Intelligence placed the king at Schandau, pulling back from Leitmeritz. Prince Wilhelm, by retiring on Böhm-Leipa, had left Silesia vulnerable to Austrian encroachment. In retrospect, the conduct of Moritz (and later Prince Wilhelm) did expose the Prussians to defeat in detail.
With little effort, the whitecoats could actually threaten both Saxony and Silesia. The Austrians had been piqued over the escape of Prince Wilhelm, not to mention the needless squandering of valuable campaigning time. Prince Charles sure heard “it” from Emperor Francis.33 Nonetheless, the Austrian efforts were not entirely without effect.
The king had been forced to either divide his forces to shield both or else choose one or the other. There were also two substantial Austrian forces holding different posts which could figure in all of this. Major-General Freiherr von Baboczay was at Neuschlöss with 3,000 hussars and Croats; while General Morocz was holding Niemes to the north-northeast by that point. Beside the main Austrian force ensconced about Swigan. The Prussians were once again saved by their lethargic opponents. On July 11, the Austrians unaccountably withdrew on Münchengrätz. This retrograde movement actually helped the Prussian cause, as it allowed the hard-pressed king a very welcome breathing space.
On the other hand, a Croat detachment of 2,500 men under Colonel Franz Freiherr Jahnus von Eberstadt moved quickly from Königgrätz on Landshut, a gateway position into Silesia. His men pressed a Prussian detachment almost into Schweidnitz (July 11), about which, more later. Two days after, finally awakening to the possibility of inflicting major damage upon the enemy’s cause, Daun and Prince Charles suddenly sprang to life with their plans. They marched from Münchengrätz forward towards the Prussian lines, arriving at Hühnerswasser, while the Duke of Arenberg’s advanced guard moved on Molschen. Arenberg eyed joining MacGuire. The latter had another detachment out by Wartenburg. Responding to prompt instructions, the latter force moved on Gabel, complete with some 28 guns. An additional body of about 1,500 men was detached to veer in upon Gabel from Brims, under the command of Major-General Christian Friedrich Freiherr von Wülfen. Next morning, the main Austrian army finally hitched into Niemes, none the worse for wear.
Part of the drama was taken up by a Prussian force enmeshed at the old castle of Reichstädt—some 11 miles due east from Böhm-Leipa. The original force at the castle (under Major Karl Aemilius von Lubath [consisting of about 200 grenadiers and two cannon], strengthened shortly by the Grenadier Battalion 29/31)34 was accosted by the “dynamic” duo of Beck and Morocz, with a number of grenadier companies and a generous allotment of artillery. But the whitecoats did not press their advantage, and this allowed precious time for the Prussians to pump more reinforcements into the place.
This, plus the caution with which the Austrians pushed home their attack, enabled the garrison to keep the castle, although the local village fell to the intruders. Only on July 17, and under no new pressure, did the bluecoats leave, veering towards the rear. July 15, meanwhile, the main Austrian army reassembled at a new camp much on the basis of the earlier one; a tussle with Frederick being looked on as a distinct possibility. It was clear the Austrians, in spite of Kolin, were still wary of the king. The prey was wounded and desperate, but he could still show a fight.
Nor was the Prussian cause any easier to deal with. For Prince Wilhelm, he still confronted a serious situation in and of itself. Nádasti was closing in on his rear posts and his line-of-communication with the king. MacQuire (during July 13–14) snagged a convoy of 110 wagons (all of them filled with oats), under the escort of two full Prussian battalions. It was attacked and driven into Gabel, about 1300 hours on July 14. At the walled town, the command of Major Wilhelm Sebastian von Belling stood, consisting of several hundred men, including the Grenadier Battalions 9/10 and 8/46, plus three battalions of fusiliers, about 80 cavalry, and seven guns.
