Published in the United States of America in 2010 by
CASEMATE
908 Darby Road, Havertown, PA 19083
and in the United Kingdom by
CASEMATE
17 Cheap Street, Newbury, Berkshire, RG14 5DD
© 2009 by Henrik O. Lunde
ISBN 978-1-935149-33-0
eISBN 9781612000459
Cataloging-in-publication data is available from the Library of Congress and from the British Library.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.
Printed and bound in the United States of America.
For a complete list of Casemate titles, please contact
United States of America
Casemate Publishers
Telephone (610) 853-9131, Fax (610) 853-9146
E-mail [email protected]
Website www.casematepublishing.com
United Kingdom
Casemate-UK
Telephone (01635) 231091, Fax (01635) 41619
E-mail [email protected]
Website www.casematepublishing.co.uk
CONTENTS
Preface & Acknowledgments
Prologue
1.
Allied Plans–Flawed, Inadequate, and Hesitant
2.
German Plans—Bold, Imaginative, and Reckless
3.
Ignored Warnings—Ships Passing in the Night
4.
Narvik Area Defenses
5.
The German Attack on Narvik
6.
Destroyer Battle
7.
Confusion and Disarray
8.
Beachhead Consolidation and Second Naval Battle
9.
The Narvik Front, April 13–26
10.
Campaigns in the South
11.
The Norwegian-French Offensive, April 29–May 12
12.
2nd Mountain Division to the Rescue
13.
The Bjerkvik Landing and the Mountain Offensive
14.
The Loss of Nordland Province
15.
The Week that Lost the Campaign—Strained Relations
16.
Time Runs Out
17.
Evacuation, Armistice, and Disaster
Epilogue
Maps
Command Structures
Operational Code Names
Bibliography
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There are many cogent reasons why the 1940 campaign in Norway has an enduring importance and why its study should be basic reading for students of military history, for military planners and operators, and for policymakers. The fact that it was the first campaign in history in which land, sea, and air forces were fully involved is sufficient to meet the above criteria. However, there are other compelling reasons.
For both the Germans and the Allies, the war in Scandinavia demonstrated the extreme risks and dangers inherent when undertaking a preemptive war or a war of choice. The Norway campaign remains a perfect example of how things can quickly unravel when the underlying assumptions governing plans are fallacious. Furthermore, the Allied and Norwegian responses to the manner and pace of the German attack provide classic examples of the results of the problems that have always faced military planners in democracies relying on poorly trained and equipped conscript forces.
Many writers have concluded that the German plans and preparations were kept so secret that the attack came as a complete surprise to the Norwegians and the Allies. In fact, there were numerous intelligence reports pointing to imminent German actions in Scandinavia. Policymakers and planners gave little credit to these reports because of their preconceived ideas about German capabilities and intentions; hence they failed to draw the conclusions that, perhaps, ought logically to have followed.
The rough geography and severe climate of Norway encouraged the Norwegians to believe that their country was easy to defend. This belief, combined with the scarcity of resources in the interwar period, left the country with inadequate military forces to meet a determined aggressor. The operations in north Norway show clearly that to commit forces in the Arctic without adequate equipment and training is a recipe for disaster.
The war was the first direct clash between German and Allied land and air forces. It was a testing ground for the innovations in equipment and doctrine developed since World War I. The effect of air power on both land and naval operations, little understood in Norway and Great Britain, was demonstrated clearly during the war in Norway, and caused a fundamental shift in how this new weapon was viewed. The campaign also saw the first use of airborne troops to seize airfields and key objectives far behind enemy lines.
The Norwegian campaign revealed serious deficiencies in Allied command structures and inter-allied coordination and cooperation. Failure to achieve unity of command plagued both sides, but with the Germans the command difficulties were largely overcome by a high degree of professionalism at the operational level.
Finally, the campaign in Norway provides a textbook example of two military operational philosophies: centralized versus flexible control.
The German invasion of Denmark and Norway is usually dealt with in a few pages in the better-known political or military histories of World War II. This is understandable. The campaigns of the war were spread across nearly six years around the world, and the one in Norway was a comparatively small affair, both in the size of forces involved and in the number of casualties.
