by Kershaw, Ian
As regards scapegoats, the Jews were an easy target. Nazi diabolization of Jews enabled them to be portrayed as both the representatives of rapacious big capital and of pernicious and brutal Bolshevism. Most Germans did not go along with such crude images. Nor were they likely to become involved in, or approve of, physical violence directed at individual Jews and their property. But dislike of Jews extended far beyond Nazi sympathizers. No political party, pressure-group, or trade union, and neither main Christian denomination, made the defence of the Jewish minority an issue. And, when times were hard, it was simple enough to stir envy and resentment against a tiny minority of the population – 0.76 per cent in 1933 belonged to the Jewish faith – by stressing how they dominated out of all proportion to their numbers sections of business, the arts, and the professions.179 It was no coincidence, for instance, that one of the most viciously antisemitic Nazi sub-organizations was the Fighting League of the Commercial Middle Class (Kampfbund des gewerblichen Mittelstandes), where small traders campaigned against department stores that they claimed to be largely in Jewish hands. Most people during the Depression years, as we have already commented, did not vote for the NSDAP, or even join the party, primarily because of its antisemitism. But the widespread latent antisemitism in Weimar Germany – the feeling that Jews were somehow different, ‘unGerman’, and a harmful influence – did not provide any deterrent to people offering their enthusiastic support to Hitler’s movement in full cognizance of its hatred of Jews. And since that hatred was central to the ethos of a Movement which was massively expanding its membership in the early 1930s – by the end of 1932 its membership numbers had reached 1,414,975180– more and more people were becoming exposed, once in the Movement, to the full brutality and viciousness of Nazi antisemitism. The same applied to the SA, by this time numbering around 400,000 stormtroopers.181 Even many of the young thugs who had been attracted to it in increasing numbers were not outrightly antisemitic before they joined.182 But once members, they were part of an organization whose ‘Fighting Song’ contained the lines: ‘When Jews’ blood spurts from the knife, good times are once more here.’183
The half-a-million-strong Jewish community – the vast majority patriotic, liberal-minded Germans, anxious to be assimilated into, not separated from, their fellow countrymen – was divided in its reactions to the upsurge of antisemitism. The main Jewish organization, the Centralverein-the ‘Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith’ – took the danger very seriously, and put up a sturdy defence of Nazi inroads into civil rights.184 Others were more complacent – a feeling they often combined with a sense of helplessness. They thought the danger would blow over. Few had direct experience of racist attacks – something Jews themselves associated with Russia, Poland or Rumania, not with Germany. It was possible to accept some discrimination, avoid threatening situations, and generally keep out of trouble.185 It was still possible to feel ‘at home’ in Germany.186 It was still possible on the very last day of 1932, as Lion Feuchtwanger’s fictional characters in Geschwister Oppermann did, to joke about whether ‘the Führer’ would end up as a market salesman or an insurance agent.187
Three years of crippling Depression had left Germany a more intolerant society. A sign that the humane principles on which the Republic had been based were being whittled away during the Depression, as German society lurched towards the Right, was the reintroduction of the death penalty in the early 1930s. A few years earlier it had seemed close to abolition. The Nazis were to make it the pivot of their proclaimed restoration of ‘order’.188 Another indicator of a changing climate in which liberal values were being rapidly eroded was the radicalization of medical views on eugenics and ‘racial hygiene’. The costs of keeping mental patients in asylums at a time of drastic cuts in public expenditure brought increased pressure for legislation to introduce the voluntary sterilization of those with hereditary defects. Growing support for such measures among doctors, psychiatrists, lawyers, and civil servants led to draft proposals, supported by the German Doctors’ Association, for a Reich Sterilization Law. Württemberg and Prussian Chambers of Doctors underlined their backing for such legislation in November and December 1932.189 Hitler’s party, with a third of the voters behind it, went further and advocated compulsory sterilization of the hereditarily sick. In 1933, the Nazis wasted little time after coming to power in introducing notorious legislation to this effect. But the ground had been prepared by the ‘experts’ before Hitler took office.
