Churchill's Spy Files

by Nigel West

  Buster Milmo concluded that Hlidar would have been an important German spy if he had undertaken his assignment as planned in 1944, but by the time he reached Scotland, with the war almost over, he had become an irrelevance. He was deported to Iceland by air from Hendon on 2 August 1945, accompanied by seven of his compatriots.

  * * *

  John Olday, also known as Arthur Oldag, was an author, cartoonist and political extremist very familiar to MI5. His wife, Hilde Meisel, a member of Militant Socialist International, was a Hungarian Jewess born in Vienna, known to Special Branch.1 She was employed by the BBC to compose German language talks, and had published How to Conquer Hitler under the name Hilda Monte. They had married in September 1938 and lived in a top floor flat in Greek Street, Soho. According to Scotland Yard, Oldag’s British passport had been issued in Hamburg in April 1937, and he had been interviewed in September 1939 upon his return to London from Geneva. On that occasion he claimed to have been born in London in 1905 but to have lived in Hamburg when his mother moved to the United States, and was reported to have asserted the need for ‘IRA action’ against the Nazi regime in Germany. When questioned he described himself as the illegitimate son of a German woman who had taken him as a child back to Germany. There he had been brought up by grandparents in Kiel and Hamburg, and later, when working as a journalist on the Anzeiger, had joined the Young Communist League.1 He also claimed to be a member of a small nameless terrorist group based in Paris that had access to explosives and intended to mount a bombing campaign across Germany:

  … the sole object of which would appear to be the destruction, by means of sabotage, of points of military importance in Germany. The principal of this group, he stated, was a German named Karl GROEHL or FRIEDBERG of 7 rue Barrault, Paris XIII, which address is also the headquarters of the organisation.

  In 1937 he had moved to London and found a job as a cartoonist on Everybodies Weekly, lodging in Victoria with a poet, Rose Fyleman. He had also adopted the pen-name John Olday to publish Kingdom of Rags,2 a collection of anti-Nazi cartoons. According to his MI5 file, Olday was considered for recruitment by SIS for some undisclosed purpose, but he was rejected as being unstable and indiscreet.

  Oldag was described as possessing ‘a superior intellect and education’, and in July 1941 joined the Pioneer Corps, prompting MI5’s Mark Johnstone in November to send his commanding officer a discreet warning about his political extremism and his potential for spreading subversion. However, Olday was highly regarded in his unit, at least until March 1943 when he was registered as a deserter. In August 1943 he was reported by the police for having created a booklet of caricatures entitled The March to Death, which was published by the Freedom Press, and F Division reopened its investigation of him. According to Max Knight, Oldag’s wife had been a Trotskyite, but recently had abandoned both the cause and her husband and had moved in with a Communist, Baron Hellmut von Rauschenplat.3 His agent reported that Olday’s booklet was being sold by the Peace Pledge Union, a group of pacifists closely monitored by MI5’s F Division. Another informant suggested Olday was being sheltered by the Chinese in Soho, as he had demonstrated a particular affinity for that community.

  Olday was eventually arrested by the police in 1944 on a charge of carrying false identity papers, and upon his release was sentenced by the army to two years’ imprisonment for desertion. In 1946 he resumed his activism for the anarchist movement, and thereafter made frequent contributions to the Anarchist fortnightly journal.

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  11 JUNE 1945

  MI5’s last report of the war to the Prime Minister was dated June 1945 and concentrated exclusively on those British turncoat soldiers who had been recruited into the Legion of St George, a Waffen SS infantry unit, supposedly to fight on the Russian front, but in fact which never really left their barracks in Dresden for lack of numbers. MI5’s response to the issue had been the creation of a special section of four Scotland Yard detectives, designated B4(a) and then SLB3, and led by Donald Fish and Reg Spooner, to investigate each case and assemble the evidence for submission to the Director of Public Prosecutions. As a first step, in November 1933 Len Burt and Jim Skardon opened an office in Paris.

