Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  The operations in eastern Norway, in Trøndelag, and in Nordland Province are full of examples of how well the differences in the two doctrines worked to Germany’s advantage.

  In their after-action and lessons learned reports, the Germans show a relatively high regard for the operations of smaller Norwegian units, particularly in defensive operations. Special mention is given to ski units and to the marksmanship abilities of the average Norwegian soldier. However, they held a rather low opinion of how larger units functioned. The Norwegian lack of large-scale maneuvers and exercises in the 1930s was telling, and their rather rigid operational philosophy translated into weakness on the battlefield.

  The Germans viewed the British units as having low morale, poor self-reliance, and lacking fighting qualities and spirit. This is an interesting observation in view of General Auchinleck’s confidential report on June 19, 1940. An abridged version of this report was published in 1947 but two paragraphs were suppressed:

  The comparison between the efficiency of the French contingent and that of British troops operating under similar conditions has driven this lesson home to all in this theatre, though this was not altogether a matter of equipment.

  By comparison with the French, or the Germans, either for that matter, our men for the most part seemed distressingly young, not so much in years as in self-reliance and manliness generally. They give an impression of being callow and undeveloped, which is not reassuring for the future, unless our methods of man-mastership and training for war can be made more realistic and less effeminate.3

  As later years in the war would demonstrate, a great deal had to do with poor training and inadequate equipment.

  The Long Term Effects

  There is no doubt that the occupation of Norway was a constant drain on German resources. At times, nearly a half million men from the armed forces were tied up in Norway. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the resources tied up in Norway could have had any major influence on the events in other theaters of war.

  Hitler, like Churchill, had what can be characterized as an unhealthy preoccupation with Scandinavia, particularly Norway. Hitler was extremely proud of having pulled off the “sauciest” military operation of the war, against virtually all military principles except surprise and against the almost unanimous views of the renowned German General Staff. He undoubtedly viewed Norway as a trophy attesting to his military genius and wanted to protect that trophy at nearly any cost. He continued to maintain, “Norway is the zone of destiny in this war” and demanded unconditional obedience to all edicts pertaining to its defense.5 Concern about Norway after the British/Norwegian commando raid on Vågsø in December 1941 was the reason for ordering the battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen to make the famous Channel dash in February 1942 and for subsequently stationing most of the German fleet in Norway.

  Was this expenditure of resources warranted by the advantages obtained? Let us first look at what is considered a primary motive for Hitler’s move against Norway, iron ore. While the harbor facilities in Narvik were so damaged that the first shipments of iron ore from that port could not tale place for over seven months, the Germans shipped over 600,000 tons through Narvik in 1941. This amounted to no more than 25% of what had flowed through that port in 1939 but by 1943, it was back up to 1.8 million tons. Shipments from Swedish ports more than compensated for the reduced volume going through Narvik. While the successful German offensive in the west secured a 14 million ton annual supply of iron ore from the French and Luxembourg mines, Hubatsch claims that the flow of Swedish ore made the great battles of 1942-44 possible for the Germans.

  While the German Navy obtained bases for a wider starting line against the British, the problem was that the naval losses sustained in the invasion and the cancellation of most of the building program in the famous Z plan, made obtaining these bases rather meaningless. Furthermore, the German Navy acquired excellent harbors on the Atlantic after the fall of France but this could also not have been anticipated. The advantages secured by a less restricted access to the Atlantic were countered by the British occupation of Iceland in May 1940. Aircraft operating from Iceland and the Faeroe Islands were able to patrol the gateways to the Atlantic, including the strait between Iceland and Greenland. While the movement of the heavy units of the German fleet to the fjords of northern Norway in 1942 presented a potent threat against the Murmansk convoys, the concentration of most of the German fleet in Norwegian waters was welcomed by the Royal Navy.

  German occupation of Norway complicated British blockade measures. They were also forced to prepare to defend against air and naval threats from the Scandinavian Peninsula. However, these threats were more than offset by the resources Germany needed to employ to defend against the reverse threat of Allied raids and possible invasion.

  Nevertheless, all of this fails to address adequately the question of advantages versus disadvantages. We have to place ourselves in the position of the German planners and ask what the situation would have been for the Germans if the Allies had seized strategic points in Norway. This would have allowed them to exert pressure on Sweden and Finland and eliminate Swedish export of iron ore to Germany. Allied air power would be more effective in the Baltic and over German ports on the southern shores of that sea. An Allied presence in Norway would probably have kept Finland from joining Germany in its attack on the Soviet Union and Stalin would not have had to worry about an Arctic front or a threat to his supply line from the United States. While the wisdom of the German preoccupation with Norway was an advantage or an unnecessary drain on its resources is debatable, Hitler was not paranoid when he concluded that an Allied occupation of Norway would be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war.

