8 Vaihinger, Zum Jubiläum von Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
9 This is Kant's statement, though it is not quite accurate. See Adamson, On the Philosophy of Kant. That Kant knew Hume's Treatise on Human Nature seems to follow from Hamann's Metakritik über den Purismus der reinen Vernunft, note.
10 What I mean by this, may be seen in the last Lecture of the Second Series of my Lectures on the Science of Language, delivered in 1867 (ed. 1880, Vol. II., seq.); in my article On the Origin of Reason, Contemporary Review, February, 1878; my Lectures on Mr. Darwin's Philosophy of Language, Fraser's Magazine, May, 1873; also in Professor Noiré's works, Der Ursprung der Sprache, 1877; and Max Müller and the Philosophy of Language (Longmans, 1879). One important problem, in the solution of which I differ from Kant, or rather give a new application to Kant's own principles, has been fully treated in my Hibbert Lectures, 1878, pp. 30 seq. All this may now be seen more fully treated in my Science of Thought, 1887.
11 Gildemeister, Hamann's Leben und Schriften, Vol. III.
12 See Noiré, in Die Gegenwart, June 23, 1881.
13 Critique.
14 Critique.
15 Critique of Pure Reason.
16 Critique.
17 Ibid.
18 He died November, 1881.
19 Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, zum hundertjährigen Jubiläum derselben, herausgegeben von Dr. H. Vaihinger. Stuttgart, 1881.
20 Zum Jubiläum von Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, von H. Vaihinger, Separatabdruck aus der Wochenschrift Im neuen Reich, 1881, No. 23.
21 Revue des deux Mondes, 1879, Août.
22 Jacobi's Works, Vol. II.
23 'En général la vigueur de l'esprit, soit dans la politique, soit dans la science, ne se déploie dans toute sa plénitude qu'à l'âge où l'activité vitale vient à s'affaiblir.' E. Saisset, L'me et la Vie.
24 See Critique.
25 See Critique of Pure Reason, Supp. XXVII.
26 See Kehrbach, Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
27 Erdmann.
28 See Erdmann.
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Translator's Preface to Second Edition
So much has been done of late towards a critical restoration of the text of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that it was impossible to republish my translation without a thorough revision. Scholars who are acquainted with the circumstances under which Kant's work was originally written and printed will easily understand why the text of his Critique should have required so many corrections and conjectural emendations. Not being able myself to find out all that had been written on this subject in successive editions of Kant's works and in various articles scattered about in German philosophical journals, I had the good fortune to secure the help of Dr. Erich Adickes, well known by his edition of Kant's Critique, published in 1889, and now engaged in preparing a new critical text under the auspices of the Royal Academy of Berlin. Dr. Adickes has not only given me the benefit of all the really important various readings and emendations which will form part of his standard edition, but he has also pointed out to me passages in which I seemed to have misapprehended the exact meaning of Kant's peculiar and often very ambiguous style.
That emendations of Kant's text are often of great importance for a right understanding of his philosophical arguments can easily be seen from the list given in Dr. Adickes' edition of Kant's Critique. Here we find, for instance, such mistakes as:
helfen Instead of fehlen
erfolgt Instead of verfolgt
alle Instead of allein
Realität Instead of Idealität
veränderlich Instead of teilbar
Einsicht Instead of Einheit
reinen Instead of keinen
priori Instead of posteriori
einer Instead of seiner
Anleitung Instead of Ableitung
Antithese Instead of These
eine Instead of keine
phaenomenon Instead of nooumenon
alle Instead of als
Ungrund Instead of Urgrund
More perplexing even than these gross mistakes are smaller inaccuracies, such as ihr instead of sie, sie instead of ihn, den instead of dem, noch instead of nach, which frequently form very serious impediments in the right construction of a sentence.
I cannot conclude this preface without an Ave, pia anima to my departed friend, Professor Ludwig Noiré, who encouraged and helped me when, in commemoration of the centenary of its first publication, I undertook the translation of Kant's Critique. The Introduction which he contributed, his Sketch of the Development of Philosophy from the Eleatics to Kant, seemed to me indeed the most valuable part of my book, and the most likely to remain as a lasting monument of my friend's comprehensive knowledge and clear understanding of the historical evolution of philosophy. Though it has been left out in this second edition, I hope it may soon be republished as an independent work.
F. MAX MÜLLER.
OXFORD, November, 1896.
