Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Norwegian Delaying Actions at Tromsa and Vinstra

  Encouraged by their success against the British at Tretten, General von Falkenhorst altered the mission of the 196th Division. Group Fischer was put under von Falkenhorst’s direct command with the mission of linking up with German forces moving south from Trondheim. The rest of the division was ordered to conduct a relentless pursuit in Gudbrandsdal towards Åndalsnes, to destroy or capture the British forces in central Norway.

  The Norwegian 11th Infantry Regiment carried out a near normal mobilization in the Møre and Romsdal Province and two line battalions were brought to the Dombås area to join the British in their southern drive to Trondheim. After the defeat at Tretten, the regiment was moved into Gudbrandsdal and the 1st Bn was placed under the command of Major Torkildsen near Tromsa, about ten kilometers north of Tretten. These troops witnessed the British retreat, and it certainly had a negative effect on their morale. If Ruge had known that operation Hammer was cancelled, he may have moved the 11th Regiment into Gudbrandsdal earlier.

  The Germans attacked the 1/11th Inf with tanks and infantry in the morning of April 24. With the arrival of additional armor and seeing how helpless the Norwegians and British were against this weapon, the Germans changed their tactics. Rather than immediately initiating flanking maneuvers, they made frontal attacks led by armor. This tactic was successful at Tretten and at Tromsa. While their armor broke into the positions at Tromsa, the Norwegians succeeded in making an orderly withdrawal to another delaying position. The Germans followed and broke through the Norwegian lines with tanks that same afternoon. A number of Norwegians were driven into the mountains. The battalion, reduced to 550 troops, withdrew to an assembly area north of Otta, about 40 kilometers to the north. The Torkildsen Battalion was not attacked and managed to withdraw to Ringebu (15 kilometers to the north) in the evening but only after losing 50 men, who were cut off by the Germans.

  Meanwhile, the 2/11th Inf had occupied a hasty delaying position north of Vinstra, about 12 kilometers from Ringebu. The roadblocks were held open for retreating units but the Germans were in such hot pursuit that it was not possible to close them after the last retreating units came through late on April 24. The German armor drove through the Norwegian frontlines, driving some of the defenders into the mountains. The Norwegian reserves managed, with great difficulty, to stop the Germans, who withdrew to Vinstra for the night. That same night the Norwegians were ordered withdrawn to Otta. The 2/11th was badly mauled. It had lost one infantry company, most of the machinegun company, and another infantry company had lost 30 men. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment was reduced to two squadrons. German armor and air power were major factors in the inability of the Norwegians and British to halt the relentless German pursuit, a pursuit that repeatedly scattered and isolated the defenders.

  British Reinforcements

  Lieutenant General H. R. C. Massy was appointed commander of all British forces in Norway, except those in the Narvik area, on April 20, but he never left London. Major General P. G. T. Paget was appointed commander of forces operating in southern Norway on April 20, now that this was about to become a multi-brigade operation with the diversion of the 15th Brigade to Åndalsnes from its original mission against Trondheim. Brigadier General H. E. F. Smyth commanded the 15th Brigade and this unit began landing in Åndalsnes and Molde from cruisers and destroyers on April 23. The 15th Brigade, unlike the 148th, consisted of regular soldiers, withdrawn from the western front with great secrecy. The original plan called for this brigade to enter Østerdal and assist TF Hiorth. However, the disaster at Tretten made it necessary to move the brigade into Gudbrandsdal to shore up the crumbling defense there.

  The British tried to remedy their mistake in not providing air support. They were reluctant to bring aircraft carriers sufficiently close to the coast to be effective and decided to counter the German air threat by bringing in fighter aircraft and more antiaircraft guns. However, half the antiaircraft guns were lost when a German submarine sank the transport Cedarbank.

  The British could not find a suitable airfield in this mountainous terrain and decided to base their operations from the frozen Lake Lesjaskog, between Dombås and Åndalsnes. Despite objections by their own officers sent to reconnoiter, the British Air Staff decided to use Lake Lesjaskog since it was closer to the operational area than the larger lake near Vang in the Valdres Mountains, which was used by the Norwegians.

