Churchill's Spy Files

by Nigel West

  In April 1941 Leibbrandt adopted the alias Walter Kempf and, accompanied by Scharf acting as radio operator under the alias Emil Dorner, sailed with a crew of five to South Africa aboard a 40-ton French yacht, the Kyloe. This was to be an epic voyage, from Paimpol in Brittany on the 20m, English-built vessel, to land Leibbrandt in June at Mitchell’s Bay, 150 miles north of Cape Town. His mission was to establish contact with the pro-Nazi Ossewa Brandweg (OB) and assassinate General Smuts, but his plan went awry when in December he made a night visit to Bernard Gerling, an aide to the OB leader Hans van Rensberg, thereby inadvertently alerting the local police. A major manhunt followed, resulting in the capture of his German-manufactured wireless transmitter, which was found to contain Hungarian and American components. Leibbrandt himself narrowly escaped arrest several times, but was eventually apprehended at a road-block near Pretoria on 24 December 1941. In November 1942 he was convicted of treason and condemned to death. Smuts commuted the sentence in 1943 to life imprisonment, and he was amnestied in 1948. He later married, had five children, and died in 1966 in Bloemfontein.

  Leibbrandt’s 31-year-old companion Hans Scharf was actually Hans Schneider, an Abwehr officer originally from Alsace-Lorraine who had joined the Brandenburger Lehr Regiment as a corporal in November 1939 before being transferred to the Abwehr II headquarters in Paris. He had been captured on 4 December 1943 by the French in Port Say after he had parachuted into Algeria on an intelligence collection mission and had tried to flee to Spanish Sahara posing as a Spanish Jew named Jaime Toledo.

  When questioned by his French captors, led by Paul Paillole, Scharf volunteered the identities of fifty-eight German intelligence personnel and their agents, and disclosed details of his previous assignments. He described how he had been employed to promote Breton separatists in PoW camps before sailing to South Africa with Robbey Leibbrandt in March 1942. In August 1943, following assignments in France, Scharf was sent to Montpellier to prepare for a mission to either Tunisia or Algeria, dressed as an Arab, that ended at the second attempt. He was incarcerated at the Caserne de Vieux Château for seven months before arrangements could be made for his interrogation in England.

  After his arrival by air at RAF Lyneham from Algiers Scharf was cross-examined at Camp 020 on his role in an aborted mission to North Africa with Charles Bedaux and, as anticipated, proved to be a mine of information, so much so that he remained in England for seven months before he was returned to French custody. Camp 020’s commandant, Robin Stephens, would have preferred to keep him permanently as a research resource, remarking in August 1944 in his Liquidation Report, ‘Personally, I would like to add him to the Ambulatory Library at Ham.’

  Before he was questioned, MI5 drew up the customary ISOS schedule, which detailed his known activities between September 1941 and July 1943. This was the template against which Scharf’s answers were compared, and he turned out to be truthful, not least because he feared French retribution if it was discovered that he was not a German, but a French collaborator from Kreuttingen in Lorraine. Furthermore, it was alleged that he had deserted from the French army while serving on the Maginot Line in November 1939.

  Our first record of Scharf is in November, 1941, when he was in the Rio de Oro working under PILA, the head of the Cisneros station. He was officially an Abt. II agent under the direction of Kurt Haller, a member of Abt. II, Paris, but his work in Cisneros was also of interest to Waag and Huebner, heads of the Eins Heer and Eins Marine in the Paris Astleitstelle, which controlled the Cisneros station. It is probable that Scharf’s career with the Abwehr started much earlier than this, however, since he was at some time condemned to life imprisonment by the French, presumably for espionage.

  Scharf appears to have been able to establish good contacts in French West Africa, and to obtain information from Port Etienne. He was also able to perform the useful service of getting into direct touch with French Emirs without the assistance of the Spanish. In January and February of 1942 he was engaged in organising the WIND expedition. This was an Eins Heer project and involved sending a man, most probably a Frenchman, in the guise of a soldier along the West African coast through the Gambia and Sierra Leone to Liberia.

