Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Georg Thiele had received numerous hits by British shells and everyone on the bridge was killed except Commander Wolf. Without more shells or torpedoes to fire, Wolf signaled full speed ahead on the engine room telegraph and beached the destroyer at high speed near Sildvik. The ship capsized and the aft portion sank at 1500 hours while the forward part remained beached. Fourteen crewmembers were killed and 28 wounded.

  The actions of Commander Wolf throughout the fighting in Narvik—admired by friend and foe alike—had a fitting ending. Commanders Rechel in Bernd von Arnim and Smidt in Erich Giese were also singled out for praise by their opponents for their daring and determination. The British concluded that the German destroyers acquitted themselves as well as could be expected under the circumstances. The ineffectiveness of their submarines, torpedoes, and their shortage of ammunition doomed their efforts from the start. The British destroyer commanders also showed their traditional daring and aggressiveness.

  The crews from the German destroyers assembled ashore and headed up the hillsides on the south side of Rombaksbotn, towards the railway line. This was not an easy task on the steep hillsides in deep snow and under fire from the British destroyers. According to the 3rd Division journal, the British fired after the escaping German destroyer crews with both their main armaments and machineguns. The crews were later transported to Narvik. When they entered the inner part of the fjord, the British found Hans Lüdemann still afloat and she was sunk by a torpedo from Hero.

  The British Consider Landing

  Admiral Whitworth reported to Admiral Forbes at 1742 hours that a German submarine and all destroyers were sunk. He considered the idea of a landing in Narvik, but concluded that his exhausted men were in no state to face the 2,000 or so German troops he believed to be in the city.

  The British naval bombardment caused no fatalities among German troops and the material damage was minor, even though many buildings in and around the city were destroyed. Whitworth’s assumption that German morale was low may well be correct. They had watched helplessly as their warships were destroyed. The German troops occupied positions along Rombakfjord and the troops in Narvik were in their positions with orders to repel any landing attempts.

  Some British writers leveled mild criticism against Admiral Whitworth for not seizing the opportunity to capture Narvik. Norwegian writers have been more direct. They point out that Dietl’s forces in Narvik numbered only 800 spread along the shoreline from Fagernes to Vassvik as well as along the Rombakfjord, and that they knew it was hopeless to engage an enemy with overwhelming naval artillery with only individual or crew-served weapons. Colonel Munthe-Kaas concludes that “There is no doubt that Narvik would have fallen if a determined amphibious commander had understood to exploit the demoralizing state of mind in which the Germans, for a second time, found themselves, particularly after witnessing their destroyer fleet shattered.”8 He points out that Whitworth had 2,700 men at his disposal and that two companies from the 24th Guards could have augmented this force if the admiral had only waited in the fjord for another half day. The 2,700 were not Royal Marines but the crews of the British battleship and the nine destroyers. Munthe-Kaas fails to consider that the two Guard companies embarked on the cruiser Southampton were prepared for an administrative landing. They carried only individual and a few crew-served weapons and were not ready for combat operations.

  Norwegian conclusions that German morale was broken are based primarily on the observations of civilian observers, whose judgment of discipline in the German units is at least debatable. Railroad traffic inspector, Johan Olsen, stated that “Both the Germans and we civilians expected that the British would land in Narvik. The Germans were panic-stricken. Crowds of them threw away their weapons, asked for the way to Sweden, and left the city.”9

  The fact that the German troops did not sustain any fatalities and only a few wounded calls into question the accuracy of reports about disintegration of discipline and unit cohesion. There is no reliable information that the German mountain troops were in a state of panic. They were battle-experienced and professionally led troops and their performance against numerically superior Norwegian forces two days later indicates that reports of their demoralization and panic are much exaggerated.

  Admiral Whitworth does not deserve criticism for not landing shore parties in Narvik on April 13. Such action would likely have resulted in a severe setback and the possible loss of the inadequate landing parties carried on the warships. Moulton reports that the marines available on the heavy ships of the Home Fleet amounted to two or three companies and that many of these ships were not in the Ofotfjord area. The lead elements of the 24th Guards Brigade were still 24-36 hours away and were unprepared for immediate combat operations. A failed landing would have been an undesirable ending to an otherwise successful operation. Whitworth also feared that enemy submarines and aircraft would attack Warspite if she remained in the fjord. He withdrew Warspite and most of the destroyers from Ofotfjord around 1830 hours.

  The 140 survivors from the destroyer Hardy were moved from the immediate vicinity of the wrecked ship to the village of Balangen where they were cared for by local Norwegians. Here they joined 47 merchant seamen who had been prisoners aboard Jan Wellem. Admiral Whitworth returned with the battleship and destroyers after dark and remained in the fjord during the night taking aboard wounded sailors. Norwegians brought the survivors from Hardy and the British merchant seamen who had joined them, to a place where they were taken aboard two British destroyers. All British ships withdrew from the fjord by daylight on April 14.

