The naval protection provided for the convoys was woefully inadequate. Except for the ships coming from Tromsø accompanied by the cruiser Devonshire and one destroyer, the supply and equipment convoys had only armed trawler protection until destroyers that were involved in other duties could join them. The first troop convoy, carrying nearly 15,000 troops, had no escort initially except the aged and partially disarmed Vindictive because all destroyers were used to transport troops from embarkation points to the transports. The second troop convoy, carrying about 10,000 troops, had better protection although still inadequate in case of a German surface attack.
There were several reasons for the inadequate naval protection. First, the British were lulled into a false feeling of security since their numerous convoys between Great Britain and Norway had sailed unmolested for two months. Second, the British naval planners did not believe the German Navy was capable of or willing to make a determined sortie into northern waters, much in the same manner as they had miscalculated on this issue earlier in the year. Much of the convoy routes were outside the range of air protection but except for notifying the commander of Coastal Command in the strictest secrecy that an evacuation was underway, even long-range Sunderland aircraft were not employed to reconnoiter the routes. Finally, Allied naval resources were stretched thin. The events on the western front naturally caused the British to concentrate their ships against a cross-Channel invasion and few resources were diverted from this task. However, there were major units of the Home Fleet in Scapa Flow or in the waters between the Faeroes and Iceland.
The Norwegian Government held its last meeting on Norwegian soil in the afternoon of June 7. The king, crown prince, members of the government, the diplomatic corps, including Ambassador Dormer, boarded the cruiser Devonshire a few hours later.
All serviceable Norwegian naval vessels, aircraft with adequate range, and merchant ships were ordered to Great Britain. The remaining flyable aircraft were ordered into internment in Finland. The 1,500-ton Fridtjof Nansen carried the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Admiral Diesen, General Fleischer, and their families. The ship left Norway in the afternoon of June 8 and arrived in the Faeroe Islands in the morning of June 13 without any mishaps.
Most small warships reached their destination, but not all and not without difficulties. The patrol vessel Nordkapp and the armed trawler Kvitøy became involved in a gun duel with the British ships Raven and Northern Gem. Two hits were registered on Raven before the British ceased fire and headed out to sea.14 There was no serious damage or loss of life on either side. Kvitøy was damaged in an air attack and forced to return to Norway where it was captured.
The armed trawler Svalbard II started its journey, but on June 11 its crew found numerous bodies floating in the ocean. Around noon, it encountered a raft with five men aboard in very poor condition. Steen reports that there were originally 32 men on the raft but 27 had been thrown overboard as they died. The captain of the trawler decided to bring the wounded British seamen back to Norway for medical assistance. One died before they reached shore but the other four were hospitalized. Svalbard II was captured by the Germans.
Submarine B3 and the armed trawler Honningsvåg departed together in the morning of June 8. There was a battery explosion aboard the submarine after the two ships had reached a position about 100 miles from shore. They returned to Norway to see if the damage could be repaired. When this proved impractical, the submarine was scuttled in deep waters and Honningsvåg departed for a second time and joined one of the British convoys.
The five Norwegian merchant ships, Nova, Hestmannen, Prins Olav, Finnmarken, and Ariadne, which tried to link up with the British convoy were not as lucky. Finnmarken was forced to return to Norway by German aircraft. Prins Olav and Ariadne were attacked by six to eight German aircraft late in the evening of June 9. Ariadne was hit by several bombs and set on fire from stem to stern. Nine crewmembers were killed and others were wounded. The crew managed to lower lifeboats and those who jumped overboard were rescued, including Captain Askim, commander of the coastal defense ship Norge. Forty-five were saved.
Prins Olav tried to avoid the bombs by evasive maneuvers but one exploded so close that the engine stopped and it was not possible to get it restarted. The order to abandon ship was given but the Germans continued to attack as the personnel were entering the lifeboats. A bomb hit the ship after the crew had left and the explosion tore it apart. One crewmember was killed and three wounded. Thirty-six were saved.
