Rogue Tory

by Denis Smith

  In his private discussions with the president, Diefenbaker sought reassurance that the Bomarc program, whose current funding had recently been denied by Congress, would be maintained. He offered hesitant and tentative support for a joint air defence exercise, “Sky Shield,” for which joint planning had been under way for months. And he pursued discussion on an aircraft swap arrangement that would see Canada purchase sixty-six F-101 fighter interceptors while the United States purchased thirty-seven Canadair CL-44 transport planes. The subject of nuclear warheads for the Canadian Bomarcs was discussed, apparently without contention or agreement. In his own notes for the meeting, Diefenbaker prepared to press for “fair, full and equal participation” in defence planning because “with USA interdependence with Canada usually means that one is stronger than the other.” Whether he actually spoke from the notes is uncertain.16

  The meeting had been amicable and “neighbourly,” as Diefenbaker told parliament. In cabinet, the prime minister reported that Eisenhower “was anxious to remove causes for differences” between the United States and Canada. The president had described the most recent American test firing of an intercontinental missile, which had travelled 9000 miles and “landed within a few hundred yards of the target.” Eisenhower reassured Diefenbaker that “the U.S.S.R. has not a large number of missiles.” Despite some doubts about whether the proposed air defence exercise “Sky Shield” would appear provocative to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the failed summit, on June 15 the cabinet approved the joint operation, to be conducted sometime during September. The closeness of the American relationship was clearly comforting to the Canadian cabinet.17

  During the summer Nikita Khrushchev rattled his (perhaps nonexistent) rockets against the Western alliance in support of the new Castro regime in Cuba. In July the Soviet Union shot down an American RB-47 reconnaissance plane in international airspace. Soon the Soviet leader was also railing against the United Nations and its secretary general, Dag Hammarskjöld, for the Security Council’s intervention in the Congo, where Canada was already contributing technical and supply units to a hastily assembled UN force in conditions of chaos.

  After the aborted summit, Western governments had turned to the United Nations as their diplomatic focus, and a parade of government leaders was now expected to attend the General Assembly in late September. Khrushchev made clear his intention to participate, and was one of the first to arrive in New York. On September 15 Harold Macmillan - who had not yet decided whether to attend - wrote to his Canadian colleague urging him to throw himself into the grand debate.

  I do not know whether you are contemplating going to the Assembly yourself. There are arguments for and against. Mr. Khrushchev will no doubt make a slashing attack on America and the West. What one doesn’t know is whether this is all he has in mind or whether he is prepared for something more constructive. In any case there is a good deal to be said for re-stating the Western case and at the same time trying to test out on the spot whether there is any prospect of restarting the kind of movement which I began in my visit to Moscow eighteen months ago. If there is any hope of this kind of progress, I am sure it would be helpful that some of the Commonwealth Heads of Government should be there to help promote a common purpose … The note, I feel, should be the rebuttal of the crude attacks of communism on the one hand, but on the other the development, in a calm and unprejudiced spirit, of sound and sensible approaches to the solution of some of the world problems with particular reference to disarmament. This might make an impact upon world opinion and especially the uncommitted countries. I would be interested to know what are your plans. If I were to go I do not think it would be in the first few days. The chance of doing anything serious would be better after Mr. Khrushchev’s speech and when people might be looking for some positive action. By that time we shall also know more what is really in Khrushchev’s mind.

