This intelligence was several hours old when received, but it caused Marschall to revise his estimate of the situation. He became convinced that the numerous reports of British ship movements on different courses away from the Norwegian coast indicated that a major movement of warships and transports were underway and that the most important targets would not be found in the fjords around Harstad. An entry in his war journal reads, “It strikes me that that the noteworthy westerly movement [of British ships], may indicate a British evacuation of Norway, and that the convoys on a westerly course present valuable targets.”22
Marschall decided to operate against the British ships that had been sighted and to await further intelligence before moving against Harstad. He informed Saalwächter of his decision at 0400 hours on June 8. Saalwächter disagreed with Marschall’s decision and sent a message stating that the main mission remained as before, the destruction of enemy naval forces in the Harstad-Narvik area. There appears to have been some differences between Saalwächter and the German Naval Staff on this issue, resulting in a compromise which permitted the Hipper and the destroyers to search for the merchant convoy.
The Germans encountered the British tanker Oil Pioneer and its escort, the armed trawler Juniper at 0600 hours on June 8. Hipper sank the trawler with gunfire and 29 survivors were taken aboard the German ships. The Germans removed the crew from Oil Pioneer and sent the ship to the bottom with torpedoes. The two British ships were unable to send out messages warning other ships.
Aircraft were launched by Hipper and Scharnhorst to look for the convoy. This led to the sighting of the passenger vessel Orama and the hospital ship Atlantis. The liner Orama was one of the troop transports not used in the evacuation. It was short of fuel and water and she was sent on her way along with the hospital ship without an escort. Hipper sank the 20,000-ton Orama, carrying 100 German prisoners, and successfully jammed her last radio message. Two hundred seventy-five survivors were taken aboard the cruiser and two destroyers. In accordance with the rules of war, the Germans did not attack Atlantis, carrying over 600 wounded, and in accordance with the same rules, Atlantis did not report the presence of the German ships until she made a visual signal to the battleship Valiant about 24 hours later.
Hipper’s reconnaissance aircraft also reported seeing an enemy cruiser and a merchant ship to the south and the two German battleships and the destroyers searched unsuccessfully for these ships while Hipper took care of Orama. The reported sighting must have been a mistake since there was no British cruiser near that location. It is possible that the aircraft had spotted the Devonshire but if this is the case it was serious mistake in position and direction since that cruiser was located to the northwest of the German fleet.
Soon after this encounter, Marschall sent Hipper and the destroyers to Trondheim to refuel and to participate in that part of his mission that called for securing the sea route along the coast of Nordland Province. He discontinued his search for additional British transports and headed north with the two battleships, intending to operate between Harstad and Tromsø. He was particularly interested in the two aircraft carriers, which had been reported repeatedly.
Several groups of British ships were meanwhile well within range of the German battleships. Two divisions of the slow convoy were approaching from the northeast. The second troop convoy, carrying about 10,000 troops and escorted by the cruisers Southampton and Coventry, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, and five destroyers, was also approaching from the northeast. This convoy was heavily outgunned by the two German battleships. The cruiser Devonshire, carrying the Norwegian royal family, Government, and Allied diplomats and their families (400 passengers), was located only 80 nautical miles northwest of the German battleships. Then there was the aircraft carrier Glorious with its two destroyers, Acasta and Ardent, about 100 nautical miles behind Devonshire.
The land-based British fighter aircraft had maintained their patrols over the evacuation area until the very last moments around midnight on June 7. The original plan was to destroy the aircraft but it was decided to try to land them on the aircraft carriers despite expert opinions that the flight decks were too short for Hurricanes. Ark Royal had a slightly longer flight deck, but since the aircraft could not be brought under deck because their wings could not be folded, it was decided that they should land on Glorious. The ten Gladiators and eight Hurricanes landed successfully on this aircraft carrier in the early hours of June 8. The landings on an aircraft carrier by pilots who had never before done so and in aircraft not intended for carrier operations was a courageous accomplishment. However, problems for air operations were thereby created. The Gladiators and Hurricanes, whose wings could not be folded, made for a disorderly storage situation.
