Official German sources give different statistics for this action that are confirmed by records of the Norwegian War Cemetery Service. The Germans claimed that they lost ten killed in the Kvam engagement and Norwegian cemetery records show that 13 Germans were buried in Kvam, three of those apparently killed in nearby areas. Furthermore, it was not customary for the Germans to cremate their fallen, at least not at this stage of the war.
Another problem that should be kept in mind when looking at the casualty figures is the very low number of wounded in relation to the number killed. Historically the ratio of wounded to killed in land combat is greater than 3:1. This ratio has increased over the years as means of evacuation and field medical services have improved. Nevertheless, Norwegian statistics show a ratio of less than 1:1. Similarly, the ratio resulting from German figures for land combat losses, gives us a ratio of killed to wounded of roughly 1:1.2. It is possible that the Germans and Norwegians used a more restrictive classification for those that they listed as wounded. For example, they may not have counted as wounded troops that were able to return to duty during the campaign. The terrain and climatic conditions under which the fighting took place contribute to this low ratio. Evacuation of wounded in a timely manner was difficult. Most British, French, and Polish sources do not break down the figures into killed, wounded, or missing and their losses at sea are not included. By using the figures that are available, it appears that there were about 12,000 military casualties in the 62-day campaign. Probably about 70% of these were killed.
The official German figure for losses in the Norwegian campaign is 5,296 killed, wounded, and missing. Hubatsch and Moulton give a figure of 5,660 but this includes the small number that died in the invasion of Denmark. German records break the 5,296 figure into 1,317 killed, 1,604 wounded and 2,375 lost at sea. This last number includes over 1,000 who were killed when Blücher was sunk in the Dröbak Strait.
On the Allied side, British casualties are listed as 1,869 killed, wounded, and missing while those of the French and Poles are given as 533. These do not include losses at sea where at least 2,500 perished.
Norwegian losses have not been established with complete accuracy, even today. Most sources list about 860 killed. Lindbäck-Larsen places the number of killed and wounded at about 1,700, not including the approximately 400 civilians who died during the campaign.
The loss of military equipment was most serious for the Allies. Most losses occurred in the five evacuations that they undertook from Åndalsnes, Namsos, Mosjøen, Bodø, and Narvik. The Germans ended up with a net gain in this area, due primarily to the sudden capture of Norwegian depots and the surrender of Norwegian Army units.
The naval losses in the campaign were significant. The German Navy was prepared for the loss of more than half its fleet. That expectation was largely realized. Among the larger units of the German Navy, both battleships were damaged. Of the three heavy cruisers involved in the operation, one was sunk, one badly damaged, and the third sustained moderate damage but it returned to service during the campaign. Two of the four light cruisers were sunk and one was damaged. Ten destroyers, six submarines, two large torpedo boats, and 15 lighter units were also lost. Six destroyers sustained various degrees of damage, as did many lighter units. Churchill stresses the importance of these losses:
On the other hand, at the end of June, 1940, a momentous date, the effective German Fleet consisted of no more than one eight-inch cruiser, two light cruisers, and four destroyers. Although many of their damaged ships, like ours, could be repaired, the German Navy was no factor in the supreme issue of the invasion of Britain.1
Churchill overstates the case. It is debatable whether the German Navy as it existed before the invasion of Norway could have seriously interfered with the Dunkirk evacuation or tempted the Germans to undertake an invasion of Great Britain in 1940 unless they also achieved air superiority. There is no doubt, however, that the German naval losses gave the British considerable comfort during a period of continuous bad news.
The Norwegians effectively lost their whole navy. Two destroyers made their way to Great Britain from western Norway. A number of smaller ships escaped to England from both western and northern Norway. However, for the most part, the naval units were sunk, scuttled, or captured. Within a relatively short period, the Germans put about 50 captured vessels into service. With the exception of a minelayer and two destroyers, these were small or obsolete units.
The Allies also sustained heavy, but not crippling, naval losses. The most serious was the aircraft carrier Glorious. In addition, the British lost two cruisers, seven destroyers, one sloop, four submarines, and a number of armed trawlers. The French and Poles each lost one destroyer and one submarine. The British also had six cruisers, eight destroyers, and two sloops disabled but repairable.
Aircraft losses in the Norwegian Campaign were relatively light and had minor effects on the future conduct of the war. Statistics given for aircraft losses vary significantly. Kersaudy writes that the Luftwaffe lost 240 planes, including 80 transports. These are essentially the same numbers used by Derry. Ziemke puts German air losses at 127 combat aircraft and this is ten more than given by Hubatsch. Levsen, quoting official German sources, place the total number of German aircraft lost at 90.
Except for some aircraft flown to England or interned in Finland, the Norwegians lost all their aircraft. British air losses are placed at 112. These losses had little effect on future operations, because the Gladiators were too slow and cumbersome to have made a difference in the Battle of Britain.
The losses in transports and other merchant ships were significant, especially for the Germans. They lost 21 transports with a tonnage of 111,700, or about ten percent of available shipping. Levsen writes that the Allies lost over 70 transports. This number, if correct, must include Norwegian ships.