  I should be extremely grateful to know your thoughts about all this. Your presence at the General Assembly would of course add enormously to our debating strength.18

  This was an encouraging boost to Diefenbaker’s ego: Macmillan seemed to place him in the big leagues. He brandished no rockets, but he could toss some cutting phrases. The prime minister sensed the opportunity. Two days later he replied:

  Following receipt of your communication I discussed the matter with my colleagues and they are in general agreement that anything in the nature of a boycott by the Western Heads of Government would not be beneficial, while at the same time recognizing that attendance at the Assembly by any of them would be a propaganda victory for Mr. Khrushchev. I am informed that President Eisenhower will speak next Thursday and that Mr. Khrushchev will make his presentation on Friday. Canada’s representative is to speak on the following Monday. I have refused to be committed on whether or not I will be attending the meeting and will follow that course during the coming week. After Khrushchev has spoken a decision will then be made as to whether I will speak for Canada on the Monday following in place of Mr. Green.19

  Both Macmillan and Diefenbaker decided to attend before Khrushchev made his speech on September 23. Hammarskjöld and Eisenhower had opened the Assembly with conciliatory addresses intended to pacify Cold War conflicts, but Khrushchev preferred belligerence. In a three-hour performance he attacked Western colonialism and American military imperialism, defended his country’s action in shooting down the U-2 and the RB-47, denounced the UN secretary general and proposed a three-person executive to replace him, and supported the removal of UN headquarters from New York to Geneva or Vienna.20

  Diefenbaker would be the first Western leader to speak after Khrushchev’s address, and he saw his response as the occasion to make his mark on the international stage. Against the advice of his officials, who preferred a constructive and moderate speech in the Pearson tradition, Diefenbaker wanted fireworks. “He simply insisted,” wrote Basil Robinson, “on our helping him to find dramatic language in which to attack Khrushchev, with particular reference to Soviet domination of Ukraine and the Baltic states.”21 By the time the prime minister decided to take Howard Green’s place on the podium, the Canadian speech was in its sixth departmental draft - and still in positive form. Diefenbaker now called for drastic surgery to the text. On September 24 Robinson worked on revisions all day before flying to New York in late afternoon with the prime minister, two External Affairs aides, and two secretaries. Following an evening meeting with Diefenbaker, the team of five worked through the night on a “framework” text. After two hours’ sleep Robinson was back with the prime minister at 9:30 on Sunday morning:

  by which time he was all over the floor of the bedroom with bits of paper. He gave me bits of the speech to polish and then later when Howard Green came with some sensible ideas, called me back for a further session. Ross Campbell and I worked from 2 p.m., stringing it together, re-writing some passages, and it was finally approved at 8:30 or 9. Putting it to bed took till 11…

  On this day there was a low point around noon when it really looked as if P.M. was losing control but he came back very strong with Howard Green’s help and a timely phone call from Grattan O’Leary with an eloquent concluding section. P.M. was very anxious for comment on speech as a whole. I said it was on the rough side and that he would please the U.S. but forfeit the role of peacemaker to the U.K. He took out the word “arrogant” at one point but showed no special worry at being deprived of peacemaking role.22

  Next morning Diefenbaker delivered his speech, in the absence of Nikita Khrushchev, to a mostly appreciative audience. The Soviet delegate left in mid-speech. Diefenbaker began optimistically.

  To some observers the Assembly in the past week gave the appearance of being a circus and a drama of personalities. Whatever their views, this fact stands out, that this is the most important and most representative gathering of the world and national leaders in all history. This meeting symbolizes the bringing-together of the cultures and philosophies of all races. It is our responsibility to ensure that
out of this meeting shall come a testament to the capacity of rational men to achieve rational relations, to bring about the attainment of peace and to practise brotherhood and the raising of standards everywhere in the world … As one coming from Canada, I say that the United Nations constitutes the greatest hope for the middle and small powers, for the new and weaker states, indeed, for all the nations of mankind of every social and political system.23

  But he quickly went on the attack:

  In the last few days the Assembly has heard from the leaders of its two most powerful members. I had great hopes when I learned that Mr. Khrushchev was going to attend. I came here prepared to accept, to adopt and to agree with any good suggestion he might offer, for I am of those who believe that his suggestions must not be rejected out of hand. I have been disappointed. Mr. Khrushchev, in a gigantic propaganda drama of destructive misrepresentation, launched a major offensive in the cold war. He gave lip-service to the United Nations which, in my opinion, would be destroyed by his proposal for a triumvirate. That speech could not have been intended to bring the world closer to peace; yet, to bring the world closer to peace is the major reason for our being here.

