Rogue Tory

by Denis Smith

  16 Diefenbaker’s notes from an informal meeting of ministers on March 23, 1962, record criticisms of the government’s stance by Churchill, Flemming, Starr, Halpenny, Walker, O’Hurley, Dinsdale, Monteith, Fairclough, and probably Nowlan. After the meeting, Ellen Fairclough wrote Diefenbaker to add her comment that the effects of British entry on Canadian exports would not be felt for ten years, “by which time we surely would have taken action to counteract them. Why knock our own blocks off over a hypothetical situation?” JGD, “Ministers’ Meeting - March 23, 1962, Re Common Market”; Fairclough to JGD, March 23, 1962, JGDP, XII/54/C/108

  17 Horne, Macmillan, 1957-1986, 447; CC, 7-63, January 29, 1963; OC 2, 202-06. Diefenbaker later claimed that de Gaulle insisted to him in November 1958 that Britain would not get into the Common Market and that he had reported the conversation to Macmillan, without any response. Diefenbaker said he had repeated de Gaulle’s warning to the Commonwealth prime ministers at their meeting in September 1962, but Edward Heath, “flushed with anticipated success,” would not believe it. Since the formal British application for entry was not made until October 1960, warning of what amounted to a French veto in 1958 seems unlikely. Such a conversation could have occurred when de Gaulle visited Canada in the spring of 1960. JGDI, December 10, 1969; OC 2, 205

  18 Leslie Frost to JGD July 21, 1961, JGDP, XII/61/C/189

  19 Leslie Frost to JGD, November 8, 1961, Frost Papers (also quoted in Graham, Frost, 403)

  20 He did find his appointment as a member of the Privy Council, which was made formal in December 1961, “very pleasing … more than anything else in fact.” Leslie Frost to JGD, October 7, 1961, JGDP, XII/4/A/89; Graham, Frost, 403-05

  21 Leslie Frost to JGD, February 19, 1962, JGDP, XII/12/F/395

  22 Dalgleish suggested a royal commission on tax structure; and for the short term, a tax holiday for new businesses, tax incentives for research, added depreciation allowances for new capital assets produced in Canada, and a 50 percent tax reduction on profits of new export businesses. Oakley Dalgleish to JGD, February 13, 1961, JGDP, XII/89/E/23

  23 Frost to JGD, February 19, 1962, JGDP, XII/12/F/395. Frost wrote again the next day to point out that the “Liberal brain trust,” including Walter Gordon and Mitchell Sharp, was preparing a platform that would capitalize on the report of Gordon’s royal commission on Canada’s economic prospects, “which no doubt will have its own appeal. I would not underestimate this. He has already committed himself to a book and as well a number of articles and speeches which your advisers should take apart at once and study.” Leslie Frost to JGD, February 20, 1962, JGDP, XII/12/F/395

  24 JGD, “Strictly Confidential Memorandum,” February 23, 1962, JGDP, XII/89/E/23; JGD to Leslie Frost, February 25, 1962, Frost Papers

  25 He gave credit for assistance to Harry Edmison, George Gathercole, Ray Farrell, Wallace McCutcheon, and Harry Price, and noted that they made use of Dalgleish’s letters and “read Walter Gordon’s book and speeches, and we are therefore indebted to him for anything that there is good in his emanations.” The mention of Gordon may have been a slip, since Gordon - as Pearson’s chief policy adviser and a candidate in the coming election - had already declared himself dedicated to Diefenbaker’s defeat. Ten days later Frost supplied Donald Fleming with supplementary thoughts for his budget. The editor of the the Telegram, Burton Richardson, also gave Diefenbaker a brief, upbeat outline of an electoral program at the same time. Leslie Frost to JGD, March 23, 1962; Leslie Frost to Donald Fleming, April 4, 1962; Burt Richardson to JGD, March 28, 1962, JGDP, XII/12/F/395

