Frederick took some 38,000 men with him.56 His army took post with an advanced guard at Hochkirch. The following year, this little village would be the scene of a deadly grapple. At the moment, it had a different significance. In front of Löbau, Major-General Charles Marquis DeVille de Cannon’s force, 1,000 men, were busily engaged in close observation of the Prussian movements, in particular of this same force at Hochkirch. The foe remained in ignorance of DeVille’s presence until a deserter appeared, causing Prince Wilhelm to prepare to attack and bag the intruders. DeVille had crept too close for his own good. A force of 3,000 infantry and 2,500 horse was deployed and sent through the thick woods near Hochkirch, but DeVille, discovering the impending Prussian assault, fled before the clash could come.
Meanwhile, Nádasti’s sojourn continued. He moved out from the Tetschen Castle (which the enemy, commanded by Lt.-Col. Jago, had finally abandoned on July 25)57 and Schandau, on to Kreibitz. July 29, he marched to Rumburg. Wilhelm, suspecting something, from his post about Hochkirch, pushed out a patrol including 2,000 cavalry, on to the high road leading to Görlitz; so as to warn him of the enemy’s presence. On that same day, Frederick reached Jung-Bunzlau about 0500 hours.
July 25, Beck moved on Görlitz. It does appear the Austrians lost a perfect opportunity to sweep up the road from Löbau and wreck havoc on any designs the king had in mind for putting up a defense. July 31, with the king’s men in the offing, Beck pulled his forward posts back on Bernstadt. Although the Austrians might have had better circumstance if they had only moved forward, even Horace St. Paul admits their reluctance to face the Prussian king in battle.58
When the king reached Jung-Bunzlau, he had unpleasant business. What follows is a distressing tale of Frederick’s hardheartedness towards his most unfortunate brother and Wilhelm’s pathetic attempts to excuse away his own failures.59 It also helps explain the often pronounced reluctance by major Prussian officers about any independent planning in the vicinity of the contemporary Prussian monarch.
Very early on the morning of July 29, Wilhelm and his generals sat awaiting the arrival of the king, as per orders from the latter. All of the Prince’s subordinates, save Goltz and Winterfeldt, were with him and Wilhelm was expecting their arrival momentarily. Just past 0400 hours, neither Frederick nor his own subordinates having appeared by this stage, Wilhelm and his men mounted their horses and rode off down the Bautzen road.60
Shortly they espied the king and his party approaching in the distance. At about 300 paces (850 feet), the latter discerned the prince and his generals and halted, followed in turn by Wilhelm and his commanders. Wilhelm saluted the king, and a like gesture followed from Frederick’s party, except for his royal brother himself. The latter turned his horse, dismounted, followed by everyone else. The king then sat down on the ground, as if awaiting his advanced guard. He ordered the belated Goltz and Winterfeldt, who had arrived with him, to sit by him, along with Prince Henry and the Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick.
After a brief interlude, Goltz arose and walked to where Wilhelm and his attendants were and spoke to them thus: “His Majesty commands me to inform your Royal Highness that he has cause to be dissatisfied with you; that you deserve to have a court-martial held over your heads, which would sentence you and all of your generals to death; but that His Majesty will not carry the matter that far, being unable to forget that in the chief General he also has a brother.” Wilhelm made a stiff-toned answer, saying his generals were not to blame for the reverses, that an investigation ought to be launched and if he himself were found to be at fault, then a court-martial should be held.
The king made no reply, but got up, mounted his steed, and in company with the units of his vanguard—which had arrived by then—rode off towards Bautzen, with no additional word for the prince. The following day, Wilhelm sent his brother a letter, as the latter would not come within speaking distance of him, although both men were staying in Bautzen. In this letter, Wilhelm attempted to explain his lackluster performance during the recent retreat. Frederick replied, later in the same day, although he held Wilhelm responsible for the disaster, he was still emotionally attached to his brother and always would be.61 However, he added, and this soon made the rounds of genteel society in Berlin (and elsewhere), Prince Wilhelm “was only fit to manage a harem!”62
Wilhelm, upon the receipt of the king’s letter, sent Lt.-Col. Scipio Lentulus to Frederick to ask for permission to return to Dresden. Frederick’s reply was to the effect: “The Prince may go wherever he wishes; depends on himself—an escort for Dresden is going this night.” Wilhelm, the situation now made clear, left with that escort, reaching the Saxon capital the following day. From there he left for his home in Oranienburg. The king, his sibling, had not been charitable: “his ears were used only to flattery and he lacked judgement.”63 Never again would Wilhelm command Prussian troops and, when he died, on June 12, 1758, of a brain tumor, he was a thoroughly broken man. The king’s actions on this particular occasion would never be forgiven by many, particularly by Prince Henry.