Prins Olav managed to send a radio S.O.S. but the operator was not able to report the position before the antenna was destroyed. However, Admiral Cunningham knew that Norwegian merchant ships were trying to join his convoy and assumed correctly that the call for help came from one of those. The British convoy was also attacked by German aircraft but fire from the escorts kept the attackers at a distance. Cunningham sent the destroyer Arrow towards where he assumed the Norwegian ships were located. Arrow found the 81 survivors and brought them aboard before rejoining the convoy. Nova and Hestmannen joined the convoy on June 11.
Armistice and Demobilization
The planned final Norwegian attack never took place. The troops were not told about the evacuation even after Fleischer learned what was about to happen. His chief of staff wanted to inform the brigade commanders immediately but Fleischer stated this would be a breach of the word of honor to the British. While the 6th Division staff was preparing demobilization orders, the brigades at the front were still fighting without knowing what was happening.
While there were clear signs of an imminent German collapse, such as contact by the Swedes to make arrangements for an orderly internment of the German troops and the exhausted condition of prisoners, it also became obvious that the Allies were up to something. Their preparations for evacuation did not pass as unnoticed as they may have believed. Many Norwegians had concluded that the Allies might withdraw but they did not think that such a withdrawal would take place before the German forces east of Narvik were destroyed.
Rather than holding back offensive operations after learning about the Allied withdrawal, Ruge and Fleischer increased their efforts to complete the destruction of Dietl’s forces as quickly as possible. Their reasoning was that the Allies would be more amenable to leave air and naval support in place after such a victory and that with such support, the Norwegian forces would be able to block General Feurstein’s advance.
After returning from Tromsø on June 5, Fleischer ordered the 6th Brigade to attack immediately, that same night, if possible. Fleischer, knowing that the French were withdrawing, agreed to assume responsibility for the whole area north of Rombakfjord and he moved the 1/15th Inf from Narvik into positions vacated by the French.
General Fleischer was called to Tromsø early on June 7. Shortly after arriving in Tromsø, he telephoned his chief of staff and told him he would not be returning, that the chief of staff should sign all future orders, and that the troops should eventually be told that it was not his wish to leave the division.
The division staff completed the demobilization orders and the brigade commanders were ordered to report to the division headquarters at 2000 hours on June 7. This order was later cancelled, but the 6th Brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Berg, was already underway. He was finally briefed on the situation and it was left up to him to decide if he wished to use the last 24 hours to continue the attack. He was told that there would be no air support. The 6th Brigade notified the battalions the next morning (June 8) at 0545 hours that the planned attack was not to be carried out and that preparations should be made to move units and trains to the rear.
Lindbäck-Larsen met Ruge at 1430 hours on June 8. He was informed that the king, government, and Fleischer had left the country and that the campaign was to be concluded. Ruge was briefed on and accepted the demobilization order prepared by the division. The subordinate commanders within the division were then briefed by Lindbäck-Larsen.
The order to execute the demobilization pl
an was received by the division at 2300 hours on June 8. The units were ordered to leave small security detachments in the forward positions while the rest moved to the rear and were demobilized, or transported to their home district to be demobilized. The operation was carried out in good order and the Germans did not interfere. However, the troops were in a state of shock and disbelief. Birger Gotaas, the press officer with the Norwegian General Staff, asked Lieutenant Colonel Berg how the troops reacted to the news of a cease-fire, Berg answered:
It was the saddest moment in my life, to see the boys as they headed home. They looked at me with questioning eyes. They did not understand what was happening. They had fought and advanced inch by inch and week after week. They knew as well as I that within a few days, at most, the whole Rundfjell and Bjørnefjell areas would be cleared of Germans. They would have no recourse except to surrender or be interned in Sweden. And then, the boys were ordered back! I will never forget the depressed looks directed at me as they marched past.15
At 2200 hours on June 8, General Ruge notified General von Falkenhorst that he was ready to initiate negotiations for a cease-fire. In a telegram received by Ruge at 1500 hours on June 9, von Falkenhorst responded that all hostilities had to cease by 1600 hours that day. Negotiators with full authority were to be sent to General Dietl and to the German commander in Trondheim. Ruge answered that the deadline demanded by von Falkenhorst could not be met and that he had ordered his units to cease operations at 2400 hours. This was accepted by the Germans.
