by Kershaw, Ian
Serving as the go-between, Ribbentrop had arranged another meeting between Hitler and Papen on 18 January.215 Accompanied by Rohm and Himmler, Hitler – encouraged by the Lippe success and by Schleicher’s mounting difficulties – now hardened his position from the earlier meetings in the month and expressly demanded the Chancellorship. When Papen demurred, claiming his influence with Hindenburg was not sufficient to bring this about, Hitler, in his usual way, told the former Chancellor he saw no point in further talks. Ribbentrop then suggested that it might be worth talking to Hindenburg’s son, Oskar. The following day, Ribbentrop took his suggestion further with Papen. The result was a meeting, arranged for late on the Sunday evening, 22 January, at Ribbentrop’s house, at which Oskar von Hindenburg and the Reich President’s State Secretary Otto Meissner agreed to be present. Frick accompanied Hitler. Göring joined them later.216 Hitler had not felt well the previous day. Goebbels put it down to his sleeping and eating too little.217 Perhaps he was still unwell, or perhaps his meeting later that evening with Oskar von Hindenburg was on his mind, when he delivered a below-par speech to party functionaries in the Sportpalast in Berlin on 22 January.218 But when he arrived at Ribbentrop’s at ten o’clock, he was determined to make an impression on Hindenburg junior. The main part of the meeting consisted of a two-hour discussion between Hitler and the President’s son. Hitler also spoke with Papen, who told him that the President had not changed his mind about making him Chancellor, but recognized that the situation had changed and that it was necessary to incorporate the National Socialists in this or a new government. Hitler was unyielding. He made it plain that Nazi cooperation could only come under his Chancellorship. The official communiqué following the ill-fated meeting on 13 August still rankled with him. He was adamant that he had not sought total power then, and had no objection to extensive representation of bourgeois politicians in his cabinet, as long as they were not serving as representatives of political parties.219 Apart from the Chancellorship for himself, he insisted only upon the Reich Ministry of the Interior for Frick and a further cabinet post for Göring. These claims were more modest – and were recognized as being such – than those he had put forward to Schleicher the previous August.220 Papen demanded the post of Vice-Chancellor for himself.221 On that basis, he now agreed to press for Hitler to become Chancellor – a notable breakthrough – but promised to withdraw if there was any sign that he did not have Hitler’s confidence.222 Oskar von Hindenburg commented to Meissner on the way back from Dahlem that he had been impressed by what Hitler had had to say.223 Hitler was less complimentary about the President’s son. ‘Young Oskar’, he told Goebbels, cut ‘a rare image of stupidity’.224
The following day, Chancellor Schleicher, by now aware of the threat to his position, informed the Reich President that a vote of no-confidence in the government could be expected at the delayed recall of the Reichstag on 31 January. He requested an order of dissolution and postponement of new elections. Hindenburg agreed to consider a dissolution, but rejected the breach of Article 25 of the Weimar Constitution.225 What he had been prepared to grant Papen five months earlier, he now refused Schleicher. But since Schleicher himself had argued against the wisdom of such a drastic step as recently as the beginning of December, he could scarcely criticize the President for continuing to follow the advice he had given at that time, rather than the reverse advice he was now offering.