At the end of 1932, images of Hitler continued to reflect, as they always had done, the main ideological divides and sub-cultures of German society.190 For the Socialist and Communist Left – with only minor differences between them in this regard – Hitler was portrayed as the hireling of big capitalism, the front-man for imperialists, the political strike-force of the enemies, of the working class. Such views were to persist after 1933 in the left-wing underground resistance organizations, the underestimation of Hitler they contained hindering clear perceptions of the ideological dynamism of Nazism. For Catholics – the other sub-culture which Nazism found greatest difficulty in penetrating, before and after 1933 – Hitler was above all seen as the head of a ‘godless’, anti-Christian movement. In Protestant church-going circles, impressions of Hitler varied. Some looked to the dangers of a neo-heathen movement which had roused the base instincts of the masses. Others saw the potential, at a time when church attendance was dwindling and moral and religious values were allegedly being undermined, of Hitler’s ‘national renewal’ bringing in its wake ethical and religious revival. On the nationalist-conservative Right, the relatively sympathetic treatment of Hitler at the time of the Young Plan Campaign had given way to hostility. Hitler was portrayed for the most part as intransigent and irresponsible, a wild and vulgar demagogue, not a statesman, an obstacle to political recovery, the head of an extremist movement with menacing socialistic tendencies. Against these negative images had to be set the adulation of the third of the population that, despite the setbacks of summer and autumn, still saw in Hitler the only hope for Germany’s future. More than 13.5 million had voted for Hitler in the July election. They were all potential or real devotees of the Führer cult. Despite the losses in November, it still amounted to a huge reservoir of support, its focal point personalized in the extraordinary Leader of the NSDAP. And if Hitler could once get to power, and achieve some success, then there was the distinct chance that the strands of an ideological consensus rooted in strident anti-Marxism, hostility to party politics and pluralist democracy, and yearning for a restoration of national pride under authoritarian leadership, might come together to widen the basis of his support. The key would be whether he could shed the divisive image of a party leader, and appear to stand above party, for the nation. In January 1933, two-thirds of the German population were still dismissive of such a notion.
V
The events of January 1933 amounted to an extraordinary political drama. It was a drama that unfolded largely out of sight of the German people.
A fortnight after Schleicher had taken over from him as Reich Chancellor, Franz von Papen had been guest of honour at a dinner at the Berlin Herrenklub. Among the 300 or so guests listening to his speech on 16 December, justifying his own record in government, criticizing the Schleicher cabinet, and indicating that he thought the NSDAP should be included in government, was the Cologne banker Baron Kurt von Schröder. A few weeks earlier, Schroder had been a signatory to the petition to Hindenburg to make Hitler Chancellor. For months before that he had been a Nazi sympathizer, and was a member of the ‘Keppler Circle’ – the group of economic advisers that Wilhelm Keppler, a one-time small businessman, had set up on Hitler’s behalf. Already in November – though nothing came of it at the time – Keppler had told Schröer that Papen might be prepared to intercede with Hindenburg in favour of a Hitler Chancellorship. Now, after Papen’s Herrenklub speech, interested by what the former Chancellor had had to say, Schröder met him for a few minutes late in the ev
ening to discuss the political situation. The two had known each other for some time. And since Schröder also knew Hitler, he was the ideal intermediary at a time that relations between the Nazi leader and the former Chancellor were still icy. Out of the discussion came the suggestion, probably from Schröder though it is impossible to be sure, of a meeting between Hitler and Papen. Just before the end of December, Schroder rang Papen to ask whether he were free for a meeting during the next few days. The meeting was fixed to take place at Schroder’s house in Cologne on 4 January 1933. Since Papen was travelling to Berlin from his home in the Saar that day, intending to stop off at his mother’s house in Düsseldorf, and since Hitler would be in the vicinity en route to begin the election campaign in Lippe-Detmold that evening, the venue was chosen because of its mutual convenience, though Keppler had, in fact, already suggested Schröder’s house to Hitler as a meeting-place following the banker’s discussion with Papen on 16 December.191
