Norwegian-Allied Friction
There was growing bitterness between the Norwegians and the British as the operations in Norway progressed. Many Norwegians viewed British actions since the outbreak of war in 1939 as designed to pull their country into that conflict. The Norwegians were promised on April 9 that quick and large-scale assistance would be forthcoming. When the assistance did arrive it was inadequate in both quantity and quality. Continual promises and assurances during the operations in southern and central Norway never materialized. The displeasure over the adequacy of the assistance was closely tied to the question of strategy.
Norwegian recommendations on strategy failed to alter the British War Cabinet’s preoccupation with Narvik and the iron ore. The British decision makers failed to realize that control of central Norway would lead to eventual success in North Norway, while giving up in central Norway doomed any efforts in the north. Frequent Norwegian suggestions that the Allies use forces sitting idle in the Narvik area in Nordland Province were unheeded until it was too late. They could not understand the relative inactivity of the British Navy or the Allied failure to provide adequate air resources for the forces they sent to Norway. General Ruge’s comments on the air support situation in southern Norway were shared by his fellow officers in northern Norway:
It turned out that, as on many other subjects, the British had difficulties coping with the conditions in the country. They did not risk following our recommendations…. Our airmen were used to operating from frozen lakes in the winter… . The British pilots, not used to working under such conditions, did not venture to base their operations on such provisional arrangements and continued to search for what they called real airfields. In this way, much valuable time was lost.16
The British displayed an attitude of deep distrust and arrogance towards their new allies from the very beginning, often based on fallacious information. Intelligence Summary No 227 in mid-April, for example, reports that Norwegian inactivity was due to low morale, mass desertions, a country riddled with Nazi agents, and an army of disloyal elements. Reports by Auchinleck to Dill in May demonstrate disrespect for Norwegians in general and especially for their military. Reflecting on British/Norwegian relations in 1946, Ruge wrote:
To start with, the British did not have a high opinion of Norwegian defense forces. Our apparent collapse on April 9 did not exactly improve the respect for us by a people who had not yet felt what it meant to confront the German war machine and be placed in a hopeless position by German air power. Excessive talk here at home in the days after April 9 about treason and Quisling and his followers created the impression in London that Norway was full of traitors …17
It is understandable that the Norwegians were bitter towards the Allies. Norwegian operational recommendations, based on their intimate knowledge of local conditions and better intelligence on German forces, were brushed aside, often with tragic consequences. Agreed on cooperation with Allied land forces were altered without timely notification. Moulton observes that the Allies felt that the Norwegian Government and its military were unwarlike, negligent in their security, and that there was a large number of Norwegians who sympathized with the Germans.
The behavior of ill-disciplined British and French troops added to the bad atmosphere. Colonel Tue, commanding the 4th Regiment in Romsdal, reported, “Very young lads who appeared to come from the slums of London. They had taken a very close interest in the women of Romsdal, and engaged in wholesale looting of stores and houses.”18 Kersuady also attests to such behavior:
It was hard to deny the evidence, as the Foreign Office grudgingly acknowledged shortly thereafter: ‘Drunk’ British troops had on one occasion quarreled and eventually fired upon some Norwegian fishermen. Again, some of the British Army officers had behaved ‘with the arrogance of Prussians’ and the Naval Officers were in general so cautious and suspicious that they treated every Norwegian as a Fifth Columnist and refused to believe vital information when given them.19
Chamberlain’s speech to a very unfriendly parliamentary session on May 7 did not improve things. In trying to play down the extent of the defeat in South and Central Norway, he stated, “the German strike was made easy by treachery from inside Norway.” The Norwegians felt betrayed and such statements only served to increase their bitterness.
Derry notes that the shortcomings of the Norwegian forces and their lack of morale were not helped by a lack of sympathy and continual mistrust by the British. General Moulton notes that there was enough blame to go around for both sides but claims that neither side behaved badly in southern and central Norway.
Moulton underestimates the ill feeling among Norwegians in the Narvik area. They remembered the unannounced Allied withdrawals from the southern and central parts of the country where they were kept in the dark until the last moments, resulting in large segments of their troops being placed in untenable positions and forced to surrender. This pattern continued with the withdrawals from Mosjøen and Bodø. The plan to withdraw from Bodø was kept from General Ruge despite a solemn promise to the contrary on May 16. This action, which left Roscher-Nielsen’s forces isolated in Røsvik, so infuriated the Norwegian Government that the British command suspected that it might conclude peace with the Germans.
The British had the lead in the Norwegian campaign and they went to great lengths to insure that this command authority was kept intact. Auchinleck’s instructions were that, in case he became ill or incapacitated, a junior British officer be temporarily promoted to lieutenant general and assume command. In the planned operation against Trondheim, again without consulting or informing the Norwegians, it was stipulated that all forces, including Norwegians, would come under British command. Auchinleck, after taking over from Mackesy, requested authority not only to assume command of Norwegian forces but the right to regulate the non-military sector, including mass movements of civilians.
