Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Lieutenant Colonel Dahl issued the attack order on May 1. The French forces were to attack that same day towards the southern end of Storevann with three companies driving south through Labergsdal while the fourth company and the mortars advanced along Route 50. These forces would converge at the southern end of Storevann. The Alta Bn remained in its positions in the Fjelldal-Holtås area during this initial phase of the attack and awaited further orders. The 2/15th Inf was in an assembly area in the woods southeast of Kvernmoen, while the 7th Mountain Artillery Battery was in position in the Fjellhøgda area. The 9th Motorized Artillery Battery did not reach the area until May 7 because the roads had to be cleared of snow.

  Aerial reconnaissance indicated that the Germans had abandoned their positions north of Hestevann, the northernmost lake in the string of lakes on the east side of Route 50. The reconnaissance also showed that there were German defensive positions in the valley between Hills 513 and 785.

  Reconnaissance by Co 5, 2/15th Inf in Labergdal revealed that the Germans had a strong blocking position in Nedre Labergdal. A German platoon-size force occupied the blocking position in an area consisting of large boulders from which they dominated the flat valley below. Major Celerier, commander of the 6th Bn CA, conducted a personal reconnaissance with Captain Hanekamhaug, commander of Co 5, 2/15th. In the afternoon of April 30, Celerier ordered Hanekamhaug’s company, reinforced by the battalion’s SES, to seize the German positions on May 1.

  Hanekamhaug’s plan involved sending two platoons towards the German positions along the valley bottom, one on each side of the river. The two platoons were to approach the German positions frontally and halt at a distance where fire directed towards them would be ineffective. Hanekamhaug with the other two platoons and the French SES constituted the main attack. This force would advance along the western slopes of Snaufjell, approaching the German flank from the northeast.

  The advance began at 0500 hours. The two platoons in the valley moved to within 500 meters of the German positions and dug in without receiving fire. The Germans were so preoccupied with this direct approach that they did not notice the advance of the main attacking force along the west slope of Snaufjell. When Captain Hanekamhaug came even with the Germans, he ordered the French Lieutenant Blin, commander of the SES, to close on the enemy positions. Hanekamhaug sent one platoon and the machineguns forward another 300 meters as security against an expected German counterattack.

  Lieutenant Blin and his men were able to approach the Germans unnoticed and when his men were in a good location to storm the positions, they opened a devastating volley. After about two minutes of intense fire, the Germans displayed the white flag of surrender and 18 of them with six machineguns passed into captivity. The Norwegian reports are full of praise for the conduct of their French allies in this operation. The two Norwegian platoons in the valley occupied the German positions quickly and prepared for a counterattack. The counterattack came in less than 30 minutes against the Norwegian left flank and some of the Norwegian troops in the 1st Platoon were driven temporarily from their positions. The German attack was eventually repulsed but not before the 1st Platoon commander was fatally wounded.

  A three-man Norwegian patrol sent out shortly before the German counterattack to establish contact with the French unit advancing along Route 50 was lost. Another squad size patrol was sent out on the morning of May 2. It worked its way past the German machinegun nests, established contact with the French unit, returned without losses, and provided important information on German dispositions.

  While the Norwegians and French had successfully eliminated the German blocking position between Nedre and Øvre Labergsdal, the Germans succeeded not only in blocking further French advances through Labergsdal and along Route 50, but also occupied the Snaufjell mountain between the two axes of advance. From this high ground, small German ski detachments harassed the French units constantly and made it impossible to establish any reliable contact between the two axes of advance. The German ski platoon on Snaufjell was small, only about 20 men. Lieutenant Colonel Valentini finally requested that Lieutenant Colonel Dahl clear the Snaufjell plateau with Norwegian ski troops. Captain Hanekamhaug was given this mission.