  Ground personnel arrived in Lesjaskog on April 23 where Norwegians had cleared enough snow to make one landing strip. The British set up operations the following day when 18 Gladiators from the 263rd Squadron flew in from the aircraft carrier Glorious. The problems started the next day when some of the carburetors and controls had frozen, making it difficult to get the motors started.

  The Germans reacted quickly to this threat to their air dominance. Only one Gladiator managed to take off before the Luftwaffe appeared. The first visit caused little damage and the Germans lost one aircraft. The Germans reappeared in greater force around 0830 hours. In the interim, a further two Gladiators had become airborne and were flying air cover in Gudbrandsdal. The other 15 Gladiators were still on the ice. Although a couple managed to become airborne, ten were destroyed in the course of the morning.

  The bombing caused panic among the ground personnel and they fled into the woods along the lake. This caused a severe slowdown in operations since it took the pilots over one hour to replenish their ammunition and fuel. Those aircraft able to take off shot down two German aircraft. By evening, there were only four operational Gladiators left. These flew to Åndalsnes next morning, where the parade ground of a Norwegian training camp was used as a landing strip. Since these aircraft ran out of fuel the following day, all were destroyed.

  British Actions at Kvam, Kjørem, and Otta

  General Smyth reported to General Ruge in the morning of April 24 and was directed to occupy positions at Kvam, about eight kilometers north of Vinstra. Smyth occupied the Kvam positions with the battalion of the King’s Own York and Lancaster Infantry, an antitank company, and some engineers. Norwegian engineers delayed the German advance sufficiently to give Smyth five to six hours to organize his defense. These professional soldiers proved more difficult for the Germans to defeat. They also had effective antitank weapons.

  General Pellengahr’s forces in the area had grown to six infantry battalions, a mountain battalion, a motorized machinegun battalion, several batteries of artillery, and a number of tanks. The narrowness of the valley allowed for only a part of this force in the forward area. Most German units were deployed in depth all the way to Ringebu. The first German attack at 1130 hours on April 25 was repelled despite considerable British losses to an intense enemy artillery bombardment. The forward British company was forced to withdraw by 1600 hours after having lost 89 men. The Germans tried to envelop the defending force but the British managed to extend their left flank and frustrate the flanking movement. General Smyth was wounded early in the engagement and Lieutenant Colonel Kent-Lemon assumed command of the brigade. The York and Lancaster Battalion occupied a position behind the village through which the forward units could withdraw.

  The Germans resumed their attack at 0630 on April 26. This time they sent a whole battalion around the British left flank and the companies there became heavily engaged. The Germans also attacked in the center with heavy air and artillery support. While the French-made British antitank guns proved effective, some were neutralized by enemy artillery fire. Despite supporting attacks by Norwegian ski troops sent by General Hvinden-Haug, the British were in danger of having the road behind their positions cut by the German envelopment. The situation was becoming precarious for the British, not only because of the envelopment, but also from groups of Germans who infiltrated gaps between the companies.

  General Paget ordered withdrawal from Kvam at 2300 hours. The York and Lancasters, and one company from the Green Howards, were to set up a position at Kjørem, five kilometers to the north, and t
he British were to withdraw through these positions. Two companies on the far left of the British line were not informed about the withdrawal and had to make a perilous escape through the hills.

  Generals Paget and Ruge met on April 26, and a new command arrangement was worked out. The British now had the preponderance of forces in Gudbrandsdal and it was therefore natural that all forces in that area should be under British command since British forces had operated under Norwegian command when the situation was reversed. Paget, who was worried about a German breakthrough in Østerdal presenting a threat to his rear, had suggested a withdrawal to the rugged terrain south of Dombås but this was not acceptable to Ruge. To do so would mean sacrificing TF Dahl, now on the offensive against the German left flank at Fåberg.

