Fleischer’s letter of May 24, which is missing from the archives, requested that his letter of protest be forwarded to the Defense Minister. It must have convinced Ruge that he should not wait any longer to institute the new command arrangements. He announced the reorganization in a letter to Fleischer on May 26, placing the following directly under FOK: Naval High Command, 6th Division, Norwegian Forces in Nordland Province, Sector Commanders in East and West Finnmark, and 6th District Command. Ruge noted that the District Command needed to designate and separate out a Chief of Supply and necessary service chiefs for General Fleischer. He went on to solicit Fleischer’s suggestions with respect to the administrative details involving the District Command since some issues were not yet decided. He also explained why he proposed to place the Norwegian troops in Nordland directly under FOK.
In removing Roscher Nielsen’s forces from your command, it is because I believe that sooner or later it will be necessary to have a combined commander for the troops in the Salten-Bodø area. Since the Allies have the preponderance of forces there and since we are dependent on the British Navy, it should be the British commander who takes over.
Ruge’s decision elicited an immediate response from General Fleischer on May 27. He accepted only that FOK should assume the commander-in-chief duties and that the Naval High Command came under FOK. The other points were unacceptable:
… The division requests in the most urgent manner that the dissolution of the well-established command relationships not take place.
FOK also proposes to separate out the forces in Sør Hålogaland [Nordland Province] in order to place them under the English commander. This will place Norwegian troops in a subordinate relationship to Allied troops, which is not reciprocated by any Allied forces under a Norwegian commander in other places. It will place a stamp of inferiority on the North Norwegian units which is completely unjustified and which Norwegian commanders should be the last to facilitate …
Ruge answered in a personal letter to Fleischer where he pointed out that the latter’s agreement with the main point of the proposal carried with it some inescapable conclusions:25 “Thereby, the rest follow naturally since the various sectors and the District Command have been, and should be in the future, under the direct authority of the commander-in-chief (hereafter FOK).” Ruge agreed to allow the division’s current relationship with the District Command to remain essentially unchanged to ease the transition to the new command relationship. He also agreed to leave Roscher-Nielsen and his forces in Nordland under Fleischer for the time being. He rejected Fleischer’s proposal for a conference between FOK, the defense ministry, and the 6th Division, since matters concerning organization and dispositions of military forces fell within his authority and responsibility. The new command relationships were made effective in a FOK order on May 29.
Fleischer felt that Ruge handled the division’s views in an unsatisfactory manner and he did not let the matter rest after the issuance of the order. In a letter as late as June 6, the 6th Division stated that, in view of developments, the FOK order of May 29 should be cancelled. For his part, Ruge wrote that this struggle over prerogatives was the only one he had experienced during the war and that it made his job more difficult than it should have been. Writing as a prisoner of war in the fall of 1940, Ruge regretted that he had not involved himself earlier and more forcefully. However, he recognized that General Fleischer probably felt he had involved himself too much into his affairs.26
The changed command relationships became effective so late that they had little, if any, effects on the operations. However, the continuous wrangling tells us much about the personalities involved. The spiteful atmosphere made a situation that called for the highest degree of professional behavior more difficult.
TIME RUNS OUT
“It is, for the sake of the country, absolutely necessary that the brigades make a renewed effort to bring the Narvik Campaign to a conclusion.”
GENERAL FLEISCHER’S MAY 30 DIRECTIVE TO HIS TROOPS.
Plans to Recapture Narvik
The recapture of Narvik and the offensive on the northern front were the two main topics dealt with at the conference between Generals Fleischer and Béthouart on May 14. The Norwegians were satisfied with the choice of the French general as the Allied ground commander in the Narvik area. They demonstrated their confidence in him by placing one infantry battalion and a motorized artillery battery under his command for the operation against Narvik. It was the first and only time during the Narvik campaign that this was done.