  Major Celerier opposed the operation because he believed the Norwegians would take heavy casualties. Consequently, Hanekamhaug’s order was changed to a reconnaissance in force of the western, northern, and eastern approaches to Snaufjell. The company, with SES attached, carried out the reconnaissance, often under fire, in an exhaustive 25-hour march that brought them back to Labergsdal through Elvenes. In the process, Hanekamhaug’s troops drove the Germans from Hill 513, and this allowed the French in Labergsdal to establish contact with their company on Route 50. The reconnaissance resulted in a sketch map of the German positions, but this proved of little help as the Germans kept shifting their men from position to position, giving the impression that the mountain was held by a much larger force than they actually had.

  French attempts to clear the Germans from Snaufjell were slow and methodical against stiff German opposition. The German forces in this isolated position were resupplied by air and General Béthouart reported that they displayed “extraordinary endurance.”9 The slow French progress was due to their lack of training in winter conditions and their shortage of appropriate equipment. Béthouart was well aware of the difficulties his troops faced. He ordered that all operations take place at night in order to minimize exposure to German air attack and to take advantage of the improved mobility provided by the night frost. Béthouart concluded that it would take a long time to reach Narvik from the north. Admiral Cork eventually ordered that French troops on the northern front limit themselves to keeping the Germans tied down until the planned landing in the Bjerkvik area drew German forces in that direction.10

  The Norwegians were not informed about this decision. The result was that the hopes in the original plan of bypassing the German positions on Gratangseidet by the advance through Labergsdal never came to fruition. The Norwegians demanded better operational coordination, which was one of the reasons for Lindbäck-Larsen’s visit to the British headquarters in Harstad on May 6, discussed earlier in this chapter.

  The Germans committed considerable air assets against the French-Norwegian attack through Labergsdal and along the Bjerkvik road. The coastal steamer Dronning Maud, carrying the 6th Reserve Medical Company from Sørreisa was attacked by German aircraft in the evening of May 1, as it was about to dock in Foldvik, despite clearly displayed large Red Cross markings. Nineteen were killed and 31 seriously wounded.

  The 14th Bn CA relieved the 6th Bn CA in the evening of May 8. The 6th was pulled back to a rest area in Gratangen. According to Béthouart, 65% of the troops in this battalion were combat ineffective because of frostbite and snow blindness. The French troops received increased indirect fire resources when the French 75mm battery finally showed up in the period 6-9 May. The Norwegian 9th Motorized Artillery Battery, in positions near Hestvann, also provided support for the French troops.

  The 14th Bn CA resumed its advance on May 9. The battalion cleared the Germans from Snaufjell that same day. Its lead elements reached Storevann where it was stopped by flanking fire from the western slopes of Roasme (Hill 856). The battalion spent the following days clearing Labergsdal. The battalion’s SES later reached the eastern slopes of Hill 1013, but the French advance was stopped by strong German positions astride Route 50.

  7th Brigade’s Attack

  The original offensive plan did not call for the 7th Brigade to undertake any major attacks, but to follow up the expected German withdrawal caused by the pressures exerted by the advance of the 6th Brigade and the 27th CA. The partial failure of the CA’s part of the operation forced some changes in the original concept.

  The beginning of operations found the 7th Brigade at the foot of the Lægastind Massif on which the Germans had positions with excellent observation and fields of fire to the north and west. The Germans occupied both heights east
of Reisevann, Hill 785 and Roasme (Hill 856) and the 6th Brigade reported that a German company had occupied the high ground around Britatind. Dahl viewed the capture of the heights east of Reisevann and Hill 785 as the objectives of most immediate importance. It was decided that the Alta Bn should remain in its current positions for the time being while the 2/15th Inf, commanded by Major Hyldmo, attacked to secure the high ground around Hill 785. One company from the Alta Bn would cover the left flank of the attacking battalion against the German force reported to be on or near Britatind.

  The 2/15th began its attack at 0230 hours on May 2. The attacking companies began the ascent to Hill 785 in thick fog. The fog lifted as the units neared the top and the advance was halted by heavy German fire. Nevertheless, Co 7 managed to get close enough to the German positions to storm and secure the objective. Heavy German fire from Hill 842 prevented a pursuit. Company 7 occupied Hill 785, with one platoon about 400 meters to the south of the summit. Company 6 occupied some heights to the east with its front facing Roasme (Hill 856), southwest of Hill 785. The two companies remained in these positions for several days while the Alta Bn and the French tried to work their way forward in the valley.