  During the course of the war a total of fifty-four British and Empire soldiers joined the Free Corps, but there were never more than twenty-seven in the unit at any one time. John Amery was tried and executed in December 1945, but the other participants received prison sentences of up to fifteen years. MI9 was particularly well-informed about the Free Corps’ membership as Quartermaster-Sergeant John H.O. Brown of the Royal Artillery, who had been in contact with its personnel, had also been reporting to London. After his return to England in 1945 Brown was decorated with the Distinguished Conduct Medal, an award that caused some surprise among the British prisoners of war with whom he had shared the previous four years. They remembered him as having often expressed pro-German sympathies and had been regarded as more likely to face a court martial when he was back in England than be the recipient of a medal. The secret of Brown’s true role was finally revealed at the Old Bailey trial of Walter Purdy, a renegade Briton who was convicted of broadcasting propaganda for the Nazis. Both he and Tom Cooper, a leading recruiter for the British Free Corps, were sentenced to death after Brown had given damning testimony for the prosecution.

  Educated at Cambridge and a man of deep religious beliefs, Brown had attended a course of MI9 lectures to prepare him for the possibility of capture. He memorised a simple code to use in his correspondence home and was taught to indicate the existence of a secret message by writing the date in a particular way and by underlining his signature. Scrutiny of the letters upon their arrival in London by British censors enabled those with secret messages to be diverted to MI9, where they were decoded.

  Brown had been captured in France at the end of May 1940 with a dozen survivors of his battery, a remnant of the British Expeditionary Force. His first camp was Lamsdorf but he volunteered for a work camp at Blechhammer in Upper Silesia, where he gathered information and conveyed it to MI9. Later, masquerading as a Nazi sympathiser, he switched to Berlin where he was approved for a special camp, Genshagen, which from June 1943 accommodated potential members of the British Free Corps. Brown was eventually liberated by American troops in April 1945 but was kept in custody as a suspected traitor until MI9 could confirm his credentials. Upon his release he was flown home for a lengthy debriefing by MI5’s Len Burt.1

  William Joyce, who broadcast on German radio, was convicted of treason and hanged at Wandsworth in January 1946, while his colleague, Norman Baillie-Stewart, escaped a death sentence by pleading guilty to a lesser charge and receiving a sentence of five years’ imprisonment. Purdy and another BFC volunteer, Thomas Cooper, had their death sentences commuted to life terms.

  MAY 1945

  BRITISH RENEGADES

  During the war the Security Service received information about the conduct of British subjects who were in Germany or in the occupied territories, and who had in one form or another taken service with the enemy. Some of these persons were notorious, such as William Joyce,2 Norman Baillie-Stewart3 and John Amery,4 whose activities were reported in the Press, while others, although the subject of intelligence reports, were not, and indeed are not, well known to the public in this country.

  It was necessary that the Allied forces should be warned in advance as to who the renegades were, otherwise there would be danger of the renegades being accepted as loyal British subjects and even being given employment, a situation which would have involved grave security risks.

  Before D-Day therefore, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces were furnished with the names of those British subjects who were known to have assisted the enemy, or who were suspected on good grounds of so doing. The list of these names has become known as the Warning List of Renegade British Subjects, and the names upon it have been circulated by SHAEF to Army Groups. Similar information was given to Allied Force Headquarters in Italy and to
Consular posts who were likely to have to deal with British subjects seeking to leave the Continent.

  As a result of a discussion between the various authorities concerned, SHAEF were requested to arrange, in the more serious cases, for the detention of the persons concerned until enquiries could be made on the Continent into their activities with a view to their being reported to the Director of Public Prosecutions. In the less serious cases detention was not asked for but advice was given against the employment of the person concerned by any Allied Institution until the case had been investigated. In December 1944, at the request of SHAEF, the Security Service sent over to Paris a Liaison Section in order to advise on matters concerning British renegades, and where necessary to make enquiries and collect evidence as to their activities. This section now consists of four officers, two of whom are experienced police officers from New Scotland Yard, who are attached to the Security Service.

