Admiral Cork sent a message to London on May 31, stressing the necessity to inform the Norwegians about the evacuation and received the necessary authority to do so that same day.
It fell to Ambassador Dormer to fly to Tromsø to carry out this distasteful task. Dormer gave the bad news to the Norwegians on June 1. Auchinleck’s biographer writes, “…when the truth was told them, the Norwegians reacted with generosity and courage. It is arguable that, even at some risk of security, it would have been wiser, as well as more friendly, to have taken them into confidence earlier.” Admiral Cork wrote that the Norwegians “… after a very natural display of great disappointment continued to co-operate loyally to the end, although they might, with some justification, have decided to lay down their arms at once and so gravely prejudice our withdrawal.”7
The Mowinkel Plan
The message to Admiral Cork from the Foreign Office on May 31 also gave the green light for the Norwegians to explore the so-called Mowinkel Plan. This plan had surfaced earlier but rejected by both the British and Norwegians. The plan originated with the Swedes and it was designed to keep the war in Scandinavia from dragging out with the distinct possibility that Sweden might become involved. At the same time, the plan also protected Swedish commercial interests. It called for the neutralization of North Norway, with both the Germans and Allies withdrawing. Swedish troops would occupy Narvik and the Norwegian King and Government would continue to function in the pacified area. If the belligerents accepted the plan, it would reduce the chance of Sweden becoming involved in a protracted conflict and would protect their export of iron ore to both sides. According to Sandvik, the first approach to the Germans came in early May in conversations that a private Swede Dahlerus had with Göring.
Dahlerus reported his conversations with Göring to the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Lars Mowinkel. Nothing developed until a conversation between Mowinkel and the Swedish Foreign Minister, Christian Günther, on May 13, followed by a visit by the Permanent Undersecretary of the Norwegian Foreign Office to the Swedish Foreign Office on May 14. Günther assured the Norwegians that it was not a question of peace negotiations but hinted at the possibility of a demarcation line in North Norway. He stressed that the suggestion had to come from the Norwegians, with British agreement. Sweden would then present the proposal to Germany. Günther stated that the Germans might be more likely to look favorably on the plan if it called for the Swedish occupation of Narvik.
The reactions by Norwegian officials were mixed. Some were opposed to Swedish military occupation while others opposed the whole scheme. The Norwegian Ambassador in Stockholm had asked the Norwegian Ambassador to Great Britain, Colban, for his opinion and Hambro discussed the plan with the British Ambassador in Stockholm in the evening of May 14. The Norwegian Government also discussed the plan, but in the end, the idea was rejected.
There were two reasons for this rejection. First, the Norwegians did not want to take any action that could be interpreted as disloyalty to their brothers-in-arms. Second, they viewed a demarcation line as a risky proposition, since the forces at their disposal after an Allied withdrawal would be unable to cope with a German breach of the agreement. The British reaction was also negative. While the British Foreign Office expressed interest in the idea, others felt that the operations in North Norway could be brought to a successful conclusion and suspected that the plan had originated in Berlin.
Churchill was adamant in his opposition to the Mowinkel Plan on May 19 but had changed his opinion by the end of the month. In the May 31 message to Cork, it was clear that the Mowinkel Plan had full British backing. The message pointed out that the time for negotiations was short, and that the Germans would be sure to reject the plan if they had any inclination that an evacuation was contemplated.
The Norwegian Government decided to make the attempt. Foreign Minister Koht flew to Luleå on June 3 and met with his Swedish counterpart. Koth, who had delivered the rejection of the plan a week before, told Günther why his government had changed its position. A proposed agreement was drafted by Koth and approved by Günther. The Swedes were asked to position troops on both sides of the demarcation line as well as in Narvik. Günther stated that he would submit the proposed agreement to his government and hoped to have it on its way to Berlin that evening.
Koth ran into a hornets’ nest when he returned to Tromsø and informed the government of his actions. Most were upset that Koth had found it necessary to tell his Swedish counterpart about the evacuation. Everyone believed that the negotiations would fail and many concluded that this was the best outcome. A formal Norwegian investigation after the war found that Koht acted correctly when he gave his counterpart in Sweden the true reasons for the changed Norwegian position on the Mowinkel Plan.
In their discussion about Koht’s revelation to the Swedes, Berg and Vollan refer to a note made in Lieutenant Rohr’s journal on June 3 about a rumor, brought from the division by a parachute lieutenant. The rumor was a demand by General Dietl that his troops hold out for at least five more days. All were waiting in anticipation for this ‘Miracle of Narvik.’ Berg and Vollan suggest that this indicated that Dietl knew about the evacuation.
This is not so. First, Dietl was completely unaware of the evacuation and did not believe it even when it was discovered that French and Polish troops had abandoned their positions east of Narvik. Second, Koht met with Günther on June 3 and the proposal was not presented in Berlin until June 4. The rumor referred to in Rohr’s journal probably had a basis in the anticipated arrival of the 1,800 paratroopers and 1,000 mountain troops Hitler had ordered be parachuted into the Narvik area.
