Another factor influencing reluctance to initiate operations in the west was the four-year bloodletting in the brutal trench warfare of World War I, still fresh in French and British memories. Many people, including Winston Churchill, believed that the nation’s resources were badly spent in this war of attrition and that a repeat of that calamity must be avoided in any future conflict. This feeling strengthened Churchill’s existing fascination with flank strategies.
In accordance with their policy, Chamberlain and Halifax were eager to prevent the war from escalating to the point where it took on a life of its own. This view soon collided with that of Churchill, who pressed for action in Scandinavia, as well as with that of the French leadership, keen on distracting German attention from its own doorsteps.
Norwegian Policies
It is impossible to understand Norwegian policies and actions in 1939–40 without considering how the country viewed its own interests as well as those of the belligerents. Great Britain enjoyed considerable good will among the Norwegians, who still attached some importance to their common historical heritage which dated back to the Scandinavian settlements in England and Scotland. They saw in the growth of British democracy over the preceding century a close parallel to developments in Norway during the same period. British support during the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905 was not forgotten. The Norwegian royal family was closely related to the British royal family. King Håkon VII, who married his cousin Princess Maud, the youngest daughter of Edward VII and Queen Alexandra in 1896, was King George VI’s uncle.
The economic bonds to Britain were strong and the very survival of Norway’s large merchant fleet and its future as a trading nation were closely tied to British fortunes. Norway had the fourth largest merchant marine in the world. This fleet, in particular the modern tanker part of 1.5 million tons, was of vital importance to the Allies. The British needed iron ore that came through Narvik, as well as annual imports of 10,000 tons of aluminum and 70,000 tons of carbide from Norway. The Norwegian policy makers felt, therefore, that a war with England had to be avoided at all costs.
This feeling was well known to the British and that, plus the sorry state of Norwegian defenses, emboldened the Allies to violate Norwegian sovereignty. Rowland Kenney, the press attaché at the British Embassy,1 had a discussion with Finn Moe, a member of the Norwegian Labor Party. This was shortly after Foreign Minister Koht delivered a speech attacking the British. Finn Moe assured Kenney that the foreign minister was resolute in his view that if Norway entered the war, it had to be on the side of the Allies, something he could not say openly.2 While the statement appears to give a correct picture of Koht’s views, to provide this information to Kenney could only encourage the British leaders in their continued violations of Norwegian neutrality.
The friendship between Germany and Sweden at the beginning of the 20th century when Norway asserted its independence also had a tendency to cause anti-Swedish sentiments to take the form of friendship and sympathy for the British. The activities in Germany in the 1930s had created both disgust and alarm, and the Norwegian leaders took some actions that were sure to irritate the Germans. In 1935, the Nobel committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Carl von Ossietzky, who was in a German concentration camp when nominated. Four years later, Norway rejected a German offer of a non-aggression pact. The historical relationship with Great Britain and Germany and the policies of the latter’s government go a long way to explain the consensus in Norwegian political circles in 1940 that a war with Great Britain had to be avoided.
Most members of the Norwegian government were ill equipped to deal with the events that unfolded in 1939 and 1940. Most had little interest in military affairs and foreign policy. Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold was a former lumberjack and labor union offical, Minister of Justice Trygve Lie was also a former labor union official, and Minister of Defense Carl F. Monsen was a conscientious objector and had been arrested for pacifist agitation. Foreign Minister Koht was a professor of history and well qualified for his job, but in this, he was a lone figure among his colleagues.
The Norwegian Terrain
To understand the magnitude and difficulties faced by anyone undertaking military operations in Norway, it is important to keep the country’s geography in mind. Norway is slightly larger in area than Great Britain but over 95 percent of the country consists of mountains, deep valleys, extensive forests, and thousands of islands along the coast. These features resulted in enormous internal communications problems. The population, which was slightly over three million in 1940, was concentrated in a few cities, the main valleys in the eastern part of the country, and along a narrow strip of coastline.
Cold and heavy snow is the normal winter climate in the eastern and internal portions of central Norway. The coastal areas of western and northern Norway, in contrast, have relatively mild winters because of the Gulf Stream. However, the darkness, frequent and violent storms, and the spring thaw complicate both military and civilian movement.
The primary means of communications was by sea, or by the railroad system that had not yet reached Narvik. The road network was susceptible to interdiction in the narrow, precipitous valleys, in the mountains, and along the coast where the use of ferries was required to cross the numerous fjords. There were no roads linking Narvik and the two northern provinces, Troms and Finnmark, to the rest of the country.
The rough geography and severe climate, while presenting an invader with serious problems, encouraged the belief that the country was easy to defend. This belief, in turn, contributed to the scarcity of resources allocated for defense.
The Norwegian Military
Norwegian policies and the level of preparedness of her armed forces in 1940 can be explained partly by the country’s experience in World War I, or rather by the failure of its leaders to interpret correctly the reasons for that experience. While the country managed to avoid direct involvement in that conflict, the Norwegian merchant marine, mostly in the service of the Allies, suffered losses that were proportionally greater than those suffered by the British. More than half of the Norwgian merchant fleet and 2,000 sailors were lost, primarily to German submarine warfare. Although the country had to endure severe blockade measures and the war involved great costs to the Norwegian population, Norwegian companies, industrialists, and shipping magnates reaped huge economic benefits.