  5,000 pesetas was sanctioned to pay for the expedition, which was run entirely independently of the Spanish. The money was brought over from Madrid by an official of the Cisneros station known as Mendez. The agent was presumably to make his reports by wireless, as after he had started out, Scharf was to go to the Spanish frontier with a W/T set, presumably for the agent’s use. The organisation of this and other missions was considered sufficiently important for a proposal to be made that Wang and Huebner should visit Cisneros for discussions in March 1942. It was eventually decided, however, that the visit was not possible, and instructions were given that Scharf should go over to Madrid by military plane for discussions, to take place either there or in Paris. The WIND expedition was eventually ready in May, 1942, and on 2nd May the agent was due to leave by mail packet for La Aguena. He had a relative in Port Etienne who was a French officer.

  Other expeditions with which Scharf was also probably concerned were the FISCH expedition and the HEKA undertakings. The FISCH expedition was an Eins Marine undertaking which involved sending a boat across to the South American coast. This also was organised quite independently of the local Spaniards. The Heka undertakings were probably small forays into the interior of French West Africa from the borders of Rio de Oro, and were probably organised with the collaboration of the Spaniards. There were probably also other projects for voyages along the coast of West Africa.

  Scharf’s work was considered very valuable by PILA, who during January and February, 1942, sent urgent requests to Paris that Scharf might be allowed to stay at Cisneros as he was essential for the development of the work of the stelle. He was entirely responsible for the organisation of the Wind undertaking, and his successor did not know the agents and contact men whom he met on the coast. In order to prevent Haller from writing to Scharf and instructing him to return to Paris, PILA asked the Paris station not to send on any mail to Scharf unless they knew the contents. He was therefore very indignant when a private letter reached Scharf from Haller through a certain ‘Neno’ informing him that he had been awarded the Iron Cross 2nd class, and that he had only been seconded to Cisneros to relieve Mendez. Haller had been pointing out for a long time that Scharf was due for leave, and eventually it was agreed that he should take his leave following his visit to Paris to discuss the WIND enterprise. PILA pointed out, however, that he still had to complete four weeks’ disciplinary punishment, and asked that this should be cancelled before he went on leave in recognition of his excellent work. PILA emphasised that it was essential that Scharf should be available after his leave as he was to be head of a coastal transmitting station which it was planned to set up and which would be vital for the work in West Africa. The project involved living in the desert for some time with two Arabs, and Paris was asked to provide Scharf with funds to buy sufficient equipment for this. A tent was to be delivered at a place called Avoninti and a six-wheeled lorry was also made available for him.

  He had, however, to negotiate for tyres when he was in Paris. The enterprise, which was to start before the spring, would not leave from Cisneros for reasons of cover.

  Scharf eventually arrived in Madrid on 13 March 1942, and went via Hendaye to Paris on 19 Match 1942. There he was to report to the station master and would be met by one of the Paris officials. While he was in Paris he discussed the various projects afoot in Cisneros, and also the equipping of fishing smacks with W/T sets. It became clear that he and PILA did not always see eye to eye over these arrangements, and finally it was proposed that PILA should visit Madrid so that the differences could be cleared up.

  There is no indication of what Scharf was doing between March, 1942 and August, 1943 when he was concerned in an enterprise based on Italy. He was to have been dropped by a machine from the Gartenfeld squadron, but the aeroplane which
was to have been used was brought down and the crew taken prisoner by the British. The operation had therefore to be postponed until another plane became available.

  Naturally, MI5 was anxious to extract from Scharf every detail of his mission with Leibbrandt to South Africa, but was hesitant to challenge him with details that might compromise ISOS. Accordingly, on 9 August 1944 Blanshard Stamp asked his French opposite number, Commandant André Bonnefous, for an assurance that Scharf would be executed upon his return to Algiers:

  Scharf is to be returned to North Africa on 23rd August. If we were sure he was then to be executed we could conduct our interrogation rather more freely than would be the case if Scharf is to mix with other prisoners on his return. There are certain matters of delicacy on which he might become aware during the course of the interrogation which we are anxious to safeguard. Could you therefore find out from Algiers how he is to be dealt with when he returns there.