The 2/15th Inf and the 9th Motorized Artillery Battery moved from the Kvernmoen area to the vicinity of Skoglund, north of Bjerkvik, in the evening of May 21. The two battalions of the Foreign Legion moved off the high ground east of Herjangsfjord with the 1st Bn remaining on the east side of that fjord while the 2nd Bn moved to Øyjord. This battalion left some security detachments in the mountains as it withdrew. These detachments withdrew after the Norwegians pushed forward to the area around Cirkelvann.
The 14th Bn, CA landed at Liljedal on May 19 and moved northeast to establish a bridgehead from Hill 332 to Hergot. The 12th Bn, CA was located at Lenvik on the north side of Ofotfjord as Béthouart’s reserve. The 6th Bn, CA was pulled out of the front on May 14 and moved to Gratangen to rest and recover from a very high percentage of frostbite cases. From Gratangen it moved to Sjøvegan to reorganize. The Polish troops were positioned as described in the previous chapter.
The attack on Narvik was to take place simultaneously with other attacks designed to tie down German forces in order to keep reinforcements from reaching Narvik and to cut the enemy’s line of retreat. Three Polish battalions were to attack the German positions on the Ankenes Peninsula. Norwegian troops were to keep up their pressure on the northern front. The Allies also planned to make a wide envelopment from the south against Bjørnefjell, a move that Dietl anticipated.
Lieutenant Colonel Magrin-Vernerey, the commander of the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion commanded the Narvik landing forces. These consisted of the two battalions of Legionnaires, a Norwegian battalion (2/15th Inf), an artillery group consisting of one Norwegian and two French batteries, and two tanks.
Magrin-Vernerey’s mission was to land at Ornes, establish a bridgehead as far inland as Hill 457, and seize the city of Narvik. He intended to carry out these tasks by landing 1st Bn of the Legion just east of Ornes. This battalion was to establish security towards the east by advancing along the railroad. The 2nd Bn of the Legion and 2/15th Inf were to embark at Seines and land in the same place as the 1st Bn, but the two tanks were to be landed at Taraldsvik when that place was secured. The second French battalion, with the two tanks, was to advance towards Narvik via the Framnes Peninsula. The Norwegian battalion would pass through units of the 1st Bn of the Legion and seize Taraldsvikfjell (Hill 457). The three artillery batteries would support the attack from positions at Øyjord. British warships would provide additional fire support and British aircraft were expected to keep the Luftwaffe at a distance.
There were insufficient landing craft to move the three battalions in one lift and the units were therefore divided into assault and follow-up elements. There were only three assault and two mechanized landing craft available for the operation. This limited the number of troops in each wave to 290. Some troops were transported in Norwegian fishing vessels. To insure surprise, the assault elements of the battalions were embarked at Seines, shielded from German observation by the Øyjord Peninsula. Plans were to move follow-up elements from the ferry landing at Øyjord and have them ashore about 45 minutes after the first echelon had landed.
The 1st Bn of Legionnaires was to make the initial landing with assault groups Gilbert and de Guittaut, each consisting of two rifle platoons with machineguns, in the first echelon. Group Gilbert’s primary mission was to secure a small bridgehead before the arrival of the second echelon. Group de Guittaut was to seize the railroad tunnel above and to the right of the landing area. Group Bouchet, c
onsisting of four rifle platoons, machineguns, and some regimental elements, formed second echelon. After its arrival, Group de Guittaut had orders to expand the bridgehead eastward. Later, after the Norwegian battalion had landed and moved forward past its right flank, Group de Guittaut would resume its advance towards Hill 457 (Taraldsvikfjell), the dominant terrain east of Narvik. Group Bouchet was supposed to move forward between Group Guittaut and the Norwegians. This was how the French understood the plan.
The Norwegians had a different understanding. They expected to pass through the French battalion only after that unit had seized the northern slope of Hill 457. This misunderstanding was only one of the problems facing the assault forces.