Johan Nygaardsvold and his government hoped to remain neutral in World War II, and perhaps to reap similar economic benefits. However, Norway’s strategic and economic importance for the belligerents had increased during the inter-war period because of the German need for iron ore. In addition, air power had come of age. There were also other important differences between the situation in 1914 and that in 1939.
The Norwegian armed forces were modern and well trained in World War I, following a deliberate program of force build-up and modernization in preparation for the separation from Sweden only nine years earlier. One reason for scrupulously defending Norwegian neutrality in World War I had to do with the likelihood that Norway and Sweden, if involved in the war, would be on opposite sides.
By 1940, the situation in the armed forces was completely different. Norwegians were caught up in the general pacifist feelings prevailing in much of Europe and the expression that World War I was “the war to end all wars” was more than a slogan. Norwegians were ardent supporters of the newly formed League of Nations and some even viewed that institution as a substitute for national defense. High unemployment levels in the 1920s and 1930s, up to 42% among organized labor in 1932, also contributed to a general unwillingness to increase spending on defense.
These pacifist feelings and severe economic conditions were contem poraneous with the rise of the Labor Party, which viewed the professionals in the military services as opponents of its social service programs. Annual defense expenditure had fallen to less than $9 million in 1935. Thereafter, it increased but even the 1938 budget allocated only $12 million, supple
mented by a $13 million loan, to the armed forces. However, the scarcity in the defense budget was only part of the problem. This is demonstrated by the fact that almost $10 million were on hand and unused when war broke out. Much of the materials needed to rearm and modernize came from sources outside Norway and these became more and more difficult to acquire.
Both the navy and coastal artillery were fully mobilized from the first to the last day of World War I. Minefields protecting the coastal fortresses were laid and all forts had infantry protection against coastal attack. The minefields were under army control until 1936 when the control passed to the navy. In 1939, in contrast, the navy and coastal artillery were only partially mobilized, the minefields were not laid, and no infantry protection was provided for the forts.
While the neglect of defenses was serious, it was not total. There was a system of compulsory military service dating back over 300 years. The conscripts were, for the most part, hardy individuals used to outdoor life in a severe climate and most individuals had access to and were proficient in the use of firearms. However, the military training period was short and the equipment was old, if not obsolete. Antiaircraft guns were scarce and there were no tanks and antitank weapons.
Despite these shortcomings, more could have been done after the outbreak of war in Europe with the resources on hand. In addition, quick and resolute actions at the time of the invasion could have made the assault very costly for the attacker. It appears that both politicians and a number of military officials lacked the will to take effective measures.
The Norwegian Army was organized into six divisional areas in 1940. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were located in eastern Norway, the 3rd Division in the southern part of the country, the 4th Division in the Bergen area, the 5th Division in the Trondheim region, and the 6th Division in North Norway. These divisions were not expected to operate in the same manner as those of major powers. The geography of the country dictated a different and more flexible approach. The divisions were territorial in nature and the operational concepts were built around infantry regiments that were expected to operate under the decentralized control of the divisions. The 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Divisions each had three regiments. The 3rd and 4th Divisions each had two regiments. In addition, there were combat units of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and so on. These units were normally parceled out to the regiments, making those units theoretically capable of operating as independent entities. There were three cavalry regiments, three artillery regiments, three mountain artillery battalions, and two named infantry battalions (Alta and Varanger) in North Norway. At full mobilization, the army was expected to field approximately 119,000 men. However, this number gives a false impression. Most of these troops were not trained and the equipment needed to sustain a full mobilization was not available.
Plans for partial mobilization relied on telegrams or letters while full mobilization called for notification by any means, including radio. The depots for the units to be mobilized were located near population centers and this proved to be a serious problem. Five of the divisional areas each had one battalion in training at the time of the invasion, but these units were located some distance from the German landing sites. The 6th Division was partially mobilized because of the Finnish-Soviet conflict, and the area from Narvik to the border with Finland and the Soviet Union can be viewed as reasonably well prepared. The total on duty strength of the Norwegian Army at the beginning of April 1940 amounted to about 13,000 troops and almost half of this force was stationed in the northern part of the country.
Training and exercises of larger formations were two of the most serious weaknesses affecting the Norwegian Army. The lack of maneuvers by larger units resulted in a reduced competence level among the higher-ranking officers in the army, an item noted by the Germans in their after-action reports. A recruit drafted into the infantry served only for 72 days, the shortest training and service period of any country in Europe. In addition, the number of eligible draftees called up each year was continually reduced, first by overly restrictive medical standards, thereafter by a raffle, and finally by the exclusion of several categories of conscripts. By 1940, there were only 20,000 draftees trained to use modern equipment and weapons. It would have taken several years to train the force adequately at that rate. In most respects, except for familiarity with the terrain and experience in the severe climate, the Norwegian Army was poorly prepared to cope with the German Army and its blitzkrieg doctrine.