  26 JGD to Leslie Frost, March 24, 1962, ibid.

  27 Oakley Dalgleish to JGD, April 10, 1962, JGDP, XII/89/E/23

  28 Among Diefenbaker’s last-moment acts were references to committee of proposals to end closure and to create an independent electoral boundaries commission. Both were promises from the 1957 campaign that had been neglected for five years; neither could be achieved in the short 1962 session. House of Commons, Debates, January 22, 1962, 57-75; January 23, 1962, 82-90

  29 CC, 141-61, December 28, 1961; 14-62, February 6, 1962; Debates, February 6, 1962, 573

  30 The memo is unsigned. It may have been from John Fisher or Allister Grosart. “Confidential,” January 6, 1962, JGDP, XII/70/C/344

  31 Fleming, Near 2, 472-86; Debates, April 10, 1962, 2688-718; CAR 1962, 3-9

  32 Those present included Dalton Camp, Finlay MacDonald, George Hogan, Eddie Goodman, Roy Faibish, Bill Wylie, Roy Deyell, and Lowell Murray. Grosart reported the party’s electoral prospects to Diefenbaker after this meeting, estimating that it had 137 safe seats and ten “probables.” This was an optimistic account of what he had heard. Interview with Dalton Camp, February 4, 1969; “Notes of a Meeting -January 22, 1962: Where Do We Stand?” JGDP, XII/40/B/294.2

  33 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, March 23, 1962, JGDP, V/4, 2427-28

  34 JGD to Chief Justice C.C. Miller, March 24, 1962, JGDP, VI/126/1936.2

  35 Diefenbaker’s draft reply appears in the same file. Eugene Forsey to JGD, March 21, 1961, JGDP, XII/61/C/185

  36 Diefenbaker used it especially when speaking to ethnic audiences and in Quebec. Among those who encouraged him to use the theme were Gordon Chown, MP, and Jack Cauley. Chown wrote that “we can push the Liberal Party out to the extreme left; hold ourselves out as the champions of competitive enterprise; and leave the New Party image in the public mind as ‘left of left,’ thereby implying that their political philosophy will expedite our country to the path of Communism.” The Liberal candidates and advisers Diefenbaker linked to the wartime administration were Walter Gordon, Mitchell Sharp, C.M. Drury, Maurice Lamontagne, and Tom Kent. Only Sharp had actually been a civil servant in that period. Gordon Chown to JGD, May 26, 1961; Jack Cauley to JGD, December 29, 1961, JGDP, VI/93/1434C, VI/60/432; Debates, January 22 and 23, 1962, 73, 85-89; Globe and Mail, January 25, March 9, 1962

  37 Hamilton’s committee consisted of Gordon Churchill, Don Johnson, Merril Menzies, Roy Faibish, and John Fisher. Alvin Hamilton to JGD, September 21, 1961, JGDP, OF/1315/Election; Carrigan, Canadian Party Platforms, 261-70, 286; CAR 1962, 10-12

  38 “Itinerary - Prime Minister John Diefenbaker – 1962,” JGDP, VI/96/1509.1, 82484-97, 82579-93, 82619, 82629-39; ibid., 1509.2, 82786-91, 82861-67

  39 The American record of the incident is contained in a seven-page letter from Merchant to the acting secretary of state, George Ball. Merchant delivered the letter by courier to Ball “in the belief that you will want to discuss its contents with the President at the earliest possible opportunity.” Livingston Merchant to George Ball, May 5, 1962, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: General: Rostow Memorandum 05/16/61 and Related Materials, 05/61-05/63, Mandatory Review Cases NLK-94-9, NLK-94-11

  40 McGeorge Bundy, “Personal - Eyes Only Memorandum for … George W. Ball, the Under Secretary of State,” May 8, 1962; telegrams, Ball to ambassador, Ottawa, May 8, 1962, 1080, 1081, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: Rostow Memorandum 05/16/61 and Related Materials, 05/61-05/63, Mandatory Review Cases NLK-94-9, NLK-94-11

  41 Telegram, Merchant to acting secretary of state, May 9, 1962, 1148, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: Rostow Memorandum … Mandatory Review Case NLK-94-11

  42 Robinson diary, May 9, 1962, quoted in Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 268-69

  43 Merchant to secretary of state, May 13, 1962, 1164, Kennedy Papers, NSF: Canada: Rostow Memorandum … Mandatory Review Case NLK-94-11