In his own post-war account of the meeting, Schroder indicated that he had already taken soundings among figures from the business community about collaboration in government between Papen and Hitler, and found them favourably disposed. Fear of Bolshevism, the hope that National Socialism in power would provide a stable political climate for economic recovery, and removal of constraints on business autonomy were what they wanted. They hoped that ‘a strong leader’ would come to power and form a government that would remain for a long time in office.192 Schröder’s soundings had, in fact, extended no further than the Keppler Circle – the limited number of businessmen whose sympathies for Hitler had not been in doubt. He had not consulted leading industrialists, either individually or through the main industrialists’ organization, the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie (Reich Association of German Industry). The view, long taken for granted, that Schröder was acting as an agent of big business is without substance. Schroder did not know the leading figures in the business world, and they, for their part, had no idea of his attempts to bring Papen and Hitler together.193 Big business was, in fact, divided in its opinion of the Schleicher government. Its early fears of the ‘Red General’, regarded by business leaders as a crypto-socialist, had not materialized. Relations with National Socialism were in the meantime poor.194 For major figures in industry, Papen was still their man. His return to the Chancellor’s seat, with Hitler in a subordinate role to bring the NSDAP behind the government, remained their favoured scenario.195 As January progressed, it would prove to be the big landowners, through their lobbying organization the Reichslandbund (Reich Agrarian League), rather than the ‘captains of industry’, who emerged as the mortal enemies of the Schleicher cabinet and the leading proponents of an elevation of Hitler to the Chancellorship.196
Papen later disingenuously claimed that his aim was to try to persuade Hitler to join the Schleicher government.197 His actual aim was to take first soundings about the prospects of collaborating with Hitler in a new cabinet. Papen, whatever his later altruistic claims, was smarting from his ousting by Schleicher. Hitler knew that if anyone could unlock the door to Hindenburg’s approval, it was Papen.198
Papen arrived around midday at Schroder’s house. The meeting was meant to be secret, but word of it had leaked out. As he stepped out of his taxi, Papen was photographed. The following day, the Tägliche Rundschau, the Tat Circle’s newspaper, reported that the meeting revolved around considerations of bringing about a Hitler government through using Papen’s good offices with the Reich President. Papen and Hitler were both forced to deny that anything was discussed beyond ‘the possibility of a great national political unity front’.199 Papen found Hitler – who had entered through the back door – together with Hess, Himmler and Keppler, waiting for him. Hitler, Papen and Schröder adjourned to another room, while the others waited. Schröder took no part in the discussions.200 Hitler began aggressively, with an attack on Papen’s treatment of him on 13 August and a denunciation of the sentences on the Potempa murderers. When he calmed down, talk revolved around the format for a new government. Hitler reportedly spoke of involvement of Papen’s supporters in a cabinet under his leadership, as long as they were prepared to accept the removal of Social Democrats, Communists and Jews from ‘leading positions’, and the ‘restoration of order in public life’.201 But for the first time, in the course of the discussions, Hitler seems to have hinted that he might accept less than the Chancellorship – at least for a while. A few days later he told Goebbels that Papen was keen to bring Schleicher down, and had the ear of the President: ‘Arrangement with us prepared. Either the Chancellorship or power ministries. Defence and Interior. That’s still to be heard about.’202 Probably, Papen had reminded him – if he needed reminding – that Hindenburg’s objections to him becoming Chancellor would still be difficult to overcome. Most likely, the question of who was to lead the new government was left open at the meeting. Papen spoke loosely of some sort of duumvirate, and left open the possibility of ministerial posts, even if Hitler himself did not feel ready to take office, for some of his colleagues. After about two hours, discussions ended for lunch with an agreement to deal with further issues at a subsequent meeting, in Berlin or elsewhere. Papen evidently felt progress had been made. A few days later, reporting on the meeting to industrialists, he gave the impression that Hitler was prepared to play the role of a ‘junior partner’ in a cabinet dominated by conservatives.203 In discussion with Chancellor Schleicher on 9 January, Papen intimated that the Nazi leader would be satisfied with the Defence and Interior Ministries. The implication was that the talks with Hitler had been about incorporating him in a Schleicher cabinet, not toppling it. And in a private audience with the Reich President the same day, Papen informed Hindenburg that Hitler had lessened his demands and would be prepared to take part in a coalition government with parties of the Right. The unspoken assumption was that Papen would lead such a government. The Reich President told Papen to keep in touch with the Nazi leader.204