But Wilhelm was not the only victim. Schmettau was signaled out by Frederick for his handling of the rearguard during the retreat. The king summarily ordered him out of his presence.64 Meanwhile, the newly arrived men were posted on the heights of Weissenberg (night of July 29–30) and promptly drove back probing pickets from Prince Charles’ army.
The latter commander, who had done very little since the bombardment of Zittau,65 was content to keep his lines. The Austrian Chancellor Wenzel Kaunitz was shocked at Charles’ behavior, and requested his recall. Emperor Francis Stephen, husband of Maria Theresa and brother of Charles, categorically refused this measure.
There were valid complaints, however. The Austrian army as a whole was perturbed. The men were unable to comprehend why they stayed in camp after their recent successes, their confidence in the army’s leaders had waned and sickness was widespread. They chafed for action with the Prussians, whom they felt they knew the full measure of, but their superiors would not lead them forth. Soon desertions began in droves, and, meanwhile, the Austrian army by its inaction was nullifying the victory at Kolin and giving Frederick the breathing space he needed. The king himself was not shying from a fight, often pointing out his preference for battle.
August 5, Nádasti pushed a detachment out into Stolpen, led by Lt.-Gen. Count Anton Kalnoky. The Prussians were compelled to detour their supply convoys around through Radeberg. On the other hand, the arrival of fresh reinforcements from the king woke the bluecoats to life. The exposed position of the Austrians close to Weissenberg was just too tempting a target to ignore. A Prussian decoy detail, which made itself obvious to the Austrians, amused them while another force overran the sentries and prevented the warning from being sounded (August 6). A detachment of about 200 men then “attacked” the main Austrian front, but this effort was unsuccessful. A strong force of 500 Austrian hussars broke up the charge, forcing the “unpleasantly surprised”enemy to recoil into the woods.
On reaching the trees, this was discovered to be a rather neatly designed trap. Some 400 irregulars struck full in the face of the pursuing, unsuspecting hussars, while a force of at least 2,000 other Prussian troops, composed of both infantry and cavalry, erupted on the flanks. The outnumbered Austrians, having lost some 80 men, fled on to Esterhazy. The latter rallied the troopers and led them back to the charge.
In the end, the little combat decided nothing, and a stalemate was the only result. It was, though, patently clear the Austrians would fight if prompted.66 On August 8, Prince Moritz’s men attempted a similar movement on the enemy post at Stolpen. But the Austrians detected and squashed this latest effort. The Prussian king himself took a detachment of some 4,000 men and surprised Austrian outposts which had been pushed up against the Prussian camp. All of these efforts seemed more to aggravate—and hopefully—to draw out the Austrians for a finish fight. Nothing could have pleased the king more at that point.
Even so, not all of the whi
tecoats were reluctant to show fight. At Streigau, a far-flung body of light troops got into a losing altercation with a much larger Prussian force on August 9. About the same time, the wily Colonel Laudon bested a sizeable Prussian force on detail from Moritz’s post at Geishubel, led by General Itzenplitz. Before the surprised bluecoats knew what hit them, Laudon’s Croats overran two redoubts, seizing the initiative while the Prussians fled. A number of 12-pounder guns were discovered, but as there was no immediate means at hand of transport, they were spiked. Laudon’s sojourn thereabouts was very brief indeed.67 A heavy reinforcement of Prussians compelled his Croats to retire, with the loss of some 70 men. Claims of “400” Prussians killed/wounded and 160 captured by the Austrians were just that: Claims. Austrian losses were 21 killed and 52 wounded.
