Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  The Commander in Chief, Navy fully endorses the conduct of the Fleet Commander. It would have been wrong to have all-out battleship operations off the Lofoten Islands; the tactical situation was very unfavorable, with the enemy disposed along the dark western horizon, our ships along the clear eastern horizon, and the wind strength 10.

  Group Command West and reports from aircraft and submarines kept Lütjens informed during the day about British fleet movements and he started his return voyage to Germany in the evening of April 9. The battleships linked up with Hipper and reached Wilhelmshaven in the afternoon of April 12 without encountering British naval forces. It was planned that the destroyers from Narvik would join the battleships for the return voyage but this was not possible.

  British Hesitation

  The Home Fleet was on a north-north-westerly course away from the Norwegian coast at 1600 hours, slightly north of Trondheim’s latitude. This allowed TF 2 to slip safely into Trondheim during the night. The Admiralty informed Admiral Forbes at about 1500 hours that a large German naval force had been observed in the Kattegat and Skagerrak on a northerly course.23 These were the ships in TF 5. This complicated the situation for Forbes. He knew there were sizable German forces to his north. He did not expect to catch up with these but he hoped Admiral Whitworth would intercept them.

  The battle cruiser Repulse, the cruiser Penelope, and four destroyers had been sent ahead since their higher speeds gave them a better chance to catch up with the German ships. These ships were formally detached from the Home Fleet at 2000 hours and placed under Admiral Whitworth’s operational control. In addition to serving as reinforcements for Whitworth, they also served as an assurance that the Germans would be intercepted if they turned south. At the same time, Forbes turned the rest of the Home Fleet around and headed south.

  Most British writers imply that the decision to turn south was Admiral Forbes’, influenced by his view, as opposed to his colleagues in the Admiralty, that a full-scale German invasion of Norway was in progress.24 There are reasons to question this conclusion.

  First, the Admiralty sent Forbes a message at 1842 GMT laying out their objectives, which were to prevent the return of the German ships to his north and to intercept the force reported heading north in the Kattegat and Skagerrak. It appears that both the Admiralty and Admiral Forbes considered these forces a more promising target for the Home Fleet. This is a strange assessment since the logical targets for the ships steaming north through the Skagerrak were ports in southern or southwestern Norway. However, it seems that both Forbes and his colleagues in the Admiralty continued to be haunted by fears of a German breakout into the Atlantic. A look at the composition of the reported forces (included torpedo boats, small minesweepers, and trawlers), taken together with the Admiralty’s own conclusion as to the target of the German forces to the north, should have put these fears to rest.

  A second reason to doubt that Forbes had concluded that a full-scale invasion of Norway was in progress at the time Glowworm was sunk is the disposition he made of the forces at his disposal. If he had reached the stated conclusion, his logical action would have been to position his forces to cover the obvious targets on Norway’s west coast: Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger. Instead, he turned away from the Norwegian coast, kept his fleet 80 to 100 miles from the Norwegian coast, even after turning south, and kept the 1st, 2nd and 18th Cruiser Squadrons that had been attached to him in the middle of the North Sea. Such a disposition only made sense if his primary concern was a German breakout into the Atlantic. Some writers maintain that the Admiralty, not Admiral Forbes, stipulated the dispositions of the naval forces in the North Sea in the evening of April 8.25 However, the official history of the Norwegian campaign makes no mention of any Admiralty orders with regard to the tactical disposition of forces in the North Sea until they issued the order for the cruiser squadrons to link up with the Home Fleet.