The Swedes did not tell the Germans about the evacuation. It was not in their interest to do so since the acceptance of the plan would be of considerable advantage to Sweden. The German successes on the western front and in Norway since the idea first surfaced made the Swedish proposal, presented in Berlin on June 4, of little interest and the Swedes received no immediate answer. The German Foreign Ministry believed correctly that the reason for the current interest in such a plan was connected to an impending Allied withdrawal. The OKW did not draw the same conclusion because it was inconceivable to them that the Allies would abandon the venture now that it was so close to a complete success. OKW therefore continued to finalize the plans for Operation Naumburg, to be executed during the last week of June.8
Norwegian Government Opts for Exile
On June 1, the Norwegian Government faced decisions of enormous consequence for the future of Norway. There were three choices: 1) Stay in the country and continue to resist; 2) Stay in the country and seek an immediate armistice or peace with the Germans; or 3) Go into exile and continue the war.
Ruge, when he received the news of the evacuation from the British liaison officer, was eager to have the evacuation delayed long enough to permit the final attack on the Germans. He maintained that Dietl could be brought to terms within a few days if all the Allied troops were used in the attack. The Norwegian troops could only carry on the war alone if Dietl was first driven across the Swedish border or surrendered. Even under these circumstances, the Norwegians would need Allied air support and supplies.
Cork and Auchinleck responded to Ruge on June 3. They pointed out that all arrangements for the evacuation were made and that a postponement was out of the question. They also stated that the Norwegians should not count on air support or supplies after the Allied withdrawal in view of the situation in France.9 Generals Ruge and Fleischer were summoned to a meeting with the king and government in Tromsø on June 3. In Ruge’s view, the war should be continued unless there was no hope of further Allied support. In that case, the king and government should go into exile. The two generals found that the government had already made decisions in line with Ruge’s thinking. Ruge recommended in the strongest terms that the attack against Bjørnefjell be allowed to continue.
There was also a discussion about what forces should be brought to England and it was decided
to take all capable naval vessels, aircraft, and volunteers. Crown Prince Olav suggested that he remain in the country and try to do what he could for the people and the nation, but his proposal was rejected by the government.
There was also the question of who should be the commander of the Norwegian forces overseas. The government wanted Ruge to fill this position but he was opposed. He pointed out that he had already been required—in South Norway—to leave his defeated troops. He would not do so again. He recommended that Fleischer accompany the government into exile. The government was not convinced and voted unanimously on June 4 to ask him to assume command of Norwegian troops outside Norway. Ruge considered the government action an order but still voiced his disagreement. Everyone appears to have viewed the matter as settled, but at the last moment it was changed.
The Norwegian General Staff intervened and implored Ruge to remain behind since they believed that to do otherwise in this crisis would have a severe negative effect on the morale of the army and the people. Ruge told his officers that he had debated the issue as far as possible with the government but that he had no problems with others trying to bring the government to a different decision. A delegation met with the President of the Parliament and various members of the government and the result was that the cabinet decided on June 7 to transfer all authority in North Norway to General Ruge when the government departed. The same decision ordered General Fleischer to accompany the government to England.
Hovland’s biography of Fleischer is very critical of the decision to leave Ruge behind to handle the demobilization and surrender in North Norway. He claims that Ruge wished to remain at home in Norway and that he used his influence with politicians to achieve this goal and that it would have been logical for Ruge to accompany the government while leaving the affairs in North Norway in Fleischer’s hands. Hovland asserts that Ruge’s campaign to be allowed to remain in Norway focused on weakening the government’s faith in Fleischer.
It is difficult to find a personal benefit for Ruge in remaining behind and spending five years in German prisoner of war camps. There is no evidence that he tried to use this fact to his advantage after the war. It is true that some members of the government had less faith in Fleischer’s than in Ruge’s abilities to handle the political–military situation in North Norway after the departure of the government. This lack of faith may have more to do with a protest letter from Fleischer to the government about their decision to leave the country than it had with any attempt by Ruge to discredit his fellow officer.
When Fleischer returned to his headquarters in Soløy after meeting with the government on June 3, he discussed the situation with his chief of staff. A letter to the government was prepared for the general’s signature. Lindbäck-Larsen does not state in his report or book who wrote the letter. Hovland writes that Lindbäck-Larsen “returned to Fleischer in the afternoon of June 4 and stated that he found it unacceptable to surrender the whole country to German troops after the division had covered the withdrawal of the Allies unless all other possibilities had been tried.”10 Hovland writes that Lindbäck-Larsen thereupon presented Fleischer with a draft document. The document stated that since the government had decided that it would not continue the war in Norway, it should enter into negotiations with the Germans for an armistice and peace. If the enemy refused, the Norwegian Army should cross the border to Sweden and Finland and be interned. The letter warned the government not to leave the country and implored the king to remain to insure that peace was concluded.
It is, as noted by Hovland, a strange document that far exceeds the authority and prerogatives of a division commander. It challenged a political decision already taken and called for a separate peace with Germany. Hovland maintains that the document only makes sense by understanding the desperate situation in which Fleischer and Lindbäck-Larsen found themselves and that it should be regarded as an attempt to secure peace and maintain a reasonable degree of independence in part of the country. This would have been a settlement along the line of that reached by the Soviet Union and Finland. However, if this was their thinking, they failed to recognize the fundamental political-military differences between the situation in Finland and that in Norway.
