii, who entered Gaul by way of modern Switzerland.14 As Dando-Collins notes, “Their men-at-arms joined their traditional clans and formed into solid phalanxes of spearmen many men deep, each wearing a Gallic-style helmet with a plume like a horse’s tail, a small breastplate, and carrying a spear up to twelve feet long. The Helvetii were Celts, larger men than the Romans, brave, and well versed in the arts of war.”15 Both also had excellent cavalry; indeed, Germans became the primary cavalrymen of the Roman army for centuries. Gallic warriors, like the traditional Roman soldier, were typically people of some means. Equipment and weaponry thus reflected one’s place in society, with helmets and mail probably being worn only by the wealthiest.16 For common warriors a long slashing sword and an elongated rectangular wooden shield would have been standard equipment. Without the means to afford armor, the regular infantryman wore anything or, in some reported cases, literally nothing. When massed armies were raised, poorer people would have been raised as a militia to act as slingers or archers.