Several accounts of the campaign were written shortly after the war by authors from all participating countries. The Campaign in Norway by T.K. Derry in 1952, which became the official British history of the campaign, is undoubtedly the most authoritative and most widely read account in English. However, this excellently written book suffers from some of the same problems that David Reynolds finds in Churchill’s multi-volume history of World War II. Both authors present British motives and actions in the most favorable light. For the most part, facts are presented correctly, but the reader is often misled or influenced by omissions, lack of balance, distortions, and the shifting of blame for failure. Although a number of books have been written by British authors since the 1950s, they are largely unknown on this side of the Atlantic. These works were primarily written for the British public, and deal mainly with Allied operations, in particular the naval aspects. Some accounts, by omission or through a narrow perspective, paint an inaccurate picture of events. While there are some well-written German and Norwegian accounts, they have not been translated and are therefore practically unknown outside their own countries.
There are a number of biographies of individuals involved in the Norwegian operations, both political and military, as well as a number of personal accounts and unit histories. These sources are valuable but must be treated with care. For example, it is often the case that writers of a biography fall in love with their subjects and therefore lose their objectivity, sometimes downplaying, overlooking, or excusing their subjects’ flaws and weaknesses.
A review of the studies available in English led this author to the conclusion that the treatment of the campaign, with few exceptions, is unbalanced. The operations of French, Polish, and Norwegian troops are invariably given far less coverage and credit than they deserve. Inconsistencies between national accounts are numerou
s and the impact of such factors as terrain, climate, training, and personalities are seldom addressed adequately.
The intent of this book is to treat planning and operations in a balanced manner, without a national focus, using sources from all participating countries. The planning and operations are analyzed in the light of what the participants knew or could have been expected to know. Hindsight analysis is avoided as far as possible. It is always easy to be wise after the event. While few things are more dangerous in the writing of a military history than hindsight, the mere recounting of events without analysis and objective critique makes it a useless exercise. The focus of this book was originally on military operations in and around Narvik and on the political decisions and planning leading up to those operations. However, while Narvik had a seemingly magnetic effect upon military planners before and during the war—out of all proportion to its actual military importance—these operations cannot be understood in isolation. I soon realized that limiting my book to Narvik was unrealistic because that campaign was entwined with the whole of the war in Norway as well as in Europe generally.
I owe a special debt to those who have written about the various aspects of the war in Norway, and they are frequently referenced in text and notes. Among those who deserve special mention is retired Norwegian Major General Torkel Hovland, a former commander in north Norway. He provided a number of references at the outset that would otherwise have been difficult to locate.
The same is true for Hans Haugse, a retired Norwegian headmaster, who also put me in contact with Petter Sandvik, an individual with personal experiences from Narvik in 1940. Mr. Sandvik, in addition to his personal observations, provided materials from various institutions that proved useful. Lieutenant Colonel Palle Ydstebø of the Norwegian Defense Staff was kind enough to make available helpful information on the historical aspects of the defenses in north Norway. Magnor Kr. Fjellheim kindly provided photographs of the area around Narvik that illustrate the formidable terrain and climatic challenges to military operations. Colonel (US Army, Ret) Henry Gole reviewed the draft manuscript and provided valuable perspectives on the issues during our frequent discussions.
I am grateful to a number of institutions and wish to give the staff of three a specific mention: the US Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; the Library of Congress in Washington, DC; and the Coyle Free Library in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. The friendly and helpful staff at the Coyle Library helped locate and obtain access to sources from all over the United States.
My friend, Dr. Enoch Haga, has expertly guided me through this project, from beginning to end. He read every draft and made very helpful suggestions as to subject matter, organization, style, composition, and illustrations. Whenever pessimism began to rear its ugly head, Dr. Haga was always there to provide encouragement and support.
Finally, it is obvious that without the great patience and understanding on the part of my family, as I became increasingly absorbed in this work over the past three years, it would never have seen the light of day. My debt to them is immense.
Despite the diligence of those who provided assistance, comments, and advice, I must stress that I take full responsibility for all conclusions and such errors as this book may inadvertently contain.
PROLOGUE
“A power that wants to land in Norway, whether in the south or in other places, must rule the sea, and the power that rules the sea has no need to land in Norway.”
STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON JANUARY 14, 1939 BY ADMIRAL HENRY E. DIESEN, COMMANDER IN-CHIEF OF THE NORWEGIAN NAVY.
