Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  The difference in French and Norwegian interpretations of the operational plan now led to difficulties. While the French understood the plan to be that Group de Guittaut should only advance against Hill 457 and secure the northern slope after the Norwegians had passed them on their right, the Norwegians understood the plan to be that they were to pass through the French forces after these had secured the northern slope of Taraldsvikfjell.4 The different interpretations of the operational plan may well have been caused by language difficulties.

  The Norwegians found that the French bridgehead did not extend as far forward on the hillside above the rail line as they were led to expect in the pre-operational briefings. The Norwegians encountered heavy enemy fire, first from the flank and then from the front, as they approached the area where the two companies could spread out and where they expected to pass through the French forces.

  The German troops appearing in front of the Norwegians did so as one Norwegian platoon was in the process of enveloping some Germans who were giving them problems from the flank. The Norwegians were slow in firing on the troops to their front because they believed them to be part of Group de Guittaut. The Germans opened heavy fire on the Norwegians. Several soldiers were killed or wounded in the exchange and around 0400 hours, the company commander decided to reposition his troops for better cover. In doing so, there was a temporary loss of contact with the enemy.

  The weather in an area at some distance from Narvik turned the situation temporarily in the Germans’ favor. A heavy fog descended on Bardufoss Airfield and the Hurricanes that had provided air cover were barely able to land before the airfield was closed. The Luftwaffe appeared in the clear skies above Narvik shortly after the British aircraft were grounded.

  The German bombers began an intense attack of the British warships. The ships were forced to cease their supporting fire and concentrate on avoiding the bombs that rained down from the sky. The antiaircraft cruiser Cairo, with Admiral Cork and General Béthouart aboard, was struck by two bombs. One landed between the smokestacks while the other hit the forward deck. The last bomb killed or wounded 30 sailors at the forward turrets. The five destroyers operating in Rombakfjord were forced to withdraw west to Ofotfjord where they could maneuver under high speed.

  Cork had earlier requested that Béthouart inform him when his troops were securely ashore to allow him to minimize the number of warships in the constricted waters. Béthouart now informed Cork that he only needed the support of two destroyers and the admiral ordered most of his ships to retire at 0630 hours, leaving the antiaircraft cruiser Coventry and two destroyers to support the troops. Cork‘s desire to withdraw most of his ships is understandable, particularly in view of the loss of the cruiser Curlew the previous day. Béthouart moved his flag to one of the destroyers and shortly thereafter, he went ashore at his forward CP in Øyjord. The British ships avoided further losses but one Norwegian fishing vessel, loaded with ammunition, was sunk.

  The German air attacks had two important results. First, the movement of the 2nd Bn of the Foreign Legion was delayed and was not completed until 1100 hours. Second, the reduction in fire support for the troops that had landed enabled the Germans to launch a counterattack against the French and Norwegians and thereby win valuable time for their comrades to begin evacuating Narvik before their route of retreat was cut.

  Group de Guittart was located to the left and slightly to the rear of the Norwegians on the slopes leading to Hill 457 and the troops had become intermingled on a narrow front that prevented proper deployment. Schweiger’s vigorous counterattack came as a surprise to both the French and Norwegians who had a distinct numerical superiority over the attackers.

  The attack struck the weakest point in the line, the Norwegian left flank and the French right flank. Captain de Guittaut fell, along with a number of his men in the close-quarter fighting and a near panic situation developed. Some French troops began withdrawing and pulled along parts of Co 7, 2/15th Inf.

  Strong leaders among the French and Norwegians prevented a debacle. Captain Hans Hanekamhaug, commander of Co 7, drew his pistol and threatened to shoot any of his troops who withdrew. The commander of the heavy weapons company grabbed an abandoned machinegun and personally operated it effectively against the advancing Germans. Major Hyldmo exhorted his troops forward by calling out that the fate of the nation was at stake. These examples of leadership in the heat of battle lifted the fighting spirit of the men and enabled them to halt the German advance. Lieutenant Schweiger was shot through the throat and killed. Most of the German officers were killed or severely wounded and this undoubtedly had a negative effect on German morale.