A second meeting between Hitler and Papen soon followed. It took place this time in the study of Ribbentrop’s house in Dahlem, a plush residential suburb of Berlin, on the night of 10–11 January. Nothing came of it, since Papen told Hitler that Hindenburg still opposed his appointment to the Chancellorship. Hitler angrily broke off further talks until after the Lippe election.205
Elections in the mini-state of Lippe-Detmold, with its 173,000 inhabitants,206 would at other times scarcely have been a first priority for Hitler and his party. But now they were a chance to prove the NSDAP was again on the forward march after its losses the previous November and after the Strasser crisis. Despite the poor state of the party’s finances, no effort was spared towards obtaining a good result in Lippe.207 For close on a fortnight before the election, on 15 January, Lippe was saturated with Nazi propaganda. All the Nazi big guns were fired. Göring, Goebbels, Frick, and Prince Auwi spoke.208 Hitler himself gave seventeen speeches in eleven days.209 It paid off. The NSDAP won almost 6,000 more votes compared with the November result, and increased its share of the poll from 34.7 to 39.5 per cent. The Nazis presumably won back most of the voters they had lost to the DNVP, whose support now dropped by over 3,000. The Communists also lost over 3,000 votes, while the SPD gained over 4,000. In reality, the Nazi success was less impressive than portrayed. Their support in the region still lagged by some 3,000 votes behind the result the party had obtained in the July Reichstag election.210 This was naturally overlooked. The optical impression was what counted. The bandwagon seemed to be rolling again.211
Hitler’s position was strengthened, however, less by the Lippe result than by Schleicher’s increasing isolation. Not only had his lingering hopes of Gregor Strasser and gaining support from the Nazi ranks practically evaporated by mid-January,212 but the Reichslandbund had by then declared open warfare on his government because of its unwillingness to impose high import levies on agricultural produce. Schleicher was powerless to do anything about such opposition, which had backing not only within the DNVP but al
so within the NSDAP. Accommodation with the big agrarians would axiomatically have meant opposition both from both sides of industry, bosses and unions, together with consumers. Hugenberg’s offers to bring the DNVP behind Schleicher if he were to be given the combined ministries of Economics and Food were therefore bound to fall on deaf ears. Correspondingly, by 21 January, the DNVP had also declared its outright opposition to the Chancellor. Shrill accusations, along with those of the agrarians, of the government’s ‘Bolshevism’ in the countryside because of its schemes to divide up bankrupt eastern estates to make smallholdings for the unemployed were a reminder of the lobbying which had helped bring down Brüning. Schleicher’s position was also weakened by the Osthilfe (Eastern Aid) scandal which broke in mid-January. The agrarian lobby was incensed that the government had not hushed up the affair. Since some of Hindenburg’s close friends and fellow landowners were implicated, the ire directed at Schleicher could be transmitted directly through the Reich President. And when, in the wake of the scandal, it was revealed that the President’s own property at Neudeck, presented to him by German business five years earlier, had been registered in his son’s name to avoid death-duties, Schleicher was held responsible by Hindenburg for allowing his name to be dragged through the mud.213
At a cabinet meeting on 16 January, the day after the Lippe result had been announced, Schleicher had again raised the issue which had occupied Papen in the autumn: whether to seek a dissolution of the Reichstag and postponement of new elections; in other words, to risk a breach of the constitution. In contrast to Papen’s last cabinet meeting, no minister opposed such a move. Schleicher remained optimistic that, over a period of time, he could broaden the support for his government, and thought, following the line that Papen had fed him, that Hitler had now given up pretensions to the Chancellorship and had the more modest aim of the Defence Ministry, which Hindenburg would certainly refuse him.214 Schleicher’s strategy for a breach of the constitution was in effect no different from that, which he himself had rejected, put forward by Papen. It required the support of the Reich President. At the beginning of December, Schleicher had persuaded Hindenburg that a breach of the constitution and declaration of a state of emergency would risk a civil war, and that the Reichswehr would not be able to withstand the civil unrest. He now faced the difficult task of persuading the President that what he had prophesied would happen in December would not happen in January – even though conditions were little different. His prospects were not good.
