Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  As for Frederick, he had formed the army with its right hanging towards Streziskow, while the left deployed to Satalitze.9 The bluecoats kept this position long enough for the morning’s reconnaissance to be completed. Directly after Schwerin and his escort returned to the king’s party, they rode back to prepare for the day’s fateful events. The king had been ill, regurgitating repeatedly, although the jaunt seemed to improve his humors. Along the way, a cannonshot fired by a distant enemy battery nearly killed Frederick and his entourage. But they continued, calmly evaluating the situation most carefully.10

  Prince Charles had been alerted about 0300 hours that morning that suspicious enemy movements were taking place close by. He repaired to the out posts at Prosek. The army was ordered to draw out from their tents into lines preparing for battle. Their ridge was horseshoe shaped by the old Moldau River. So, as the whitecoats drew into battle lines, they faced north and eastwards. Their front line was a virtual four mile long mass of men ranked three-deep.11 The second line was to serve as support to the first, in theory firing while the front line reloaded, while the third was behind the second for a similar function, of course.

  Prince Charles’s left, striking the corner of the horseshoe ridge, overlooked the ground below, intermixed with hillocks and woods. His center occupied the line between the ridge, bent back around the Taborberg, ending by the Homolyberg. In front of the Austrian center was a tough topographical obstacle. According to his History, the king wrote, “a ravine more than 100 feet deep covered its front.”12 Tuttle was more elaborate in his description. He told of “treacherous swamps and muddy pools … [forming] a natural ditch.”13 The right was a tad more favorably situated. The latter stood refused behind a line of batteries with a great marsh hard-by in front of an already strong work. This mixed with hillocks overlooking the woods and a grouping of small, stagnant ponds.

  This strong, formidable line was occupied by 48,550 infantry (in 59 battalions, five composed exclusively of Croats), 12,600 cavalry in 17 regiments (12 regular, five hussar), which made up the army of Prince Charles. It was augmented by ordnance of 178 guns, of which 58 were heavy guns. The cavalry had been placed to cover both flanks, and the Austrian tents still stood visible, up off towards the southward, with no time and no spare personnel to dismantle them. They were clearly visible to Prussian eyes.

  The nature of the ground beyond the Austrian right made it the most exposed of the whole camp. This, in most circumstances, might have been academic. Here it became all important. To the point, as the Žižkaberg dropped towards the east, it bordered on a swamp, marshy tract of ground, almost entirely dominated by small lakelets arising out of the Moldau, the Lieber-Wasser. Hard by Hastowitz, the little tributary meandered southward near Unter-Michelup, depositing there into a second, final lakelet. Behind that first lake, on the Austrian side, the small village of Sterbohol, and the rise, were found. Thereabouts, these lakelets had once been dammed up, but were now loosened. The day of the battle they stood open, flooding that south pasture by an oozy goo with green slime on top.

  Additionally, like the Battle of Zorndorf, little more than a year into the future, that of Prague was divided into three almost distinct sections by the two lines of rises already alluded to. There was limited visibility. This disturbing scenario virtually negated any attempt at cooperation between Luchessi and the Austrian infantry hard-by, and made very difficult Austrian attempts to communicate or to pass reinforcements in a speedy manner.

  Meanwhile, with their reconnaissance completed, the king and his entourage coldly calculated the condition of the enemy’s camp. The left, protected by the Moldau, was clearly beyond hope of successfully attacking. As was their front, which boasted strong lines of redoubts and prepared obstacles. Glancing over at the right, where Marshal Browne was, the Prussians perceived some promise of success there. Frederick, with no viable alternative, decided to strike the Austrian right, and ordered the army be made ready for its business at once. Schwerin objected to this order.14 He rather brusquely informed the king his men were dead-tired; they had been on forced marches for days. It was his contention the army should be allowed a day of rest in that hot spring season.15 But his Prussian Majesty had a ready retort. He answered that Daun, with additional Austrian forces, was approaching to relieve Prince Charles’s men from their present predicament. This force might just be enough to shift the tide of the coming battle over to the Austrian side. Battle it must be, and at once!16