  While the attacking Germans were able to place effective machinegun fire on the landing area, statements that the French and Norwegian troops were driven “back down the hill and on to the beaches” are not correct. However, the landing site was moved further west after Major Paris, General Béthouart’s chief of staff, was killed in a landing craft.5

  Lieutenant Schweiger’s counterattack points out the value of strong reserves with aggressive leaders when defending a long line against an enemy that can strike at any point along that line. If Major Haussels had followed General Dietl’s wishes and left Co 2, 137th in reserve alongside Lieutenant Schweiger’s unit, it is quite possible that they could have overwhelmed the Norwegians and French and driven them back to the landing area. This might have encouraged the German naval units in the area to become more aggressive and could have spelled the end of the amphibious operation.

  The situation ashore was still critical and it was worsened by friction between the French and Norwegians. Some French accounts place the blame for the setback caused by the German counterattack on the Norwegians.6 Magrin-Vernerey complained to Fleischer that the 2/15th Inf would not advance and this placed his own troops in danger. He demanded that the general intervene to insure that his orders were followed. Fleischer wisely refused to intervene, pointing out that he had placed the battalion under French command and it was the colonel’s job to lead the attack. He would not complicate the situation by intervening but agreed to have a Norwegian officer bring the colonel’s orders to Major Hyldmo. He also pointed out to Margin-Vernerey that the Norwegians had again reached the plateau and were ahead of, not behind, their French allies.7

  Major Hyldmo committed his reserve, Co 6, and a bitter close-quarter fight ensued on the edge of the plateau. The Germans were finally driven back after Norwegian forces managed to work themselves into a position on the German left flank. The last German assault was carried out by naval personnel who tried to overwhelm the Norwegians making their way towards the flat ground on the north side of Hill 457. The attack failed and it resulted in a dozen Germans killed. The Norwegian losses in the fighting for Taraldsvikfjell were relatively heavy with 18 killed, including those who died while being evacuated, and 36 wounded. Two additional soldiers were later killed and two seriously wounded in a German air attack.

  Two other events contributed to the change in Allied fortunes. Lieutenant Commander S. H. Balfour, who accompanied the French as naval gunfire liaison officer, lost his signal lamps during the retreat following the German counterattack. He went back to the landing site, found a boat that brought him to the Coventry, where he explained the situation to Rear Admiral Vivian before heading back to the shore with new signal lamps. Vivian ordered the destroyer Beagle back into Rombakfjord and its 4.7-inch guns helped stabilize the situation. The second event was the departure of the German bombers because of fuel shortage, followed by the reappearance of British Hurricane fighters after the fog at Bardufoss lifted.

  The 2nd Bn of the Legion was ashore by 1100 hours and started its planned advance towards the Framnes Peninsula and Narvik. The two tanks that were to lead the advance became bogged down in the soft ground near the landing site and they did not participate in the fighting. There was some sharp fighting with Co 6, 2/139th located on Framnes and with Haussels’ reserve, which was now committed. This mixed grou
p of engineers, railroad personnel, and naval infantry was unable to prevent the French from seizing Hill 79, a dominating piece of terrain southwest of Taraldsvik. The French also secured Hill 102 at the western tip of the Framnes Peninsula. Part of this success was due to a much earlier decision by Haussels to evacuate Narvik and withdraw his forces towards the village of Beisfjord.

  The fighting in the mountains continued throughout the day as the Germans withdrew slowly eastward. In the process, Hill 457 was secured. Small groups of isolated Germans surrendered. It was evident to those in the mountains that the Germans were evacuating Narvik in the direction of Beisfjord. Hyldmo was ordered to move the bulk of his battalion into town, to the left of the 2nd Bn of the Legion, and to clear the city north of the railroad. Company 7, reinforced with a machinegun platoon and a section of mortars, was left to secure Taraldsvikfjell.

  General Fleischer, still in the bridgehead, was concerned that French troops would enter Narvik and that there would be no Norwegian Army representation. He decided to send three officers with the French units but these halted on Hill 79 at 1200 hours. From there, the French and Norwegians had an excellent view of the city and it was obvious that the Germans had left or were in the process of leaving. The division commander returned to Bjerkvik and ordered a group of military police into Narvik.