  It may well be that, after turning south, Admiral Forbes began to give more credence to the possibility that the German forces observed in the Skagerrak were heading for ports in Norway, a possibility also alluded to in the Admiralty’s message at 1842 hours. This explains his orders to the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons. However, he must still have viewed this as a less likely possibility than a breakout since he continued the Home Fleet on a southerly course far out to sea, and had the 18th Cruiser Squadron sweep towards the Home Fleet, also far out at sea. Forbes ordered Admiral Cunningham’s 1st Cruiser Squadron, now reinforced by the French cruiser Emile Bertin and two French destroyers, and Admiral Edward-Collins’ 2nd Cruiser Squadron to proceed to a point off the Norwegian coast between Stavanger and Bergen. They were to start a northward sweep at 0500 hours on April 9. If carried out, the sweep would undoubtedly have led to an engagement with TF 3, destined for Bergen.

  Task Force 3 Eludes the British Navy

  The ships constituting TF 3 were located in three harbors in northern Germany on April 7. The light cruisers Köln, Königsberg, and the auxiliary Bremse were located in Wilhelmshaven and cleared that harbor before 2340 hours on April 7. The torpedo boats Wolf and Leopard, and the depot ship Karl Peters left Cuxhaven about the same time. The motor torpedo boats left from Helgoland. Plans called for the three elements of TF 3 to rendezvous near the southern coast of Norway, 56° 20´ North, 06° 20´ East, at 1015 hours on April 8. The three elements picked up an escort of He-111s at dawn on April 8.

  Admiral Huber Schmundt’s assessment of the situation was not very optimistic. He realized that the German groups destined for Narvik, Trondheim, and Bergen were dangerously exposed to British interception and counterattacks. Narvik and Trondheim were located far from British naval bases, but Bergen was within eight or nine hours’ sailing distance from Scapa Flow and Schmundt believed that the British would launch their main naval effort against Bergen with secondary attacks against Narvik and Trondheim. Much of TF 3’s passage took place in daylight since its speed was limited to 18 knots because of the slow moving Bremse and Karl Peters. Schmundt assumed that the German ships destined for Narvik and Trondheim, which had departed a day earlier, would encounter British naval forces. This would make it very difficult for TF 3 to proceed along the Norwegian coast in clear weather.

  The Germans were lucky because the weather deteriorated as they headed north and because the British made mistakes and were indecisive. The fog that hid the Germans ships from the British also prevented the German ships from making their scheduled rendezvous off the coast of southern Norway. Admiral Schmundt’s orders stipulated that he should let nothing interfere with his mission and therefore he proceeded towards Bergen at 18 knots, despite the fact that visibility was less than 500 meters.

  It was not until around 1600 hours on April 8 that Karl Peters and the torpedo boats joined the main force. The Germans were in great peril during their voyage along the Norwegian west coast. Admiral Schmundt received a message from Naval Command West that numerous British warships were located between TF 3 and Bergen. This was an accurate report. As the fog lifted and the ships of TF 3 assembled, except for the motor torpedo boats, a British naval force of two modern light cruisers and 15 destroyers was located only 60 nautical miles to the northwest, between TF 3 and the southern approach to Bergen. This was the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, which had reached its start point for next morning’s sweep. The weather was clear and visibility good as TF 3 continued towards Bergen at a distance of 12 to 15 miles off the Norwegian coast.

  The Admiralty now made another unfortunate intervention in tactical operations and the outcome was again harmful to the British and beneficial for the Germans. Worried that the cruiser squadrons off the Norwegian coast, which were about 135 nautical miles from the Home Fleet, could be caught between the German naval forces in the north and the ones reported in the Skagerrak, the Admiralty annulled Admiral Forbes’ plan for a cruiser sweep along the Norwegian coast. Instead it ordered the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons to join forces about 100 miles off the Norwegian coast and steer towards the Hom
e Fleet. The 18th Cruiser Squadron had received a similar order earlier.

  The British also failed to have reconnaissance aircraft aloft along the Norwegian coast after the fog lifted late in the afternoon on April 8. Reconnaissance aircraft might have spotted the German ships before the 2nd Cruiser Squadron started towards the Home Fleet and the attack on Bergen could have had a different outcome. As with Narvik and Trondheim, the British left the door to Bergen wide open at the last moment.