  There are at present on the Warning List the names of 95 British subjects, and of these 40 have so far been located, Reports have already been made to the Director of Public Prosecutions regarding a number of those persons located, and investigations as to the activities of the remainder are in progress. Cases hitherto unknown to us have also to be examined.

  The British subjects who took service with the enemy were employed either as broadcasters, or writers of propaganda for broadcasting, or for use in the Press.

  The Germans did, however, seek to form a British unit to serve with the German Army. This was first known as the ‘Legion of St George’ and later as the ‘British Free Corps’. Their efforts in this direction proved a failure as, according to our information, the total number of recruits never amounted to more than sixty. For the most part these recruits came from members of the Services detained in prisoner-of-war camps though a few civilian recruits were obtained. All were assured that they would only be used to fight against Bolshevism. Each person who is known, or who may be discovered, to have joined the British Free Corps is the subject of enquiries which are now proceeding. Many of those so far interviewed state that they joined the Corps in order to sabotage its activities, or with a view to escaping from the enemy. Each case is being studied and when the enquiries are complete a report will be submitted to the proper authorities.

  The collection of evidence in all these cases will take time, involving as it does the examination of broadcasting times and the archives of German broadcasting establishments, the search for documents concerning the British Free Corps and the general organisation of the German effort to relieve British subjects from their allegiance. Progress has already been made and with the cessation of hostilities the task will become easier.

  The nature of the charge to be preferred against a renegade is a matter for decision by the legal authorities in each case. It is understood that in the more serious cases a charge of either treason or treachery will be preferred, while in other cases Defence Regulations will be invoked.

  The Security Service officers are working in close and constant touch with the Director of Public Prosecutions.

  11th June 1945

  * * *

  By the end of the inquiries conducted by SLB3 every allegation of collaboration with the enemy had been investigated and almost all were resolved, the exception being an SOE officer, Ronald Seth, whose behaviour after his capture while on a sabotage mission in Estonia on Operation BLUNDERHEAD in 1942 led to accusations that he had acted as a stool pigeon in a PoW camp, and had allowed himself to be recruited by the Sicherheitsdienst. Despite many interrogations and much conflicting evidence, no charges were ever brought against Seth who successfully lobbied the government for his back-pay. He later gave a version of his adventures in his autobiography, A Spy Has No Friends.5

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  HARLEQUIN

  During the period of MI5 reporting to the Prime Minister, two special reports were compiled at his request, the first on the defector Richard Wurmann, the second on GARBO. The first MI5 dossier on a specific case, generated at Churchill’s request, concerned HARLEQUIN, the Abwehr prisoner captured in North Africa who had become a walking encyclopædia on the German Intelligence apparatus.

  THE HARLEQUIN CASE

  HARLEQUlN is a German officer who was captured by British troops in North Africa in November, 1942, when endeavouring to make his escape onto Tunisia. Whilst purporting to be a member of the German Armistice Commission, HARLEQUIN was in fact the Leiter of the Abwehrstelle at Algiers and was known to us as such.

  Technically an American prisoner, be was brought to the UK where he was turned round to a point where, convinced of the inevitability of a German defeat, he placed in our hands a written offer of his services, subject only to the reservation that he should not be compelled to take up arms against the German forces. He has supplied a wealth of intelligence, much of which is subject to check, though this fact is unknown to him. He has also been used in a consultative capacity and has contributed helpful and informative comments on cases submitted to him.