  Both Paget and Ruge reported back to their respective governments around this time. Paget’s report on April 26 refers to the 148th having “had a dusting,” and it fed the flames of ill feeling among the Norwegians by calling some of their units “unreliable.” He also gave a greatly exaggerated estimate of German strength when he reported that the 15th Brigade faced two or three German divisions.13

  General Massy’s reply on April 27 emphasized the importance of holding a bridgehead that included Dombås and a 70-kilometer stretch to the north as far as Opdal in order that a second base could be developed in Sunndalsfjord. It is difficult to understand Massy’s message in view of what was going on in London and Paris. Chamberlain had ordered plans finalized for an evacuation of Åndalsnes and Namsos on April 26 and Massy received permission from the Prime Minister and the War Office to evacuate Åndalsnes the following day, the very day on which he sent the message to Paget.

  General Ruge’s report to the government on April 25 was bleak. He stated that his troops were exhausted after over two weeks of continued fighting and he expected the Norwegian and British forces to be swept aside within a day or two. He concluded that future operations had to be based in Trøndelag and North Norway.16 Ruge was apparently in the dark as to the situation in Trøndelag. On the day prior to Ruge’s report the Allies, rather than advancing on Trondheim, were in full retreat.

  Kjørem was only a temporary delaying position. The British were preparing positions at Otta, 12 kilometers to the north. Kjørem was held by the York and Lancaster battalion. The Germans launched their attack shortly after 0800 in the morning of April 27. They repeated their tactics of frontal attack supported by heavy artillery at the same time as they worked on the British flanks. The front company in the British defenses was driven out of its positions when the woods around it were set on fire. Attempts to recapture the position failed.

  The British had sent security well into the hills on both flanks but when the order was given to withdraw, they discovered that a German flanking movement over the mountains had succeeded in cutting the road behind their positions. The British managed to escape the trap, but sustained heavy losses. One company became separated and made its way back to Dombås after a 24-hour march through snow-covered mountains. The battalion lost about half of its original strength of 600. The Germans had only ten killed and 42 wounded.

  At Otta, it was the Green Howards’ turn to try to slow the German advance. The battalion was short one company. The area southeast of Otta was excellent defensive terrain. The Germans softened up the British positions by air attacks and artillery fire before launching a ground attack. The Green Howards were well dug in and they suffered only minor losses from these attacks. The British antitank weapons again proved effective and the ground fighting, which began around 1030 hours, ebbed back and forth most of the day until the British company on the west side of the river was forced back towards the town and across the railroad bridge, which was destroyed around 2200 hours. The order to withdraw from Otta was issued about this time. Again, one of the forward companies did not get the message but it managed to disengage.

  Norwegian Operations in Gausdal, Østerdal, and Valdres

  After it was decided not to pull TF Dahl into Gudbrandsdal, Colonel Dahl considered two possibilities: 1) link up with Colonel Østbye’s forces fighting in Valdres; or 2) conduct delaying actions in Gausdal south of Vinstra. A reconnaissance proved that it was not possible to link up with Østbye in Valdres because the roads could not be opened. It was possible to move to Vinstra but the move would take three to four days and it was uncertain where the forces in Gudbrandsdal would be at the end of that period.

  Dahl’s forces consisted of the 1/6th Inf, the 1/4th Inf, and a number of company-size improvised units, some of an independent mindset or questionable quality. The enemy consisted of the three battalions from Group Nickelmann and a battalion that crossed the river at Fåberg on April 26.

  When the Germans captured the bridge at Tretten intact in the evening of April 23, Colonel Dahl decided to withdraw into Vestre Gausdal since his rear was now exposed. The decision was accelerated by a false report that German armor had crossed the bridge in force. Dahl realized later that his withdrawal had been unnecessary and he ordered his troops forward again late on April 26.