  The relief army under Daun—who had superseded Serbelloni in command of the Austrian forces beyond Prague on May 4—was nearing. He had 30,000 men by that point under his command. The advanced guard reached Brandeis (only some 14 miles from Prague), in a strength of 10,000 men under General Baron Kevin Phillipp von Beck, on May 6. Forward units had reached Podebrad by then. The progress of this new force was reported on regularly to the king. The latter now calculated how much time he had in which to overthrow Prince Charles’s army in its present position. If nothing else, Frederick appeared confident of success.17

  All of this the king knew on that fateful morning, which explains why he was so insistent the army move out as soon as possible.18 Schwerin gave up his objections at last, and the attack plan was quickly formulated. The scheme called for an attack round by Podschernitz towards the Sterbohol, there to attack the lines of the enemy’s redoubts. Meanwhile, the Prussian horse was to sweep around by a more southernly route and, by striking the Austrian flank, roll up their lines to take them in the rear. The main Prussian force had between 62,000 to 66,000 men. This day was to be the very last time in this long war Frederick’s men would be either nearly equal in number to or superior to the enemy’s force. With Keith’s men tossed into the mix, the Prussian superiority in numbers was really telling. Of course, Keith was not present for this battle.

  The Prussian soldiers themselves were not adverse to a little superstition. A Prussian soldier noted a white dove, perched on the arm of a large, tall crucifix; “it repeatedly turned its head to face the Austrians, as if to show us the way.”19

  The composition of the Prussian force was approximately the following: 47,000 infantry in 66 battalions; 17,000 cavalry in 117 squadrons; and an artillery train of 214 guns, of which 82 were heavy ordnance. Charles enjoyed a slight superiority in infantry, but his great foe had a decided advantage in both cavalry and in ordnance. Taking into account the position of the Austrian army before Prague, the advantage this superiority in cavalry would confer upon the bluecoats was questionable. However, because of the hasty order for Serbelloni to return to Königgrätz, the assistance of his force was not going to be forthcoming.

  The deployment of the bluecoats must have been beautiful on that sunny late spring morning. The long lines of troops proceeded by way of the Chaber Heights, specifically at Strzischkow, then by Prosek. The infantry of the right wing, under Manstein, halted and took up position there, while the nearby cavalry of Lt.-Gen. Peter Ernst von Pennavaire20 rode on past. The men of the Prussian center, under the king’s own direction, and Schwerin’s left marched on well to the eastward, then faced right and veered off to the south. The artillery plowed through Podschernitz’s narrow streets, but the going was slow, while between that village and Chwala, Frederick’s men condensed their long marching lines into two attack columns. The baggage train was left at Gbell. In less than two hours, the Prussians were ranked for action. By no later than 0900 hours, the majority of the regiments were in position. The remainder wheeled to the right from Chwala and Podschernitz, descending on the Sterbohol to get hold of it from the opposite side.

  The Sterbohol was the key to the whole Austrian position for the main Prussian battle effort on the left.21 The Austrians were swinging themselves around to confront the attackers. Marshal Browne realized the Sterbohol needed to be held.

  Browne was instructed to get his right wing lined up with the rest of the army. The encampment formations stretched into battle lines. The commander was not at his best just then. As sick as
he was, though, Browne did not forget his primary job of confronting the enemy, speeding off Colonel Cullen (a Dutch volunteer seeking adventure in war) to Luchessi’s quarters with orders to ride down the enemy before they had time to properly form up. Unfortunately, the Austrians could not as swiftly alter their formations as the well-drilled bluecoats could.22 As a result, neither Luchessi nor a nearby infantry force which Browne wanted to move to block the approaches to the Sterbohol could complete their missions before the Prussians struck.

  Prince Charles continued to be unconcerned. In another blunder, with the enemy clearly massed in the valley below, the Austrian army was dismissed to go cook breakfast and attend mass, with no sense of urgency. Thus, the whitecoats were still not completely ready when the enemy attack, at about 0930 hours, was launched towards the Sterbohol.23

  Winterfeldt, leading the van of Schwerin’s command (eight battalions now sweeping towards the intended target) dashed up before Browne could complete his preparations. The Prussian line surged forward. Browne was busy moving the Austrian horse south between Sterbohol and Unter-Michelup when he became aware of the presence of Winterfeldt’s men (visible beyond the ponds at Podschernitz), making belated efforts to throw pontoon bridges across those bodies of water.

