Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Chapter 1

  1 J. L. Moulton, A Study of Warfare in Three Dimensions: The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 (Athens, Ohio: The Ohio University Press, 1967), p. 44.

  2 Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 536.

  3 William Norton Medlicott, The Economic Blockade (London: HMSO 1952-59), vol. 1, chapter 4 Section 6.

  4 Memorandum by the War Economy and Armament Division of the OKW, dated February 22, 1940, contained in Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy 1940 (Translated and printed by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., 1947), vol. 1, pp. 18-19.

  5 Maurice Harvey. Scandinavian Misadventure (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount, 1990), p.33.

  6 Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 544-547.

  7 Ibid, 544-545.

  8 United Kingdom Public Record Office (PRO), War Cabinet (CAB), 66/5 WP (40) 60, 19 February 1940.

  9 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 546.

  10 See Patrick Cosgrave, Churchill at War, alone 1939–1940 (London, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 120-128.

  11 Bjørnsen, Narvik 1940 (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1980), p. 55.

  12 An investigation by the Norwegian Navy was inconclusive. It could not ascertain with certainty that the sinking of two of the three ships took place within Norwegian territorial waters. They felt relatively certain that Deptford was sunk in territorial waters. This sinking claimed 30 lives, including two Norwegian pilots. It was determined during the Nuremberg Trial that the German submarine U38 had sunk all three ships.

  13 Letter from Ambassador Wollbæk on January 12, 1940, quoted in E. A. Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945. 1. Sjøforsvarets nøytralitetsvern 1939-1940. Tysklands og Vestmaktenes planer og forbe-redelser for en Norgesaksjon (Oslo: Den Krigshistoriske Avdeling, Forsvarstaben. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1954–1958), p. 57.

  14 François Kersaudy, Norway 1940 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1987), p. 24.

  15 The Swedish Cabinet Secretary, Erik Boehman, had a stormy meeting with Pollock, the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Stockholm about the British note. Boehman asked Pollock if the British Government had not already sufficient number of small nations, whose destinies they had ruined, on their conscience (PRO, CAB 66/3, January 7, 1940). Bjørn Prytz, the Swedish Ambassador in London, espoused a completely different line after having delivered the Swedish protest to Halifax. In commenting on Boehman’s outburst in a conversation with Charles Hambro in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Prytz mentioned that he personally felt that the British should carry out their threatened action. He stated that the Norwegians would only complain loudly and try to blame Sweden (PRO, FO 371, 24820 WM (40) 7 CA, January 9, 1940).

  16 Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly (eds), Time Unguarded. The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940 (New York: David MacKay Company, Inc., 1963), p., 228.

  17 Sir John Kennedy, The Business of war: The War Narrative of Sir John Kennedy (Edited by Bernard Fergusson. London: Hutchinson, 1957), p. 49.

  18 Ibid, 48.

  19 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 1, p. 69.

  20 The armed merchant ship Westerwald, flying the German naval flag, had been allowed to proceed through Norwegian territorial waters without inspection after a decision by the Norwegian Foreign Office. It was also allowed to proceed through the restricted area around Bergen under escort during daylight hours.

  21 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 561.

  22 Each torpedo boat had a crew of 21. Kjell had one 76mm (3-inch) gun and three torpedo tubes. Skarv had two 47mm cannons and three torpedo tubes. The patrol boat Firern arrived on the scene during the confrontation. This 247-ton vessel with a crew of 12 and a single 76mm gun did not change the enormous odds facing the Norwegians.

  23 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940–1945, vol. 1, p.71.

  24 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 562. The British later claimed that Captain Vian suggested the joint escort to Bergen to Lieutenant Halvorsen during their conference. Halvorsen denied that any such exchange had taken place. Churchill sent his orders to Vian at 1725 hours and it is therefore unlikely that Vian had these instructions at the time he talked to Halvorsen.

  25 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol.1, p. 90.

