Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  The Views of the Opposing Admiralties

  Did the two admiralties think with precision along the same lines in correct strategy as claimed by Churchill in his now famous quote? Strategy is driven by objectives and capabilities. There was a distinct, although subtle, difference in the objectives of the two sides. Churchill’s desire was to provoke the Germans into operations in Scandinavia, operations that he believed could be challenged effectively and successfully by the Allies and thereby bring quick military victories in a war that had stagnated. Threatening the German source of badly needed iron was a means of provoking this confrontation. The French, likewise, wanted to open a new front in order to divert German attention and resources from their border. They also viewed the threat against the flow of iron ore as a means by which to open the new front. Both Churchill and his friends across the Channel felt that if they succeeded in this process, the maritime blockade of Germany would become more effective, especially if they succeeded in severing the flow of iron ore. To this end, they were willing to accept great political and military risks.

  The Allies certainly possessed the capability to bring on the confrontation desired by Churchill and Reynaud. It is a much different question to ask if they could have succeeded in cutting the flow of iron ore to Germany. A realization of the difficulties involved in doing so may help explain Churchill’s lukewarm support for Ironside’s project of invading northern Sweden. The Allies lacked expertise in arctic warfare and were ignorant as to the problems of geography, climate, and the lack of lines of communications in northern Norway and Sweden. In retrospect, it is difficult to see how the Allies could have captured the iron ore districts in northern Sweden in the face of almost certain Norwegian and Swedish resistance, even without German intervention in that area. The goal of doing so was unrealistic in view of their capabilities.

  The senior officers in the German Navy had served during the four years of relative inactivity of the High Seas Fleet in World War I, imposed largely by geographical limitations. They had seen the effects of the previous war’s blockade on the German people and witnessed the drop in morale in the navy that eventually led to a mutiny of the High Seas Fleet. They were determined to avoid a similar situation arising in World War II. Their desire for bases in Norway was driven by a wish to complicate British blockade measures and open the door to the Atlantic.

  Raeder shared this view, but he was in less of a hurry to acquire those bases. However, the urgency of acquiring them increased as evidence suggested that the British intended to seize the bases for themselves. Raeder was encouraged by Hitler’s approval of the Z Plan, but realized that if the iron ore supplies were limited the navy might suffer as a result of priority being given to the demands of other branches of the services. In the short term, therefore, his primary concern was to keep Swedish iron ore flowing to the benefit of the naval building program. Hitler’s main concerns were the uninterrupted flow of iron ore, not primarily for the benefit of the navy, but to the benefit of the German armament industry as a whole. He was also concerned with the air threat to Germany by Allied air forces operating from bases in Scandinavia. The other military services in Germany were far less in favor of the Scandinavian operations because they viewed them as distractions from the main effort in the west.

  Hitler certainly had the ground and air assets to undertake the Scandinavian operations, as well as troops trained and capable of operating in the arctic mountain wilderness. The navy did not have the resources required by a thoughtful military plan, particularly as it involved Narvik and, to a lesser, extent Trondheim. The Germans could have carried out the operation in Norway without landing in Narvik, but it would have been more difficult. For the German Navy, it was an extremely high-risk affair. While the Allies risked losing ships, the Germans ventured their whole navy. Whether or not this happened hinged on secrecy and slow, irresolute, and faulty reactions by the Norwegians and the Allies, hardly the assumptions required in a prudent military plan.

  The debate over motives and capabilities will never be settled. However, Churchill’s statement that the two admiralties thought in precision along the same lines and in correct strategy—while an excellent one-liner—fails to tell the story.

  IGNORED WARNINGS: SHIPS PASSING IN THE NIGHT

  “I wish I could believe this story. German intervention in Scandinavia is just what we want.”

  NOTATION BY LAURENCE COLLIER, A HIGH BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL, ON RECEIPT OF NEWS THAT THE GERMANS WERE ABOUT TO INVADE NORWAY.

  German Intelligence and Security

  Already on January 4, the Abwehr reported that one division of alpine troops had been pulled out of the Maginot Line and the agent who made the report concluded that these troops were destined for northern Europe. On March 7, the Germans learned that 16,000 troops were being redeployed from France to England. The increased British naval activities off the Norwegian coast and repeated violations of that country’s territorial waters in March and early April were unmistakable signs that something more ambitious than troop redeployment might be afoot.

  One source for German intelligence was Taylor G. Kent, who worked in the code room of the American Embassy in London. Since October 1939, he had forwarded important messages that came through the deciphering machine to the German Embassy in Rome. From there they were sent to Berlin. These messages included private communications between Churchill and Roosevelt.1

  Reports received by the German intelligence services, particularly the SKL, indicated that the Allies would invade Norway and possibly Sweden even after the conclusion of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union. There were indications, supported by notations in the SKL journal on 15 March, that the peace had postponed but not altered Allied plans. These notations were based on intercepted and partially deciphered radio messages. A message from the British Admiralty to the commander of the Home Fleet on March 14 indicated that a large-scale embarkation of troops had been completed. The transports were prepared to sail and the troops were ready to board. The transports were to leave British Channel ports and proceed north on 48 to 80 hours notice depending on the political situation. Raeder and the SKL believed that Weserübung had developed into a race with similar British plans and they urged that landing operations be undertaken as quickly as possible. This influenced the selection of April 7 as the day of attack, later changed to April 9.