Glorious and her escorts were thus about 100 nautical miles behind Devonshire when one of the worst calamities in British naval history began to unfold. The catastrophe could have been far worse if the Germans had their reconnaissance aircraft aloft since they would undoubtedly have discovered both the Devonshire and the second troop convoy.
At 1645 hours on June 8, the lookout on Scharnhorst sighted smoke off the starboard bow. The Germans immediately altered course and headed towards the sighting. As they approached they recognized the silhouette of an aircraft carrier. Glorious, recognizing the danger, turned away and tried to escape from her pursuers. Admiral Marschall continued on a course that would bring his battleships to the windward of the carrier, forcing that ship to turn towards the Germans if she attempted to turn into the wind to launch her aircraft.
Gneisenau opened fire with her secondary armament against the escorting destroyers at 1728 hours and Scharnhorst opened fire on the carrier with her 11-inch guns four minutes later, at a range of 25,000 meters. Gneisenau opened fire on the Glorious with her main armaments at 1746 hours. This distance far exceeded the range of the 4.7-inch guns on the aircraft carrier. The radio operators on Glorious tried to report the presence of the Germans but the Germans believed that they had succeeded in jamming the transmission. The British version is that the initial report was interrupted when a salvo from Scharnhorst struck the bridge. No signals were received from the two destroyers, which is strange. The Devonshire received a garbled and incomplete message with the words “2 PB” (2 Pocket Battleships). Its authenticity was suspect and Cunningham decided not to break radio silence and possibly give away his position because of the important passengers the cruiser was carrying.
Scharnhorst found the range with her third salvo and a projectile penetrated and exploded in the forward hanger among the Hurricanes that were stored there. The spreading fire made it impossible to get any of the Swordfish aircraft aloft. About 1800 hours, an 11-inch shell hit the carrier’s bridge, killing the captain and destroying the steering controls. The two destroyer escorts laid a smoke screen that successfully concealed the carrier, now on a southeasterly course, for about 20 minutes.
The destroyer Ardent turned back through the smoke and launched her torpedoes at Gneisenau. The German battleship avoided the torpedoes by evasive maneuvers that bought the carrier a few more minutes of survival but both German ships opened fire at the British destroyer with their secondary armaments. The devastating German fire tore the British destroyer apart and caused her to capsize and sink within four minutes.
Glorious now emerged into view from behind the smoke and both German battleships opened fire on her with their main armaments. An 11-inch shell struck the aft part of the carrier and this sealed her fate. At 1820 hours, the order to abandon ship was given and the Germans ceased firing at the sinking ship at 1843 hours as the carrier was showing a 40-degree list. It sank at 1908 hours.