  The German problems with their torpedoes again saved the British from potentially heavy losses. Lieutenant Commander Viktor Schütze in U25, positioned in Vestfjord, made two attempts to torpedo Warspite as she left the fjord the first time. The destroyer Foxhound drove off one attack while the second attack failed, probably because of faulty torpedoes. Schütze tried again on the battleship’s second visit to the fjord. The single torpedo again missed, or malfunctioned. The ability of both U25 and U46 to penetrate the destroyer screens with relative ease demonstrates the inordinate risk the British were taking by sending a battleship into these restricted waters. The Second Naval Battle of Narvik could have been a costly affair if the German torpedoes had functioned properly.

  At 2115 hours the Admiralty urged Admiral Forbes to occupy Narvik in order to prevent later opposition to a landing. They apparently believed that the German troops were driven out of town because of the naval bombardment. Derry writes that it is unknown if Admiral Whitworth was aware of this message since the reception conditions in the fjord were poor. He did send a message later that evening reporting that he believed “the enemy forces in Narvik were thoroughly frightened” and recommended that the main landing force should occupy Narvik as quickly as possible.10 Whitworth followed up this message the following morning with one recommending that a small landing force could secure the city if he could support such a landing with the naval forces under his command.11 However, Forbes soon ordered Whitworth to take Warspite out of Vestfjord for fear of submarine and air attacks. The Home Fleet’s experience with the Luftwaffe in the North Sea may have influenced this decision.

  The British losses in the Second Naval Battle of Narvik were 41 killed (15 on Eskimo, 14 on Punjabi, 11 on Cossack, and 1 on Foxhound) and over 60 wounded. No British destroyers were sunk but most sustained some minor damage from German shells. The destroyers Eskimo, Cossack, and Punjabi were heavily damaged, and they were brought to the improvised naval depot in Skjellfjord for repairs. In the three naval engagements as a whole, 276 Norwegians, at least 316 Germans, and 188 British were killed.

  The Home Fleet departed for Scapa Flow on April 15, but British naval operations in the area continued. The First Cruiser Squadron under Admiral Cunningham stayed behind in the Troms/Finnmark area as did all the ships involved in the transport and escort of the troops that were beginning to arrive.

  The loss of ten German destroyers in the two batt
les was a hard blow to the German Navy. It represented 45% of their destroyer force. However, the survivors from the destroyers enabled Dietl to add about 2,100 men to his force, doubling its size. The crews from the four destroyers sunk in the inner part of Rombakfjord were organized into a regiment commanded by Commander Fritz Berger, which was used initially as a security force for the railroad east of Narvik.

  The crew of Hermann Künne was organized into a battalion under the command of Lieutenant Commander Kohte and assigned to Colonel Windisch. The survivors from Wilhelm Heidkamp and Anton Schmitt were organized into a battalion commanded by Lieutenant Commander Erdmenger and given the mission of local defense in Narvik. This allowed Dietl to move soldiers from the 3rd Mountain Division inland to take part in ground operations. Technical personnel from the destroyers were used to maintain and repair the railroad line. The destroyer crews were issued uniforms, weapons, and supplies from Norwegian stores captured at Elvegårdsmoen.

  THE NARVIK FRONT, APRIL 13–26

  “One should give something up as lost only when it is lost.”

  GENERAL ALFRED JODL’S RESPONSE TO HITLER ON APRIL 14, 1940 WHEN THE LATTER PLANNED TO GIVE UP NARVIK.

  ”The British are coming”—Unprepared for Operations

  As the Second Naval Battle of Narvik was fought, a convoy of British troops was on its way to Harstad carrying most of the 24th Guards Brigade and the 146th Brigade. The two transports carrying the 146th Brigade were diverted to Namsos shortly before they reached Harstad. General Mackesy, in the cruiser Southampton, arrived in Harstad on April 14 with two companies of the Scots Guards.

  Admiral Cork, in the cruiser Aurora, had intended to proceed directly to Harstad but a message from Admiral Whitworth caused him to change his plans and proceed to Skjellfjord. He arrived there before noon on April 14. The message from Whitworth to the Admiralty and copied to Admirals Forbes and Cork gave Whitworth’s assessment of the situation in Narvik. He estimated that there were 1,500 to 2,000 German troops in Narvik and was convinced that the city could be taken by direct assault without serious opposition, provided a naval force on the same scale as that used in the battle on the previous day supported the landing.

  In view of this assessment, Cork decided to carry out a combined attack on Narvik in the morning of April 15 using the two companies embarked on the Southampton and about 200 Royal Marines from the ships in Skjellfjord. He sent an order to Southampton to proceed to Skjellfjord, to arrive there by 2000 hours on April 14. Because of poor radio communications, the message was not received until after Southampton arrived in Harstad and had landed the troops at Sjøvegan.

  General Mackesy was dubious about Admiral Cork’s planned operation and said as much in a message to the admiral. He went on to state that if the operation were to be carried out, the troops would have to come from the transports bringing the main force of the 24th Brigade, and they would not arrive until April 15. Cork also received a message from the British Admiralty at about the same time that put another brake on the operation: “We think it imperative that you and the General should be together and act together and that no attack should be made except in concert.”1 These two messages put an end to the plan for an immediate attack on Narvik, and Cork proceeded to Harstad, where he arrived on April 15.