  Company 2, Alta Bn occupied Hill 559 (to the northeast of Hill 785) on May 2 without opposition. A security detachment was sent towards Lortvann. This detachment was later moved to the area between Britatind and Stortind (Hill 1150). The Norwegians kept Hill 559 occupied by one company until May 6. Company 2, Alta Bn and Co 2, 1/16th, the latter sent via Lortvann from the 6th Brigade to secure the 7th Brigade’s left flank, relieved each other in 24-hour intervals and conducted extensive patrolling to their front between Britatind and Lægastind. These patrols reported considerable German activity that pointed to a counterattack.

  The counterattack came against Hill 785 during the night between May 4 and 5. The most forward Norwegian platoon was driven out of its position but it was recaptured in a counterattack the same day. Fourteen German soldiers, including one officer, were captured along with a number of weapons including machineguns and mortars. Five of those captured were wounded. The Germans admit losing a platoon to Norwegian ski troops in this attack and blame the loss on the unit’s lack of mobility in the deep snow.

  Company 3, Alta Bn had the difficult task of trying to eliminate German positions, including a number of well-concealed machinegun nests, from the very broken and difficult terrain between the mountains and Route 50. The company moved from Fjelldal, where it had been the battalion reserve, on May 3 and occupied the high ground about one kilometer east of Reisevann. The company resumed its advance at 2330 hours but it soon ran into heavy German fire and the attack was called off after a fight that lasted over three hours. Norwegian casualties were one killed and six wounded. The company continued to patrol and probe the German positions on May 5 and 6. There were frequent clashes, with losses on both sides. The Germans withdrew to new positions between Reisevann and Storevann on May 6.

  Norwegian army and naval aircraft provided valuable support for the ground operations by flying numerous reconnaissance and ground support missions. Attacks by Norwegian aircraft are mentioned frequently in the 3rd Division’s war journal. The Luftwaffe was also active, despite problems mentioned earlier. One Norwegian aircraft was shot down and four others were wrecked. Two pilots were captured.

  The Germans were well armed with automatic weapons and were able to establish a belt of interlocking fire along the valley and Route 50. The same applied to the mountain massif where the placement of machineguns on key terrain covered not only the approaches to the heights but also the valleys between those heights. The German positions reduced the possibility of bypassing and flanking maneuvers and it became necessary for the Norwegians to drive the Germans from their mountain strong points by frontal attacks. This proved both tough and time-consuming in difficult terrain with deep snow against very competent and obstinate German defenders.

  Orders from the division on May 5 called for a continuation of the offensive by both brigades. The division saw the clearing of the area north and northeast of Læigastind as the most important mission for the 7th Brigade. Dahl viewed Hill 842 as the key German defensive position. He decided that Hills 698 and 684 had to be captured before an attack could be carried out against Hill 842. The Norwegian attack on these hills was carried out during the night between May 5 and 6. The attack against Hill 698 succeeded but the attack against Hill 684 was repelled.

  Dahl decided to attack along his whole front from Hill 785 to Britatind. Two companies on the Brigade’s left flank were to attack the high ground near the lake to the east of Læigastind while two companies attacked Hill 842. Another two companies were kept back as brigade reserve. The attacks were supported by all available artillery and mortar resources and by air attacks against Hills 842 and 780.

  The Norwegian attack proceeded according to plans. Company 1, Alta Bn successfully stormed the well-fortified Hill 842 at 0600 hours on May 7. Company 7, 2/15th Inf passed through Co 1 quickly and proceeded against Roasme (Hill 856). The Germans were driven from this important height and the Norwegians now had a clear view of Herjangsfjord and could see the Narvik Peninsula in the distance. They were less than eight kilometers from Colonel Windisch’s headquarters. The distance is misleading since some very rough terrain still separated the Norwegians from that location.