At the same time, Hindenburg had left himself with little room for manoeuvre. He had once more rejected the idea of a Hitler Chancellorship.226 That left only the return to a Papen cabinet – Hindenburg’s favoured outcome, but scarcely likely to resolve the crisis, and regarded with scepticism even by Papen himself. As rumours hared round Berlin, the prospect of a reversion to Papen’s ‘cabinet of struggle’, with a major role for Hugenberg, and a declaration of a state of emergency was, remarkable though it now seems, seen as more worrying than a cabinet led by Hitler.227 Fears of such an eventuality were sharply intensified after Schleicher, on 28 January, having been refused the dissolution order by the Reich President, submitted his own resignation and that of his entire cabinet.228 Within hours, Hindenburg asked Papen to try to work towards a solution within the framework of the Constitution and with the backing of the Reichstag.229 According to Papen’s own account, he was asked by the President to take soundings about the possibilities of a Hitler cabinet.230 Papen told Ribbentrop that Hitler must be contacted without delay. A turning-point had been reached. After his talk with Hindenburg, he now thought a Hitler Chancellorship a possibility.231
By this time, Papen had come round to full acceptance of a government led by Hitler. The only question in his mind was to ensure that Hitler was firmly contained by ‘reliable’ and ‘responsible’ conservatives. On 27 January, the day before Schleicher’s resignation, Hitler had been practically incapable of rational deliberation. He told his advisers he had no more to say to Hindenburg. And he broke off discussions with Hugenberg in great anger when the DNVP leader rejected his demands to install a National Socialist as Prussian Minister of the Interior in a new cabinet and – a point of great importance to Hitler – for new Reichstag elections.232 Hitler was beside himself with anger and frustration. He had to be calmed down by Göring and Ribbentrop, and dissuaded from leaving Berlin immediately for Munich. ‘I have never seen Hitler in such a state,’ commented Ribbentrop. ‘I proposed to him and Göring that I should see Papen alone that evening’ – Hitler had declined to meet him – ‘and explain the whole situation to him. In the evening I saw Papen and convinced him eventually that the only thing that made sense was Hitler’s Chancellorship, and that he must do what he can to bring this about. Papen declared that the matter of Hugenberg was of secondary importance, and that he was now absolutely in favour of Hitler becoming Chancellor; this was the decisive change in Papen’s attitude… This recognition by Papen is, I believe, the turning-point.’233
Following the resignation of the Schleicher cabinet on 28 January, Papen had meetings with Hugenberg and Hitler.234 Hugenberg agreed that a Hitler cabinet was the only way forward, but stressed the importance of limiting his power. He demanded for himself the Reich and Prussian Ministries of Economics as the price of the DΝVP’s support. Hitler, unsurprisingly, refused – as he had done since August – to entertain the notion of a government dependent on a parliamentary majority, and held out for the headship of a presidential cabinet with the same rights that had been granted to Papen and Schleicher. He reiterated his readiness to include those from previous cabinets whom the President favoured, as long as he could be Chancellor and Commissioner for Prussia, and could place members of his own party in the Ministries of the Interior in the Reich and Prussia.235 The demands for extensive powers in Prussia caused problems. Ribbentrop and Göring tried to persuade Hitler to settle for less. Eventually, ‘with a bad grace’, as Papen put it, he accepted that the powers of Reich Commissar for Prussia would remain with Papen, in his capacity as Vice-Chancellor.236
Meanwhile, Papen had taken soundings by telephone from several former cabinet members, conservatives held in esteem by Hindenburg. All replied that they would be prepared to work in a Hitler cabinet, with Papen as Vice-Chancellor, but not in a Papen-Hugenberg ‘cabinet of struggle’. This impressed Hindenburg, when Papen reported to him late on the night of 28 January. He was also gratified by the ‘moderation’ of Hitler’s demands. For the first time, the Reich President was now amenable to a Hitler cabinet.237 The deadlock was broken.