With Ardent sunk and Glorious sinking, no one would have faulted Lieutenant Commander C. E. Glasfurd, the captain of Acasta, if he had tried to disengage and save his destroyer. For a while, it appeared to the crew that he had chosen this course. Leading Seaman C. Carter, the only survivor from Acasta tells the story:
On board our ship, what a de
athly calm, hardly a word spoken, the ship was now steaming full speed away from the enemy. Then came a host of orders, prepare all smoke floats, hose-pipes connected up, various other jobs were prepared. We were still steaming away from the enemy, and making smoke, and all our smoke floats had been set going. The Captain, then had this message passed to all positions: “You may think we are running away from the enemy, we are not, our chummy ship has sunk, the Glorious is sinking, the least we can do is make a show, good luck to you all.”23
After that message to his crew, Lieutenant Commander Glasfurd made a 180-degree turn into his own smoke. As the destroyer exited the smoke, it made a starboard turn and fired its port torpedoes against Scharnhorst at a distance of 14,000 meters. Despite evasive action, one torpedo hit the battleship on the starboard side near the aft turret at 1840 hours as she was coming back to her original course, killing two officers and 46 men. The explosion put the aft turret out of commission and caused flooding that forced the shutdown of the amidships and starboard main engines. This reduced the battleship’s maximum speed to 20 knots. Acasta reentered the smoke screen without receiving fire but as she emerged from the smoke for another torpedo attack, the Germans were ready. The Gneisenau, which had tried to keep the enemy in sight, sent a rain of projectiles from her secondary armament at a range of 10,000 meters against the destroyer, registering a number of hits. One hit in the aft of the ship caused a violent explosion. Acasta, making only five knots and partially shielded in the smoke, kept firing her guns at the adversary and scored a hit near Turret C on the Scharnhorst without causing any severe damage. Gneisenau turned away at 1916 hours to look after Scharnhorst, leaving Acasta motionless with fires covering two-thirds of the ship. Acasta sank shortly thereafter. Leading Seaman Carter continues his story:
I will always remember the Surgeon Lieutenant [Lieutenant H. J. Stammers], his first ship, his first action. Before I jumped over the side, I saw him still attending to the wounded, a hopeless task, and when I was in the water I saw the Captain leaning over the bridge, take a cigarette from a case and light it. We shouted to him to come on our raft, he waved “Good-bye and good luck”–the end of a gallant man.
The German reports are full of praise for the gallant and skillful actions of the two British destroyers. The two German battleships had fired a total of 387 11-inch and 1,448 6-inch shells against the British. This was a lot of munitions but represented only 20% of what they had available and there was therefore plenty left to continue the operation.
Instead, Marschall decided to break off the operation and escort the damaged Scharnhorst to Trondheim. Based on the information at hand, his decision is understandable. However, the wisdom of his earlier decision to send Hipper and the four destroyers to Trondheim to refuel in preparation for a secondary mission is questionable. If he had not done so, he could have sent the damaged Scharnhorst back to Trondheim with a destroyer escort and continued the operation with the Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser. There is a high probability that these ships would have encountered the second troop convoy steaming unknowingly towards the scene of the disaster. However, this is only apparent in retrospect.
Hindsight is not needed to see the grievous mistakes made by the British Admiralty and Forbes. While the British were preoccupied with events in France and the threat of a cross-Channel invasion, this does not explain why the heavy units of the Royal Navy were kept at anchor in Scapa Flow or in the waters north of Scotland. The Home Fleet was not responsible for either the operations in the Channel or off Norway but, as pointed out by Moulton, the “cover for both was surely its prime responsibility.” Admiral Forbes had the battle cruisers Repulse and Renown, the battleships Rodney and Valiant, and several cruisers and destroyers at his disposal. Part of this powerful force was sent north to reinforce the Northern Patrol and to investigate reports of a German landing in Iceland.
It appears that the battleship Valiant and four destroyers were sent out to meet the first troop convoy more as an afterthought. When Valiant learned from the hospital ship Atlantis on June 9 that two German battleships were in the waters off Norway, she headed for the second convoy at full speed. Valiant also notified Forbes who finally left with the Rodney, Renown, and six destroyers. He also ordered the Repulse, two cruisers, and three destroyers, still near Iceland, to join him.
In the official British history, Derry concludes that Operation Juno “achieved by luck a considerable success for which it was not designed.” This may be technically true but it is also misleading. The British were the ones who were lucky. Had it not been for the gallant self-sacrifice of the two destroyers and Glasfurd’s lucky torpedo, Marschall would have continued his operation and probably located and destroyed the Devonshire as well as the second convoy. The sinking of Devonshire would have had far-reaching political repercussions and would have been a severe blow to Britain’s naval reputation. The loss of this ship, a second carrier, and the second convoy with approximately 20,000 troops, passengers, and crewmembers would truly have been calamitous.
The Admiralty and Forbes made the dangerous error of assuming that the lack of evidence for actual or intended German naval operations off Norway meant that they did not intend or were incapable of such operations. As in the case of the invasion in April, they based their decisions on what they viewed as the most likely German course of action rather than on German capabilities and the most dangerous course of action.