  However, while Bonnefous considered MI5’s request, it was decided that Scharf was too valuable to return as agreed, and a delay was sought:

  This man is proving himself a mine of information and we feel both here and at Camp 020 that he would be a very valuable acquisition for reference purposes if we could retain him for, say, a further three months. As an example of the sort of information Scharf can provide I would refer you to the Camp 020 report dated 11 August 1944, four copies of which went to the War Room. This shows how valuable Scharf may be in identifying stay-behind agents. Further, he has displayed a formidable and perhaps unique knowledge of the activities and organisation of the Abwehr in Paris, and it might be very convenient indeed to have him on hand when we start to receive the products of the comb out of the city in the not too distant future.

  One reason why MI5 was so interested in Scharf was his willingness to disclose information that he had not mentioned when questioned by the French in Oran, and his participation in a mission involving Charles Bedaux was one such topic, recalling that he had been called to Paris in 1942 where:

  … he reported to Ledenburg as instructed, and the latter outlined to him the proposed mission. He was, it seemed, to travel to Algeria with an agent in the German pay by name of Bedaux, for whom he was to act as wireless operator, transmitting all items of information which Bedaux wished to send to his chiefs in Paris. Bedaux, he was told, was identical with the well-known man of that name who acquired United States citizenship and became chief of the concern known as ‘Bedaux Undertakings Incorporated’ in America. He had also acquired fame by lending his home in Paris for the marriage of HRH the Duke of Windsor to Mrs Simpson.1

  The mission was being undertaken ostensibly for the purpose of surveying a projected pipe line which was to convey vegetable oil from French West Africa to Algeria, and it had received the blessing of de Brinon and other members of the Vichy Cabinet, who were affording Bedaux all possible assistance. The Germans for their part, however, wished to make use of this admirable cover for the purpose of obtaining military information, and the Hotel Lutetia officials had decided to send two Abwehr W/T operators with the expedition who could carry out the necessary Secret Service work. Scharf unfortunately never learned the precise nature of the secret information which was to be obtained, though he suspected that it was to be, to a certain extent, economic as well as military.

  After the plan had been briefly outlined, Hauptmann von Ledenburg took Scharf to a private hotel at 53 Avenue Hoche, which had formerly been the property of the well-known Greek financier, Sir Basil Zaharoff, and there introduced him to Bedaux. The discussion was now carried on in French, though Bedaux occasionally conversed with Ledenburg in what seemed to Scharf to be perfect English. Scharf was now told that the expedition was to be split up into two groups. The first of these, under the command of Bedaux himself, was to cover the territory bordering the projected railway line from Colomb-Bechar to Cao in the French Sudan, while the second, under the leadership of a colonel whose name Scharf never learned, was to operate along the route Colomb-Bechar, via Tibosti to Cao. The party was to consist of some fifteen to twenty men, and as they were to travel as much as possible in cars and lorries, the Germans had been approached with applications for the necessary petrol and tyres.

  Bedaux was scheduled to set out for North Africa at the beginning of November 1942 and he, Scharf, and GEORGES (the second W/T operator) and [Jean] Caudron, a technical expert, duly alerted Paris for Lyons at the time arranged, where they were to catch the plane which was to take them to Algiers. On arrival in Lyons, they found that they had three days to wait, so Bedaux obtained accommodation for himself at the Carlton Hotel, while Scharf put up at the Grand Nouvel Hotel. Before the time fixed for the departure of the expedition, however, Scharf was unexpectedly recalled to Paris, where Gastl informed him that he would be unable to accompany Bedaux as Hauptmann Burkhardt of the Hotel Lutetia had a more important mission for him. He heard later on Burckhardt and Caudron caught the plane arranged, whilst GEORGES the V-Mann followed them by sea from Marseilles. The remaining members of the expedition were, of course, already in North Africa.