Hindenburg and Papen discussed the composition of the cabinet. The President was glad that the trusted Neurath would remain at the Foreign Ministry. He wanted someone equally sound at the Defence Ministry, following Schleicher’s departure. His own suggestion was General von Blomberg, the army commander in East Prussia and currently technical adviser of the German delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Hindenburg thought him extremely reliable and ‘completely apolitical’. The following morning he was ordered back to Berlin.238
&
nbsp; Papen continued his power-brokerage on the morning of 29 January in discussions with Hitler and Göring. The composition of the cabinet was agreed. All posts but two (other than the Chancellorship) were to be occupied by conservatives, not Nazis. Neurath (Foreign Minister), Schwerin von Krosigk (Finance), and Eltz-Rübenach (Post and Transport Ministry) had been members of the Schleicher cabinet. The occupancy of the Justice Ministry was left open for the time being. Frick was nominated by Hitler as Reich Minister of the Interior. Compensation for the concession made over the position of Reich Commissar of Prussia was the acceptance by Papen that Göring would serve nominally as his deputy in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.239 This key appointment effectively gave the Nazis control over the police in the giant state of Prussia, embracing two-thirds of the territory of the Reich. There was no place as yet for Goebbels in a propaganda ministry, part of Nazi expectations the previous summer. But Hitler assured Goebbels that his ministry was waiting for him. It was simply a matter of necessary tactics for a temporary solution. Apart from all else, Hitler needed Goebbels for the election campaign he was insisting must follow his appointment as Chancellor.240
Papen had talks the same day with Hugenberg and with the Stahlhelm leaders, Seldte and Duesterberg. Hugenberg still objected to the Nazi demands for new elections, from which his own party had nothing to gain. But, tempted by the offer of the powerful Economics Ministry, which he had long coveted, he tentatively offered his cooperation.241 The previous November, Hugenberg had told Hindenburg he thought Hitler untrustworthy. ‘His entire way of dealing with political matters makes it extraordinarily difficult to give him the political leadership,’ was Hugenberg’s judgement at the time. He would have very great reservations about such a step, he added.242 Now, his own power ambitions removed such reservations. When, in late January, the deputy Stahlhelm leader Theodor Duesterberg warned him of the consequences of entrusting the Chancellorship to someone as dishonest as Hitler, Hugenberg waved the objections aside. Nothing could happen. Hindenburg would remain Reich President and supreme commander of the armed forces; Papen would be Vice-Chancellor; he himself would have control of the entire economic sphere, including agriculture; Seldte (the Stahlhelm leader) would be in charge of the Labour Ministry. ‘We’re boxing Hitler in,’ concluded Hugenberg. Duesterberg replied darkly that Hugenberg would find himself one night fleeing through ministerial gardens in his underpants to avoid arrest.243
Some of Papen’s conservative friends also expressed their deep concern at the prospect of a Hitler cabinet. Papen told them there was no alternative within the framework of the Constitution.244 To one who warned him that he was placing himself in Hitler’s hands, Papen replied: ‘You are mistaken. We’ve hired him.’245
A last problem still had to be resolved. Hitler insisted at his meeting with Papen on new elections to be followed by an enabling act. For Hitler, this was crucial. An enabling act was vital to be able to rule without dependency on either the Reichstag or on presidential backing for emergency decrees. But the current composition of the Reichstag offered no hope of passing an enabling act. Papen reported back, via Ribbentrop, that Hindenburg was not in favour of new elections. Hitler told Ribbentrop to inform the President that there would be no further elections after these. By the afternoon of 29 January, Papen was able to tell Göring and Ribbentrop that all was clear. ‘Everything perfect,’ Göring reported back to the Kaiserhof.246 Hitler was expected by the Reich President at eleven o’clock the next morning to be sworn in as Chancellor.247
In the evening there was another scare. Werner von Alvensleben, one of Schleicher’s go-betweens, turned up at Goebbels’s house with rumours that Hindenburg was, after all, going to install a Papen minority cabinet. That was something the Reichswehr would not accept. Oskar von Hindenburg would be arrested the next day. The President himself, no longer seen as fit for office, had been taken off to his estate at Neudeck. Hitler and Göring, in the adjacent room, were immediately informed. Göring wasted no time in letting Meissner and Papen know what was afoot. Goebbels was sceptical. But the Nazi leadership took the rumours seriously enough to put the SA on alert in Berlin.248 The President’s entourage also acted. The next morning, Oskar von Hindenburg was sent to the Anhalter Bahnhof to intercept Blomberg, on his arrival from Geneva, before he could be whisked away to army headquarters by the adjutant of General von Hammerstein, the army chief of staff, also waiting on the station platform. Blomberg was taken directly to the President, informed of the alleged putsch plans, and sworn in as new Defence Minister – itself a technical breach of the Constitution, since ministers could only be sworn in on the recommendation of the head of government. Blomberg was told by Hindenburg that it was his duty to reverse Schleicher’s course, and keep the Reichswehr out of politics.249