Five hundred wagons returning towards Zittau, while under the protection of Puttkammer’s hussars, about 3,000 strong, were struck by the Austrians of Wülfen out by Brims. Meanwhile, the Duke of Arenberg had arrived to help MacGuire at Gabel, bringing with him 12 heavy guns.35 MacGuire & Company wasted no time in setting up their ordnance, which commenced a vigorous pounding against the Zittau Gate area. About 1800 hours, the work began. One of MacGuire’s junior officers, Major Ernst Normann, backed up by a force of foot soldiers and engineers, chopped through the outer gate, while the Austrian guns battered away at the inner. One of the officers who broke into Gabel was seized and cut down trying to allow his companions in.36 Ultimately, Normann did have to withdraw from his forward post, but the whitecoats did cut off the water supply for Gabel’s defenders in the meantime.
For his part, although heavily outnumbered, Puttkammer decided to stay put, relying upon Prince Wilhelm to rescue him at Gabel. He sent a rider to the prince for reinforcements.37 The sounds of the fight were clearly audible to Wilhelm’s lines, making the message superfluous. The Prussian prince vacillated over what to do. While he awaited help that would never arrive, Puttkammer valiantly ordered his men to fight off the enemy as long as possible, although Nádasti with 20,000 men was close-by. The whole affair started at 1800 hours on July 14, the Prussians forming the wagons into a circle to better protect them.
Wilhelm here showed a distinct lack of judgment and convened another council-of-war. This although the valiant detachment and the precious wagons required rescue. There were three courses considered: (1) the most likely to be effective, march straightway to relieve Puttkammer and save the convoy, and the road to Gabel and Zittau; (2) that of marching on Leitmeritz and thus abandoning the convoy and its valiant defenders to their fate; (3) that of marching on Zittau by the roundabout way of Kamnitz, through Rumburg, into country of steep, winding roads difficult to traverse and defend against attack, thereby saving the main magazine and the majority of the men, but, again, leaving Puttkammer and the wagons to their fate.
Failing the advice of Winterfeldt, who was not present at the council,38 the three alternatives were in no way explored. The first course (which the king himself undoubtedly would have taken without delay) did have the drawback of bad roads most of the way to Gabel, but would have assured numerical parity with Nádasti and been the easiest course to adopt. Wilhelm favored this course, but was talked out of it by the generals present. Success would have meant the salvation of the desperate situation at Gabel and at least temporarily undoing what blunders had already been committed. Not the least of these was exposing the army to defeat in detail.
The second method guaranteed only reprimand from Frederick because of the complete failure of the prince’s mission and the loss of Zittau besides. The king was beside himself when he learned what did transpire. The third course was adopted. This last was without question the worst of the three; rendering a march of over 70 miles necessary to wind up at Zittau, some 30 miles or so in the direction of Gabel, not only abandoning Puttkammer’s men, but also leaving the direct road to Zittau open to the enemy army. This gave the latter ample opportunity to occupy the great magazine first.
When the council dissolved at 0300 hours on July 15, the deed was done. Arenberg and MacGuire, spurred on by the prospects of a sure success, redoubled their shelling of Gabel, which effort blew holes in the town’s walls and drove some of the garrison to “make a break for it” through those openings. Puttkammer surrendered about 1500 hours. Total losses were approximately 1,887 men, 67 officers, and eight guns. The Austrian loss amounted to some 300 killed and wounded, a high cost.39 An entire day was spent by Prince Wilhelm preparing for the march, working under the knowledge that Gabel was lost.40 The Austrians next moved on Zittau, where a garrison of 2,500 men were located under Colonel Christian Friedrich von Dierecke.41
Meanwhile, Schmettau—in charge of the Prussian van—pushed off at 0100 hours on July 16, followed in short order by the remainder of Wilhelm’s men. There were no supplies, food or water, other than the little the men were carrying, and the four-wheeled transport had been lost with Puttkammer.
It was not until July 22 that the exhausted Prussians reached camp near Zittau,42 to find the enemy already posted on the opposite bank of the Neisse River. Here the latter held the Eckartsberga and Klein-Schönau, keys to the area. The Austrian left swung round the village of Postrelna, beside a commanding height, while the right lurched over near Lamberg Castle; a fairly strong position.
Wilhelm, knowing he could not successfully reach Zittau at that point without offering battle with his exhausted troops, sat down on the heights at Oderwitz to await developments. The prince continued to vacillate, just at a time when decisive action was required. The enemy were certainly aware of his arrival.