  Before leaving the subject of the Bedaux mission, it should be pointed out that Scharf was instructed to operate under the cover name of André L’Huillier, and given a code based on a French novel by Pierre Benoit. This code was operated by means of a grid, but unfortunately Scharf is unable to remember the name of the particular novel which he was to use with it. His instructor was Unteroffizier Fitzentum of the Funkstelle at the Hotel Lutetia.

  When pressed for more details, Scharf revealed further information about the Frenchman known to him as GEORGES:

  … the W/T operator who accompanied Bedaux to Algeria, and who is still known to be working for the German Secret Service. When first introducing this man to Scharf, von Ledenburg mentioned that he had formerly been established with his wife in a villa on the coast of Normandy or Brittany, where he had set up a wireless transmitter for communication with the Paris Stelle. Considerably later, during 1943, the same von Ledenburg, who had in the meantime been transferred from Gruppe III to Gruppe I, told Scharf that GEORGES had returned safely via Spain after having satisfactorily carried out his duties for Bedaux, and that he had reestablished himself in his villa with a view to remaining as a W/T agent behind the Allied lines in the event of invasion of the continent. In the circumstances, therefore, it is desirable that this export agent be located at the earliest possible opportunity, and arrested.

  MI5 would eventually receive help from Carl Eitel to identify GEORGES as Georges Aubry, whom he had employed as an agent in Brest operating under the code name CARLOS. Aubry somehow made a miraculous escape from Algiers and returned to Paris, where he was welcomed with some scepticism by the Abwehr. Bedaux was not so lucky, and was arrested when American troops entered Algiers, to be kept in custody until December 1943 when he was shipped to Florida.

  The issue of Bedaux’s loyalties would become moot following his suicide by an overdose of deliberately hoarded sleeping tablets in February 1944, but the evidence was collected anyway as Liddell was anxious to tie up all the loose ends. As well as testimony from Scharf, who had been rejected for the task by Bedaux, MI5 gathered other witnesses, including Josef Graf von Ledebur-Wicheln, an Austrian aristocrat and member of the Paris Abstelle who was later appointed aide to Colonel Georg Hansen in Berlin and in 1944 defected to the British embassy in Madrid. The fact that Bedaux had himself insisted on being accompanied by two Abwehr wireless operators was itself a significant indicator of the intelligence dimension to his mission. It also shed light on his relationship with senior Abwehr personnel, such as Kapitan Erich Pfeiffer2 and his chief, Major Alexander Waag, who had selected and assigned the appropriate personnel. Waag, who was Admiral Canaris’s nephew, became the second most senior figure in the Paris Abstelle, under Colonel Friedrich Rudolf who headed the Abwehr across the whole of France throughout the occupation. These were indeed friends in high places, but such contacts would leave him defenceless when a federal grand
jury was convened in February 1944 to bring charges of treason and trading with the enemy.

  When in January 1945 the time came for Scharf to be returned to the French, Helenus Milmo recommended that the authorities should be informed of the assistance he had rendered:

  It seems the French Military Court is anxious to lauch proceedings against Scharf, and if this is so I think that whilst it would probably be unwise to make any positive recommendation we should draw the attention of the French to the fact that this man has given a very great deal of assistance to us voluntarily whilst he has been over here, and that this might be taken into account in mitigation of the offences of which he will doubtless be found guilty.

  When finally Scharf was ready to go back to Algiers, his flight from RAF Lyneham was delayed by bad weather for a few days, and he was held in the cells at Wootton Bassett police station until 5 February, much to the discomfort of the Chief Constable of Devizes. Upon his arrival Scharf was charged with treason and sentenced to death on 14 March by a military tribunal.

  * * *

  Unwittingly, the Spanish consul in Vancouver, Fernando Kobbe, would bring about the downfall of that most assiduous German spy, Alcazar de Velasco. Even before his arrival in Canada, Kobbe, who was a widower, formerly married to a German woman, had been compromised by Japanese decrypts that suggested he had been recruited as a Japanese spy, perhaps by his mistress, Marichu Amenza. Initially, some consideration was given by Peter Wilson of SIS’s Section V to making a pitch in the hope of turning Kobbe into a double-agent, but it was decided that such a move might compromise another double-agent, ASPIRIN.