The German Defenses
The German defenders in the Narvik sector numbered about 1,100 troops but only 550 of these were mountain infantry. Major Haussels, the sector commander, faced serious problems in mounting an effective defense. He had to defend the long coastline from Straumsnes in the east, around the Framnes Peninsula, and the harbor area. Three reinforced mountain infantry companies under his command were tied down on the Ankenes Peninsula, facing the Poles. The Germans did not know where the attack would take place and had to prepare for all eventualities. This made for a thinly manned strong-point defense line and very limited reserves. Major Haussels had to assume that it would be exceedingly difficult to move his reserve or shift his forces once the attack was underway because of expected heavy naval and artillery fire.
The German right flank was held by Naval Co von Freytag, which tied into Naval Regiment Berger on its right. A naval artillery unit under Lieutenant Nöller was located in the Ornes area. Co 6, 2/139th and the battalion engineer platoon were located on the Framnes Peninsula. Company 6 had earlier occupied Ankenes village but Co 8 replaced it there on May 24. Two naval infantry companies, Co Möllmann and Co von Gaartzen, were responsible for the defense of the harbor area. A railway company of about 40 men constituted the sector reserve.
Company 7 (reinforced) held the southern front on Ankenes Peninsula while Co 8 (reinforced) held the pocket around the village of Ankenes. In addition to the approximately 900 troops mentioned by most writers, Cos 1 and 2 of the 137th Mountain Regiment were moved into the Narvik sector shortly after they parachuted into the Bjørnefjell area on May 23, 24, and 25. These reinforcements increased the strength of Major Haussels command to approximately 1,100 troops.
Company 1, with a strength of 108, was placed in reserve while Co 2, with a strength of 109, was moved across the Narvik harbor to reinforce Co 8. Haussels had ordered this move despite the reluctance expressed by General Dietl at a meeting between the two on May 27. The 3rd Division journal notes on May 28 that the movement of that company to Ankenes did not have the desired results and it could have been used to better effect as a reserve in Narvik.1
The battalion’s heavy machinegun platoon had four guns located where they could fire on the harbor area and two at the bottom of the Fagernes Mountains from where they could support the German forces in Ankenes. There were only two 75mm mountain howitzers in the Narvik sector, located about 700 meters northeast of the railroad station. The two 105mm railway guns were not very effective since their positioning was restricted by their dependence on the rail network. There were seven 20mm and one 37mm antiaircraft guns that could be used against enemy attempts to land in the harbor as well as at Vassvik and Taraldsvik.
The Recapture of Narvik
The Germans expected an attack on Narvik at any time, but there was not much they could do about it while they did not know the exact landing sites. A German agent in Stockholm–Marina–had overheard a conversation between the Norwegian Ambassador and the embassy. Based on this conversation, she reported that coordinated attacks against Hundal from the north and across the Rombak against the railroad should be expected within the next six days.2 This information was forwarded immediately to Major Haussels, although it turned out to be inaccurate.
The first useful information received by the Germans came around 2300 hours on May 27 when British warships entered Ofotfjord. This was the British naval fire support group consisting of the cruiser Southampton, the antiaircraft cruisers Cairo and Coventry, and five destroyers. Four destroyers entered Rombakfjord while the two antiaircraft cruisers and one destroyer remained in the eastern part of Ofotfjord. Southampton, with its 6-inch guns, remained further west in that fjord. General Béthouart was aboard Cairo and a flare from that ship at 2340 hours signaled the start of the attack.