Quarter of an hour before the time of its appointment with the Reich President, at eleven o’clock on Monday, 30 January 1933, there was still dissension in the ranks of the members of the new cabinet who were wending their way through the ministerial gardens to the Reich Chancellery – Hindenburg’s residence while the Reich President’s Palace was under repair. Hitler was still unhappy at the restriction on his powers through the blockage on his appointment as Reich Commissar for Prussia. He insisted again on new elections. Hugenberg was opposed. Hitler and Hugenberg were still locked in heated argument even as they waited in Meissner’s room to meet the President. There was a chance that the cabinet might collapse before it had even been sworn in. Hitler promised that the composition of the cabinet would remain unaltered by the results of the election. Hugenberg remained unimpressed. The time for the appointment arrived. But the arguing continued. Meissner warned that the President could not be kept waiting much longer. Papen interceded to ask Hugenberg to respect the word of a German man. A last concession wrung out of Hitler by Papen was worthless: that he would consult the Zentrum and Β VP without delay about broadening the support for the government. Just before the new cabinet entered the Reich President’s chambers, it was finally agreed that they would seek the dissolution order that Hitler so badly wanted.250
At last, by now shortly after noon, the members of the Hitler cabinet trooped into the Reich President’s rooms. Hindenburg, piqued at being kept waiting, gave a brief welcoming address, expressing satisfaction that the nationalist Right had finally come together.251 Papen then made the formal introductions. Hindenburg nodded his approval as Hitler solemnly swore to carry out his obligations without party interests and for the good of the whole nation. He again approvingly acknowledged the sentiments expressed by the new Reich Chancellor who, unexpectedly, made a short speech emphasizing his efforts to uphold the Constitution, respect the rights of the President, and, after the next election, to return to normal parliamentary rule. Hitler and his ministers awaited a reply from the Reich President. It came, but in only a single sentence: ‘And now, gentlemen, forwards with God.’252
VI
‘Hitler is Reich Chancellor. Just like a fairy-tale,’ noted Goebbels.253 Indeed, the extraordinary had happened. What few beyond the ranks of Nazi fanatics had thought possible less than a year earlier had become reality. Against all odds, Hitler’s aggressive obstinacy – born out of lack of alternatives – had paid off. What he had been unable to achieve himself, his ‘friends’ in high places had achieved for him. The ‘nobody of Vienna’, ‘unknown soldier’, beerhall demagogue, head of what was for years no more than a party on the lunatic fringe of politics, a man with no credentials for running a sophisticated state-machine, practically his sole qualification the ability to muster the support of the nationalist masses whose base instincts he showed an unusual talent for rousing, had now been placed in charge of government of one of the leading states in Europe. His intentions had scarcely been kept secret over the years. Whatever the avowals of following a legal path to power, heads would roll, he had said. Marxism would be eradicated, he had said. Jews would be ‘removed’, he had said. Germany would rebuild the strength of its armed forces, destroy the
shackles of Versailles, conquer ‘by the sword’ the land it needed for its ‘living-space’, he had said. A few took him at his word, and thought he was dangerous. But far, far more, from Right to Left of the political spectrum – conservatives, liberals, socialists, communists – underrated his intentions and unscrupulous power instincts at the same time as they scorned his abilities.254 The Left’s underestimation was at least not responsible for getting him into power. Socialists, communists, trade unions were all little more than by-standers, their scope for influencing events emasculated since 1930. It was the blindness of the conservative Right to the dangers which had been so evident, arising from their determination to eliminate democracy and destroy socialism and the consequent governmental stalemate they had allowed to develop, that delivered the power of a nation-state containing all the pent-up aggression of a wounded giant into the hands of the dangerous leader of a political gangster-mob.
