Churchill's Spy Files

by Nigel West

  The Fulgor, a tanker in Cádiz harbour: Screw and rudder damaged by an explosive charge of 15 kilos fastened to the ship’s ‘Schlingerleiste’ by ANTE.

  Gaeta, freighter, Huelva: Same method as above. Charge, 30 kilos. Results: Screw and rudder damaged.

  Tanker (name unknown), Cartagena. An unsuccessful attempt was made by Leutnant Kampen, who planned to use the same method as that used on the Fulgor. As Kampen and his assistant, Richter, rowed from the Lipari to the tanker, the fuse ignited prematurely. Kampen was instantly killed, and Richter and one of the Lipari officers were injured.

  A second attempt was carried out with the help of Giuseppe Faber, an Italian Fascist officer residing in Madrid. Faber persuaded two members of the tanker’s crew to assist him. Originally it was intended to destroy the screwshaft inside the ship and some bearings. Some of the charges did not go off, however, and only minor damage was inflicted.

  Cesena, freighter, Barcelona: Blaum directed this mission, assisted by the second engineer of the Cesena. Blaum suggested the shaft be destroyed, but the engineer, whose cabin was located nearby, feared his life would be imperiled in the attempt. Without Blaum’s knowledge, the bomb was placed in another section of the ship, and little damage was caused by the explosion.

  At Vigo an attempt to sabotage an Italian ship failed. Sasso, a friend of Faber’s, claimed to have fastened two British magnetic mines to the ship’s hull. Sasso was probably not well acquainted with the handling of these mines.

  At Las Palmas and Tenerife the crews of two Italian ships, acting on their own initiative or at the urging of the German consulates, opened a number of valves and destroyed several engine parts in each ship. The II agent at Las Palmas, José Segura, claimed to have smuggled a 15 kilo charge aboard one of the vessels. Neither attempt was successful.

  Sabotage of Allied Ocean Cables

  In summer 1942, Referat II attempted to cut British cables leading from Vigo to Gibraltar and Lisbon, and in 1943 an attempt to cut the Bilbao–Great Britain cable was undertaken. Both actions were ordered by Berlin despite the fact that the cables were officially out of use. To cut the cables, a three-pronged anchor was dragged along the bottom of the ocean about a mile offshore, in the general vicinity of the cables. When the anchor hooked a cable, it was raised, thus exerting maximum tension and causing a break. The participants in these missions – the II staff plus Juan José Dominguez at Vigo and José Luis Echazarra at Bilbao – claimed success.

  Use of Torpedoes for Sabotage

  In 1943 a small torpedo was to be fired from a ship outside Huelva harbour. The torpedo, constructed for shipment in sections, had an S-charge weighing about 50 kilos. After being fired in the desired direction the torpedo could be guided automatically. The torpedo was never used, however, because permission was not received from Berlin. A supply of these torpedoes brought to Huelva in 1943 was returned to Germany in early 1944, when S-operations in Spain were discontinued.

  This MI5 interrogation report contained no analysis, but the reference to the Welsh Nationalist contact named Williams must have given B1(a) some cause for satisfaction, for he was actually the double-agent Gwylym Williams, code-named G.W., who had been part of a larger Welsh network supposedly based in Swansea. Evidently Blaum’s justified suspicions about Williams had not been shared with any of his Abwehr colleagues.

  Blaum also had some interesting observations about the Abwehr’s efforts to attack Allied shipping in Gibraltar, a subject often mentioned in Petrie’s reports:

  Following Italy’s entry into the war and the collapse of France and its possessions, Gibraltar, because of its unique geographical position, its military strength, and its political status, became an important objective of German Intelligence Service activities in the Iberian peninsula. This report will summarize chronologically the activities of Referat II KO Spanien in Gibraltar.

  The first permission to operate in Gibraltar was received in late autumn. Later, orders were received to study possibilities for sabotage work and to begin recruiting agents.

  1941

  The first shipment of explosive and incendiary charges was smuggled into the fortress at the beginning of the year. It was intended to attack various targets, eg, fuel dumps and grounded aircraft, in a simultaneous action. The first attempt failed because the timing mechanisms furnished by Berlin proved to be 24-day clocks, whereas it had been assumed that they were 24-hour devices, although one agent reported some success. Referat I notified Major Rudolf that most of the sabotage materials had been discovered by the British, who had neutralized them. Positive results were reported to Berlin, however, since at the time it was general Abwehr policy to shield its inexperience with exaggerated claims of success.