The Royal Norwegian Navy, including the coastal forts, was partially mobilized at the outset of hostilities in Europe and its primary task was to enforce the neutrality laws and regulations along the extensive Norwegian coast. The navy was divided geographically into three naval districts. The 1st Naval District included the coastline from the Swedish border to a point just south of Stavanger. The 2nd Naval District included the coastline from south of Stavanger to the provincial boundary between Nord-Trøndelag and Nordland. The 3rd Naval District included the coastline from where the 2nd Naval District left off to the Soviet border. The navy was small compared to that in 1914. The total tonnage in 1914 was about 34,600 while the total tonnage in 1940 came to only 10,300. In addition, the construction program in 1914 called for eight coastal defense ships, two monitors, six destroyers, 40 torpedo boats, and 12 submarines. The building program in 1939 consisted of only two destroyers, three torpedo boats, one submarine, and one motor torpedo boat.3
The relatively small navy in 1940 consisted of two coastal defense ships (an additional two in mothballs), 10 minelayers, three older destroyers of the Draug class, four newer destroyers of the Sleipner class, three larger torpedo boats of the Trygg class, and 14 other torpedo boats. There were also six B class and three A class submarines, eight minesweepers, and six patrol ships. Another 49 leased or requisitioned vessels served as patrol boats. A significant portion of the fleet of 111 ships available in April 1940 was obsolete by the standards of the time. Only one minelayer and four destroyers could be considered modern warships. There were 5,200 officers and men on duty in the navy in April 1940.
The coastal fortifications, one of the most neglected elements of the Norwegian defense establishment, were only partially mobilized. Many of the officers earmarked for mobilization had not been on active duty since 1918 and some batteries had not fired a live round since the 1890s. Several of the main batteries were not manned and only a few of the forts had operational antiaircraft guns. The gun-pits were open and exposed to air attacks. The planned minefields were not laid. Under the full mobilization scenario, the coastal forts should have a total strength of 8,424 officers and men. The actual strength in April 1940 was only 2,403.The coastal forts also suffered from a lack of infantry to defend any inland approaches.
There was no Norwegian air force as such. All aircraft were assigned to either the army or the navy. The Army Air Corps was in the middle of reorganization and receiving new aircraft. The period of reorganization and retraining was to have been completed by July 1, 1940. The reorganization called for the establishment of two squadrons of fighters consisting of Curtis Hawk P36s purchased from the United States and two bomber squadrons consisting of Italian Ca 312s. These aircraft were delivered but they were still in their crates when the Germans attacked. Another 129 aircraft were ordered but not delivered.
The Army Air Corps consisted of 62 aircraft at the beginning of 1940 but only 19 of these were modern operational aircraft: nine British Gladiator fighters, four Italian Ca 310 bombers, and six Heinkel (He-115) torpedo aircraft.4 About 42 naval airplanes were assigned to seven coastal stations and were a mixture of reconnaissance, torpedo, and training aircraft. Again, the aircraft were old and ill suited for modern warfare. Neither the army nor the naval aircraft were capable of meeting the onslaught of the Luftwaffe and, despite valorous individual deeds, had no significant effect on operations.
Norway’s neglect of its armed forces in the inter-war period was well known to the belligerents and the poor state of its defenses, when c
ompared to a generation earlier, served as an invitation to violate the country’s neutrality. Both the German and the British leaders viewed the Norwegian military as a minor obstacle to their plans.
ALLIED PLANS: FLAWED, INADEQUATE, AND HESITANT
“I think the whole thing is hare brained.”
CHIEF AIR MARSHAL SIR CYRIL NEWALL’S COMMENT ON ALLIED PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN SCANDINAVIA.
Plan Catherine
Winston Churchill, who turned 65 in November 1939, was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak of World War II. He had a fascination for the indirect approach in warfare and for striking at what he perceived to be enemy vulnerabilities or weaknesses. This fascination led to the debacle at Gallipoli and goes far to explain Britain’s preoccupation with flanking strategies in the Balkans, southern Europe, and Norway. In 1939, Churchill advocated taking strong action in response to what he perceived as German weaknesses.
Churchill had his first conceptual plan of action against the German northern flank ready the very instant he returned to his old job in the Admiralty. He discussed the plan with Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, on September 3, 1939. The operation he had in mind is reminiscent of the Dardanelles operation that cost him the job as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1915. Churchill’s plan called for forcing an entry into the Baltic for the purpose of attacking the German fleet and cutting the German supply route from Sweden. Churchill recalled to active duty an old friend, 65-year-old Admiral of the Fleet William Boyle, who had inherited the title of Lord Cork and Orrery, for work on this project. Admiral Cork had a personality akin to that of Churchill’s. He had vast energy, an offensive spirit, and a feared temperament—and he was apparently the only one who expressed any enthusiasm for Churchill’s scheme.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 2