  While Hitler’s decision on March 26 to launch the invasion in early April was primarily due to anticipated weather conditions, the correctness of that decision in Hitler’s mind was reinforced by continuous reports of Allied intentions to land in Norway. The Germans learned about the decision taken by the Allied Supreme War Council on March 28 and German intelligence intercepted a diplomat’s report on March 30 of a conversation with Paul Reynaud. This report indicated that the Allies would launch operations in northern Europe within the next few days.2

  Hitler had placed stringent restrictions on the number of individuals who knew about the impending operations. However, this circle had to be widened as the date for the operation drew closer. The Germans tried to disguise their troop movements as maneuvers and some troops were left in the barracks to suggest ongoing normal activity. The risk of discovery increased when the troops and shipping for the operation began assembly in the north German ports of Stettin, Hamburg, Wesermünde, Cuxhaven, Swinemünde, and Wilhelmshaven. Any intelligence forces monitoring German troop dispositions would have had ample reason to suspect that an important operation was underway.

  Betrayal

  Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Abwehr, was an opponent of Hitler and his policies, and that included the Scandinavian operation. Colonel Hans Oster, Chief of Staff at the Abwehr, was the center of Abwehr opposition and more aggressive than his superior in his anti-Hitler activities. Both eventually paid for their actions with their lives. Oster and others hoped to remove Hitler and come to an understanding with the British. They believed that a confrontation with the Allies in Scandinavia would harden Br
itish determination and make it difficult or impossible to arrive at an agreement. With respect to this issue, the views of the opponents of Hitler in Germany paralleled those of Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax in Great Britain.

  As a last resort Colonel Oster and his associates decided to leak information about the impending operation as soon as they had certain knowledge about its details. They may have felt this treasonous act as being justified by their belief that they were acting for the greater good of their country. They hoped that their warnings would lead the British and Norwegians to take countermeasures that would spoil the German operation, or plans for that operation. They anticipated that the Germans would detect active Norwegian and British preparations to meet the threat and therefore cancel the operation. To this end, Colonel Oster passed information about the operation to his contact in the Vatican and to his friend Major Gijsbertus J. Sas, the Dutch Military Attaché in Berlin, on April 3. Oster informed Sas that the German invasion of Norway and Denmark would take place early the following week (April 8-10) and asked that this information be passed to the Norwegians, Danes, and British.3

  The information was passed to the Dutch War Ministry in two messages on April 3 and 4. Sas had a casual friend at the Norwegian Embassy, Councilor Ulrich Stang. Sas met Stang at the bar in the Adlon Hotel in the afternoon of April 4 and they had lunch together. Sas told Stang the Germans would invade Norway and Denmark on Tuesday (April 9) and that the attack in the west was sure to follow in short order. Stang dismissed the warning, stating that he did not believe it. Both Deutsch, in his book, and Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, in their book, write that Sas did not know that Stang was a Quisling follower and claim that Stang never forwarded the warning to Oslo.4

  Sas also informed Commander Kjølsen, the Danish Naval Attaché in Berlin, who forwarded the warning to the government in Copenhagen by courier, concluding that it was an OKW plant. His superiors in Denmark apparently shared this conclusion. Kjølsen met Arne Scheel, the Norwegian Ambassador in Berlin, the same day (April 3) and told him about the conversation he had with Major Sas. While Kjølsen’s report to Scheel was less precise than Sas’ statement to Stang, it is obvious that both the Norwegian Ambassador and his Councilor received clear warnings of an impending German attack.

  In 1945, the Norwegian Investigative Commission looked into what the Norwegian Embassy did with these warnings. Scheel’s explanation was never obtained since he died during the war. Scheel sent the following message to the Foreign Office in Oslo on April 4:5

  The military attaché at one of the neutral nations legations here has today—in strict confidence—stated to one of the Legation’s officials that according to information he had received from a responsible source, one should expect an attack on Holland in the near future, possibly already next week…. The Legation repeats the above—with all possible reservations—because the military attaché in question is known as a sober minded and well-informed man, and this Legation does not wish to fail to report the matter. The military attaché also hinted at a German invasion of Denmark with the intention of acquiring air and submarine bases on the west coast of Jutland.

  The report failed to mention the warning about a German invasion of Norway on April 9. Another message the next day (April 5) from the Norwegian Embassy in Berlin read:

  The same report that is treated in my message 683 (above) was also received by the Danish Legation, which also heard rumors about occupation of points on the southern coast of Norway. The objective of the attacks that the rumors deal with was to step up the tempo of the war and to forestall the Allies.