  26 Churchill, 564.

  27 Steen, 1:99. It should be noted that Germany also violated Norwegian neutrality during this period. A German submarine–U21–ran aground in Norwegian territorial waters on March 27, and it was captured and interned. A German aircraft made a forced landing in Norway on April 3. The crew destroyed the aircraft before they were captured by Norwegian forces.

  28 Christopher Buckley, Norway. The Commandos. Dieppe, 13.

  29 Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 584.

  30 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol 1, p. 166.

  31 Ibid, vol 1, p. 106.

  32 Bjørnsen, Narvik, pp. 222-223.

  33 Ibid, p. 220.

  34 The actual composition of the various cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas changed frequently, as ships were attached or detached.

  35 PRO, CAB 65/6 WM (40) 83, April 6, 1940. Also, Bjørnsen, Narvik, pp. 182 and 223.

  36 Kersaudy, 26.

  Chapter 2

  1 Basil H. Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1971), p. 52.

  2 Wolfgang Wegener, Die Seestrategie des Weltkriges (Berlin: E. Mittler & Sohn, 1929), p. 49.

  3 The Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935 fixed German naval tonnage at one-third of the British fleet. However, the German Navy’s desire to play a major role is demonstrated by the Z Plan, which called for the construction, by 1945, of 10 battleships, 13 pocket battleships (Panzerschiffe), four aircraft carriers, five heavy cruisers, 44 light cruisers, 68 destroyers, 249 large, medium, and small submarines, and 90 torpedo boats. Hans-Martin Ottmer, Weserübung. Der deutsche Angriff auf Dänemark und Norwegen im April 1940 (Oldenburg: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1994), p.13.

  4 Kenneth P. Hansen, “Raeder Versus Wegener: Conflict in German Naval Strategy,” in Naval War College Review, September 22, 2005. Raeder was godfather to one of Wegener’s children and describes him as an intimate friend in his memoirs, but they developed such an animosity that Raeder refused to deliver the eulogy at Wegener’s funeral in 1956.

  5 Quoted in Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organization, Conflict, and Innovation. A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning 1888-1940. (Lunde: Esselte Studium), pp. 286-287.

  6 Gemzell writes, “Moreover, the results of our investigation make it possible to establish with certainty that, from the start of the war, Carls was greatly involved in the Scandinavian question and advanced opinion about the importance of bases in Denmark and Norway.” (Organization, p. 381)

  7 Erich Raeder, My Life (Henry W. Drexel, transl. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960), p. 300.

  8 Michael Salewski writes, “The ‘Norwegian case’ remained, as already demonstrated, permanently in the considerations of the Naval Staff since 1937” (Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945. Volume I. 1935-1941 [Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1970], p.177).

  9 International Military Tribunal (IMT), Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Nuremberg: 1947-49), vol. 14, pp. 85-86.

  10 See Carl-Axel Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien. Der Kamp für einen Maritimen Operations-plan (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1975), pp. 301-308 and 380 for detailed discussions of these events. Also Ottmer, Weserübung, pp. 17-20.

  11 IMT, Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 14, pp. 85-86.

  12 IMT, Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 14, p. 86. An entry in the Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945 (hereinafter KTBS), for October 3, 1939 confirms Raeder’s testimony and treats the questions that needed to be answered by the study in more detail. See also IMT, document C-122, GB-8.

  13 The document titled “Überlegungen zur Frage der Stützpunktgewinnung für die Nordsee-
Kriegführung” appears in Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, vol 1, pp. 563-565.

  14 KTBS, October 9, 1939 and Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol 1, pp. 126-127.

  15 Fuehrer Conferences On Matters Dealing With the German Navy 1939 (Translated and printed by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 12-14.

  16 Fuhrer Conferences, December 8, 1939, p. 46.

  17 Ralph Hewins, Quisling. Prophet without Honour (New York: John Day Company, 1966), pp. 178-179.

  18 Letters between Admirals Böhm and Schniewind as quoted in Gemzell, Organization, p. 389 n. 43.

  19 Gemzell, Skandinavien, p. 270.

  20 Hans-Dietrich Loock, Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven. Zur Vorgeschicte und Geschichte der national-sozialistischen Revolution in Norwegen (Stuttgart: Deutsch Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), pp. 207-209.