In a letter to General Dill, Auchinleck wrote, “I shall shortly have to have a wholesale clearing out of the inhabitants from the occupied areas. The place is riddled, I am convinced, with spies.”20 There is no mention of where he intended to move the civilians in this winter wilderness or how he proposed to feed and care for them after such a move. While these proposals and suggestions were never acted on, they illustrate the extent of the mistrust that existed.
There was a complete lack of systematic coordination and cooperation between the Allied military leaders in North Norway and the Norwegian authorities. The British commanders, Cork, Mackesy, and Auchinleck, never visited Ruge or Fleischer’s headquarters. Fleischer had likewise not visited the Allied headquarters in Harstad until Ruge brought him along on May 16. This conference was General Fleischer’s first and last direct contact with the British leadership during the campaign.
Liaison officers were exchanged but they were not provided with adequate communications and were often purposely kept in the dark about planned operations. Consequently, they had little or no influence on the planning and conduct of operations at the highest echelons. The failure to include Norwegian officers on the operations and intelligence staffs at Harstad is deplorable.
News of what had transpired in southern and central Norway made Norwegians, especially Fleischer, suspicious of Allied plans and intentions. The way the evacuations were carried out was looked upon by many as treachery, particularly since the Norwegian forces were not given an opportunity to be evacuated. The broken promises caused bitterness and dejection from cabinet level to the privates who suffered at the front.
Fleischer’s suspicions were evident when Admiral Cork sent a wing commander to arrange for British use of Bardufoss Airfield for two fighter squadrons. After keeping the British waiting for twenty minutes and then listening to the request, Fleischer demanded written assurances that there would be no sudden withdrawal of aircraft and pilots. Fleischer also rejected the use of Allied troops to clear snow at Bardufoss. He no doubt thought they could be used to better purpose somewhere else. According to some
, the meeting was at times heated but in the end, Fleischer agreed to British use of the airfield, arranged for a workforce to clear the field, and provided a battalion as protection. Victor MacClure writes that Fleischer’s agreement was contingent on his chief-of-staff going to Harstad to present Fleischer’s conditions to Admiral Cork.21 Ash, while not mentioning any demands by Fleischer for his chief of staff to be taken to see Admiral Cork, also describes the meeting as tense and Fleischer as “completely intransigent” and says that he made it “plain that his intransigence would continue until he had evidence of some Allied will to fight.”22 Ash, who describes Fleischer as “resentful and uncooperative,” notes that the general had some good reasons for his bitterness. Moulton writes that the British account is denied by Lindbäck-Larsen who termed it inaccurate and insulting.
Fleischer’s distrust reached a point where he questioned the motives of Béthouart, an officer he had worked well with from the outset. In late May, Béthouart recommended that the French forces north of Rombakfjord be moved to Narvik and replaced by the Norwegian battalion that had participated in the capture of that city. Fleischer saw in this recommendation an Allied attempt to further shift the burden of fighting to the Norwegians while sparing their own forces and he refused. Béthouart’s recommendation had a different motive. He had just learned about the planned evacuation and was concerned that a precipitous withdrawal of French forces from the northern front would leave the Norwegian right flank wide open.
The campaign in Norway is a textbook example of what to avoid when multi-national forces are involved in joint operations. There are numerous examples of improper behavior on both sides and it was naïve for Norwegians to expect that their own objectives should be reflected in all cases in those of a world power like Great Britain. The Allies were involved in the beginnings of a giant struggle that had worldwide implications while the Norwegian leadership was more concerned about what happened in Norway.
Relations between Ruge and Fleischer
Hovland writes that Fleischer learned about the new Norwegian administrative and military command relationships in North Norway from Ruge at their meeting with Auchinleck. It is strange that Fleischer could not tell from the meeting with Ruge on May 6, and the document issued the same day by HOK, that he was no longer commander-in-chief but would continue to direct military operations against Narvik. Fleischer’s reaction to the new arrangements, as well as other episodes, suggests that he was a person who allowed his ego and pride to cloud his judgment. Fleischer’s apparent unwillingness to confront people directly on critical issues may have contributed to some of the already mentioned misunderstandings that characterized the campaign. His unwillingness to deal directly with his subordinate commanders at the critical time of the invasion is a most glaring illustration. However, there are other examples such as the uncertainty about his wishes when it came to the positioning of defensive installations in Narvik before the attack, confusion about the movement of Alta Bn in the fighting at Gratangen, General Béthouart’s understanding that parts of the 7th Brigade was under French command in early May, and the misunderstandings that arose between Fleischer and Getz about the destruction of lines of communications. So many examples of misunderstandings are difficult to explain except for the possibility that Fleischer may not have made himself clear.