Wilhelm was in no shape to force the matter. Zittau was no Gabel; being a major center of commerce and life in the entre region. According to the military customs of the time, it should have been besieged. But Austrian understanding of this element of warfare was rudimentary (at best) at this stage of the war, far behind the French (the acknowledged masters of a siege) and probably even the Prussian king’s comprehension. So there would be no siege. What remained? About 1200 hours Austrian batteries (total of 44 guns) on the Eckartsberga began shelling Zittau with incendiaries as Dierecke had refused the proffered surrender terms. “The cannonading began at eleven o’clock at noon [sic], and continued no longer than till five in the evening.”43 Dierecke’s reply was in rather curt fashion. His answer was a defiant “The mountain shall crumble before we will yield!”
The Austrian artillery let up long enough for an attack by the 57th Infantry of Andlau, which made surprising headway against the Prussian defenses, although the town of Zittau caught fire. Some of the unfortunate citizens partook to the cellars, and it was said more than 200 suffocated to death or died from the flames.44 Some 600 houses, two churches, almost all of the public buildings, eight schools, and most of the town records were lost.45 But the fortress remained largely intact. Early the following morning, Wilhelm sent a detachment to lay hold of some provisions from the fortress for his starving army. A roaming Austrian detachment seized Görlitz on July 21, together with a dozen wagons loaded with foodstuffs for Wilhelm’s men. But the latter were unable to reach Zittau fortress because of the searing heat from the flames of the burning town, and thus could receive no supplies.
During the night of July 23, General Schmettau and a 500-cavalryman detachment broke out of Zittau fortress, carrying supplies for Wilhelm’s now desperate men. The Austrians tried to fend off the effort, but roughly half of the garrison managed to make their way to safety. Inevitably, Dierecke soon sent Prince Wilhelm word he could not hold the fortress largely for the same reason. What was the final extent of the damage to the town? Archenholtz states that only “sixty houses remained standing.”46
About 1600 hours on July 23, part of the “Prussian” garrison manning one of the double walls went over to the enemy. The offenders were actually Saxons and some “riff-raff,” but Diercke fought on. Within a few hours, about 1830 hours, his men were filing out of the place, the defense done. Unfortunately for the colonel, a wall fell between Diercke and a few attendants and the rest of the men. The colonel was taken prisoner by the pursuing Austrians; his command, which had been reduced to some 230 men, disintegrated. Alas, the actions of gallant Prussian officers of the vein of a Puttkammer or of a Diercke could do little to salvage the overall desperate situation for the bluecoats.
Thus the Austrians made a capture of a major magazine which could have “sustained 40,000 men for three weeks.”47 General Nádasti occupied Linay, while General Draskovitch stormed the Schreckenstein Castle (some eight miles south of Aussig), capturing the surprised 200-man Prussian garrison. The Austrians were also able to extract a great deal from the “ruined” Zittau, including large quantities of both powder and flour. They hauled out thousands of barrels of flour which the bluecoats had so meticulously gathered thereabouts.
After learning of these events from his scouts, Wilhelm resolved to march for Bautzen. On July 24, he rose with his tattered remnants—his own column plus a few from Zittau fortress—moving through Löbau. What a retreat for the prince and his tortured army! Finally, July 25, the battered men reached Bautzen, totally discouraged and beaten at every turn by a wily, clever foe. Lt.-Col. August Prince von Hohenzollern-Hechingen, with some 500 horse, energetically hounded the Prussians as much as possible during this ordeal.
The badly managed retreat had left the doors to both Silesia and Saxony wide open. What was worse, Colonel Jahnus had irrupted from Landshut into Silesia with some 4,000 light troops, while Beck moved on Weissenberg. Prince Charles, in trying to restore order in Zittau after the terrible recent events, ordered the arrest of six unsavory characters who had been engaged in nefarious acts against the unfortunate citizenry. July 23, these gentlemen were summarily hanged outside the gates.48 The deed was touted as a warning to all such would-be malefactors.