Norway’s Strategic Importance
Located east of the British Isles, Norway is situated on one side of the route used by German ships heading to or returning from the Atlantic. In the south, Norway forms the northern shore of the waters leading to and from the Baltic approaches. With the advent of air power, the possibilities that control of the Norwegian coastline offered to the belligerents, particularly Germany, were obvious. The Baltic, its approaches, and German harbors in the Baltic were within reach of both long range and shorter range British bombers operating from Norwegian airfields. An Allied presence in Norway would virtually bottle up the German Navy and cut off much of the merchandise that flowed through Scandinavia. This was a serious concern since the very effective Allied blockade during World War 1 was a fundamental reason for Germany’s defeat in that war. On the other hand, a German presence in Norway would secure the Baltic approaches. German bombers operating from Norwegian airfields could cover the whole of the North and Norwegian Seas, as well as portions of the FaeroeIceland gap, critical for naval access to the North Atlantic. The sea routes to Soviet harbors on the Arctic coast could also be interdicted by naval and air forces operating from bases in North Norway. This consideration, however, only became important later in the war.
In World War 1, to prevent German access to the North Atlantic, the Allies decided to create a mine barrier across the North Sea, from the Orkneys to a point three miles off the Norwegian coast, near the town of Haugesund. The United States was the major participant in this enormous project. The U.S. Navy laid almost 57,000 of the 70,000 mines. The barrier stretched over a distance of 230 miles and varied in width from 15 to 35 miles. The mines were laid in several layers at various depths. The British Navy complained that the barrier, on which enormous labor and money was spent, would be ineffective unless the corridor between the mine barrier and the Norwegian coast was closed, and all Allied governments put the strongest pressure on the Norwegians to close it themselves.
This immense barrier took a long time to complete, and by then there was little doubt about how the war would end. It had become clear to the Norwegians that Germany no longer possessed the means to invade Scandinavia. Still, it was not until October 1918 that Norway laid two minefields in territorial waters to close the gap.
During World War II, both Germany and the Allies imported raw materials from Scandinavia, but in Germany’s case, these imports were critical. The German war industry lacked two important raw materials, oil and iron. Most of the iron ore coming from mines in Sweden was shipped from the port of Luleå when the Baltic was ice-free. During the months when Luleå was blocked by ice, the ore was shipped to Narvik in Norway and from there in ships along the Norwegian coast to Germany. The importance of the iron ore and the role it played in the plans of the belligerents is discussed in the first two chapters.
Opposing Policies at the Outset of World War II
When war broke out in Europe at the beginning of September 1939, none of the belligerents planned for or expected Scandinavia to become a theater of operations. Germany viewed a neutral Norway as in their best interests. When Norway issued a declaration of neutrality on September 1, 1939 the German response came on September 2. The Germans stated that they would respect Norwegian neutrality as long as that neutrality was maintained in an uncompromising manner. If not maintained in such a manner or if a third power violated Norwegian neutrality, Germany would be forced to protect its interests in ways and by means dictated by the situation at the time. While the statement signaled Germany’s views that it considered Norwegian neutrality to be in its best interests, it also gave a clear warning that Germany would not tolerate a tilt in Norwegian neutrality towards the Allies or an actual Allied presence in Norway. The British and French did not issue an immediate response to Norway’s declaration of neutrality but in answer to a query from the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvdan Koht, the British Government stated it would respect Norwegian neutrality in the present war. However, a German attack on Norway would be considered an attack on Great Britain and would be met with force. There may have been several objectives behind this British declaration. First, a way to close some of the loopholes in the British blockade was to prevail on the Norwegian government to interpret their responsibilities as a neutral party in a manner favorable to the British; and secondly, to lessen Norwegian fears of the German threat. In addition, it was critically important for the
British to obtain the services of the large Norwegian merchant fleet.
The British achieved this last objective when the Norwegian Shippers Association chartered the largest and most modern ships in their fleet to the British on November 11, 1939. British achievement of this important goal was not the end of the matter. Policy makers had to keep in mind that hostilities with Norway would nullify the agreement. To balance the scales, Norway signed a trade agreement with Germany on February 23, 1940 stipulating that Norway would continue to provide exports to Germany at the 1938 level.
The British policy of appeasement in the 1930s was aimed at maintaining peace and the status quo in Europe. To this end, British leaders were willing to accommodate some of the German government’s grievances resulting from provisions forced on it at Versailles at the end of World War I. This British policy did not end entirely with the declaration of war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, continued to cling to the desperate hope that the German people would overthrow Adolf Hitler. In the light of Hitler’s continued aggressive tactics, it is clear that Chamberlain and Halifax misjudged and underestimated Hitler and his ambitions and overestimated the ability and willingness of the German people and their armed forces to take action against their own government. Nevertheless, this policy partially explains Allied reluctance and timidity towards offensive operations in 1939 and early 1940.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 1