Captain MacIntyre may be correct in his conclusion that divided authority on the British side contributed to the disaster. Churchill’s appointment of Admiral Cork, much senior to Admiral Forbes, to command an area within the Home Fleet’s region of responsibility was bound to create confusion and misjudgments but it is also a damaging conclusion about the professionalism at the highest levels of the Royal Navy at this stage of the war. Marschall was recalled for his perceived errors during Operation Juno. No action was taken against commanders of the Home Fleet.
The loss of one of the four carriers available was severe for the British Navy. Few survivors were rescued. The Norwegian ship Borgund rescued 38 men from Glorious and the lone survivor from Acasta on June 11 and brought them to the Faeroe Islands. Two were also rescued by a German seaplane. In all, 1,515 lost their lives. All aircraft and pilots from Norway that could have been used in the looming Battle of Britain were lost.
Admiral Marschall took the Gneisenau, Hipper, and four destroyers back to sea on June 10 to continue the operation against the convoys. The sortie did not lead to any contacts and was cancelled by Naval Group West when it concluded that the Allied evacuation was completed and there was therefore nothing of importance to be accomplished in the north. Marschall brought his ships to Trondheim in the morning of June 11. On that day, 12 aircraft from Bomber Command carried out an unsuccessful attack against the German ships. Early on 13 June, 15 Skuas from Ark Royal attacked the German ships in their anchorage in Trondheim. One 500-lb bomb struck Scharnhorst but rolled overboard without detonating. Eight British aircraft were downed by antiaircraft fire and fighters.
Admiral Lütjens took Gneisenau and Hipper back to sea on June 20. He headed for the Iceland-Faeroe Island gap in an attempt to divert British attention from Scharnhorst’s return to Germany. Gneisenau was hit by a torpedo from the British submarine Clyde shortly before midnight on June 20 while 40 nautical miles off the Norwegian coast. The torpedo tore a large hole through both sides of the forward portion of the battleship. No armaments were affected and there were no casualties. However, the sortie was aborted and the ships returned to Trondheim to make emergency repairs.
It was decided that the battleship needed to return to Germany in order to make more extensive repairs. A fleet consisting of Gneisenau, Hipper, the light cruiser Nürnberg, and the destroyers Galster, Ihn, Lody, and Jacobi left Trondheim on July 25. Five torpedo boats were later added as escorts. The torpedo boat Luchs happened to be in the track of a torpedo fired at Gneisenau by a British submarine. The torpedo boat sank after a violent explosion. Th
e German ships arrived in Kiel in the morning of July 28. Operation Juno was concluded after eight weeks.
EPILOGUE
“It was a marvel—I really do not know how—I survived and maintained my position in public esteem while all the blame was thrown on poor Mr. Chamberlain.”
CHURCHILL’S REFLECTION ON THE NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN IN HIS DRAFT OF THE GATHERING STORM, AS QUOTED BY DAVID REYNOLDS.
The Human and Material Costs of the Campaign
In comparison to other theaters of operations in World War II, the losses in lives in Norway were small. However, when viewed against the number of combatants involved (about 100,000 German, 55,000 Norwegians, and 38,000 Allied), the number of casualties in the 62-day campaign came to over six percent. Even today, some of the statistics covering losses vary and are misleading, particularly as they apply to specific actions. Ash’s statement that “German Army casualties were a good third higher than the casualties of the Norwegians and all the Allied units put together,” even when losses at sea are discounted, is not supported by figures released by the various participants. Norwegian and Allied casualties on land were about 25% higher than those of the Germans.
One example of these discrepancies is the two-day engagement between British and German troops at Kvam, in which 54 British soldiers fell and are buried at the Kvam Cemetery. Norwegian and British eye witness accounts, which prevailed in the postwar period, told about a large number of German killed and that their bodies were cremated on large wooden funeral pyres. Kersaudy, writing in 1989, claims that there were over 50 Germans killed at Kvam.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 70