Von Falkenhorst assessed the losses in the Norwegian Campaign as surprisingly light, justified, and acceptable. He writes that much greater losses were expected, particularly because of British and French naval superiority. It must be remembered that he wrote the assessment against the background of the horrible losses sustained during the remainder of World War II.
Achievement of Objectives
The Germans achieved most of their objectives in what must be viewed as a stunning military success in the face of overwhelming odds. The source of iron ore was secured and the navy was able to remove some of the limitations imposed on it by geography. The occupation of Norway not only complicated British blockade measures but also cracked open the door to the Atlantic for possible interference with the British supplies coming from overseas. The air threat to the Baltic by a British presence in Norway was avoided, as was the possibility of Sweden falling into the Allied orbit.
If the diplomatic effort had been as thoroughly prepared as the military, the German success could have been even more spectacular and the campaign might have been avoided. The fault must be placed at Hitler’s feet. Ribbentrop and his Foreign Office were kept in the dark about the plans for Scandinavia for security reasons.
By April 10, it was obvious that the Norwegians would resist and that a solution along the lines achieved in Denmark could only be achieved by modifications in the original ultimatum. Colonel Eriksen’s action had saved the government from capture and the Germans knew that the Norwegians were mobilizing. The German demands were not modified and Hitler’s action in allowing Quisling to form a government in Oslo only served to increase Norwegian defiance. Finally, German attempts to capture or kill the Norwegian Government by Captain Spiller’s raid and the bombing of Elverum, removed all possibilities of coming to an understanding.
French objectives, primarily to avoid or reduce the threat to their homeland by opening a new theater of war, were not achieved. The protracted war in Scandinavia and the consequent drain on German resources did not materialize. In divisional strength, only about five percent of the German Army was employed in Norway when Hitler attacked in the west. The conqu
est of Denmark was so quick that the combat forces employed there were available for use in the west by May.
British desires to get the Germans involved in an operation in Scandinavia were achieved but the quick victories that had been envisioned were unrealized. The German source of iron ore from Sweden was in fact secured. Sweden came under the sway of Berlin and the supply route through the Baltic was safer than before the operation.
Churchill did get Germany to react to earlier violations of Norwegian neutrality and the possibility that the Allies intended to establish themselves in Norway. However, rather than a reaction to the Allied mining, it was a full-fledged preemptive invasion that had been in planning for three months. The hope that quick victories could be achieved by enticing the Germans into an area where they would confront enormous British naval superiority was not realized. While the German Navy sustained heavy losses, the hoped for easy victories turned into a humiliating defeat.
For Norway, its policy of neutrality backed by inadequate military resources brought disaster to the country and increased suffering to its people during a five-year occupation. It is doubtful if Hitler would have undertaken the invasion if Norway had possessed a military establishment on the scale and quality, which wiser political and military leaders had provided for in World War I.
Some Reasons for German Military Success
When looking at the reason for Norwegian/Allied failure, it is most convenient to break the analysis into two periods. The first period covers the time leading up to and including the landings. The second period covers subsequent operations. Much of the German success in the initial part of the operation was due to luck and the Norwegian and Allied failure to act in a rational manner.
There can be no doubt that the German invasion would have met with disaster if Norway and the Allies had responded appropriately to the many warnings they received in the week or two leading up to April 9. A full or partial mobilization between April 5 and April 9 would have changed the events on April 9, as well as the conduct of subsequent operations. Even more limited defensive measures, such as laying minefields, full manning of coastal fortresses, and adequate infantry protection for airfields, would have made the task of the invading forces more difficult. Such measures may have prevented the quick capture of mobilization centers and depots as well as the German success in capturing the airfields at Fornebu and Sola.
The Allies and Norwegians placed too much faith in the Royal Navy and consequently underestimated German capabilities and the potential threat to the western and northern portions of Norway. The pre-conceived notion that Germany could not undertake operations in these areas led to a rejection of some of the more explicit warnings.
The British Navy could have done much more to hinder the German invasion. The obsession of its leaders with a possible German breakout into the Atlantic caused them to overlook possibilities even more damaging to their own interests by failing to search for German naval units in areas where they could be expected to be found in an invasion scenario.
Admiral Forbes’ delay in sailing from Scapa Flow to a central location in the North Sea after the sighting on April 7, allowed the main German fleet to pass the latitude where it could be intercepted. The concern with a breakout continued even after the composition of the various German flotillas indicated that they were not structured for high sea operations.
The Admiralty insistence on overwhelming superiority also worked in the Germans’ favor. R4 was abandoned at the very moment when the situation for which it was held in readiness arose. If the panic-like debarkation of the troops for R4 had not taken place, these could have been committed much earlier and with all their equipment intact. This damaging decision, taken solely by the navy, caused a chaotic equipment and supply situation for the forces when they were eventually deployed.