Two lieutenant colonels, with full powers to enter into agreements, were sent to the two headquarters designated by General von Falkenhorst. Lieutenant Colonel Harald Wrede Holm was sent to General Dietl’s headquarters while Lieutenant Colonel Roscher-Nielsen was sent to Trondheim. The representatives had written authorizations from General Ruge as well as verbal instructions. General Hovland has directed sharp criticism against Ruge and the agreement he entered into with the Germans. He writes:
As became known later, Ruge immediately initiated negotiations about capitulation. He was not satisfied with a cease-fire agreement for North Norway, but allowed himself to be led into comprehensive capitulation negotiations with General Falkenhorst’s staff that resulted in the Declaration of Capitulation of June 10, 1940, which fails to mention that the war should continue, led from overseas, and could therefore rightly be interpreted as a total Norwegian capitulation.16
This is a serious charge that is not supported by statements, documents, and reports. It would certainly be strange for the German military to agree to and sign a document that recognized and acknowledged continued Norwegian resistance from overseas and one should therefore not be surprised that this subject is not mentioned. Ruge was empowered by the government to make all arrangements dealing with the German assumption of authority in North Norway. Both representatives initiated their contact by stating that the king, government, navy, and air force had left the country and that Norway, as a state, continued now and in the future to be at war with Germany. In this regard, it may be of interest to quote from Roscher-Nielsen’s description of events when he reported to the German headquarters in Trondheim:17: “The negotiations began with Colonel Buschenhagen [von Falkenhorst’s chief of staff] asking what kind of negotiating authority I had, whether I came to negotiate a peace or a cease-fire. I answered that I was exclusively authorized to negotiate a cease-fire for the 6th Division in North Norway, which for various reasons no longer could continue the fight.”
Buschenhagen then asked Roscher-Nielsen if he was empowered to act on behalf of the Norwegian Navy and Air Force to which the Norwegian answered that he did not have such powers. As to the location of the navy and air force, Roscher-Nielsen answered that he did not know but believed they were outside the country. Roscher-Nielsen’s report continues:
”Good,” said v. B. “It was really what we had expected and based on that assumption we have prepared a draft for an agreement to a cease-fire, which we will now go through. However, I wish to point out to you in advance that you will have full opportunity to present your objections about the various points and your objections will be carefully weighted and, if possible, accepted.”
The OKW situation report from June 10 confirms Roscher-Nielsen’s account, “… the negotiator emphasizes strongly that despite the end of fighting in Norway, the war continues. It is stressed that the Norwegian naval and air forces have left Norway with the Allies.”18 Furthermore, the nine-paragraph document signed by Roscher-Nielsen starts with the following statement of purpose, which clearly limits its scope: “In view of the Norwegian 6th Divisions courageous conduct, it is accorded the honorable conditions set forth below in laying down its weapons.”19 The other paragraphs in the document deal with the release of prisoners, weapons, ammunition, equipment, fuel, vehicles, airfields, and the disposition of Norwegian forces along the Soviet border. These forces were permitted to continue their functions under the authority of the provincial governor until German forces could take over those functions. Non-career officers, NCOs, and troops were allowed to proceed to their homes. Career officers and soldiers could chose between giving their word of honor not to participate in hostilities against Germany or its allies in the current war or entering an honorable prisoner-of-war status. Officers were permitted to retain their personal weapons.