  44 This was not accurate. At least three others on the prime minister’s staff - the unnamed aide who delivered the memo, his secretary, Marion Wagner, and his foreign affairs adviser, Basil Robinson - knew of it; and Robinson had also discussed the matter confidentially with Norman Robertson, Robert Bryce, and the Canadian ambassador in Washington, Ed Ritchie. Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 267-70

  45 Ibid., 270

  46 Fleming, Near 2, 487-501; OC 3, 117-25; CC, 49-62, 50-62, May 1 and 2, 1962

  47 OC 3, 124-25

  48 Robinson,
Diefenbaker’s World, 266

  49 JGD, Memorandum: “To do - Sunday, May 20, 1962,” JGDP, XIV/9/D/17

  50 Neil S. Crawford, “Memorandum to the Prime Minister,” May 3, 1962, JGDP, XII/66/C/290.2

  51 OC 3, 127-28; Fleming, Near 2, 502-03

  52 Diefenbaker responded to the strippers: “I was raised on a homestead in Saskatchewan; that is why I know what those things are.” CAR 1962, 16-17

  53 Charles Lynch, quoted in CAR 1962, 17

  54 Globe and Mail, May 7, 12, 14, 28, 30, and 31, June 4, 5, 6, and 8, 1962

  55 Ibid., June 8, 1962; CAR 1962, 18-19

  56 Walter Gray, “The Week That Counts,” Globe and Mail, June 11, 1962; CAR 1962, 19-21

  57 Globe and Mail, June 15, 1962

  58 Ibid., June 5, 1962

  59 Montreal Gazette, May 28, 1962

  60 For the results, see CAR 1962, 22-27; the reference to Macdonald is in the Globe and Mail, June 22, 1962.

  61 “Daily Transactions Affecting Exchange Fund Owned Reserves,” August 23, 1962, JGDP, XII/107/F/147.2; Fleming, Near 2, 516-20; OC 3, 131-34; CC, 57A-62, June 20-24, 1962. There were eight separate meetings of cabinet, plus meetings of the special committee. No secretaries attended, and no records were kept, until Fleming presented Bryce with a brief statement on the emergency program after the last meeting, held at the prime minister’s home on Sunday, June 24, 1962. This statement alone appears in the official record.

  62 OC 3, 121

  63 Ibid., 132-33. Fleming’s view was that the exchange reserves “could not be expected to survive more than a few days.” He reported that the exchange fund reached its lowest point of $1100 million on June 24. Fleming, Near 2, 517

  64 CC, 57A-62, June 20-24, 1962; OC 3, 132-36; Fleming, Near 2, 518-24; CAR 1962, 28-29, 184-87

  65 Leslie Frost to JGD, June 22, 1962, JGDP, XII/61/C/189

  66 Telegrams, Leslie Frost to JGD, June 25, 1962, ibid.

  67 On July 2 Macmillan wrote again to express satisfaction that the financial community had acted rapidly to assist Canada, to note that Britain had provided one-third of Canada’s $300 million draw on IMF funds as well as $100 million in bilateral credits, and to offer a gentle reminder that Diefenbaker had said that the import surcharges would be withdrawn as soon as possible. Harold Macmillan to JGD, June 24, July 2, 1962, JGDP, XII/8/A/282.3

  68 Davie Fulton to JGD, June 29, 1962, JGDP, XII/61/C/190

  69 Interview with E.D. Fulton, September 24, 1993

  70 W.F.W. Neville, “Memorandum of a meeting with Hon. Gordon Churchill, 7 July 1970,” 4

  71 Churchill was not precise about when Diefenbaker first raised the matter of resignation, although he seemed to place it in the first six weeks after the election. Churchill described this period as “the most difficult of my life,” when the prime minister was still “visibly shattered” by the election results. Churchill recalled that Diefenbaker talked “almost every other day” about resignation, “and several times in cabinet.” W.F.W. Neville, “Memorandum of a meeting with Hon. Gordon Churchill …” 4-5