  Dahl’s force was divided into two groups. the 1/4th Inf, a cavalry training company, and an under-strength ski company, commanded by Major Broch, advanced southward against Follebu, located west of Lågen River on the road to Fåberg. The second group, consisting of the 1/6th Inf and an improvised 3/6th Inf under Major Abildgaard, was sent northward towards Tretten. Task Force Broch soon faced the German battalion that had crossed Lågen at Fåberg that same day. The Norwegian battalion attacked frontally while the cavalry troop and ski company began an envelopment. The German battalion commander reported he was surrounded and requested help.

  The flank threat against the Germans that Ruge had hoped for was now realized and it caused immediate German reactions. The battalion facing TF Broch was reinforced, primarily with artillery, while three battalions, with five tanks, were pulled from their advance in Gudbrandsdal and crossed the bridge at Tretten on April 27.

  Major Broch was killed and the reinforced German battalion halted the Norwegian advance at Follebu. Task Force Abildgaard reached as far as Svingvoll, about six kilometers west of Tretten without meeting any appreciable opposition.

  The German advance of three battalions from Tretten encountered a Norwegian company at Svingvoll and it withdrew slowly northward in the direction of Åmot, followed by a German battalion. Reinforcements from 1/6th Inf stopped the other two battalions at a bridge near Svingvoll. In a pause in the fighting that occurred with the appearance of a German negotiator under white flag, the German tanks crossed the bridge and the Norwegians were compelled to withdraw. They made a stand near Østre Gausdal where heavy fighting continued throughout the day until German armor enveloped the Norwegian right flank.

  Because of increased enemy pressure against both his task forces, Colonel Dahl stopped his offensive and pulled his forces back to Vestre Gausdal. Norwegian units managed to halt the German advance in a defile about four kilometers east of Vestre Gausdal and on April 28, Ruge asked Dahl to stay in that area and tie down as many German units as possible.

  However, Dahl’s troops were exhausted, running short of ammunition and provisions, and it was no longer possible to reach friendly units near Dombås. Under these circumstances, Colonel Dahl decided to accept a German offer to negotiate that led to surrender terms that allowed Norwegian troops to demobilize rather than become prisoners. The final arrangements were made in person between General von Falkenhorst and Colonel Dahl. The surrender on April 29 included about 200 officers and 3,000 soldiers.

  Group Fischer was tasked with linking up with German forces south of Trondheim. It consisted of three infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, one engineer battalion, two motorized companies, and two platoons of 10 tanks. These forces broke through the Norwegian defenses in the Rena area after three days of fighting.

  Task Force Hiorth no longer had the strength to contest the German advance through Østerdal. With his main force of about 600 men Colonel Hiorth p
lanned to make a stand in the Rasta area on the east of Glåma River. The Germans attacked in the morning of April 23. They were held in check until evening when German armor broke through the Norwegian left flank. Hiorth did not have many resources left after the fighting at Rasta. The last defensive operations in Østerdal took place between Kvikne and Nåverdal.

  While heavy fighting took place for three days along the Kvikne-Nåverdal road without a Germans breakthrough, the eventual outcome was a foregone conclusion. The last Norwegian position in Nåverdal capitulated on April 28 and Group Fischer linked up with forces moving south from Trondheim near Berkåk at noon on April 30. The remnants of TF Hiorth crossed into Sweden and were interned.

  We saw earlier that General von Falkenhorst turned the 163rd Division westward to deal with the flank threat posed by the 4th Field Brigade, which had crossed the mountains from western Norway. The fighting between the 163rd Division and the 4th Field Brigade in Valdres and Hallingdal was among the heaviest in Norway. The Germans committed eight infantry battalions, two artillery battalions and 17 tanks in these areas.

  The Norwegians conducted tough delaying actions in the hope that the Allies would land forces in Sognefjord. The brigade was still fighting at Fossheim in Valdres on April 30, but the situation had become precarious as various units were splintered and beginning to dissolve. With no prospect of assistance, Colonel Østbye decided to accept German demands and surrendered his 2,000 men at Fagernes. The Norwegians had lost 46 killed, 240 wounded, and about 800 missing and captured since April 25. The total German casualties are not known but their lead regiment had 157 killed and about 360 wounded.