  Those in Germany who secretly hoped for a failure in Norway that would weaken Hitler’s hold on power were silenced. In fact, the stunning success strengthened Hitler’s popularity. His military advisers became increasingly reluctant to argue against his plans. To some, he took on the qualities of a genius. The incidents of Hitler losing his nerve when confronting the possibility of failure were forgotten in the elation of success and they did not resurface as serious issues until the military reverses in the east and in North Africa. Hitler’s international standing was also elevated by the series of military successes from Poland, to Norway, to the Low Countries and France. This was offset by the hardening of public opinion against Germany in neutral countries, particularly in the United States.

  The initial effect on the British was negative. Their inability to confront the Germans successfully in Norway reduced their standing as a military power and this was reinforced by the calamity in France. In a strange twist of history, Churchill, who was largely responsible for some of the most serious mistakes in Norway not only survived politically but also became Prime Minister. His eloquence and determination became factors of immense importance as he became the personification of Allied determination to prevail. Churchill himself was surprised by his political survival. In the initial draft about these events he wrote, “it was a marvel–I really do not know how–I survived and maintained my position in public esteem while all the blame was thrown on poor Mr. Chamberlain.”6

  The British put their lessons from Norway to good use but there remained resistance to the recognition of the problems and the necessary corrective actions. Although Churchill had toyed with the idea of restructuring the cumbersome command structure earlier, the fiasco in Norway gave impetus to the effort. The reorganization did away with some of the maze of committees involved in planning and decision-making. A Ministry of Defense was created and a system of theater commanders was established. These reorganizations eliminated some of the most serious command structure problems that had plagued the operations in Norway.

  The operational lessons were also taken to heart. British troops were not again sent into battle in the sad state that they were in Norway. There was increased emphasis on training. The problem of close air support for g
round troops was addressed and it became an increasingly important factor in future operations. The British were impressed by the innovative German use of airborne and air assault forces to seize airfields and this gave an impetus to the development of similar capabilities.

  While the lessons from the Norwegian campaign led to important improvements in the planning and conduct of combined operations, their importance should not be overstated. As Kersaudy points out, some of the mistakes were repeated at Dakar, Crete, and Dieppe and it was only through the resistance of military advisers, that Churchill was kept from carrying out major landings in Norway later in the war.

  Improved inter-allied cooperation and coordination was forced on the British more by the developing situation than by lessons learned from Norway. As the war became worldwide, the British sometimes found themselves in the unaccustomed situation of being a junior member of a coalition of great powers. This uncomfortable position required a revision of some traditional thinking and the establishment of new command structures. The eventual success of the more compromising approach was due in large measure to the leadership of Churchill and Roosevelt. They recognized that coalition warfare requires compromises and accepted the necessity that coalition goals take precedence over more parochial ones.

  The Allies obtained the willing service of the 4.8 million ton Norwegian merchant fleet. The service and sacrifice of this fleet was a vital factor in the survival of Britain, particularly in the critical period 1940-1942.

  The German invasion had a profound effect on Norwegian policies over the next two generations. There was no return to the policy of neutrality. Norway embraced collective security and became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While Norway has elected not to become a member of the European Union, there remains strong support for the traditional security system that came into being after the war.

  Maps

  Ships passing in the night. On April 8, 1940, German flotillas, in a surprise operation, were able to slip through the teeth of British naval superiority to begin the invasion of Norway.

  Above: British warships attacking the Germans on the approaches to Narvik. Below: The Battle of Bjørnefjell on April 16 saw German troops surprising and defeating a larger Norwegian force, thus securing the all-important railway line to Sweden.

  The Battle of Tretten, in which the Germans defeated a combined British-Norwegian force, and the British 148th Brigade all but ceased to exist.

  The area between Trondheim, Norway’s ancient capital (bottom), and the city of Namsos (top).

  The region south of Narvik along Norway’s central west coast.

  The Allies repeatedly attempted to break the German grip on Narvik until events in France forced efforts to cease.

  Norwegian forces persisted in attacking after the Allied evacuation had begun, but finally capitulated to the Germans on June 10, 1940.

  The British evacuation that culiminated in the loss of the Glorious.

  COMMAND STRUCTURES

  Allied Command Structure in Norway

  1 General Massy never left London but operated from the War Office. British commanders in Central Norway did not command naval or air forces associated with their operations. Those forces took their orders from their respective service.

  2 Scissorforce and Colonel Gubbins remained under General Massy’s command until May 7 when the command was transferred to General Auchinleck.

  3 Initially, Admiral Cork commanded only the naval forces and reported to the Admiralty. Major General Mackesy, replaced by Lieutenant General Auchinleck on May 16, reported to General Ironside. Admiral Cork assumed command of both sea and land forces on April 20.