  Sensing the seriousness of the situation, Browne personally delivered two heavy 12-pounder guns from the reserve for the firing line. These were deployed, along with two of the regimental artillery, on the Homolyberg. At the same time a request was sent to Charles for help via Prince Franz Xavier August Albrecht Comte de Lusace of Saxony (brother of the Elector of Saxony). Browne knew additional reinforcements would be required to fill the gap left by Luchessi’s momentarily anticipated move. About 14 companies of grenadiers or so would be needed to prolong the battle front. General Stampatch was sent with the second line of the left wing cavalry from near Žižkaberg, along with Lt.-Gen. Andreas Hadik Graf von Futal’s (hereafter Hadik) riders from nearby Hrdlorzez. The latter positioned himself at the very end of the Austrian line near Unter-Michelup. Stampatch and he had some 100 squadrons of cavalry, not to mention artillery assistance, behind them.

  The Prussian artillery support was greatly hindered by necessity to use the only available “hard” road; this caused unavoidable delays in getting the guns forward. Although he had minimal support from the ordnance, Winterfeldt meant to take the Sterbohol before the enemy could stop him.24 He was directly supported by Fouquet’s troops, three full regiments, which drove forward head-on against the Sterbohol. A heavy firefight ensued, in which the three Prussian regiments took a pounding.

  The 37th Infantry (of Major-General Heinrich Adolph von Kursell) pulled back suddenly without orders towards Unter-Michelup.25 The general fell wounded, and the shredded unit lost 13 officers and 661 men in a brief firefight.26 The survivors had temporarily lost their nerve. Fouquet’s 33rd fared still worse; more than half of the men were laid low by the withering enemy fire. Included among them was the regiment’s commander, Colonel Balthasar Friedrich, Baron von der Goltz.27 When Fouquet himself fell wounded, his men forsook their muskets and fled. The third Prussian unit, the 24th Infantry of Schwerin, would have a yet more sanguinary day in store.

  The bluecoats involved in this initial effort as a whole fared poorly.28 But Prussian discipline was remarkable. Still, the marching formations were within 200 paces of the Austrian line before the attack stalled out. The whitecoats were clearly massing before them. The fiery Irishman Browne was busy preparing a counterattack against Winterfeldt’s men.29

  Winterfeldt might still have succeeded, in spite of everything, had the Austrians not opened a terrific shelling from the artillery on the Homolyberg and from eight battalion guns set up right amongst the Austrian grenadiers. The Homolyberg dominated the approaches to the Sterbohol, and the Austrian guns were highly effective, but it was nothing new to the seasoned veterans of Frederick’s army.30 They had seen the like before.

  Nevertheless, Browne saw confusion begin to spread through the bluecoat units, as he was preparing his hasty attack. General Luchessi was slow to believe a hussar screen led by Prince Esterhazy would be enough to shield the Austrian right from a large enemy force. He had no way of knowing the Prussian horse in front of him was a bare 20 squadrons of cuirassiers, led by General George Philipp Gottlob Schönaich, with insufficient strength to dislodge Luchessi from his post. Nevertheless, Prussian artillery started belching fire and a large body of bluecoat infantry menaced, much more than Esterhazy’s hussars could have managed. Schwerin, once the decision to give battle that day was a go, set to work immediately to give battle with what he had at hand. Schönaich was ordered to strike the enemy cavalry opposite before he was actually ready. His misfortune was to have the only handy body of Prussian cavalry thereabouts.

  During this disorganized Prussian charge, Luchessi pushed his men towards the pond near to Unter-Michelup, more than a mile from his former position. The Austrian horse there was capably led by Lt.-Gen. Althann. As for Hadik, he was instructed to cover the now exposed hole in the Austrian line left by Luchessi’s maneuver. However, his “attack” was interrupted by the initial Prussian effort and he was deflected to go to Luchessi’s aid. This denied any reinforcements for the moment, and the feebly held gap would later be of decisive importance.