  21 IMT, Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 14, pp. 92-93.

  22 Fuehrer Conferences 1939. Annex 1–Minutes of a Conference on December 11, 1939 at 1200, p. 56.

  23 Fuehrer Conferences, p. 54.

  24 Loock, Quisling, p. 371.

  25 Fuehrer Conferences 1939, p. 54.

  26 Hewins (Prophet without Honor, p. 179) reports that the first meeting between Hitler and Quisling took place on December 15 but this is apparently an error. The Jodl Diary gives the date of the first meeting as December 13, but this is also most likely a mistake since Raeder’s handwritten note at the bottom of the letter he received from Rosenberg on December 13, refers to the meeting scheduled for December 14.

  27 This according to Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest. The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958, p. 88.

  28 Entry in the Jodl Diary for December 13–a probable error in date as already noted–and in the Halder Diary, dated December 14, 1939.

  29 Churchill, 537 and 564. [add title]

  30 IMT, 14:95.

  31 There has been considerable speculation about what was discussed at a meeting between Colonel Hans Piekenbrock, Chief of the Abwehr’s espionage section (Abwehr 1–Nachritenbeschaffung) and Quisling at the Hotel d’Angleterre in Copenhagen on April 4, 1940. There is no evidence that Quisling was informed about the impending invasion. The Germans made a mention of this meeting (see IMT, Trials of the Major War Criminals, vol. 14, p. 41) but they also state, “Quisling and Hagelin, according to orders, could not be informed of the imminence and the time of operation.” See also Walter Hubatsch, Die deutsch Bezetsung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940. Gottingen: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1952, p. 55 and n. 33 on that page. It is more likely that the meeting was an attempt by the Germans to see if Quisling knew anything that would indicate an intelligence leak. To tell Quisling about the operation five days before the landings would be very reckless and not in keeping with the security measures adopted to protect the whole venture. It would have been contrary to specific orders issued by Hitler on February 29, 1940.

  32 Fuehrer Conferences 1939, p. 62.

  33 Hubatsch, Die deutsch Bezetsung, pp. 40-41.

  34 Ib Damegaard Petersen, “Aksen OKW-OKM”, in Historisk Tidsskrift. Copenhagen: 1966, 12. Række, 2:1:92-122. It appears Gemzell (Organization, pp. 397-399) supports the views expressed by Petersen.

  35 Gemzell, Skandinavien, p.227 and Organization, p. 399.

  36 Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff 1657-1945. New York: Praeger, 1957, p. 371.

  37 However, an entry in the Halder Diary for February 21 states that von Falkenhorst had been placed in charge of preparations for the Norwegian operation and that Hq. XXI Corps would be placed under OKW “in order to avoid trouble with the air force.” There is also a note by Halder, “Not a single word has passed between the Fuehrer and ObdH [Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch] on this matter, this must be put on record for the history of the war. I shall make a point of noting down the first time the subject is broached, not until 2 March.”

  38 General von Falkenhorst was tried and found guilty of war crimes by an American–British–Norwegian military tribunal in 1946 and sentenced to death. The sentence was subsequently reduced to 20 years’ imprisonment. He was released from prison in 1953 because of health problems. Von Falkenhorst died in 1968. xxxix Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 1, pp. 134-135.

  40 Kurt Assmann, The German Campaign in Norway. Admiralty: Naval Staff, 1948, p. 4 n. 7. See also, Jodl Diary, 5 and 7 March 1940.

  41 Hans-Guenther Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs aus den Jahren 1934/35 und 1939/40. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1956, p.102.

  42 Fuehrer Conferences 1940, February 23, 1940, vol. 1, p. 14.

  43 John W. Wheeler-Bennet, The Nemesis of Power. The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. New York: St Martin’s Press, Inc., 1954, p. 494.