  We do not always agree with the United States, but our very existence - with one-tenth of the population of the United States and possessing the resources that we do - is an effective answer to the propaganda that the United States has aggressive designs. I say that to begin with President Eisenhower made a restrained, a wise and a conciliatory speech. He presented a constructive programme. He looked forward to a world community of peace. He opened the door to international conciliation and world fellowship. I am sorry to say that Mr. Khrushchev tried to shut that door…

  I turn now to a subject dealt with at great length by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the subject of colonialism. He asked for and advocated a declaration at this session for “the complete and final elimination of colonial regimes”…He has spoken of colonial bondage, of exploitation and of foreign yokes. Those views, uttered by the master of the major colonial power in the world today followed the admission of fourteen new members to the United Nations - all of them former colonies. It seems that he forgot what had occurred on the opening day…

  Indeed in this Assembly the membership is composed in a very considerable measure of the graduates of empires, mandates and trusteeships of the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth and other nations. I pause to ask this question: How many human beings have been liberated by the USSR? Do we forget how one of the postwar colonies of the USSR sought to liberate itself four years ago, and with what results?

  How, he asked, could the Assembly reconcile “the tragedy of the Hungarian uprising” with Khrushchev’s claim that the USSR believed in colonial liberation?

  What of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia? What of the freedom-loving Ukrainians and many other Eastern European peoples which I shall not name for fear of omitting some of them?…

  There can be no double standard in international affairs. I ask the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to give those nations under his domination the right of free elections - to give them the opportunity to determine the kind of government they want under genuinely free conditions.

  Diefenbaker chastised the USSR for its recent threats and propaganda attacks. “What good can there come from threats to rain rockets or nuclear bombs on other countries, large or small, to despatch so-called volunteers into situations already dangerously inflamed, to encourage political leaders to follow the line of extremism? Mankind, the peoples of all the nations, are fearful and anxious, and these fears and anxieties aggravate the tensions.”

  Finally, the prime minister turned to what remained of his earlier - and constructive - draft text. He called for an immediate return to negotiations aimed at “full disarmament, to be assured by effective control and inspection”; an end to nuclear testing; the banning of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and the prohibition of weapons in outer space or on satellites in orbit. He urged enlarged economic and technical assistance to the less-developed world. He renewed his former appeals for a system of emergency distribution of food surpluses through a UN “food bank.” He called for general acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as a means of resolving disputes between nations. And he ended with Grattan O’Leary’s flourish.

  We are not here in this Assembly to win wars of propaganda. We are here to win victories for peace … We are not mustered here under the direction and domination of any nation. We are mustered not for any race or creed or ideology. We are here for the hosts of humanity everywhere in the world. Peoples and nations are waiting upon us. Man’s hopes call upon us to say what we can do. My hope is that we shall not leave this place without having done something for mankind, so that we shall be able to say to the peoples of the world that death’s pale flag shall not again be raised in war, that fear shall be lifted from the hearts and souls of men. For this could be our last chance to achieve those objectives.

  Moscow radio quickly denounced Diefenbaker’s “malicious and slandering remarks.” But the US ambassador to the United Nations called it “truly magnificent,” and other voices in Washington joined the chorus of praise. From the US capital, Canadian ambassador Arnold Heeney wrote to Diefenbaker to tell him of its salutary effect there. Heeney, at Diefenbaker’s request, had recently told the Americans that there was “widespread ‘anti-American’ sentiment” in Canada. That, he said, had caused them “serious concern and some bewilderment,” because they felt “they have made considerable effort to meet Canadian complaints and difficulties.” But Diefenbaker’s warm endorsement of American leadership had been reassuring. Messages of congratulation poured in to the Canadian delegation, and the prime minister preened. In Canada there was general enthusiasm for the speech from all parties, most daily newspapers, and the ethnic press.24