The Admiralty’s interference in operational matters on four different occasions in the critical 24-hour invasion period resulted in an amazing series of miscalculations and missed opportunities. First, the cruiser screen on the Norwegian coast south of Bergen was removed only hours before they would have encountered Task Force 3. Then the attack on Bergen was cancelled at a time when the Luftwaffe threat was still a minor factor. The withdrawal of the naval units in the Vestfjord approach to Narvik and Admiral Whitworth’s subsequent withdrawal from the area left the gate to Narvik unguarded. Finally, Warburton-Lee’s destroyer flotilla was dispatched to Narvik under unfavorable conditions. These actions had a great effect on subsequent operations.
The paralyzed behavior of the Norwegian Government in the immediate aftermath of the German landings, the irrational mobilization decision, and premature withdrawals in the region around Oslo facilitated the efforts by the Germans to secure their beachheads. Likewise, the failure of the Allies to settle quickly on an appropriate strategy and the hurried dispatch of disorganized and ill-equipped forces without clear missions created delays and uncertainties.
Without Admiralty interference and Whitworth’s withdrawal, Narvik might have remained in Norwegian hands and the divisive debate over strategy–Narvik versus Trondheim–would not have taken place. In the debate over strategy, Churchill’s insistenced on the importance of Narvik led to an unfortunate compromise that split the Allied effort, with the best troops employed in Narvik. This compromise apparently ignored the fact that Trondheim was the key objective. Capturing and holding central Norway would have made the German position in Narvik untenable. The recapture of Narvik at the expense of giving up the Trondheim area had little effect on the eventual outcome of the campaign.
The invasion of Norway was history’s first three-dimensional military campaign and it illustrated the dangers of not using the three elements in harmony. The Luftwaffe has been identified by most writers as a factor of decisive importance. Derry and Roskill emphasise its undermining of sea power and conclude that the period of fleet operations without air cover was over. Moulton and Liddell-Hart view British failure to understand the concept of three-dimensional warfare as a root cause for the defeat. It was not only the physical damage inflicted by the Luftwaffe but the psychological effects of its domination of the skies over the battlefield and the rear areas that had to be taken into account. In his after-action report on operations in Norway, General Auchinleck writes, “that to commit troops to a campaign in which they cannot be provided with adequate air support is to court disaster.”2
The British air force was never much interested in the Norwegian operations. It was responsible for the defense of Great Britain and the forces in France and saw the operations in Norway as an unwelcome distraction. This is at least a partial explanation for the failure to provide adequate air units to support operations in Norway. The fleet air arm proved incapable in countering the German air threat. This was partially due to the type of aircraft employed but also because the carriers stayed so far offshore that they could not effectively support the troops fighting in the valleys of eastern Norway or north of Trondheim.
The movement of troops, equipment, and supplies into Norway by air was history’s largest airlift operation up to that time. The Norwegians and the Allies also underestimated the German capability to move reinforcements and supplies by air to isolated beachheads. This was an important factor in saving General Dietl’s forces at Narvik and supplying General Feurstein’s drive through Nordland Province. The air-bridge established to Oslo and from Oslo to Trondheim allowed for a rapid build-up of forces in both areas.
Operations in Norway gave the Allies their first taste of the German doctrine of close air support for ground operations. Norwegian and British forces were unable to counter the devastating effectiveness of coordinated German ground and air operations. In this respect, the operation in Norway was a curtain raiser for what was soon to follow on the western front.
The Allies also failed to provide their troops with adequate artillery and anti-tank weapons, leaving their troops helpless against German employment of only a few light tank units in eastern Norway.
The British command structure was not geared for quick decision-making. The time-consuming coordination between the British cabinet and its subsidiary committees was nothing short of disastrous when trying to cope with the tempo of German operations. Most issues requiring quick decisions were debated and studied in a leisurely manner more appropriate for a peacetime environment. Studies and recommendations were thrown back and forth between committees until it was too late. The events leading to the cancellation of Hammer is a typical example. The only member in the War Cabinet with any experience in military matters was Churchill, and it is not an overstatement to say that his experience and views were primarily focused on naval matters.
The Norwegian campaign revealed the glaring inadequacies in inter-allied cooperation and coordination. Mistrust, suspicions, and too much emphasis on national versus coalition objectives infected the decision-making apparatus. The cavalier and insensitive manner in which the British treated their brothers-in-arms, particularly the Norwegians, had a deleterious effect on the campaign.
One aspect of the campaign in Norway that is often neglected is the effect of differences in operational philosophies. These differences, and their effects, are illustrated repeatedly in this book. German officers and NCOs were taught to expect the unexpected on the battlefield and were instructed to deviate from plans in order to achieve their goals. Higher German commanders intervened in operations of subordinate units to a far lesser extent than the Allied commanders, who tended to be schooled in a much more centralized operational philosophy. The Germans expected quick decisions and equally quick execution, a cornerstone in the German military doctrine. The speed at which operations at all levels were executed resulted in keeping an opponent, operating under more centralized and methodical guidelines, off balance. There is a long-standing principle that one of the most lucrative objectives for a military commander is the mind of the enemy commander. The Germans achieved this objective by confusing, demoralizing, and paralyzing the enemy through unrelenting pressure.
Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 Page 71