  The 2/15th Inf entered and occupied Narvik without resistance at 1830 hours, before the arrival of the military police. In a show of gallantry, the French let the Norwegians have the honor of occupying the town and Magrin-Vernerey informed the Norwegians that as long as he was in the city, “I am under your orders.” The many soldiers from Narvik in the Norwegian battalion were greeted as heroes as they entered the city.

  Major Haussels had a difficult time exerting operational control of his forces in and around Narvik. The naval and artillery bombardment destroyed all landline communications and he was forced to rely on runners for communicating with his units. The communications difficulties increased as units became involved in combat and small units operated independently. The failure of Lieutenant Schweiger’s counterattack to drive the French and Norwegians back to the beach and the flow of fresh forces in the beachhead convinced Haussels that he could not hold Narvik. His forces were in danger of having their line of retreat cut by the Poles advancing south on the Ankenes Peninsula or the Norwegians in the mountains east of Narvik. He ordered the city evacuated at 0650 hours.

  Schweiger’s counterattack, while failing to achieve its primary goal, provided enough delay to enable Haussels to get most of his troops out of Narvik. The withdrawal order specified that all equipment, heavy weapons, and excess ammunition were to be destroyed and Fagernes was designated as the assembly area. Only personal and crew-served weapons along with plenty of ammunition were to be carried by the retiring troops. The Germans tried to bring along the 20mm antiaircraft guns but it proved impossible because of French fire and they were made inoperable and abandoned.

  However, not all units received the withdrawal order or were in position to extricate. Two groups from Co von Gaartzen did not receive the order and went missing. Company Möllmann was later able to disengage and withdraw on its own. A heavy cloud of smoke from the many burning buildings in Narvik hung over the area and aided the disengagement and withdrawal.

  The Germans occupied several delaying positions between Narvik and the village of Beisfjord. The first position was on Fagernes and occupied by a platoon from Co 6 and a machinegun section from Co 10. Their fire prevented a quick follow-up by the French along the harbor road. Company 8, at Ankenes, also provided cover for the withdrawal. The withdrawing units assembled at Fagernes, reorganized, and moved to the village of Beisfjord in trucks.

  These troops occupied a security line in the Lakselv Valley behind the heavily engaged Co 7 at the southern end of the Ankenes Peninsula. Naval infantry detachment Dehnert was left at Fagernes to cover the withdrawal across Beisfjord of the rear guard on the Ankenes Peninsula. The mission of securing the road from Fagernes to the village of Beisfjord was given to parts of Co von Gaartzen, which occupied a position about three kilometers southeast of Fagernes with orders to hold until 2000 hours. A last delaying position, about 1,500 meters north of Beisfjord village, was occupied by half of Co 6 with orders to hold until the Ankenes rear guard, naval infantry detachment Dehnert, and Co von Gaartzen withdrew through its positions. The mountain flank on the German right was covered by machineguns from Co 10.

  Major Haussels’ CP remained at Fagernes until after 1100 hours, by which time the rear guard from Ankenes had arrived. Parts of the two companies at Ankenes appear to have withdrawn along the south side of Beisfjord. Haussels established his new CP in the village of Beisfjord at 1200 hours.

  During the afternoon, the 1st Bn of the Legion pushed east along the railroad towards Sildvik while the 2nd Bn sent a motorcycle platoon along the road to Beisfjord village where contact was made with Polish troops. Haussels had meanwhile withdrawn his troops to a line running generally from Beisfjordstøtta (Hill 1448) in the north to Durmalsfjell (Hill 844) in the east.

  Narvik holds the distinction of being the first city recaptured from the Germans in World War 2. General Béthouart made the official report of this accomplishment at 2200 hours on May 28. The victory announcement transmitted to the world must have seemed ironic to the privileged few who knew about the evacuation decision taken in London and Paris four days earlier. It is difficult to establish accurate casualty figures, except for those already noted in the 2/15th Inf. Most Norwegian and Allied sources apparently base their figures on those contained in General Béthouart’s official announcement on May 28 and place the French and Norwegian casualties at about 150 while they claim that 300 to 400 prisoners were taken.