  4 All naval forces operating within 100 nautical miles of Harstad.

  5 Lieutenant General Auchinleck assumed command from Major General Mackesy on May 16.

  6 Brigadier Fraser commanded the 24th Guards until he was evacuated to England at which time Gubbins, promoted to brevet Brigadier General, assumed command of that unit as well as the Independent Companies.

  German Command Structure for Operations in Norway

  1 Weserübung Süd, under General Kaupisch, was subordinate to von Falkenhorst until April 12 when it was placed under OKH.

  2 The Battle Fleet operated under the orders of Group West in the North Sea but directly under OKM for operations in the Atlantic.

  3 The submarine command was subordinate to OKM but parts were under the operational control of the Fleet Commander during fleet operations.

  4 Boehm was subordinate to von Falkenhorst within Norway but he was subordinate to OKM for naval operations.

  5 General Dietl (3rd Mountain Division) operated directly under OKW in the period April 18 to May 5.

  6 General von Falkenhorst did not command the air forces in Norway. General Milch’s 5th Air Fleet absorbed Air Corps X as well as the territorial air commands within Norway. Geissler was not subordinate to Falkenhorst. Theoretically, all requests had to go through the chain of command but after the establishment of regional air commands, many requests were handled laterally between army and air force commands.

  Norwegian Command Structure1

  1 This is the command structure in North Norway that became effective after the reorganization in late May. Before hostilities, the army and navy commanders (General Laake and Admiral Diesen) reported directly to the Ministry of Defense and General Fleischer, like the other division commanders, reported to the army commander. After hostilities commenced, Fleischer became commander-in-chief in North Norway and reported directly to the Ministry of Defense.

  2 While commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Ruge continued to also occupy the position as commander of the army. The two headquarters operated as one.

  3 Admiral Diesen had placed himself and his forces under General Ruge’s command during the campaign in Central Norway. The May reorganization made this arrangement official.

  4 As a result of the reorganization, 6th District Command became the army’s support organization, responsible for supporting all army organizations. It was directed to separate out a staff, which would concentrate its efforts on supporting General Fleischer’s forces.

  OPERATIONAL CODE NAMES

  Alphabet Allied evacuation of Narvik in May/June 1940.

  Avonmouth Planned Allied expedition to Narvik and the Swedish iron ore districts.

  Biene German operation to clear out Norwegian naval units along the Nordland coast and open a coastal supply route for General Feurstein’s forces..

  Büffel German relief operation through the mountains between Bodø and Narvik.

  Catherine Plan for British fleet in the Baltic to sever German’s supply of Swedish iron ore.

  Juno German naval operation against shipping off North Norway.

  Hammer Planned Allied attack on Trondheim.

  Maurice Allied operation against Trondheim from Namsos. Force involved was called Mauriceforce.

  Naumburg German plan to land forces in West Finnmark and Bardufoss for relief to Narvik.

  Plymouth Allied plan for operations against the Germans in southern Sweden.

  R4 Allied plan to occupy Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger in conjunction with Operation Wilfred when German intention to land in Norway was evident.

  Royal Marine Allied plan to drop mines in the Rhine River and its channels simultaneous with Operation Wilfred.

  Rupert Allied operations to recapture Narvik. Units involved were labeled Rupertforce.

  Scissorforce British Independent Companies operating in Nordland Province.

  Sickle Operation against Trondheim from Åndalsnes. Force was labeled Sickleforce.

  Stratford Allied plan in February 1940 to occupy Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger

  Weserübung German operations against Denmark and Norway. Weserübung Sud = Denmark and Weserübung Nord = Norway.

  Wildente German amphibious and air assault operation against Hemnesberget.

  Wilfred Allied mining operations in
Norwegian territorial waters.

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  The Norwegian language contains three letters–æ, ø, and å–that appear at the end of its alphabet. To avoid confusion, they are given here in the English language alphabetical order.

  *Adams, Jack. The Doomed Expedition. The Norwegian Campaign of 1940. London: Leo Cooper, 1989.

  Aftenposten. June 6, 1945 and June 14, 2005.

  *Ash, Bernard. Norway 1940. London: Cassell, 1964.

  Askim, Per. Rapport fra sjefen for Norge og Ofotavdelingen til Kommanderende Admiral av 20 april 1940. Six page typed manuscript.

  *Assmann, Kurt. The German Campaign in Norway. Admiralty: Naval Staff, 1948.

  Baudouin, Paul. Neuf mois au gouvernement. Paris: Table Ronde, 1948.

  Berg, Johan Helge and Olav Vollan. Fjellkrigen 1940. Lapphaugen–Bjørnefjell. Trondheim: Wennbergs Trykkeri A.S., 1999.

  Berg, Johan Helge and Olav Vollan. I Trønderbataljonens fotspor–50 år etter. Trondheim: Wennbergs trykkeri, 1990.