General Ruge became a prisoner of war, but he was treated with courtesy and generosity by Dietl, and no efforts were made to interfere with the Norwegian demobilization. Dietl visited Ruge’s headquarters on June 12 and Ruge made a reciprocal visit to Dietl’s headquarters the following day. Walter Hubatsch takes note of what General Ruge said in his proclamation to the Norwegian people on June 9. The statement “But the war continues on other fronts–Norwegians are participating in that war …” towards the end of the proclamation are hardly words describing a “total Norwegian capitulation.”20
Operation Juno
The evacuation from Norway was not completed without serious losses. The Germans, without any knowledge about the Allied evacuation, had launched a naval operation in northern waters. In mid-May, OKW held a bleak view of the situation in Narvik. It appeared that Dietl would not be able to hold out much longer, that the weather in the Narvik area was too unpredictable for effective reinforcements by air, and that General Feurstein’s troops would not reach Narvik in time to save the 3rd Mountain Division. It was decided to employ German naval forces against the Allied bases and ships in the Harstad-Narvik area in order to reduce the pressure on Dietl’s forces. The mission was expanded on May 16 to include protection of sea supply routes for General Feurstein’s troops. The operation was given the codename Juno.
Admiral Saalwächter issued the directive for the operation to Admiral Wilhelm Marschall, the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, on May 29. The main objective was to enter Andfjord and Vågsfjord to destroy enemy warships, transports, and base facilities. If the fleet commander found a penetration of Ofotfjord to Narvik possible, that would become the main mission. The protection of the sea routes for supplies to the 2nd Mountain Division was a secondary objective. The forces placed at Admiral Marschall’s disposal included the battleships Gneisenau (his flagship) and Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, and the destroyers Karl Galster, Hans Lody, Erich Steinbrinck, and Hermann Schoemann.
The German fleet departed Kiel at 0800 hours on June 4 and proceeded northward through Storebelt. It had a rotating escort of He-115s and 111s for portions of the voyage and aggressive air reconnaissance was carried out from bases in Norway. The fleet passed the latitude of Bergen during the night of June 6 and reached a position at the latitude of Harstad, 200 nautical miles southeast of Jan Mayen in the morning of June 7.
Marschall was informed by Group Command West that an analysis of British radio traffic indicated that the British were unaware of the presence of the German fleet. Group Command West kept Marschall informed about the location and movement of British surface units. A report in the evening on June 6 inform
ed Marschall that the battleship Valiant, the aircraft carriers Glorious and Ark Royal, the cruisers Devonshire, Southampton, Vindictive, Coventry and about 15 destroyers were in North Norway. A message the following morning reported seven ships about 360 nautical miles northwest of Trondheim on a southwesterly course. These were the ships of the first convoy, carrying about 15,000 Allied troops. Marschall was about 110 nautical miles north of the reported sighting when he received the message. These fast liners were already out of reach of the German fleet. Marschall may have assumed that they were empty ships returning to England and the report did not cause him to change his plan to attack the Harstad area.
Heavy units of the Home Fleet were engaged in a chase after two mysterious warships reported by a British armed merchant ship. These mysterious naval vessels were 200 nautical miles northeast of the Faeroe Islands with a course towards the Faeroe-Iceland gap. Admiral Forbes, fearing a German breakout into the Atlantic, sent a strong naval force consisting of the battle cruisers Renown and Repulse, the cruisers Newcastle and Sussex, and five destroyers to chase this sighting. This left the battleships Rodney and Valiant at Scapa Flow. Valiant was sent to meet the first troop convoy, escort it around the Faeroe Islands, and repeat the operation for the second troop convoy two days later.
Marschall assembled his ship captains aboard his flagship in the evening of June 7 to discuss the attack on Harstad, which he intended to carry out during the night of June 8-9. While this conference was taking place, Marschall received a radio report from Group Command West (2155 hours) which read:
Air reconnaissance reports one cruiser, two destroyers, and two large transports at 1325 at the northern entrance to Andfjord on a westerly course at moderate speed, and two destroyers at 1345, 25 nautical miles from Andenes on a northerly course. Two aircraft carriers and two destroyers were dead in the water at 1400 about 45 nautical miles north of Andenes.21
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 69