  72 Oakley Dalgleish to JGD, July 6, 1962, JGDP, XII/56/C/122

  73 OC 3, 139-40

  74 Frost also sent a copy of his letter to Dalgleish, noting that he had “endeavoured to put things on the line and I hope it works, particularly for his sake to say nothing of the country.” Leslie Frost to JGD, July 12, 1962, JGDP, XII/61/C/189; Leslie Frost to Oakley Dalgleish, July 12, 1962, Frost Papers

  75 JGD, “Memorandum,” July 16, 1962, JGDP, XII/61/C/189

  76 Diefenbaker had telephone conversations on July 17 and 19 with Frost and on July 21 with Dalgleish; Frost recorded a summary of his reasons for refusal in a memo headed “Don’t want to!” and dated August 1962. JGD, “Note,” July 21, 1962; “Memorandum,” July 21, 1962, ibid.; Leslie Frost, “Don’t want to!” August 1962, Frost Papers

  77 Leslie Frost to JGD, July 18, 1962; JGD, “Note,” July 21, 1962, JGDP, XII/65/C/261; Leslie Frost, “The Diefenbaker Days,” 13-15, Frost Papers; Graham, Frost, 407-08; OC 3, 139-40

  78 JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, July 14, 1962, JGDP, V/5, 2549-50

  79 OC 3, 140-41; JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, July 26, 1962, JGDP, V/5, 2564-65

  80 OC 3, 141. The cabinet met at Sussex Drive from July 25 until it resumed meeting on Parliament Hill on August 29.

  81 Marjorie (Bunny) Pound, Oral History, July 7, 1989, JGDP, XVIII/OH/83.3

  82 In particular, Alvin Hamilton had been hospitalized for several weeks after the election. JGD to Elmer Diefenbaker, August 11 and 14, 1962, JGDP, V/5, 2596-97, 2598-99

  83 Quoted in Fleming, Near 2, 526

  84 Ibid., 526-27; OC 3, 142

  85 JGD, “Memorandum Re: Discussion with Hon. E. Davie Fulton, Tuesday, August 7, 1962,” JGDP, XII/61/C/190; interview with Hon. E.D. Fulton, September 24, 1993; OC 3, 143-44

  86 OC 3, 141-48; CAR 1962, 31-33; Fleming, Near 2, 527-31; Conrad, Nowlan, 266-68

  87 Sévigny, This Game, 225

  88 CAR 1962,32

  89 OC 3, 141

  90 Robinson was puzzled why, if Diefenbaker was convinced that de Gaulle would veto Britain’s application, he spent so much energy opposing it. OC 2, 92-93, 205; Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, 355-57; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 279-82; CC, 73-62, 73A-62, 74-62, 75-62, 80-62, August 30 and 31, September 3, 5, and 21, 1962

  91 JGD, “Memorandum for Wednesday August 8,” August 5, 1962; JGD, “Memorandum to: Hon. M.W. McCutcheon, C.B.E.,” August 25, 1962; MWM, “Memorandum to: The Prime Minister,” September 4, 1962; JGDP, XII/51/C/66; XII/65/C/261

  92 Debates, September 27, 1962, 7-9; OC 3, 148-50

  93 Smith, Gentle Patriot, 109

  94 JGD to Leslie Frost, October 7, 1962, JGDP, XII/61/C/189

  95 OC 3, 150-51; Conrad, Nowlan, 272-76

  96 Sévigny, This Game, 232

  97 Interview with Hon. E.D. Fulton, September 24, 1993; W.F.W. Neville, “Memorandum of a meeting with Hon. Gordon Churchill, 7 July 1970”

  98 W.F.W. Neville, “Memorandum of a meeting with Hon. Gordon Churchill …” Sévigny also commented on this “drinking group,” whose personally labelled bottles were kept in a cupboard and “reserved for the owner’s particular use.” Sévigny, This Game, 227

  99 HCG, “Memorandum for: The Prime Minister,” October 22, 1962, JGDP, XII/88/D/204; Reeves, President Kennedy, 333-425

  100 Quoted in Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 284

  101 Ibid., 284-85; Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 181

  102 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 285

  103 Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, 362-67; Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 182