  HISTORY

  HARLEQIN was commissioned in the German Army in April 1914, and served with distinction in the war 1914–1918, being wounded on five occasions and being twice decorated, once with the Hohenzollern EK 1,1 and once with the Verdienstkreuz for bravery in the field. On leaving the Army he became a chartered accountant, and in 1933 became a member of the Nazi Party when the Stahlhelm, of which he was a member, was incorporated in the Party. In 1937 he was recalled to the Reserve and the following year was transferred to the Abwehr. From the outbreak of war until May of 1940 he was stationed at Cologne, and during the Battle of France was engaged upon the interrogation of British Prisoners of War. After Dunkirk he was sent to Biarritz to organise an Abwehrstelle and remained there until November of 1941. During this period his principal duty appears to have been the surreptitious slipping of German Secret Service agents and personnel across the Franco-Spanish frontier, with the assistance and collaboration of the Spanish authorities. In December 1941 he was transferred to Berlin, where he worked until March 1942. From Berlin he went to Paris and remained there for two months, after which he was transferred to Algiers as Head of the local Abwehrstelle.

  REASONS FOR CO-OPERATION

  HARLEQUIN is a doubly disappointed and disillusioned man. His early hopes and expectations of a military career culminating in his becoming a general staff officer were shattered by the defeat of German arms in 1918. Like many others of the Prussian officer class, to which he belongs, he disapproved of much that the Nazi regime represents, but he saw in its rise to power the agency through which Germany could shake off the shackles of Versailles and achieve her aggressive ambitions. It was on this basis that he was prepared to, and did, support the new Party. With the failure of the German summer offensive on the Eastern front in 1942 to achieve decisive victory, he realised that the war was lost. Lacking the moral courage to face internment and the bitterness of defeat for the second time he found it consistent with his none-too-rigid conscience to convince himself that it was in the interests of humanity in general, and the German people in particular, that the termination of the war should be accelerated, and, aided by our inducements, decided to do what he could to assist this end. So far he has played well by us and it is anticipated that provided we hold to our side of the bargain he will continue to do so. Moreover, the letter which he has written and which is referred to above puts him completely in our power; and he is fully aware of that fact.

  It would not be possible to do more in this note than to indicate topics upon which HARLEQUIN has provided intelligence, and to set out by way of illustration some of the more interesting items which he has recounted. He has supplied important information upon the following subjects inter alia:

  Organisation and Personnel of the Abwehr

  Abwehr Agents employed by, or otherwise known to HARLEQUIN

  Abwehr System of Recruiting, Training and Running Agents

  Abwehr Terminology

  Pre-War Activities of the Abwehr vis a
vis the UK

  Relations between the Abwehr (High Command Intelligence Service, Controlled by Canaris) and the Sicherheitsdienst (Party Intelligence Service Controlled by Himmler and including the Gestapo)

  The following are examples of detailed intelligence supplied by HARLEQUIN:-

  FAILURE OF THE GERMAN SUMMER OFFENSIVE ON THE EASTERN FRONT, 1942

  In April of 1942 at the Hotel des Ambassadeurs, Paris, a conference of all Abwehr officers in France was addressed by a general, the chief of foreign Armies Section of the German Intelligence. The lecturer gave a very lucid and convincing account of the situation on all the fronts, and came to the following conclusion – ‘The great offensive which Germany is going to start against Russia in the summer must lead to the decisive annihilation of the Russian Army. If this result is not achieved then, in view of the growing discrepancy between German and Allied arms production, the war must be considered as lost.’ HARLEQUIN states that when the German summer offensive failed to bring about the annihilation of the Russian armies, every single officer of the Abwehr was convinced, as was HARLEQUIN, that Germany had lost the war.

  SECURITY OF BRITISH ARMY W/T SIGNALS

  The UK is badly covered by the Abwehr and according to HARLEQUIN the best information from and about the UK is obtained from wireless monitoring service, which apparently intercepts and deciphers Army signals W/T traffic. HARLEQUIN has seen the periodical results of this traffic and states that it upset him considerably by showing him how useless was the Abwehr Intelligence product when compared with that of this splendid intercept service, as a result of which, he alleges, everything is known about the distribution and battle order of the troops in England, their numbers and etc. He saw similar results compiled from intercept signals in the Western desert.