Against this backdrop, Frederick was doing his best to draw out the Austrians, trying to knock them out before his other enemies had time to close in. On August 14, after about two weeks of nipping at the Austrian outposts, the king was joined by Keith with his 17,000-man column and well received provision convoy. This raised the Prussian strength at and about Bautzen to some 55,000 men, with 72 big guns. The next day, they marched from their lines near Weissenberg forward upon the Austrian outposts deployed at the passes into Saxony, which were under the command of General Beck, his headquarters at Bernstadt. Beck’s men were scattered between Löbau and Görlitz, but they kept their communication up. Morocz had his men deployed right at Löbau, Hadik had pushed up to Postwitz, while our old friend Kalnoky was still ensconced at Stolpen. To his left, Major-General Franz von Schröger had a full regiment and three battalions of Croats. Schröger was nearest to the Prussians of General Finck, who was holding Radeberg.68
Colonel Jahnus with a detachment of some 4,000 Croats had been hitching back upon Landshut, aiming for Schweidnitz, while the Prussians, alerted by patrols of his presence, began assembling a body of troops to deal with this incursion. Major-General Johann Friedrich von Kreytzen69 took a body of infantry and cavalry (of some 3,000 bluecoats, including the II battalion of Philipp Loth von Seers and the 1st battalion of Quadt’s 9th Infantry) rather discreetly towards Landshut via Hartmansdorf, with every intention of surprising Jahnus.
Whitecoat patrols seized Landshut on August 10, but for the moment advanced no further. The Prussians applied gradual pressure which threatened to pry loose the Austrian grip on Landshut. Kreytzen pressed off from a post near Hartmansdorf aiming straight at Vogelsdorf, about 1350 hours on August 13. But the foe had a superiority in the mounted arm, so the Prussians were unable to probe beyond the tree lines to check the enemy’s strength. So there was an inevitable delay of more than two hours duration before Jahnus’ camp was discovered. A dominating feature of the immediate terrain was discovered by Prussian scouts to the rear of the whitecoat force at the Buchberg. This point of vantage could potentially compromise the position of Jahnus, so, after 1830 hours, Kreytzen unbuckled his force to try to leverage the enemy out from the Buchberg. The combination of superior Austrian light forces, which helped impede this move, and the faulty estimation of the distances/difficulties involved spelled the doom of the attack scheme before night intervened. So Kreytzen ended up bivouacking for the night in an area dominated by thick woods peppered with active enemy light troops.
With his opponent thus rendered vulnerable, Jahnus was determined to take full advantage of the situation. He headed off the “surprise” attack with one of his own. Some of the Grenzer light forces swarmed around the bluecoats, sowing confusion. Jahnus sent forth a force of about 50 Croats under Colonel Nematz during the night of August 13–14 across the Zieder Wasser, while throwing forces up on the two rises in the whole area, the Buchberg and its neighbor, the Burgberg. Kreytzen was further handicapped by having to keep his supply wagons so close to his lines.70 This caused a lot of mischief and greatly upset the Prussian plans for attack.71 A furious firefight ensued, of some hours’ duration, and Kreytzen ended up hard pressed just to hold his position. The whitecoats finally paused, hard by the rises to await the dawn and the day’s events.
Kreytzen discovered the Austrians jockeying for position, and, at first light, an Austrian force under Captain Lackopich—consisting of Warasdiner Croats—was attacked by the men of Kreytzen’s 28/32 Grenadiers, joined by the S-53/S-57 grenadiers.72 The Croats were gradually pushed back by a Prussian force which, for maximum effect, deployed into a single line and drove forward.
The bluecoat attack pressed head-on towards the Buchberg, which the force surmounted, driving back the defenders, and taking six guns which were there. This forced Jahnus into ordering his gun crews to load grapeshot for maximum effect. The ensuing bombardment shredded the bluecoat line, and Jahnus summoned up a vigorous counterattack. This new stroke was decisive; Kreytzen’s men, with their fill of the tussle, broke off and fell back towards Schweidnitz.
