Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  The Norwegians had their suspicions about the ship’s cargo but allowed it to proceed along the coast under naval escort. The ship flew the German naval flag, but despite this fact, Dau allowed three visits by Norwegian naval personnel on February 15. The German captain reported that the ship had participated in exercises in the Atlantic and was on its way from Port Arthur, Texas to Germany with a cargo of 8,500-tons of oil, that the ship was armed with 20mm anti-aircraft guns, but that these were stowed away before entering Norwegian waters.

  Rear Admiral Carsten Tank-Nielsen, the commander of Norway’s 2nd Naval District, was in a dilemma. If Altmark was a merchant ship, it had the right, under the neutrality regulations, to sail through the restricted area around Bergen after being inspected. A warship, on the other hand, could not sail through the area. Classified as a naval auxiliary, the ship did not fit neatly into either of the two categories.

  The Norwegian destroyer Garm, with Admiral Tank-Nielsen aboard, and the minelayer Olav Tryggvason intercepted Altmark well within the restricted area, escorted by the torpedo boat Snøgg. The acting chief of staff of the naval district and Snøgg’s captain boarded Altmark and conferred with Captain Dau. The Norwegians informed Dau that either he had to submit to a search or he would not be allowed to proceed through the restricted area. Captain Dau stated that the ship was a naval auxiliary and he would not permit a search. He was then ordered to take his ship out to sea, around the restricted area.

  While this conference was underway, the Germans broke radio silence and sent a report to the German Embassy in Oslo. Norwegian naval communicators intercepted the radio message and the military control office in Oslo stopped the telegram from reaching the German Embassy. Captain Dau was admonished not to use his radio while in Norwegian waters. The German captain apologized but asked the Norwegians to notify the German Embassy that he had refused inspection and was taking his ship out to sea. Admiral Tank-Nielsen agreed to this request. Altmark withdrew from the restricted area to await an answer from the German Embassy. Norwegian warships remained in the vicinity to ensure that the German ship did not reenter the restricted area.

  The destroyer Garm had been close enough to Altmark for sailors to report that SOS whistle signals were heard from the German ship and that white handkerchiefs had been displayed at the portholes. Garm also reported that the Germans had started up the on-board cranes and other machinery, obviously in an attempt to drown out the signals.

  Admiral Tank-Nielsen sent the following message to the Norwegian Naval Staff: “The ship has refused supplemental visitation and its passage through the restricted area has been denied. Probably prisoners aboard. Inform the Commander-in-Chief.”19 The telegram reached Admiral Diesen at 1554 hours. Diesen conferred with the Norwegian Foreign Office. Both the Foreign Office and Admiral Diesen appear to have felt there had been enough visitations to the German ship, and that Admiral Tank-Nielsen was not handling this problem in accordance with supplemental instructions after a somewhat similar situation in November 1939.20 Diesen and the Foreign Office decided to send the German ship on its way at once. The Norwegians were eager to get this embarrassing and potentially dangerous ship out of its territorial waters as quickly as possible.

  The report from Garm about suspicious activities aboard Altmark did not reach the Norwegian naval headquarters until after Admiral Diesen’s decision, but he stated later that receipt of the report would not have altered his decision. Admiral Tank-Nielsen was ordered to let Altmark pass in its capacity as a naval auxiliary and to provide an escort. The passage through the restricted area was accomplished in darkness, an action contrary to the navy’s own neutrality regulations.

  Meantime, a report of Altmark’s presence in Norwegian waters had reached Rear Admiral H. Boyles, the British Naval Attaché in Oslo. Boyles passed this report on to the British Admiralty. Churchill recognized the potential opportunities in the situation and acted quickly. He instructed Admiral Pound that he should not hesitate “… to arrest Altmark in territorial waters should she be found. The ship is violating neutrality in carrying British prisoners of war to Germany…. The Altmark must be regarded as an invaluable trophy.”21

  Three reconnaissance aircraft from Coastal Command were dispatched to locate Altmark. She was sighted in Norwegian waters south of Stavanger. The escorting Norwegian patrol boat Firern had no antiaircraft guns and could only signal the British aircraft that they were violating Norwegian airspace, and warn them to stand off.