  104 The words are those of Macmillan’s diary, commenting on the American ambassador’s briefing on Monday morning. The ambassador, David Bruce, had been told by the State Department to carry a revolver that day, which he did. Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, 364-65

  105 HCG, “Memorandum for: The Prime Minister,” October 22, 1962, JGDP, XII/88/D/204

  106 Ibid.

  107 Diefenbaker noted in handwriting at the top of the memo: “Seen first at meeting with Mr Merchant and ministers 5.30 pm. Delivered to me at home at 7 pm after broadcast of Pres Kennedy.” Robinson confirms from a confidential source (perhaps Bryce or Robertson) that Diefenbaker did not receive the memo before Merchant’s visit, although Bryce had seen it and did not think the proposal was acceptable. Diefenbaker claims in the memoirs that he talked to the president some time after meeting with Merchant and engaged in an argument over UN onsite inspection, the alert status of NORAD units, and the absence of consultation. But the conversation (if there was one) did not, apparently, occur that day, as Diefenbaker implies. HCG, “Memorandum for: The Prime Minister/Cuba,” JGDP, XII/88/D/204; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 286-87; OC 3, 82-83

  108 This account is based on reports of the meeting by Douglas Harkness and Livingston Merchant; Merchant spoke later about the meeting with Basil Robinson. D.S. Harkness, “The Nuclear Arms Question and the Political Crisis wh
ich Arose from It in January and February, 1963,” August 19-27, 1963, Harkness Papers; Livingston T. Merchant to Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball), memorandum, nd, 441, FRUS, 1961-1963, 1190-91; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 285-86

  109 John F. Kennedy to JGD, October 22, 1962, JGDP, XII/88/D/204

  110 “Memorandum from Livingston T. Merchant to Secretary of State Rusk …” nd, 441, FRUS 1961-1963, 1190-91; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 285-86; Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 7-9

  111 “Notes used by Prime Minister for address in the House on the Kennedy announcement of the ‘quarantine’ of Cuba - October 22, 1962,” JGDP, XII/56/C/120; Debates, October 22, 1962, 805-07

  112 Ghent-Mallet and Munton, “Confronting Kennedy,” 85

  113 “Memorandum … Merchant to … Rusk,” nd, 441, FRUS, 1961-1963, 1190

  114 DEF CON 5 was normal; DEF CON 3 indicated “very serious international tension”; DEF CON 1 meant war. The Canadian equivalent of DEF CON 3 was known as READY. Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 9-10; Ghent-Mallet and Munton, “Confronting Kennedy,” 86

  115 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 10; Globe and Mail, January 2, 1963

  116 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 11; CC, 93-62, October 23, 1962

  117 The only limitations short of full alert were that no personnel on leave were recalled, but no active personnel were granted leave. Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 11-12

  118 Diefenbaker’s memoirs leave the impression that the conversation took place on the evening of October 22, which seems wrong. Robinson places it in the late afternoon of October 23, but confirms the substance of Diefenbaker’s account from notes taken by Diefenbaker’s secretary, Bunny Pound. OC 3, 82-83; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 288

  119 Harkness, “Nuclear Arms Question,” 12-13. Whether, or to what extent, Diefenbaker was aware of the unauthorized involvement of Canadian forces in the military alert is not clear Bryce believed (according to Robinson) that “Diefenbaker had a pretty good idea of what was going on and preferred to let it happen in a less than formal way.” In his memoirs, Diefenbaker claimed that he did not believe “the popular notion that … Mr. Harkness, under the influence of the Canadian military and the United States Pentagon, engaged in a clandestine authorization of a full alert on 22 October.” Canadian military activity, at sea as well as in NORAD, was more extensive and more closely integrated with American operations than even Harkness recorded; and there seems little doubt that Diefenbaker had an inadequate understanding of the degree or consequences of the operational integration resulting from the existence of the NORAD and NATO commands. These issues are examined in detail in Haydon, 7962 Cuban Missile Crisis. See also OC 3, 88; Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 288.