  In June a bathing hut was rented at Puente Majorca and a 25 kilo mine was concealed there. An agent was to row to the vicinity of one of the cargo vessels anchored off Puente Majorca and lay the mine. British Secret Service agents foiled the attempt, however, when they discovered the mine in the bathing hut.

  The chief agent for these missions and a subsequent one was Juan José Dominguez, of Seville, another agent, Emilio Plazas, was hired in late 1941. He was unsuccessful in his first mission placing a charge inside an artillery shell, he forgot the necessary explosives.

  1942

  The first sabotage attempt was made by Dominguez, who in late December 1941 or early January 1942 concealed a five kilo British plastic charge with corrosion igniter in a case of eggs aboard a transport in Algeciras. The case was discovered by Spanish customs officials and was exploded on the pier. Dominguez was later arrested and sentenced to death because of an alleged attempt on the life of Spanish War Minister Varela in summer 1942.

  A project resulting in the destruction of two airplanes on the ground was undertaken by Alfonso Olmo, a sub-agent of Plazas, in January 1942. Olmo later proved to be completely unreliable, and his claims could never be verified.

  Two of Plazas’s subordinates, Ramon Correa and Manolo Tapli, succeeded in a mission undertaken in February 1942. A British adhesive mine with corrosion igniter was placed inside a water-bomb aboard a patrol boat. The boat was sunk and a nearby vessel damaged by the explosion.

  1943

  In late 1942 Berlin had authorized large-scale sabotage activities against Gibraltar. At the same time Hummel had taken over Referat II. These changes brought new ideas and impetus to an organisation lacking in imagination and enthusiasm.

  In January a small tanker was set afire by means of a thermite incendiary charge smuggled aboard by Ramon Galves. Since the time and place of the action were known in advance, the success of the mission was definitely ascertained. Another mission executed by Galves proved equally successful. Galves affixed a small British adhesive mine to a water-bomb aboard a submarine chaser, which was later seen sinking off Gibraltar.

  An ammunition dump next to an anti-aircraft position was blown up in early 1943 by means of a small British plastic charge with corrosion igniter inserted into an anti-aircraft shell. As in previous actions, advance notice of this mission had been given. The principal agent was Carlos Calvo.

  In June three Spanish agents used a British plastic charge with corrosion igniter to set afire two fuel dumps. The agents were Angel Sarasol and Pariano Gonzales, and another Spanish agent employed by Calvo. The latter was later captured by the British. Hummel had been notified of this mission in advance, and its success was unquestioned.

  Also in summer 1943 Hummel met an Italian naval officer who had been directing Italian sabotage against Gibraltar, independently. The Italian, (name unknown), was consul at Algeciras and closely connected with the GAMMA swimming school, which trained men in long-distance swiping and deep-sea diving as prerequisites for sabotaging Allied shipping, by fastening sabotage charges to the vessel’s ‘Schlingerleiste’. Although close cooperation between the Axis countries was precluded by Italy’s surrender, GAMMA swimmer sabotage methods were followed by Referat II in subsequent actions, especially against Allied shipping
.

  A mission of considerable importance was undertaken in late summer 1943 by a group of Spanish officers headed by Narciso. They intended to blow up the main ammunition dump of Gibraltar proper by inserting a large charge in a stored shell or water-bomb. The mission was never executed, however, since a number of participants gave information on the project to the British, Later, complete details of the undertaking were secured by the British through the trial of Luis Cuenco and others. Blaum claims none of the Spaniards involved, including Perales, had been paid Abwehr agents. Its participation in the action was limited to technical advice, supply of British S-charges, and financial aid, according to Blaum.

  Blaum’s information was added to other material supplied by Colonel Paul Fuchs, an Abwehr officer who had been based in Biarritz, and from a former KO Spanien agent, Hermann Amende, to create a very accurate order-of-battle for the Abwehr’s wartime organisation across the Iberian peninsula:

  During the war, Spain was the scene of numerous acts of sabotage committed by Germans and agents of the Germans against Allied shipping and military installations. In addition, the Iberian peninsula was used as a base from which agents with a wide variety of missions were sent to many parts of the globe.