One day after Wilhelm reached Bautzen, a battle had taken place on the Western Front between d’Estrèes and Cumberland. While pulling back his advanced posts, Cumberland had been falling back trying to find a position to stand. He was still clinging to Hameln. There his center was protected from view by the little village of Hastenbeck in front, his right behind a swamp with the Weser before it; the left held behind a heavily-wooded rise. Cumberland had kept a small detachment far afield to keep him informed about the French intentions.49
Cumberland made no attempt to interfere with the surging French, who encamped close by on July 25.50 D’Estrèes had a superiority in numbers: 60,000 (50,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry) with 68 guns against a composite British-Hanoverian-Prussian force of 35,000 (30,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry) with 28 guns. Early on July 25, French scouting parties were unable to make out the enemy positions because of fog, but d’Estrèes decided to launch his attack anyway, in the belief Cumberland was retiring.51 This assault was directed against the one sector of the allied front that could be barely made out under these conditions: the left flank.52 After a prolonged bombardment, General François de Chevert swept forward about 0700 hours to storm the position. Chevert was ultimately successful, but the preliminaries to a general action took the greater part of the morning. So d’Estrèes chose to delay the main blow until the following morning. The main allied cavalry, some 29 squadrons, were held behind Cumberland’s right flank. But the commander placed more faith in his artillery.
Chevert’s units started forward in the predawn, on July 26, but his march up became disordered in the dark. He attacked nonetheless, and the French artillery was able to gain local superiority as their infantry pushed forward. Chevert struck and overran the allied posts on the Obensburg, a key part of Cumberland’s lines.
The loss of this post was crucial, for the French were enabled to open an enfilade fire from the Oldenburg on the rest of Cumberland’s lines. Cumberland’s pressed forces on that side still put up a spunky resistance. Once the French did squeeze the enemy from the Oldenburg, they had to withstand repeated enemy efforts to regain that rise. Other French forces seized Hastenbeck and the remaining key points along Cumberland’s front.53
Resistance was determined, and the advantage was shifting from one side to the other when an exploding wagon at the allied center threw the defenders into confusion. The French, pressing home this advantage, now overwhelmed that flank, forcing it to fall back in heavy fighting. Simultaneously, their assault against the allied center was making progress. At this point, an ironic twist of circumstances took place. Behind the hill where the allied left was positioned, there was a deep, narrow hollow through which the French may have been able to turn the enemy lines had they known of its existence. Before the battle, Cumberland, believing this post needed to be held—rightly so—had placed Colonel Briedenbach with a small detachment (three battalions there) for that purpose.
As soon as the new French attack commenced, Briedenbach assumed his services were required. His men came barreling out to hit Chevert in the flank, blunting his attack while an additional body of troops under t
he command of Prince Ferdinand, retook the battery. The battle had been won! But when Cumberland heard the sounds of Briedenbach’s attack, he assumed the enemy had outflanked him, and ordered an immediate retreat. At the same time, d’Estrèes had ordered a withdrawal, believing the battle beyond hope of recovery.
The allies left the field to the French and retired from an action they had really won. D’Estrèes’ cavalry, unsettled by the orders to withdraw and then resume their advance, failed to pursue the allies. The losses of the two armies were not insignificant, either. Cumberland had 1,404 casualties (311 killed, 886 wounded, and 207 missing in action). The French had 1,054 killed, and another 1,277 wounded.54
This “defeat” marked the effective end of the “Army of Observation,” for, in the haste to withdraw, Cumberland’s instructions to fall back into Hanover were botched and the men ultimately found themselves at Stade (on the Baltic). This move exposed western Prussia and Hanover to the French. There was more reason for French confidence. The allies, rather prematurely as it turned out, felt Kolin had dealt the Prussian king a blow from which his country might not recover.55
To the east, Frederick, having received word of the disaster at Zittau and of Wilhelm’s withdrawal on Bautzen without orders, determined to see for himself what had befallen the Prussians there. The king marched from Leitmeritz on July 21, moving through Pirna and making at best pace for Bunzlau. He left a detachment of 10,000 men under Prince Moritz to keep the gate into Saxony near Pirna secure, while Keith was given charge of getting magazines built up. The latter had by then withdrawn his forces from Bohemia.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 21