  The Home Fleet continued on its southerly course during the night and when the Germans attacked Bergen, it was located only 90 miles off the Norwegian coast between Bergen and Stavanger. This enormous concentration of naval power was completed when the cruiser squadrons joined the Home Fleet early in the morning of April 9. Admiral Forbes had already learned from the Admiralty that German warships were engaged by fortresses covering the approach to Oslo and that German forces were attacking Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, and Kristiansand. This information must have convinced him that he was chasing a phantom enemy in the open waters of the North Sea while a full-scale German invasion of Norway was in progress. The question was what to do about it. Here again, we see the dramatic differences between the decentralized and swift German operations as opposed to the centralized and hesitant British response.

  Forbes knew that German warships were in Bergen but he kept worrying about their strength. Although the picture of what was happening was still very murky, it was probably possible for Forbes and his staff to draw accurate conclusions about the strength of German force in Bergen, if they had pieced together accurately the reports about German naval movements that had been received since April 6. They estimated that the German force to their north (near Narvik) consisted of one battleship, two cruisers, and ten destroyers. It was actually two battleships and ten destroyers. The German force observed steering away from the Trondheim area was estimated to consist of one battleship, two cruisers, and two destroyers. It was actually one heavy cruiser and four destroyers. Information was now flowing in that one German light cruiser was in action at Kristiansand and that two heavy cruisers and one light cruiser were attacking Oslo.

  The British knew that the German surface navy included two battleships, one armored cruiser (Admiral Sheer, not yet re-classified as a heavy cruiser), three heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, and 22 destroyers. They may have been aware that Admiral Sheer, two light cruisers, and six destroyers were undergoing repairs. However, even without possession of this fact, a review of recent intelligence reports could have let them deduce that both battleships, eight of the 10 cruisers, and 12 of the 22 destroyers were accounted for. From this, it would be logical to assume that the German naval forces in Bergen consisted at the most of two cruisers and a few destroyers. A further consideration was that it would take some time before the Germans would have the forts around Bergen operational, if they were captured, and that the Luftwaffe was not a serious threat until established at Norwegian airfields. The situation called for a quick and decisive strike against the Germans in Bergen before they were able to consolidate and the situation changed to their advantage.

  Instead, Admiral Forbes entered into a discussion with the Admiralty about the situation, starting at 0620 hours. He mentioned that he contemplated making a strike against Bergen with cruisers and destroyers and asked for information about German strength in that city. About four hours passed before the Admiralty signaled approval for the attack by instructing Forbes to:

  Prepare plans for attacking German warships and transports in Bergen and for controlling the approaches to the port on supposition that the defences are still in the hands of the Norwegians. Similar plans as regards Trondheim should be prepared.26

  Forbes finally sent Vice Admiral Layton’s 18th Cruiser Squadron with four cruisers and seven destroyers at 1130 hours on April 9 to attack the German naval units in Bergen.

  The Home Fleet was only 90 nautical miles from Bergen at 0620 hours when Admiral Forbes mentioned to the Admiralty that he contemplated an attack on Bergen. However, the Home Fleet continued on its present southward course, leading it away from Bergen. This meant that when Admiral Layton’s cruisers and destroyers were dispatched to Bergen they had to sail northward in the face of a strong northerly gale. The destroyers were only able to make 16 knots in the heavy seas. At that rate, the ships would not reach the entrance to the Bergen approaches before nightfall.

  The plan called for the destroyers to attack Bergen harbor from the north and south supported at a distance by the cruisers. An aerial reconnaissance of Bergen at 1400 hours revealed that there were two German cruisers in the harbor and the British became suspicious that the Germans might already have captured the coastal fortresses. Layton began to doubt the wisdom of the plan but neither he nor Forbes had called it off when a message from the British Admiralty canceled the attack.