  44 Fuehrer Conferences 1940, March 9, 1940, vol. 1, p. 20.

  45 KTBS, March 10, 1940.

  46 Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, p. 147. As the Norwegian operation was underway (April 29), Hitler ordered severe curtailment in the navy’s shipbuilding program. Construction on two aircraft carriers, one battleship, and three light cruisers was terminated.

  47 Entry in Jodl’s Diary for March 14, 1940: “Ob.d.M. ist zweifelhaft, ob es jestz noch wichtig ist, in N. das preventive zu spielen. Fraglich ob man nicht Gelb vor Weserübung machen soll.” By hinting at delaying the attack on Norway until after the attack in the West, Raeder was obviously thinking that the very hazardous operation in Norway might not be necessary if the attack in the West was successful. See also Jodl’s Diary entries for March 21 and 28, 1940.

  48 See Fuehrer Conferences 1940, “Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer on 9 March 1940 at 1200”, vol. 1, pp. 20-21 and “Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer in the Afternoon of 26 March 1940”, vol I, pp. 22-24.

  49 Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945. Washington, D.C.: Department of Army Pamphlet 20-271, 1959, p.20.

  50 Fuehrer Conferences 1940, March 29, 1940, vol. 1, p. 29.

  51 Gruppe XXI Kriegstagesbuch (hereinafter XXIKTB), 1 April 1940 as quoted in Ziemke, German Northern Theater, pp. 21-22.

  52 Extract from the Private Diary of Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, April 9, 1940, p. 17, quoted in Hubatsch, Appendix J, 454.

  53 Quoted in Ziemke, 32.

  54 Admiral Carls’ assessment of the situation in the evening of April 7, 1940. Quoted in Steen, 1:149.

  Chapter 3

  1 Ladislas Fargo, The Game of the Foxes (New York: D. McKay Co., 1971), pp. 431-436.

  2 David Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), p. 94.

  3 Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1968), p. 320.

  4 Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler, p. 321, and Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, The Canaris Conspiracy. The Secret Resistance to Hitler in the German Army (New York: Pinnacle Books, 1972), pp. 122-123. Stang was not a member of Nasjonal Samling at this time but joined that party after his return to Norway. In the trials following World War 2 Stang was prosecuted for failing to forward Sas’ warning. He claimed that he had not knowingly kept this information from the Norwegian Government and the court found him innocent of this charge. However, he was sentenced to four years of hard labor because of his party membership.

  5 This and the other intelligence reports received by the Norwegian Naval Staff and used in this book are copied in Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 1, pp. 199-204.

  6 Ottmer, Weserübung, p. 61.

  7 “Norge visste, ingen gjorde noe,” Aftenposten, June 14, 2005.

  8 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1970), p. 114.

  9 Admiral Diesen had ordered his forces to the highest state of alert on a couple of occasions during the winter when the situation appeared threatening. He had received a reprimand from t
he Foreign Minister on the last occasion and this may have contributed to his lack of enthusiasm for taking this step, but his own views of the nature of the threat were probably of equal importance.

  10 Bjørnson, Narvik, p. 210.

  11 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 459.

  12 PRO, FO 371/24815 N 3602/2/63. Laurence Collier, considered a Norwegian expert, was Dormer’s designated replacement as British representative in Norway.

  13 T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: HMSO, 1952), p. 26.

  14 Harvey, Scandinavian Misadventure, p. 56.

  15 The Home Fleet in Scapa Flow consisted of two battleships, one battle cruiser, three cruisers (including one French), and 12 destroyers (including two French). Another battleship and an aircraft carrier (without fighters) were on their way from Clyde to join the fleet. In addition, there was the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth with two light cruisers and eight destroyers. One battle cruiser, one heavy cruiser and 16 destroyers were at sea or off Norway’s northern coast. Then there was the 18th Cruiser Squadron consisting of two heavy cruisers and five destroyers in the North Sea along with one large minelayer and four destroyers. The addition of four cruisers and two destroyers (1st Cruiser Squadron) was not a significant augmentation in view of the damage the disembarkation of troops caused to Allied plans for landing troops in Norway.