  Ziethen, as the cover reserve behind Schönaich, saw at once something must be done as the enemy sprang to life. The ground was rumbling with their big ordnance, while the Austrian cavalry had superior numbers with a favorable position. The combination of the terrain and the tough resistance the whitecoats were making, proved at first too much to handle; it would so appear, Ziethen’s distinguished biographer aside.31

  This left wing of Schönaich struck the opposing cavalry deployed beside the ponds. The suddenness of the Prussian charge allowed them to break in the front, but Luchessi’s second line held off the assailants long enough for Hadik, just arrived, to press the foe back with his more numerous forces.32 The latter were rallying, all the while. Puttkammer’s 4th Hussars acted in concert with the 3rd Hussars of Colonel Warnery; they counterattacked into Hadik’s force from the south. Three separate blows were required to force off the Austrian right, around 1200 hours. That body of Austrians, shattered by the maelstrom of the fight, withdrew towards Beneschau.

  Meanwhile, Winterfeldt’s men were very nearly overwhelmed by the intensity of the enemy’s bombardment.33 When Winterfeldt’s forces got within range, Browne’s forces opened a devastating volley fire. The bluecoats here endured terrible casualties in the ensuing fracas.34 They soon reeled back upon Schwerin’s main body, coming up behind. Winterfeldt himself received a sharp neck wound in the exchange just about 1100 hours.35 Some nearby Austrian infantry appeared to be forming up to attack, but they stood watching until Browne managed to get them steadied, utilizing virtually every available man to do so.

  Schwerin valiantly now pushed his Prussian main body forward, as quickly as the troops could be brought up. This assault, too, smashed against the enemy massed near and on the Sterbohol, but the bluecoats had missed their early opportunity, and the Austrians were present in great strength. Even more guns were being brought forward. These latter pieces, backed up by the redoubts and batteries on the Homolyberg, made the position a formidable one.

  On the other hand, artillery support for the initial Prussian attacks was nonexistent. Prussian guns, for the most part, were still making their way through the streets of Podschernitz and up the narrow road towards the Sterbohol.36 Now an Austrian account of the battle does say the Prussian artillery was used to good effect.37

  Schwerin’s new lunge was greeted by heavy artillery fire as well as small arms’ fire from the infantry; the latter had the angle on this fresh effort. The bluecoats pressed on, realizing the Sterbohol had to be taken. By the point of the bayonet, certainly not by sheer numbers, the attackers pressed forward into the midst of the enemy’s lines. Once there, the advance stalled out. Neither battle line could budge the other, fighting
to a standstill. Schwerin’s assault was delivered over marshy ground in front of the enemy’s position. His well-trained troops ignored the Austrian fire as well as humanly possible, and pressed on to near the “green pastures” to their front. (Frederick in his haste to attack had failed to look closely at these “meadows.”) Schwerin had no choice: In spite of everything, it was his duty to strike the enemy, while the king was to drive in their front.38

  The cautious Prince Charles had chosen his position well, despite the battlefield’s physical limitations, and Browne’s misgivings. His left and center were protected by the Moldau and the hillocks in front, while his right had a deep marsh before it—which the Prussians thought to be a meadow. This turned out to be a crucial factor in the Prussian battle plan, since it was against this flank that Schwerin was making the main effort.

  Everything was progressing as well as could be expected until Schwerin’s men entered the field in their front. Suddenly, the whole line was disordered, as entire battalions sank up to their knees in the marsh; at the same time, the fire of the enemy was bearing down upon them. Even then, their progress could not be stopped. As the Prussians scrambled forward, in some spots by only single-man paths, they brought forward with them as many of their own guns as they could. Once the ground permitted, the troops ranked themselves again, despite the murderous fire of the Austrian guns.39 They then promptly began advancing again, the fire of the enemy intensifying as they got closer to the Austrian lines. This episode lasted for three hours, and was the crisis of the battle.