The weather had been sunny and beautiful and the midnight sun provided excellent visibility at the time of the attack. A thunderous fire from the warships and artillery batteries now broke the stillness of the night. In order not to give away the intended landing sites, the fire from the warships was directed at a wide spread of targets along the whole coastline. Communications between the German units were lost within ten minutes of the start of the bombardment. The fire from the French and Norwegian batteries located at Øyjord, on the other hand, was concentrated on and around the landing area. Buchner describes the inferno:
Without interruption, hundreds of projectiles exploded along the railway, detonated with a thunderous roar at the tunnel entrances, rained down with a shrill whine on the cliffs on Framnes, detonated between the homes in Vassvik, and broke loose large rocks that plunged down the slopes of Fagernesfjell with earth-shaking reverberations. Also over in Ankenes and Nyborg, the roar of descending fire was like the eruption of a volcano on Ankenesfjell above. In the town, in the harbor, at Fagernes, and on the coastline of Ankenes, wooden buildings burned like torches. With infernal detonations and thunder, the shells from the ships burst in stone and steel and sent a rain of thousands of iron and rock splinters in all directions … Gradually, it was possible to discern the centers of gravity of the enemy fire. It involved the outcropping of land at Ornes with its hilltops, the railroad by Tunnel 1, Hill 79 near Taraldsvik, and even Fagernes, the southern end of the harbor, and Ankenes. A thick cloud of powder smoke and dust from stone particles, continually pierced by the bright flashes of new explosions, hung over the whole coastline from Ornes to Taraldsvik.3
The landing craft carrying the first wave of the Foreign Legion came within sight of their target area as they rounded the Øyjord Peninsula at 2355 hours. Most of the supporting fire was now directed at the area around the landing zone. The concentrated fire hit the weakest link in the German defenses, the 50-man naval artillery unit under Lieutenant Nöller. The defenders were forced to take cover and the first wave of Legionnaires landed at Ornes around 0030 hours without meeting any resistance. Group de Guittaut crossed the 70-meter wide roof of Tunnel 1 and began the climb to the top of the 1,400-foot mountain.
Lt. Nöller was seriously wounded and his men sought refuge in Tunnel 1 where they refused demands to surrender. De Guittaut left a small force to watch the tunnel while the rest of the group continued its advance. Nöller’s men capitulated later in the day after the French positioned a field gun where it could fire directly into the tunnel. Group Gilbert secured the small knoll near the railroad line by surprising its defenders (part of Nöller’s force) and the French battalion commander established his CP on the northern slope of this knoll.
The landing craft had meanwhile re-crossed the fjord to pick up the second echelon of Legionnaires at Øyjord. However, German artillery fire caused a number of casualties among the French troops and necessitated shifting the embarkation to both sides of Øyjord. This delayed the flow of reinforcements for the two groups already ashore. The Norwegian battalion was not landed until 0230 hours, about one hour behind schedule. Group Bourchet, with three rifle platoons and two tanks, which were to lead the advance into Narvik, were not embarked until 0300 hours and landed in Taraldsvik at 0345.
The delay in the buildup of forces could have jeopardized the amphibious operation but the Germans were unable to take advantage of the situation. Artillery and naval gunfire kept them under cover and many sought shelter in the railroad tun
nels. Furthermore, the shelling cut communications between the various units and Haussels CP near the railroad station.
The Norwegian battalion landed without losses. Three observers accompanied the battalion commander and his staff: Fleischer, his chief of staff, and his adjutant. This was a risky act on the part of Fleischer, but it undoubtedly lifted the morale of the troops in Major Hyldmo’s battalion to see the general accompanying them into battle.
The Norwegians crossed the tunnel roof as had the French before them and began the climb, which was very steep for the first 1,200 feet. The area was narrow, with the drop-off into the Taraldsvik River valley on the right and a ravine on the left. The companies had to make the ascent one by one. Company 5 led the advance and it was to swing to the right after reaching the flatter terrain north of Hill 457 in order to give room for following units. Company 7, with a machinegun platoon attached, constituted the left wing of the battalion after reaching the more open terrain. The heavy weapons company (Co 8), the mortar platoon and Co 6, the battalion reserve, followed these two companies.
The Germans were still unable to communicate but Lieutenant Erich Schweiger, commander of Co 1, 137th Mountain Regiment, decided on his own initiative to counterattack. He gathered his unit from the shelter in a tunnel in the Djupvik area. Reinforced by a few engineers, some naval personnel, and a small number of mountain artillery troops, he moved to and occupied positions north of Hill 457. They soon found themselves in contact with Norwegians troops moving up the hillside.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 64