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Introduction
I
The Idea of Transcendental Philosophy
[EXPERIENCE1 is no doubt the first product of our understanding, while employed in fashioning the raw material of our sensations. It is therefore our first instruction, and in its progress so rich in new lessons that the chain of all future generations will never be in want of new information that may be gathered on that field. Nevertheless, experience is by no means the only field to which our understanding can be confined. Experience tells us what is, but not that it must be necessarily as it is, and not otherwise. It therefore never gives us any really general truths, and our reason, which is particularly anxious for that class of knowledge, is roused by it rather than satisfied. General truths, which at the same time bear the character of an inward necessity, must be independent of experience,—clear and certain by themselves. They are therefore called knowledge a priori, while what is simply taken from experience is said to be, in ordinary parlance, known a posteriori or empirically only.
Now it appears, and this is extremely curious, that even with our experiences different kinds of knowledge are mixed up, which must have their origin a priori, and which perhaps serve only to produce a certain connection between our sensuous representations. For even if we remove from experience everything that belongs to the senses, there remain nevertheless certain original concepts, and certain judgments derived from them, which must have had their origin entirely a priori, and independent of all experience, because it is owing to them that we are able, or imagine we are able, to predicate more of the objects of our senses than can be learnt from mere experience, and that our propositions contain real generality and strict necessity, such as mere empirical knowledge can never supply.]
But2 what is still more extraordinary is this, that certain kinds of knowledge leave the field of all possible experience, and seem to enlarge the sphere of our judgments beyond the limits of experience by means of concepts to which experience can never supply any corresponding objects.
And it is in this very kind of knowledge which transcends the world of the senses, and where experience can neither guide nor correct us, that reason prosecutes its investigations, which by their importance we consider far more excellent and by their tendency far more elevated than anything the understanding can find in the sphere of phenomena. Nay, we risk rather anything, even at the peril of error, than that we should surrender such investigations, either on the ground of their uncertainty, or from any feeling of indifference or contempt.3
Now it might seem natural that, after we have left the solid ground of experience, we should not at once proceed to erect an edifice with knowledge which we possess without knowing whence it came, and trust to principles the origin of which is unknown, without having made sure of the safety of the foundations by means of careful examination. It would seem natural, I say, that philosophers should first of all have asked the question how the mere understanding could arrive at all this knowl
edge a priori, and what extent, what truth, and what value it could possess. If we take natural to mean what is just and reasonable, then indeed nothing could be more natural. But if we understand by natural what takes place ordinarily, then, on the contrary, nothing is more natural and more intelligible than that this examination should have been neglected for so long a time. For one part of this knowledge, namely, the mathematical, has always been in possession of perfect trustworthiness; and thus produces a favourable presumption with regard to other parts also, although these may be of a totally different nature. Besides, once beyond the precincts of experience, and we are certain that experience can never contradict us, while the charm of enlarging our knowledge is so great that nothing will stop our progress until we encounter a clear contradiction. This can be avoided if only we are cautious in our imaginations, which nevertheless remain what they are, imaginations only. How far we can advance independent of all experience in a priori knowledge is shown by the brilliant example of mathematics. It is true they deal with objects and knowledge so far only as they can be represented in intuition. But this is easily overlooked, because that intuition itself may be given a priori, and be difficult to distinguish from a pure concept. Thus inspirited by a splendid proof of the power of reason, the desire of enlarging our knowledge sees no limits. The light dove, piercing in her easy flight the air and perceiving its resistance, imagines that flight would be easier still in empty space. It was thus that Plato left the world of sense, as opposing so many hindrances to our understanding, and ventured beyond on the wings of his ideas into the empty space of pure understanding. He did not perceive that he was making no progress by these endeavours, because he had no resistance as a fulcrum on which to rest or to apply his powers, in order to cause the understanding to advance. It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only to enquire whether the foundation be sure. Then all sorts of excuses are made in order to assure us as to its solidity, or to decline altogether such a late and dangerous enquiry. The reason why during the time of building we feel free from all anxiety and suspicion and believe in the apparent solidity of our foundation, is this:—A great, perhaps the greatest portion of what our reason finds to do consists in the analysis of our concepts of objects. This gives us a great deal of knowledge which, though it consists in no more than in simplifications and explanations of what is comprehended in our concepts (though in a confused manner), is yet considered as equal, at least in form, to new knowledge. It only separates and arranges our concepts, it does not enlarge them in matter or contents. As by this process we gain a kind of real knowledge a priori, which progresses safely and usefully, it happens that our reason; without being aware of it, appropriates under that pretence propositions of a totally different character, adding to given concepts new and strange ones a priori, without knowing whence they come, nay without even thinking of such a question. I shall therefore at the very outset treat of the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge.
Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments
In all judgments in which there is a relation between subject and predicate (I speak of affirmative judgments only, the application to negative ones being easy), that relation can be of two kinds. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something contained (though covertly) in the concept A; or B lies outside the sphere of the concept A, though somehow connected with it. In the former case I call the judgment analytical, in the latter synthetical. Analytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is conceived through identity, while others in which that connection is conceived without identity, may be called synthetical. The former might be called illustrating, the latter expanding judgments, because in the former nothing is added by the predicate to the concept of the subject, but the concept is only divided into its constituent concepts which were always conceived as existing within it, though confusedly; while the latter add to the concept of the subject a predicate not conceived as existing within it, and not to be extracted from it by any process of mere analysis. If I say, for instance, All bodies are extended, this is an analytical judgment. I need not go beyond the concept connected with the name of body, in order to find that extension is connected with it. I have only to analyse that concept and become conscious of the manifold elements always contained in it, in order to find that predicate. This is therefore an analytical judgment. But if I say, All bodies are heavy, the predicate is something quite different from what I think as the mere concept of body. The addition of such a predicate gives us a synthetical judgment.
[It becomes clear from this,4
[1. That our knowledge is in no way extended by analytical judgments, but that all they effect is to put the concepts which we possess into better order and render them more intelligible.
2. That in synthetical judgments I must have besides the concept of the subject something else (x) on which the understanding relies in order to know that a predicate, not contained in the concept, nevertheless belongs to it.
In empirical judgments this causes no difficulty, because this x is here simply the complete experience of an object which I conceive by the concept A, that concept forming one part only of my experience. For though I do not include the predicate of gravity in the general concept of body, that concept nevertheless indicates the complete experience through one of its parts, so that I may add other parts also of the same experience, all belonging to that concept. I may first, by an analytical process, realise the concept of body through the predicates of extension, impermeability, form, etc., all of which are contained in it. Afterwards I expand my knowledge, and looking back to the experience from which my concept of body was abstracted, I find gravity always connected with the before-mentioned predicates. Experience therefore is the x which lies beyond the concept A, and on which rests the possibility of a synthesis of the predicate of gravity B with the concept A.]
In synthetical judgments a priori, however, that help is entirely wanting. If I want to go beyond the concept A in order to find another concept B connected with it, where is there anything on which I may rest and through which a synthesis might become possible, considering that I cannot have the advantage of looking about in the field of experience? Take the proposition that all which happens has its cause. In the concept of something that happens I no doubt conceive of something existing preceded by time, and from this certain analytical judgments may be deduced. But the concept of cause is entirely outside that concept, and indicates something different from that which happens, and is by no means contained in that representation. How can I venture then to predicate of that which happens something totally different from it, and to represent the concept of cause, though not contained in it, as belonging to it, and belonging to it by necessity? What is here the unknown x, on which the understanding may rest in order to find beyond the concept A a foreign predicate B, which nevertheless is believed to be connected with it? It cannot be experience, because the proposition that all which happens has its cause represents this second predicate as added to the subject not only with greater generality than experience can ever supply, but also with a character of necessity, and therefore purely a priori, and based on concepts. All our speculative knowledge a priori aims at and rests on such synthetical, i.e. expanding propositions, for the analytical are no doubt very important and necessary, yet only in order to arrive at that clearness of concepts which is requisite for a safe and wide synthesis, serving as a really new addition to what we possess already.
[We5 have here a certain mystery6 before us, which must be cleared up before any advance into the unlimited field of a pure knowledge of the understanding can become safe and trustworthy. We must discover on the largest scale the ground of the possibility of synthetical judgments a priori; we must understand the conditions which render every class of them possible, and endeavour not only to indicate in a sketchy outline, but to def
ine in its fulness and practical completeness, the whole of that knowledge, which forms a class by itself, systematically arranged according to its original sources, its divisions, its extent and its limits. So much for the present with regard to the peculiar character of synthetical judgments.]
It will now be seen how there can be a special science serving as a critique of pure reason. [Every kind of knowledge is called pure, if not mixed with anything heterogeneous. But more particularly is that knowledge called absolutely pure, which is not mixed up with any experience or sensation, and is therefore possible entirely a priori.] Reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge a priori. Pure reason therefore is that faculty which supplies the principles of knowing anything entirely a priori. An Organum of pure reason ought to comprehend all the principles by which pure knowledge a priori can be acquired and fully established. A complete application of such an Organum would give us a System of Pure Reason. But as that would be a difficult task, and as at present it is still doubtful whether and when such an expansion of our knowledge is here possible, we may look on a mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as a kind of preparation for a complete system of pure reason. It should be called a critique, not a doctrine, of pure reason. Its usefulness would be negative only, serving for a purging rather than for an expansion of our reason, and, what after all is a considerable gain, guarding reason against errors.
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