  This report is a study of the organisation responsible for all these activities.

  History and Organisation of Referat II KO Spanien

  Abwehr II’s first representative in Spain, sent there in early 1940, was Sonderfuehrer Krueger. Kreuger was instructed to set up an office in Madrid and to study conditions in general as well as possibilities for II operations in Spain. At the time, headquarters in Berlin had not yet devised a plan for carrying out its insurrection and minority program (J-work) in Spain. No sabotage activities were planned, principally because ‘S’ and ‘J’ were still separate departments of Abwehr II, and both Kreuger and Blaum, who went to Spain in March 1940, were sent there on orders of the J-section.

  Upon his arrival in Madrid, Blaum reported to Freg/Kptn Lenz, CO of KO Spanien. Blaum was told that his first mission was to make contacts of possible future value. Permission for Blaum to remain in Spain was obtained by the German Embassy, where he was registered as an employee. Later the entire staff of Referat II was incorporated into the Embassy as a section of KO Spanien. Thus Lenz became Blaum’s and Kreuger’s superior. Although matters of II interest were settled directly with Abwehr II in Berlin, Lenz still influenced II operations, since all general policies had to be approved by him.

  In 1941 Kreuger was transferred to Tangier, where he was put in charge of a small, independent KO organisation. Major Rudolf was appointed new head of II in Spain. The failure of most of the projects initiated under Rudolf was largely due to his inexperience and lack of initiative.

  The appointment of Friedrich Hummel, a well-known swimmer, to succeed Rudolf in 1943 paved the way for the most successful period of II KO Spanien’s history. Missions were completed against Gibraltar, Allied orange freighters, and, after Italy’s surrender, Italian vessels in Spanish harbours. A ‘cease action’ order was received from Berlin in March 1944, however, and Hummel was recalled for a more important assignment as head of Leitstelle II Jest, FA.

  The new chief of Referat II, Hptm Naumann zu Koenigsbrueck, was handcuffed by the order prohibiting S-operations in Spain. He had only begun work on an R-organisation (Rueckzugs Organisation – withdrawal plan) when he was ordered to return to Germany. In February 1945 Blaum was also recalled, and Referat II’s remaining activities were entrusted to Werner Schulz, an inexperienced man from Berlin.

  The following is a list of all personnel assigned to KO Spanien from 1940 through March 1945:

  1940 – Chief: Hans Krueger, Sonderfuehrer (Z)

  Wolfgang Blaum, Pionier alias Friedrich Baumann. Franz Zimmerman, V-Mann

  1941 – Chief: Rudolf, Hptm alias Rudolph Wolfgang Blaum

  Gefr Joseph Waber

  Gefr Heinrich Schommer, Uffz (killed in Russia)

  Frl Charlotte Hilgert, secretary

  Franz Zummermanm, employee

  1942 – Chief: Friedrich Hummel, O/Lt

  Wolfgang Blaum

  Gefr Hans Richter, employee alias Ritter

  Joseph Faber, Gefr

  Franz Zimmmermann, employee (died 1942)

  Victor Ante, Gefr alias Hoffmann

  Frl Guntrud Heise, secretary

  Frl Lilo Niemann, secretary alias Nehrkorn

  1943 – Mar 44 Chief: Friedrich Hummel

  HptmWolfgang Blaum

  Gefr Hans Richter

  Pvt Joseph Waber

  O/Gefr Victor Ante

  Gefr Fritz Rossbund

  Gefr Alfred Strickner

  Uffz Frl Lore Daumer

  Secretary Frl Charlotte Kriesch

  Secretary Karl Kampen, Lt (temp) (killed Nov 43)

  Mar 44 – Dec 44 Chief: Guenther Neumann zu Koenigsbrueck

  Wolfgang Blaum, Uffz, Sonderfuehrer (Z)

  Joseph Waber

  Uffz Fritz Rossbund

  Gefr Frl Guntrud Heise, secretary

  Cooperation with Spanish Agencies

  At no time did Referat II cooperate with the Spanish General Staff or any official Spanish agencies, according to Blaum. Such contact was restricted to Referats I and III. It was never officially admitted that II was active in Spain, and therefore Referat II was not permitted official outside assistance. Referat II was, of course, very unpopular in Spain, and the KO chief was repeatedly advised by the Spanish General Staff to cease all S-operations. Blaum emphasizes that Spain does not have an equivalent to the German Abwehr II.