  A British destroyer flotilla of six ships commanded by Captain Philip Vian (later Admiral of the Fleet) in the destroyer Cossack, intercepted Altmark, now escorted by the Norwegian torpedo boat Skarv, outside the entrance to Jøssingfjord, halfway between Egersund and Flekkefjord. Three destroyers made the initial intercept: Cossack, Intrepid, and Ivanhoe. At first, they stopped short of Norwegian territory and signaled Altmark to proceed on a westerly course, out of Norwegian waters. Altmark ignored the signal and proceeded on its previous course. At that point, Intrepid and Ivanhoe entered Norwegian waters despite protests from the Norwegian torpedo boat. Ivanhoe tried to position itself to block Altmark but the Norwegian torpedo boat took up a position between the two ships and moved to within hailing distance of the British destroyer, which fired a warning shot toward Altmark.

  The Altmark slowed down and a boat was launched from Ivanhoe with the intention of boarding the German ship. Lieutenant Hansen, the commander of Skarv, protested the British breach of Norwegian neutrality. Captain Gordon answered the protest by telling the Norwegian officer that he had orders to capture the German ship. Captain Dau used the delay to move Altmark at full speed towards the Jøssingfjord entrance. Three additional British destroyers arrived on the scene, and a second Norwegian torpedo boat, Kjell, took up a position between the British force and the entrance to Jøssingfjord.

  A very dangerous situation had developed. The six modern British destroyers were vastly superior to the two Norwegian torpedo boats.22 However, the sinking of Norwegian naval vessels, with loss of life, in their territorial waters would probably lead to war between Britain and Norway.

  Lieutenant Halvorsen, Kjell’s commander, was the senior Norwegian officer on the scene and took command of the Norwegian force in the area. He protested verbally to Captain Hadow, the Ivanhoe’s skipper. For unknown reasons, Captain Hadow initially addressed Halvorsen in German. Hadow switched to English after the Norwegian lieutenant told him, to the great amusement of the destroyer crew, “Please, speak English, Sir.”23 With these pleasantries out of the way, Lieutenant Halvorsen demanded that the British force leave Norwegian territorial waters immediately. Captain Hadow informed the Norwegian that Altmark carried 400 British prisoners, and that he had orders to free them and bring them to England. Nevertheless, the British withdrew. On the advice of Norwegian pilots, Altmark used the time to enter Jøssingfjord. Captain Dau again used his radio to send a message to the German Embassy in Oslo via a coastal radio station. Norwegian authorities stopped the message.

  Skarv remained with the British destroyers while Kjell followed and hailed Altmark. Captain Dau informed Halvorsen that Norwegian warships from the 2nd Naval District had visited the ship repeatedly and he had received permission to use Norwegian territorial waters. No mention was made of prisoners. Kjell returned to the British destroyer force, tied up alongside Cossack, and Halvorsen boarded the British ship for a conference with Captain Vian. To Vian’s statement that Altmark carried British prisoners, Halvorsen replied that he had no knowledge of any prisoners. However, even if this was the case, he maintained the British had no rights to violate Norwegian neutrality, and demanded that the British force depart as quickly as possible in order to avoid serious consequences.

  The Norwegian torpedo boats had received orders from Rear Admiral J. Smith-Johannsen, commander of the 1st Naval District (which included the Jøssingfjord area), that force should be used to oppose any British attempt to seize Altmark. Vian suggested that Norwegian and British officers should inspect t
he ship, but the Norwegian turned down this suggestion, since allowing foreign officials to inspect ships in Norwegian waters was a serious infringement of the nation’s sovereignty. Halvorsen pointed out that the German ship was in Norwegian waters, had been inspected by Norwegian warships, and had been permitted to proceed. Vian agreed to leave territorial waters, but stated that his force would remain outside to wait for Altmark.