  If Admiral Layton’s force had entered the harbor after dark as planned, it would have found only one badly damaged cruiser, one damaged naval artillery support ship, and four serviceable motor torpedo boats. There was practically no danger to the British ships from the captured Norwegian shore batteries since they did not reach partial operational readiness until April 10 and full readiness on April 13. There were some dangers from mines laid by the Norwegians but there were still Norwegian naval units in each of the approaches that, no doubt, would have been happy to lead the British safely past the minefields. Again, lack of information, and an unwillingness to take risks meant that the Home Fleet missed an opportunity to inflict significant damage on the German Navy.

  If the British had continued on towards Bergen, there is also some possibility that they might have encountered the cruiser Köln and the two torpedo boats at the start of their return voyage to Germany. However, it is equally possible that German aerial reconnaissance would have spotted the approaching British squadron, in which case Köln and her escorts may have elected to remain in Bergen. These ships left Bergen after darkness and sought refuge in a fjord when they were informed that strong British naval forces were near the route they planned to take back to Germany.

  The Home Fleet’s final chance to deal a blow to the German Navy in western Norway was lost the following morning when Forbes ordered naval forces away from the Norwegian coast and left the door open for the three ships to escape.

  Air Power Shakes British Confidence

  The Luftwaffe was not established ashore in the early hours of April 9, so this would have been the best time for the British to strike. An attack on the city late on April 9, or thereafter, may have proved costly in view of growing German air power projected from Sola Airfield and the fact that the Germans laid their own minefields in the Bergen approaches on April 10.

  German aircraft began attacking British naval forces early in the evening of April 9. The Luftwaffe first attacked Admiral Layton’s force on its way back to the Home Fleet after the cancellation of its planned operation against Bergen. Two cruisers received minor damage from near misses and one of the new Tribal class destroyers, the Gurkha, was sunk. The Germans also carried out several attacks against the Home Fleet. A 1000-lb bomb struck the battleship Rodney, Admiral Forbes’ flagship, but the damage and loss of life was not serious. Three cruisers sustained minor damage from near misses and only one German aircraft was shot down. The damage to Forbes’ confidence, however, was considerable.

  The Home Fleet steered north for several hours to get out of the range of German bombers, then Admiral Forbes turned westward during the night. He did not head back towards the Norwegian coast until after Warspite and Furious joined him. He also recommended to the Admiralty that British surface vessels only attack German naval units in northern waters and that naval operations near the south and west coast of Norway be limited to submarines. He also recommended that Furious, who had left her fighter squadrons behind in Scotland, should not be used without fighter escorts in areas where she would be exposed to German aircraft. The Admiralty accepted these sensible recommendations. Without ade
quate air cover, naval operations near the Norwegian shore would have exposed the ships to furious attacks by a Luftwaffe that was growing rapidly in strength at Norwegian airfields.

  NARVIK AREA DEFENSES

  “The defense of Narvik stands or falls on the defense of the Ofotfjord entrance.”

  STATEMENT BY COLONEL GEORG STANG, A FORMER NORWEGIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

  The Norwegian military forces stationed in North Norway in 1940, particularly the land forces, were better prepared for hostilities than those in other areas of the country. In the first place, the war between Finland and the Soviet Union resulted in the movement of relatively large forces to Finnmark. It was necessary to insure that neutrality was not violated and that the war did not spill over into Norway. Another reason for a higher level of preparedness was the obvious Allied interest in the iron ore shipments through Narvik.

  Naval Forces

  A sizable proportion of the naval force stationed in North Norway during the Winter War was redeployed to other parts of the country after the conclusion of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union. This included three modern destroyers, two submarines, and one torpedo boat. Some of the warships that were earlier stationed in Tromsø were organized into a separate division, called the Ofot Division, and moved to Narvik. This concentration of forces was aimed at hindering or discouraging British warships from entering Ofotfjord to destroy the many German merchant ships involved in the iron ore shipments during the winter of 1939-40. The prevailing view in the Norwegian Government was that the British posed the greatest danger to Narvik and consequently very little thought was given to any possibility of confronting German naval forces.