  Diefenbaker returned to Ottawa, but came back to New York two days later to hear Macmillan’s speech and to meet Eisenhower, Macmillan, and a few Commonwealth leaders. Both Eisenhower and Macmillan warmly approved Diefenbaker’s effort, and the whole episode gave Diefenbaker a burst of exhilaration. “For the moment,” wrote Robinson, “it made him feel stronger, better informed, better equipped to deal with parliament, his cabinet colleagues, the press, the public at large, foreign diplomats, and those all-knowing officials who, he suspected, were still comparing him, in their lofty way, with Pearson.”25

  On September 29 Macmillan delivered a judicious and moderate address to the General Assembly, which was interrupted in midstream when Khrushchev removed his shoe and banged it on his desk in protest. Macmillan looked up from his text and calmly responded: “Mr. President, perhaps we could have a translation, I could not quite follow.” Just afterwards, in a corridor outside the Assembly, Khrushchev and Diefenbaker seemed about to confront each other when Diefenbaker looked away - and lost a chance he at once regretted. Robinson judged that he must have feared “a rebuff or … a Khrushchev victory in repartee. Another example of his shyness and insecurity.”26

  Macmillan’s advisers told Robinson that night “that Diefenbaker’s hard line with the Soviet Union had made it easier for Macmillan to try to adopt a statesmanlike pose and thus preserve for himself some chance of exerting a mediatory influence on Moscow.”27 Knowingly or not, Diefenbaker had played the role Macmillan devised for him. But Macmillan’s stage management had no useful effect. The Soviet Union had given up on negotiation with the West. Khrushchev was waiting for the change of American leadership that would follow the election contest between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy. That campaign - in full flight after the first televised election debate - focused not only on the personal battle but on American preparedness for the next phase of the Cold War. Kennedy’s talk of a “missile gap” foreshadowed a new round of inflamed rhetoric and military assertiveness to match the poses of the Soviet leader; and by early November Kennedy was confirmed as the president-elect.

  Diefen
baker was nervous about the change of regime. He admired Dwight Eisenhower as a war hero, a fatherly presence, and a personal friend. Eisenhower had always been scrupulous in his consideration for the sensitive Canadian, soothing potential conflict between the two nations and generously sharing his perceptions of the world. His departure created fresh uncertainties. Diefenbaker would have been comfortable with Richard Nixon: they were well acquainted, they were both outsiders suspicious of established power, they admired each other’s political talents, and they had a common attitude to the world struggle. At home, Nixon offered no challenge to the prime minister’s popularity. Kennedy, in contrast, was vigorous, handsome, a wealthy son of the eastern establishment - and his appeal had already generated enthusiasm in Canada which detracted from Diefenbaker’s own popularity. Kennedy, indeed, offered a focus for those young, urban, educated voters who were losing faith in the prairie evangelist. Diefenbaker noticed - or anticipated - a change in the tone of the relationship from the beginning: for two weeks in November, Kennedy had not bothered to reply to the prime minister’s message of electoral congratulations. More significantly, Diefenbaker sensed an aspect of Kennedy’s character with unusual shrewdness. When Robinson met with Diefenbaker on the morning after the election, the prime minister called Kennedy “courageously rash” and said that the world had come closer to war. Kennedy, he thought, “had pushed himself to the top against all odds, had spoken of bringing world leadership back to Washington, and had given every indication of intending to pursue an active policy which the Prime Minister feared might prove dangerous.”28

  In January 1961 Diefenbaker received an unexpected telephone call from Eisenhower suggesting he should come to Washington to sign the Columbia River Treaty, which had been under intense negotiation between the two governments. The ceremony would be the last official act of the Eisenhower administration. For Diefenbaker, it was a final sign of his friend’s grace and America’s friendship - both of which Diefenbaker praised in his remarks at the White House lunch after the signing ceremony.29 On his return to Ottawa, the prime minister wrote a short memo for his files reflecting Ike’s flattery.