  Reports of what was transpiring on the Norwegian coast reached Churchill, and with the concurrence of the Foreign Office he sent Captain Vian the following order:

  Unless Norwegian torpedo-boat undertakes to convoy Altmark to Bergen with a joint Anglo-Norwegian guard on board, and a joint escort, you should board Altmark, liberate the prisoners, and take possession of the ship pending further instructions. If Norwegian torpedo-boat interferes, you should warn her to stand off. If she fires upon you, you should not reply unless the attack is serious, in which case you should defend yourself, using no more force than is necessary and ceasing fire when she desists.24

  By this stage, the German Ambassador and his naval attaché had become involved, lodging protests. Admiral Boyes visited the Norwegian Naval Staff that evening. In addition to protesting the British action, Norwegian officers pointed out that it was not necessary for the British to attack Altmark in its present position. The Norwegians showed Admiral Boyes maps illustrating that Altmark would be forced to leave Norwegian territorial waters to avoid the ice in the Skagerrak, and that British forces could easily intercept the ship at that time. It would be logical for Admiral Boyes to forward this information to the British Admiralty. The official Norwegian naval history states that there is no evidence he forwarded the information, but if he did, it had no influence on the events that were unfolding.

  The urgency of the British action raises questions about their motives, aside from the obvious one of freeing their fellow citizens. Altmark was trapped in Jøssingfjord and going nowhere, with a force of six British destroyers outside the entrance. If Churchill’s suggestion of a joint escort of Altmark to Bergen or another suitable harbor had been made to the Norwegian government, rather than through Captain Vian to a low-ranking Norwegian naval officer, it is quite possible that a solution agreeable to both parties would have been found. Similarly, the information given to Admiral Boyes by the Norwegian Naval Staff was certainly available to the British Admiralty, even if Boyes did not make a report. There are good reasons to believe that the British (probably Churchill and the Admiralty), knowing there were acceptable alternatives to confrontation, chose the latter. A confrontation would certainly focus public attention on German misuses of Norwegian waters, plus Norway’s failures to enforce its neutrality, and could lead to the kind of German countermeasures Churchill desired.

  Admiral Smith-Johannsen rescinded his order to use force to prevent the seizure of Altmark after he discussed the matter with his superior, Admiral Diesen. Captain Vian had meanwhile received Churchill’s order and decided to carry it out using his own destroyer. Halvorsen hailed him at the mouth of the fjord and Vian stated what his orders were. Halvorsen, who was personally convinced the German ship carried no prisoners, asked for ten minutes to examine the German ship. Reports from the 2nd Naval District indicating that prisoners might well be aboard the ship were apparently not relayed to the 1st Naval District. Captain Vian rejected the Norwegian suggestion and proposed instead that Halvorsen accompany the British boarding party as a representative of the Norwegian authorities. He also suggested that the boarding take place from the Norwegian torpedo boat. Halvorsen rejected the suggestion. However, since he was convinced there were no prisoners aboard Altmark, he consented to be present on HMS Cossack as an observer.

  After he realized what was happening, Dau managed to ram Cossack with the aft end of Altmark, without causing any significant damage. The British boarding party entered the German ship and, according to German and Norwegian sources, opened fire on its crew resulting in five (seven according to some sources) dead and a number of wounded. The British reported that they had fired in self-defense after coming under fire from the Germans. Captain Dau denied that the Germans had fired a single shot. Lieutenant Halvorsen left the British destroyer in protest when the firing started, and reported later that he observed the British firing at German crewmembers fleeing on the ice. Two hundred and ninety-nine prisoners were freed and transported to England. Norwegian destroyers escorted Altmark to repair facilities and the ship eventually returned to Germany.

  Norway protested the British action. On the legal side, Norway based its position on the claim that Altmark was a warship. “Warships have the rights to passage through neutral waters and the fact that it is carrying prisoners does not change this fact.”25 The British rejected the Norwegian protest. Chamberlain deplored the views of the Norwegians since “it would in their [British] view legalize the abuse by German warships of neutral waters and create a position which His Majesty’s Government could in no circumstances accept.”26

  The Altmark affair had no direct effect on Allied planning except for the conclusion that the Norwegians were either in no position or were not inclined to prevent German misuse of their territorial waters. The passive reaction by the Norwegian Navy may also have emboldened the British dramatically to increase their violations, both in number and scope, over the next few weeks. A passage from the Norwegian naval history is illustrative.27