General Fleischer wrote a protest letter addressed to the Defense Minister on May 17. The letter was a direct challenge to the competency, if not the authority, of General Ruge, Admiral Diesen, and the government. It is a damaging indictment of the government’s decision, scheduled to become effective by a Royal Proclamation the following day. The appropriateness of the government taking over the civil administrative apparatus in North Norway is questioned, and Fleischer claims this would weaken the war effort. He suggests that the government’s role be limited to foreign relations, the securing of resources from overseas, and dealings with those parts of the country that were already occupied.
Fleischer also challenged what he perceived as an undermining of his sole authority for conducting operations by removing the naval and air forces from his direct control. He maintained that operations in North Norway had to be viewed as a single effort and any weakening of his central authority would be damaging, both logistically and operationally. A part of his letter is worth quoting in view of his own failure for five weeks to meet with British commanders and to establish effective cooperation with them:
Since the joint command of North Norway must rest with the Commander-in-Chief [General Fleischer], the negotiations with the Allied forces about joint operations in North Norway must absolutely remain with the Commander-in-Chief. It is difficult enough to get the Allies to conduct effective operations with Norwegian military forces. The prerequisite for any hope of obtaining such cooperation is that there is no doubt whom has operational command. Moreover, those issues that the operational commanders cannot decide or reach agreement on must be handled on the diplomatic level between the respective governments. Any mixing of operational command and diplomatic negotiations will lead to tragedies as such mixtures always do in war.23
He appears to be saying that there was no good alternative to his continuing as commander-in-chief in all matters, military and civilian. He also appears to view the King, Government, and the commanders of the military services as guests in his domain who were welcomed as long as they remained inactive.
The government’s decision to take over their normal civil administrative functions in the three northern provinces rather than work through the system established by Fleischer at the outset of the war was probably not the best solution and led to dissatisfaction in some quarters. Fleischer had selected Governor Hans Gabrielsen from Finnmark Province to head the civilian machinery. It may have been wise for the government to continue to use that machinery by making Gabrielsen responsible to it rather than to Fleischer.
General Ruge’s earlier decision not to involve himself for the time being in the military operations in North Norway turned out to be impractical. The three northern provinces were now the only theater of operations in Norway. It was unrealistic to expect that the arrival of the government as well as the army and navy high commands would lead to harmonious relations with a commander who had little respect for some members of the government, and who disliked both General Ruge and Admiral Diesen.
The protest letter on May 17 served as a watershed in the relations between General Fleischer, the government, and especially General Ruge. While some of his objections to the reshuffling of responsibilities were valid and had merit, his uncompromising attitude led to a poisonous relationship and a failure to have some of the proposed changes accepted. His refusal to accept the new political realities and his apparent unwillingness to accept General Ruge as his superior led to a loss of influence when he tried to avoid changes that he believed would damage the war effort.
The Royal Proclamation of May 18 appointed General Ruge as Armed Forces Commander, with authority over all military branches. Diesen had passed control of naval forces to Ruge during the southern campaign. He also continued his former duties as army commander. Upon his arrival in North Norway, Ruge had two options under the regulations. First, he could continue to operate with General Fleischer as commander-in-chief within that part of the country; or second, he could take over as commander-in-chief and direct operations. It appears that his initial decision was to operate with General Fleischer as commander-in-chief. It soon proved impractical to adhere strictly to this arrangement.24
Hovland writes that Ruge kept Fleischer’s letter from reaching the government as a part of his planned assumption of command of the campaign and that he therefore showed himself to be a man without scruples who would go to any lengths to advance his interests. He claims that the establishment of a Defense High Command was accomplished on May 18 without the government being made aware of General Fleischer’s objections.
Ruge answered Fleischer’s protest letter on May 23. He pointed out that in a c
risis such as the country now found itself, there should not be any competence arguments or accusations, and he wanted to clarify the situation. Among other things, he pointed to the fact that North Norway had become the main theater of war. The Armed Forces High Command (FOK) was present in this part of the country and it should then automatically assume the functions that General Fleischer had taken over because of the physical and communications separation that had existed earlier with respect to the central government. The previous arrangement could no longer continue unless the FOK and the government abandoned their duties and responsibilities for defense and administration of the country.
Ruge informed Fleischer that he had not yet made the new command relationships effective because he wanted Fleischer, who had prepared the operations against Narvik, to have the honor of being in command when Narvik was recaptured. He also told Fleischer that it was his intention to give him command of the southern front (Nordland Province) as soon as the situation around Narvik was resolved or permitted such a move. In addition, he informed Fleischer that he had retained his May 17 letter since it dealt with military matters within his prerogatives and that the changes in the civil administration had been decided before he received Fleischer’s letter. If Fleischer wanted to lodge a complaint with the government about Ruge or the new command relationships, such a complaint would be expedited. Fleischer requested this be done in a letter on May 24. General Fleischer’s letter of May 17 was accordingly sent directly to the Minister of Defense along with all other correspondence between Ruge and Fleischer about the command relationships.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 63