  General Mackesy established contact with the Norwegian civil authorities in Harstad soon after he arrived on April 14. Through these contacts, he learned that there were no Germans in the area and that the British would be well received by the population. Mackesy also wished to establish contact with the Norwegian military authorities as quickly as possible. He learned that the Norwegian military headquarters was located in Moen, Målselv. This was the reason he landed the two companies of the Scots Guards at Sjøvegan. These troops established contact with Norwegian ground forces before evening.

  Aurora entered Andfjord in the morning of April 15, at the same time as the convoy carrying the 24th Brigade arrived. The battleship Valiant and nine destroyers escorted the three troop transports. There were now a number of German submarines in the Vågsfjord area. Admiral Dönitz, at the request of the German Naval Staff after the British attack on the German destroyers in Narvik on April 10, had ordered four boats from the 5th Submarine Group (U38, U47, U48, and U49), patrolling the waters between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast, to patrol Vågsfjord and adjacent areas.

  A Norwegian naval observation station warned the British about the presence of German submarines. The British destroyers Fearless and Brazen, escorts for Aurora, attacked and sank U49. One German from a crew of 42 was killed. Admiral Maund writes that the British were aware when they left Scapa Flow that the Germans had four submarines on patrol in the Lofoten-Narvik area and that all four had been accounted for with the sinking of U49, three sunk by destroyers and one by aircraft from Warspite. He is mistaken. The Germans had five submarines in Group 1, which operated along the Narvik approaches, and they lost only one, to Warspite’s aircraft. U49 belonged to Group 5. However, the loss of U64 and U49 as well as the torpedo problems caused the Germans to redeploy the submarines to the vicinity of the Shetlands on April 19 and 20.

  The 1st Irish Guards and 1st Scots Guards battalions and the brigade headquarters arrived in Harstad on April 15. The 1st Irish Guards were moved to Bogen, on the north side of Ofotfjord, on April 19. The 34th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery was also landed in Harstad, but it had no guns. The brigade’s third battalion, 2nd South Wales Borderers, landed on April 16 and moved to Bogen to join the 1st Irish Guards on April 21. Various support troops more than equal to the combat forces in numbers, were also landed on April 16.

  Harstad had a population of about 4,000 in 1940 and the pier, transport, and storage facilities were limited. The unloading and clearing of the harbor was completed on April 17 and 18 and the transports returned to Great Britain. Derry reports that confusion caused by conditions and decisions that marked the expedition’s inception was great. The lack of tactical loading required that everything be sorted after landing and much had to be reloaded and sent to Namsos since it belonged to the 146th Brigade.

  François Kersaudy is more graphic in his description of conditions in Harstad. He describes the arrival of several convoys, without warning, over a five-day period, “1,000 administrators, office clerks and accountants, together with huge amounts of office furniture.” He also notes that General Mackesy discovered that “His brigade had practically no mortar shells, very few grenades, no spare ammunition, no artillery, no anti-aircraft guns, no skis, no snow shoes, no trucks, no landing craft …”2

  The British found Harstad unsuitable as a naval base, and Admiral Cork decided to establish a base for the naval forces at Skånland, at the northern end of Tjeldsund. This place is located approximately 15 miles southeast of Harstad. A Royal Marine Fortress Unit prepared positions for placing shore batteries; however, the work was not finished. The British also started work on a large airfield near Skånland but it was never completed to the point where it could be used.

  The Debate about an Immediate Attack on Narvik

  There has been much speculation about the possible success of an attack on Narvik after the destruction of the German destroyers on April 13. Churchill charged General Mackesy with tardy and negligent behavior not warranted by the tactical situation. While Derry finds little to support Churchill’s conclusion, Ziemke takes the opposite view. He writes:

  In view of present knowledge it seems that a landing during the first days would have had a good chance of success since Dietl had only one battalion of mountain troops in Narvik to oppose two British battalions at hand on the 15th and an additional battalion that arrived on the 16th.3

  However, the British units were not prepared to deal with opposition immediately after landing. They required a period in a relatively secure area to organize and receive their equipment, to compensate for their hurried deployment. This delay cannot be attributed to Mackesy.

  The first meeting between Admiral Cork and General M
ackesy took place on April 15. While no records are available, it was described as a heated encounter. Cork was surprised to find that the troops were embarked in anticipation of a peaceful landing and not ready for immediate operations. He was equally surprised to learn that Mackesy’s orders also precluded the landing of troops against organized opposition.

  While the general viewed his instructions as not forbidding an immediate move against Narvik if a favorable situation presented itself, there were serious practical impediments. The primary ones had to do with the loading of the transports and the lack of certain necessary equipment. The troops of the 24th Guards Brigade had never operated in the Arctic and the deep snow made movement practically impossible. Faced with Mackesy’s determined conclusion that a direct attack at this time was “sheer bloody murder,” Cork gave up his plan for an immediate attack on Narvik and informed the Admiralty accordingly.

  Almost all principles pertaining to command were violated at the outset of the Narvik operation. The British had developed an excellent set of principles in their Combined Operations Manual, based on many years of experience. It is incredulous therefore, that most of these principles were discarded.

  1. No unity of command—no single individual was in charge of the whole operation.