  The belligerents’ activities on the Norwegian coast showed a strong increase during March and the first days of April 1940. The number of intentional or unintentional neutrality violations by both warships and aircraft increased continually. From the middle of March until Norway became a participant in the war, there was thus seldom a day when the country’s neutrality was not violated one or several times…. Most violations were, as earlier, carried out by British warships and aircraft …

  In the opinion of the Allies, the Altmark incident strengthened their moral justification for their planned action in Scandinavia. Such an underpinning was badly needed since it appeared that the Finnish-Soviet conflict was reaching a climax and could cease to be a motivation for action in Scandinavia.

  End of the Winter War and its Effect on Allied plans

  The great Soviet offensive against the Finnish Army on the Karelian Isthmus opened on February 1, 1940. It lasted for 42 days. Ten days of heavy bombardment by over 500 aircraft and Soviet guns, massed wheel to wheel, preceded the attack by two armies consisting of 54 divisions. After 12 days of ferocious fighting, resulting in enormous Russian casualties, the Mannerheim Line was breached on February 13, and by March 1 the Finnish right flank was pushed slowly back to the city of Viipuri. The situation for the Finns had become desperate. They were short of ammunition and their troops were exhausted. The hoped-for assistance from the West had not materialized. The total number of foreign volunteers in Finland numbered only 11,500, and 8,275 of these were from Sweden and Norway, mostly from Sweden. The volunteers also included 300 men in the Finnish-American Legion who received their baptism of fire in the last days of the war.

  A Finnish delegation proceeded to Moscow to discuss armistice terms on March 7. The Soviet terms were surprisingly lenient, almost the same as those contained in their demands in November 1939 that led to the war. The Russian losses in the war have never been published but most observers believe they suffered more than 200,000 killed and another 400,000 wounded. The Soviets were also alarmed by the cool attitude displayed by Germany in early 1940, and by the prospect of a war with England and France unless they came to quick terms with the Finns. The Finns accepted the Soviet terms on March 12.

  The conclusion of peace between the Soviet Union and Finland rendered the underpinnings of Allied plans obsolete. With unenthusiastic agreement by the French leader, Daladier, the British government decided on March 14 to set aside plans for operations in Scandinavia. Since there was no longer the slightest chance that Sweden and Norway would acquiesce to an Allied presence in their countries, active resistance had to b
e anticipated. This would throw the Scandinavian countries into the arms of Germany.

  It is easy to recognize that Allied policy and plans were shortsighted and inadequate. While execution of the policy may have achieved some success against Germany’s peripheral interests, it carried with it huge long-term risks that seriously damaged the Allies’ claim to the high moral ground. The slow-moving Allied planning and preparation machinery was undoubtedly very fortunate for their war effort. Operations in Scandinavia and assistance to Finland would probably have resulted in war with the Soviet Union, while Sweden and Norway might have become Germany’s reluctant allies. This could have had enormous consequences for the outcome of WWII.

  The conclusion of peace between the Soviet Union and Finland also saved Chamberlain and Halifax from the precarious position of having to carry out an operation that they believed would remove all possibilities of peace. They no doubt welcomed the news that the Soviet-Finnish conflict had ended, and to remove any possibility that an operation on the scale anticipated could be carried out, they quickly dispatched the two regular divisions (held back for operations in Scandinavia) to France. By reducing the force available for use in Scandinavia to 11 battalions, they hoped to discourage their use. This became a major factor in the debacle following the decision to dispatch troops to Norway.

  Churchill’s Mining Plan Approved

  Plans for Allied action in Scandinavia, particularly in Norway, continued due to Churchill’s persistence. Information about Allied plans to help the Finns leaked to the press, and their failure to carry them out resulted in a storm of criticism directed at the governments in Britain and France. Daladier’s government fell, and the more aggressive Paul Reynaud replaced him as prime minister. The new French Prime Minister was more congenial to Churchill’s designs. He advocated an aggressive war effort and revisited the question of operations in Scandinavia, including taking control of the Norwegian coast.