Fleischer and his chief of staff flew to Tromsø on June 5 to brief the government on the military situation and to present the document that represented their view to the ministers of foreign affairs and defense. According to Fleischer, the document was not looked upon favorably and according to Lindbäck-Larsen, it was withdrawn. Fleischer writes that he asked the foreign minister not to forward it to the king or other members of the government. In answer to a question from the Investigative Commission in 1945, Koht did not remember Fleischer withdrawing the document. However, he noted that Fleischer, in their conversation on the way to England, gave every indication that he supported the decision by the government and royal family to leave the country.11
While the document did not receive serious consideration, it was obviously not withdrawn as claimed by Lindbäck-Larsen and Fleischer. It was reported to the prime minister and discussed by the government in a conference on June 6. Lie writes that, “After the prime minister had read the letter, we agreed that the general’s thinking was a little unclear” and “the Government decided to stand by its earlier views about departing Norway if it could not be avoided, in order to organize and carry on the war outside the country’s borders.”12 This document was not forgotten and, according to Hovland, had later repercussions for General Fleischer.
In what appears to be an astonishing attempt to revise history, General Hovland shifts the blame for the letter to General Ruge. He writes, “In retrospect, the letter appears to mirror Ruge’s ideas and it is not improbable that Lindbäck-Larsen was influenced by the General Staff.”13 This damaging accusation is not documented and a review of Ruge’s writings, memoranda, or statements reveals nothing to support Hovland’s contention. On the contrary, Ruge had argued consistently since he assumed command of the army that the country should carry out active resistance against the Germans and he supported the government’s decision to depart the country in order to carry on this resistance.
Hovland is right in criticizing Ruge for not providing Fleischer with a staff as he left the country. Fleischer left without his own staff or members of the Norwegian General Staff. These remained in Norway. While Fleischer overcame this difficulty as competent officers flocked to Great Britain, the assistance of experienced officers from the general staff would certainly have eased the task of setting up a new headquarters in a foreign country and organizing and training military formations for future operations.
Evacuation
Admiral Cork and General Auchinleck were preoccupied with planning and executing the evacuation, especially after the recapture of Narvik. In order to give the Norwegian Government time to negotiate the Mowinkel Plan, Ambassador Dormer asked Cork to postpone the evacuation by one or two days. As a result, the first evacuation was scheduled for the night between June 3 and 4.
It was not an easy task to evacuate about 25,000 troops from various points in the Narvik/Harstad area, including disengaging those at the front without giving the enemy or the Norwegians any suspicions about what was transpiring. The bad weather that kept supplies and reinforcements from reaching General Dietl at the end of May and beginning of June also curtailed German air operations, shielded evacuation activities, and kept German bombers away when they could have caused serious damage to the operation.
The evacuated men and equipment were divided into a series of convoys and the first of these, carrying supplies and some French guns and tanks, left before the end of May. Cork had the cruisers Southampton, Vindictive, and Devonshire, the antiaircraft cruiser Coventry, 10 destroyers, one escort, and 13 armed trawlers at his disposal to cover the evacuation. He asked Admiral Forbes on May 31 to place naval escorts at his disposal for the convoys that were to carry the troops to Great Britain. Forbes ordered the aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Glorious t
o North Norway and they were offshore on June 2. Their mission was first and foremost to cover the evacuation with their fighter aircraft. Recovering the land-based aircraft operating from Bardufoss Airfield was a secondary mission.
Fifteen large troop transports were sent to evacuate the troops, but only 13 were used. To avoid air attacks, these transports rendezvoused 180 miles offshore and approached the coast in groups of two. The troops were ferried to the transports by destroyers and Norwegian fishing vessels. After taking aboard the troops, the transports proceeded back to the rendezvous point. During the nights of June 4-6, 14,700 troops were moved to six transports. These six fast ships made up the first convoy, assembled at the designated rendezvous point, and started out for Great Britain in the evening of June 7 escorted only by the old cruiser Vindictive.
The seven transports of the second troop convoy took aboard 9,800 troops during the nights of June 7 and 8. The convoy departed its rendezvous in the morning of June 9, escorted by the cruisers Southampton, Coventry, and five destroyers. Cork, Auchinleck, and Béthouart were aboard the Southampton. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal escorted by three destroyers attached herself to this convoy.
Eight transports were dispatched to Harstad to bring away equipment. This convoy, which sailed in the evening of June 7, was called the “slow” convoy and was protected by the destroyer Arrow, the sloop Stork, and ten armed trawlers. Another equipment and supply convoy consisting of three transports, one tanker, and a number of Norwegian merchantmen departed Tromsø. Its escorts were the destroyer Campbell and three armed trawlers. Vice-Admiral J. Cunningham in the cruiser Devonshire accompanied the convoy initially but they apparently parted company after reaching the open sea.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 68