  Whatever the exact numbers, Churchill’s statement that the operation was “effected with practically no loss” must have seemed dismissive to the French, Polish, and Norwegian troops who participated in the operation. Buchner takes exception to the number of prisoners claimed by the Allies, stating that it is much too high. His detailed account of losses in Narvik includes 41 killed, 69 wounded, and 176 missing. Since only a small number of the missing rejoined their units, and were not captured, he concludes that many of those missing were killed.

  The Polish Offensive

  The flare from the cruiser HMS Cairo at 2340 hours was also a signal for Polish General Bohusz-Szyszkos’ troops to go into action on the Ankenes Peninsula. Their mission was simply to clear the Germans from this peninsula at the same time as the French and Norwegians attacked Narvik, then advance against the village of Beisfjord, and cut the German line of retreat.

  While the main mission of the Polish troops was against Beisfjord, the original plan called for Polish units to make a wide encirclement through Skjomdal, Nordal, and Hundal, which would bring them into the rear of Dietl’s forces at Bjørnefjell. A company from the 3rd Polish Bn made a reconnaissance in preparation for this part of the operation. The evacuation plan caused this planned envelopment to be cancelled.

  There was some repositioning of the Polish forces before the attack because it became evident that the Germans had increased their forces on the peninsula. This involved the strengthening of Co 8 at Ankenes to where it numbered nearly 180 men and the movement of Co 2, 137th Mountain Inf into the pocket on May 27. The 2nd Polish Bn’s mission was to eliminate the German pocket at Ankenes. The 1st Polish Bn and one company of the 4th Bn (Co 1) were given the mission of attacking Beisfjord. Company 1’s task was to envelop the German positions on Hills 650 and 773 from the south at the same time as the 1st Bn attacked frontally. Parts of the 4th Bn manned positions on Hills 677 and 734 and served as a link between the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The rest of the 4th Bn was located in reserve near Klubban.

  The attack against Ankenes started at midnight, when Co 3 on the 2nd Battalion’s left wing attacked along the road towards Ankenes, supported by naval artillery, the British artillery battery, and two tanks. The center company in the Polis
h line, Co 1, began its attack towards Lyngenes and Haugen from positions southeast of Hill 295 20 minutes later. Company 2, on the battalion’s right wing did not begin its attack in the direction of Nyborg until 0200 hours.

  The Polish attack started out well and Co 3 reached the outskirts of Ankenes village around 0200 hours when one of the tanks hit a mine and ended up blocking the road for the second tank. At the same time, the company came under intense crossfire, suffered heavy casualties, and was forced to withdraw towards Emmenes.

  Biegański’s account is somewhat different. He writes that one of the two tanks never left the assembly area because of mechanical difficulties and the other tank became entangled in a barricade on the western outskirts of Ankenes. The 2nd Bn Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dec, who witnessed Co 3’s fight through binoculars, wrote later, “I found with horror that the 3rd company was bouncing back in disarray. Some groups were moving towards Baathberget by road, others were sneaking amidst the shrubbery. Some of the men had no helmets and no arms. Others were dragging the wounded.”8

  Company 1’s attack at 0020 hours drove the Germans back, but a space developed between Cos 1 and 3. Lieutenant Hermann Rieger, commanding Co 2, 137th, quickly took advantage of this opportunity. With 15 men, he launched a determined attack between the two Polish companies and captured Hill 295 at 0430 hours with his force, now down to eight men.

  Lieutenant Colonel Dec personally directed the defense of this key terrain. He had no reserves and the defenders were members of the battalion staff, orderlies, telephone operators and others that he was able to scrape together. Most Poles on the hill were killed. Only the battalion commander and eight men survived. This was a serious setback for the Poles. Hill 295 was not only a dominant piece of terrain from which Lieutenant Rieger could bring flanking fire to bear on Co 1, halting its attack, but the hill was also the observation post for the Polish battalion commander, the brigade commander, and the artillery.