  The Germans mounted a determined defense against the attack by the 7th Brigade’s left flank units and they succeeded in keeping Norwegian reconnaissance patrols at a distance. The reinforced Co 2, Alta Bn, carried out the attack. It did not start out well since the platoon that was to secure the company’s right flank was bombed by friendly aircraft and had to withdraw temporarily. German fire intensified as the company neared its objective and the attack stalled despite the commitment of an additional platoon from Co 2, 1/16th. Another platoon was added to the attacking force in the morning of May 7, but the Germans were able to keep the attack from progressing despite heavy artillery support from the 8th Mountain Artillery Battery.

  The Norwegians learned that Britatind was unoccupied. The relatively short distance from Britatind would allow effective fire to be placed on the German positions from that location, especially by snipers. A platoon from Co 2, 1/16th quickly occupied Britatind. It appears that neither the 139th Regiment nor the 3rd Division knew that Britatind was unoccupied since the 3rd Division journal states that a message from the 139th reported that Britatind was lost after it was attacked by a Norwegian battalion with heavy artillery support. The Norwegian platoon on Britatind placed effective fire on the enemy positions and the German company withdrew in some disorder. When the Norwegians occupied the abandoned positions, they found weapons, ammunition, hand grenades, and rucksacks discarded in the hasty withdrawal. The Norwegians, who had suffered five badly wounded, captured five Germans, one wearing a Norwegian uniform.

  Dietl and Windisch concluded that the situation on the northern front had reached a crisis stage. They decided to withdraw to a line Storfoss-Læigasvann-Ørnefjell-Skogfjell. Dietl’s concerns are illustrated by the fact that at 1745 hours on May 7, he ordered Major Haussels in Narvik to send another company of mountain troops to Bjørnefjell. This order was cancelled at 1900 hours after the 3rd Division was notified by Group XXI that a 60-men company of mountain troops would arrive by air the next day.

  General Dietl put on his skis, and in the company of two NCOs, made a personal visit to Colonel Windisch’s headquarters. The meeting between the two commanders resulted in the conclusion that it would be impossible to hold positions at both ends of Læigasvann if reinforcements were not received. A message to Group XXI after Dietl’s return to his headquarters on May 8 stated that two companies were needed immediately.

  In a draft of future operations provided to the brigades and also to the British liaison officer on May 7, General Fleischer emphasized the importance of reaching a line where the brigades could rest before continuing offensive operations. This involved securing a lin
e running roughly from Storfossen in the east via Læigasvann and Ørnefjell to the Bjerkvik road on the southern Snaufjell slopes. Occupation of this line would also place the Norwegians within a short distance of the Hartvigvann area, an objective for the continued offensive. The advance to the proposed line would, in the opinion of the division, draw German forces away from the planned Allied landing areas near Bjerkvik. The plan made it clear that the goal of future operations was the capture of the Bjørnefjell area on the Swedish border.

  The 7th Brigade gave 1/16th Inf the mission of clearing any German forces from the area between Britatind and Læigastind, including the eastern and southern slopes of these mountains. This would secure the brigade’s left flank and facilitate the 6th Brigade’s advance in Gressdal. The Alta Bn held Roasme (Hill 856). It and the 2/15th Inf, in cooperation with the French forces, were to be prepared to clear the Germans from the east side of Route 50, as far as the northern slopes of Snaufjellene. The next brigade objectives were Ørnefjell (Hills 667 and 664) and Vassdalsfjell (Hill 894). The successful capture of these mountains would bring the brigade into positions just north of Hartvigvann and less than five kilometers from Elvegårdsmoen.

  The 1/16th attacked the German positions in the area between Britatind and Læigastind on May 8 and the Germans were cleared from the area after some sharp fighting. They left a considerable amount of supplies and ammunition when abandoning their positions. Germans losses were five killed, five wounded, and four captured. The Norwegian had only one wounded.

  The 1/16th was ordered forward and established itself in positions at the eastern end of Læigasvann. Except for supporting the French in their efforts to reach the area near Snaufjellene, Lieutenant Colonel Dahl recommended to division that the rest of the brigade remain in its positions until the units on the flanks had reached their objectives. Supplying the forces in forward positions required enormous effort and the number of personnel in these positions was kept to a minimum to ease this task.