The whitecoats captured one full battalion of Quadt’s men.73 Some of the S-53/S-57 grenadiers put up a spunky resistance to cover the retreat of their fought-out comrades. Prussian losses amounted to 1,337 men and 30 officers, while the Austrians lost three officers and 96 men.74
As for Beck, as soon as Prussian hussars appeared a few miles from Bernstadt, the general was alerted by his outposts. Beck took to horse, realizing he had little time and with his men too scattered to bring together quickly. Beck galloped off to Ostritz, where General Nádasti had his headquarters. The enemy hussars could only nip Beck’s coattails, although they did capture an entire convoy which he had been watching. A pursuit was launched by the Prussian light troops, and Beck came roaring into Ostritz with the enemy hussars behind his men.75 Nádasti had just reclined at the table to eat, but, surprised by the sudden advent of a force of Frederick’s hussars, he jumped to horse and sped off. He left behind much field equipment and 72 men in Prussian hands.
Among the most important items captured was a strong box, which contained documents showing the Austrians and Saxons were plotting to overthrow the Prussian garrisons in Saxony as well as assassinate Frederick.76 The Saxon queen was implicated in these documents. Archenholtz relates she was sending secret communications, while “she was also busy sending compliments to Frederick.”77 What the Saxon Queen was trying to do was encourage the Saxons in the Prussian service to desert. This episode prompted the Commandant of Dresden, General Finck, to fully reveal the incriminating documents to her Majesty. Then, although the queen herself was not physically incarcerated, the individual who wrote the letters, a certain man named Schoenberg “was jailed at Spandau for the whole war.”78
The Prussian light troops were under the command of General Paul von Werner, who had left the Imperial service with a bitter taste in his mouth and bore a personal vendetta against the person of General Nádasti. Werner would likely very much have enjoyed having that general fall into his hands.
Nevertheless, the Prussian horsemen dogged Beck and Nádasti until they reached Prince Charles’ army on the Eckartsberga. Frederick rested his tired men, worn out from the antics of the past few days. While he did so, the main Austrian army stayed put. August 16, the king sent a detachment on Görlitz, and, at 1600 hours, shook his whole army towards the enemy on the Eckartsberga to force a fight. This Prussian movement was executed with much spirit and determination.
There were several columns engaged in the march between Ostritz and Bernstadt. The Austrian left held post at Geishubel, with an anchor force at Turchau. Charles held to his entrenched lines, and took only defensive precautions.79 Now the men did deploy into battle formation, arranging their troops in a semi-circular fashion around Wittgendorf. A reserve force included 30 full companies of grenadiers, 15 squadrons of cavalry and 15 battalions, behind the front. There were more than 100,000 men available, counting Nádasti’s mainly separate force. As for the terrain, it was largely steep ground, too difficult to mount a successful attack upon. The Austrian ordnance was impressive as well, with over 330 guns of various calibers being available to oppose the bluecoats, with abundant
ammo.
The Prussians were at a critical stage. The king was still determined to attack, even after the near disaster at Kolin. So Prince Henry, after dining with Frederick at his headquarters at Tittelsdorf, had a private conference with him in an attempt to dissuade the planned attack. Prince Henry felt certain such an attack would likely be worse than Kolin. Following a lengthy discussion of perhaps an hour and a half (and probably a little “arm twisting” of a sort as well), Frederick soon thought better of the whole idea.80
There were reasons for this. A small village, Wittgendorf, dominated a hollow just in front of the Austrian position; through this locale ran three roads right up to Eckartsberga. But two were for foot or horse travel only, and Austrian artillery dominated their approaches anyway.81 The king was thus denied the decisive battle he wanted, and the Austrian commanders, correctly viewing time as on their side, did not desire a full-scale engagement just then.82
Prior to this, the Austrian command had been suspecting enemy aggression of late was just a mask to conceal their continuing retreat back towards their homeland. There was nothing of consequence for a while, so Beck took advantage of the lull to go occupy some heights hard-by the Austrian position.
The Prussians, still spoiling for a brawl, pushed some big guns on to a rise near Wittgendorf. From this vantage point, about 1600 hours and from four different batteries, they commenced a rather lively cannonade against the Austrian force comfortably deployed in the village. An infantry attack by a nearby force carried part of Wittgendorf outright, but the foe cooly and deliberately pushed reinforcements (of four full companies of grenadiers) forward to help the defenders. The Prussians were finally forced to give way, after a short but very spirited little fight.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 22