  Again, there is no mention of the direct warning from Major Sas about a full-scale invasion. The message on April 5 is obviously based on Scheel’s conversation with the Danish Naval Attaché. The 1945 Investigative Commission concludes that Sas’ report to Stang was forwarded in a misleading manner and that Scheel’s report of his conversation with Kjølsen was only “a weak echo” of what was actually said. It is possible that Stang only reported to Scheel that part of the conversation with Major Sas that dealt with the anticipated attack in the west and possible moves against Denmark, conveniently leaving out the part that dealt with a direct attack on Norway.

  Dutch intelligence ignored Sas’ request to inform the British. Sas was not aware that his information was not forwarded to its intended recipient. If he had known, he may have employed other means to get the intelligence to the British. The failure to pass the information to the British intelligence and the failure of the Norwegian Embassy in Berlin to forward all the information it received to Oslo may not have changed the lethargic behavior of the two governments since other signs of impending events were ignored, discounted, or misinterpreted. However, it is possible that if the information had reached the right people, precautions could have been taken in London and Oslo that would have resulted in a calamity for the Germans.

  Ottmer writes that the German Abwehr, and therefore presumably the Chancery, knew the facts of the betrayal. They did not know, however, how the enemy would react to this information. Ottmer also writes that it seems this “factor of uncertainty” was not made known to Group XXI.6 If the German authorities knew about this breach of security, they obviously did not know who had made the disclosure.

  Warnings Received by the Norwegians

  Intelligence about suspicious activities in northern Germany reached the Scandinavian countries at least a week before the date set for the attack. Reports from Sweden, Denmark, and Germany about unusual activities began to flow into offices in Oslo during the last week of March 1940. These included rumors that the Germans were preparing to cross the Danish border and that military leaves had been cancelled. The Swedish Naval Staff believed these reports indicated that the Germans were preparing to seize Norwegian harbors and airfields.

  Ambassador Scheel had already sent a warning message to the Norwegian Foreign Office on April 1 where he reported the embarkation of German troops in Stettin. Scheel’s conclusion was that these troops were probably part of operations against Sweden or other areas of the Baltic and that he saw no connection between these activities and possible German operations against Norway. The Norwegian Foreign Office did not forward this report to the Norwegian military authorities.

  The Swedes were concerned about what was going on in Germany’s Baltic and North Sea ports. Swedish intelligence officers, who believed that the assembly of German troops and ships in Stettin pointed to an overseas expedition, informed the intelligence division of the Norwegian Naval Staff. The Swedish Ambassador in Berlin asked the German Foreign Office for an explanation on April 2. The Swedish Naval Attaché in Berlin also forwarded a report that day stating that he had been informed that the Germans were preparing an operation against Norway in order to preempt British landings in that country. While the source for this report is unknown, the wording is similar to Ambassador Scheel’s message on April 5. However, if the date of the report is correct, neither Scheel nor the Danish Naval Attaché could be the source since they did not receive their information until the following day.

  A Norwegian newspaper reporter for Aftenposten in Berlin, Theo Findahl, notified his editorial office in Oslo on April 5 that there were rumors of large troop concentrations in northern Germany. He called the same editorial office on April 7 with the news that there were plans to land 1,500,000 troops on Norway’s southern coast. The newspaper called the Norwegian Naval Staff and informed the duty officer, Captain Håkon Willoch. Admiral Diesen instructed Captain Willoch to call the Foreign Office and ask them not to print Findahl’s report. Admiral Diesen assumed full responsibility for this action before the Investigative Commission in 1946.7

  The Norwegian Naval Staff received an even more ominous report during the evening of April 7 from the Norwegian Embassy in Berlin via the Norwegian Foreign Office that appeared to substantiate the earlier reports from the Swedes:

  Information from a reliable source that the troop transports mentioned in my 611 mess
age [April 1 message], 15 to 20 ships with a combined tonnage of 150,000, departed Stettin on a westerly course on the night of April 4–5. We are informed that the destination is to be reached on April 11, destination unknown.

  Despite these alarming and accurate reports, neither Admiral Diesen nor his staff believed there was any danger of a German attack. The reports were discussed but the conclusion was that they dealt with German landings in the Netherlands in conjunction with an overland attack. Sir Llewellyn Woodward writes that Diesen concluded that the concentration of German troops and shipping in northern Germany was connected to the Allied plans to help the Finns.8 The Finnish-Soviet conflict had ended almost a month earlier and there is no support for Woodward’s claim in Norwegian sources. Of all reports forwarded to the navy by the Norwegian Foreign Office, only the last (Scheel’s report on April 7) was forwarded to the naval district commanders and its dispatch was delayed until the afternoon of April 8, almost a full day after receipt by the naval staff.

  Some in the Norwegian Army took a more serious view of the situation and Colonel Rasmus Hatledal, the Chief of the General Staff, called for partial mobilization on April 5. The government turned down this suggestion. Hatledal was an energetic officer who was not afraid to take initiative and responsibility. This was in sharp contrast to his superior, General Kristian Laake, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

  The warships comprising TF 5 (destination Oslo) sailed through the Great Belt, the main strait between the Danish islands, in clear weather and full daylight on April 8. The progress of the group was followed closely by Danish observation posts and reported to the Danish Naval Ministry. These reports were passed on to the intelligence section of the Norwegian Naval Staff throughout the day.