  Orders from Berlin

  No specific orders concerning the nature of sabotage work were ever given by Berlin headquarters, which merely issued statements of general policy. Changes in policy were frequently necessitated by political or military reverses, the exact nature of which were unknown to the lower echelons. One rule, however, was always emphasized: all sabotage against Allied shipping was to be timed so that the explosion would occur outside Spanish territorial waters, that Spanish neutrality would never be openly violated, and that no proof of German origin would be found at the scene of the sabotage. (Proof of German complicity in the explosion of an orange ship at Valencia brought a succession of reprimands from the Foreign Office, the High Command, and Spanish authorities, directed against Abwehr II in Berlin and passed down to Hummel in Madrid.)

  Only one exception was allowed to this regulation. At the last minute, permission was granted to sabotage Italian ships in Spanish harbours, but again, it was emphasized that no clue of German complicity be found, and that, should the Spanish Government make an official protest, blame be placed on the Italian crews.

  A last and definite order from Berlin was received in early 1944, prohibiting all S-operations in Spain and ordering the destruction or removal of all remaining S-materials.

  Origin of Sabotage Materials

  Whenever possible, II KO Spanien used British sabotage equipment. The reason for this was twofold: (a) British material was far superior to, as well as more reliable and safer to handle than, the German equivalent; (b) its use also prevented detection of German origin in case an action was prematurely discovered. This equipment, sent from Berlin under diplomatic privileges, had been captured in France, either after the British withdrawal of 1940 or from underground forces, to whom great quantities had been parachuted by the Allies.

  Efficiency of Abwehr II

  Personnel of Abwehr II was generally ill-suited for its job, according to Blaum and Amende. In most cases the KOs were headed by old reserve officers, intent on keeping their position and rank but lacking intelligence training and knowledge of the country to which they were assigned. Strict adherence to the rigid military hierarchy prevented abler, more experienced subordinates from making their voices heard in the operations of the KOs. As a result, plans were always vague, specific operations had little chance of success, and throughout the war the slogan in Berlin remained, ‘Something must be done, no matter wha
t.’ Abwehr II was characterized by a marked tendency to claim tremendous successes and to report constant activity, even when nothing was going on.

  II KO Spanien at Work

  The activities of Abwehr II in Spain fall into three separate phases:

  First phase, 1940–1941: No large-scale sabotage.

  Second Phase, 1942–43: Several unsuccessful missions against Gibraltar and Allied shipping. Important activity in connection with J-work, with Spain used as an intermediary.

  Third Phase: 1944 to the end of war: Activity in many fields, especially against Gibraltar and Allied shipping.

  All S-activities prohibited by Berlin, Drafting of plans for R-activities (Rueckzugsorganasation). II staff reduced at beginning of 1945.

  R-Organisation

  In late 1942 KO Spanien began to fear an Allied invasion of Spain. This attitude, based in part on persistent reports from Berlin pointing to the probability of Allied landings in Spain, prevailed throughout 1943. Shortly after the Allied invasion of North Africa orders were received to build up an R-organisation in the Iberian peninsula. Referat II’s part in the project consisted of burying small quantities of S-materials in south and south-east Spain, where the invasion was anticipated. To avoid possible indiscretions, only the German staff was allowed to participate in the burying parties.

  The plan was to send agents across the front lines or to parachute them in the vicinity of hidden dumps. Thus future Abwehr missions, once arrived behind enemy lines, would be assured of adequate supplies. Approximately 30 small crates were buried at a depth of about 30 cm, at locations calculated to be both easily accessible and close to future sabotage targets. These crates were corrosion-proof and contained five to ten charges of different types and sizes, such as incendiaries, demolitions, and camouflaged coal, all of British origin. Instructions for use were attached to each charge.

  The location of the dumps was described in great detail by means of a series of charts and photographs, of which three sets were made. One set was kept at II headquarters in Berlin, one sent to Ast Paris, and one to the Iberia Abw Trupp, a unit set up at the same time as the E-organisation for employment in the event of an Allied invasion of the peninsula. None of the charts or photographs remained in Spain. The three existing sets were destroyed before the end of the war. The copy in Paris disappeared in 1944, coincident with the rumoured desertion of a member of the II staff of Ast Paris.