Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Wobersnow’s incursion had no long-term effects, apart from the obvious morale booster. The lost stores destroyed were replaced, and a mere “raid” could not prevent the Russian army from advancing. The 10,000-man advanced guard of the Russians was at Thorn until April 24, when it moved on Posen. The advance was led by Bagrey, General Ransanov led the middle division, and Rumyantsev brought up the rear. The latter two bodies boasted 30,000 men each. Fermor’s marching orders arrived on April 16.51 Czarina Elizabeth wanted the main army to move on the main part of Prussia.

  Fermor’s men rolled over the Vistula on April 20.52 Thereupon, once the army could join up, Fermor took up at Münsterwalde. There he spent a fortnight or so on final preparations, and May 7, drew reign at Swetz. The Prussians had learned of Fermor’s advent. To help contain the enemy’s march, Dohna gathered in all of his outlying detachments. Dohna’s men were hard-pressed. The force at Stolpe moved forward, which opened a vacuum into which the Russian Colonel Tölkells promptly marched. This turn of events quite effectively uncovered Pomerania to being plundered by the Russians. The removal of Platen’s force from Stolpe had really set this off.

  Elizabeth was sending an army of about 70,000 men towards the heartland of Prussia this time around. June 1, the advanced guard reached Posen. Frederick, in the final days of May, ordered Dohna53 to march at once with his 18,000 men to Glogau to join up with Wobersnow there. Hülsen and Itzenplitz were already coming from Saxony with 10,000 more men. Dohna was to assume command of the various forces gathering at Glogau. He was ordered to strike at the Russians when the opportunity arose. For the moment he was to move on Posen again. Had Dohna promptly acted, he might have succeeded. He failed to act, and did not leave Stargart on the Northern Front until about June 3–4, only reaching Landsberg on June 5. Even at that, Dohna paused there, recuperating/gathering his stragglers, which incurred a delay of two weeks.

  Not until June 23 did he deign start.54 The bluecoats moved rather cautiously, to say the least. Dohna really was lacking in energy. Through Mienzychod, he finally reached Wroncki on June 29. By then, the enemy’s advance held Posen. Dohna had a numerical advantage: 18,000 men against 10,000 Russians. Why then did he fail to attack? The general was not advanced in years (in July, 1759, Dohna was 56) but almost daily afflicted with ailments. Wobersnow’s forward elements got to Posen on July 2. The Russians were already in strength thereabouts. Some 60,000 men in a fortified position to the left of the Warta.55 By then, General Count Soltikov had superseded Fermor on June 29.56 Count Fermor had maintained a suspicion of the Austrians: he even felt that Marshal Daun was trying to pursue a light schedule so the Russians would have to step up and take over the main prosecution of the war.57 Logistically, Posen’s magazines had been replenished over the winter.

  Meanwhile, other events were unfolding in Saxony. Zweibrücken departed on June 24, for Schlangenbad, to try to nurse an old war wound. Serbelloni assumed command of the Imperialists while Zweibrücken was away. General Hadik moved out from Pegnitz on June 4, headed for Bohemia, with some 20,000 men. This left only about 15,000 under Serbelloni’s direction, which concentrated around Friesenhaufen. Over on the Prussian side, Prince Henry pressed off General Hülsen on June 5 with a force to reinforce General Dohna. After learning of Hadik’s march, Prince Henry moved towards Chemnitz (June 9), while General Finck marched to cover Dresden. Ried moved with celerity upon Neustadt on the Saale (June 12), while advanced patrols pressed on Fulda to check for the presence of the enemy. With their numbers reduced, the Imperialists tried their best to contract their own lines. June 17, General Luzinsky was at Kulmbach, while Kleefeld took up a blocking post at Kronach, around the same time. June 13, the main Reich army secured Bamberg, then, on June 23, hitched into Eichelsdorf. This was real progress except for one thing.

  It was a most unfortunate time for the Imperialists, who now reaped the whirlwind from the destruction of their supply depots. The always frail system of supply broke down completely, and most of the energy of the Reich troops was spent foraging for food. Serbelloni could do little about the situation, and, July 13, he was relieved by the return of Zweibrücken. By that point, the troops were at Langensalza, but only for the moment. Ried & Company took up a line from Frauenwald to Ilmenau, and also from Ohrdruf-Wallershausen. But that force was far from battle worthy.

  Meanwhile, the replacement of the Russian command did not help matters. Soltikov, the new leader, was uncertain about when to march. He wanted time to familiarize himself with the army he now commanded, and there was anxiety about the force the Prussians could oppose to him. To allay his doubt, Soltikov called councils-of-war, at which the different options were weighed out and discussed at some length. To make matters more uneasy, the Austrians remained in the dark about Russian intentions, and the hesitancy which pervaded the Russian command.58 Then, July 6, specific instructions arrived from Czarina Elizabeth to proceed with the advance against Prussia. Even at that, two days elapsed before the army finally lurched off, and still, almost incredibly, the Austrians had no idea of the plan of their ally, beyond a vague understanding. In short, for a man exercising his “big chance” to command, Soltikov seemed almost sullen and could even have had a sense of foreboding. Nevertheless, on events inexorably moved.

  General Panin pressed a detachment on Lwowek. This force, screened by 200 Cossacks, was four regiments of infantry and two of cavalry. Wobersnow (with 9,000 men) suddenly appeared. The little force took to heel. The greencoats retired from their forward posts, and Wobersnow’s scouts probed their position (July 3). The results were not favorable. Wobersnow determined the Russian right was too powerfully disposed to attack with the available forces. Wobersnow’s advanced guard accordingly fell back on Muravanna Gotzlina. Dohna’s army had belatedly put in its appearance thereabouts.

  Dohna received the somber report of the enemy’s strength possibly with some relief, and his army lurched over the Warta at Öbernich, pausing to rest temporarily at Objieczrze and Prezlavia. The Prussian pause was not without reason, but the bluecoats dare not stay in a post behind the Warta with the Russians very close at hand. On July 5, a Prussian move to Casimierz precluded the greencoats from that post. A Russian expeditionary force veered off, while the Prussians had thoughts of striking this body of troops, then wrapped about Woynowice, early on July 6. But the Russians moved first. This in spite of the great caution about facing Frederick which they often exhibited.59

  Russian scouts, who answered to Brigadier-General Thrasnachokow, had detected Dohna’s initial advance into Poland. They had been shadowing the Prussians ever since. On July 8, in nothing like a knee-jerk reaction, the Russian force made for Jankovitz. By then, Dohna’s bunched up force was congregated between Morowinow and Babinkow. The next morning, Colonel Gottlob Heinrich Tottleben surprised a small Prussian force beyond the Prussian camp. The success was a minor one, but it prompted the bluecoats to reflect on their exposed position. Dohna fell back on Bittin. But he would not be suffered long to stay in that post either.60

  July 11, the Russians made a concerted effort to break up Dohna’s post. There was a measure of stick-to-it-ness in the old soldier, though. Dohna fell back to another post ensconced between Perske and Senkowe. The Russians put down their left at Dohna’s old post at Bittin, while the Russian right leaned over towards Jankovitz at Molodosko. The following day, Dohna’s forward troops got a nasty surprise when the enemy army suddenly put in an appearance. The two opposing forces commenced a lively fire with the howitzers of the Russians maintaining a lively exchange with the Prussian guns, which enjoyed the post of vantage over them. The superior defensive posture of Dohna’s troops precluded assault, and the bluecoats stayed to their new post for most of July 13. By then, Dohna was aware of a possible Russian effort to cut him off from Silesia and Brandenburg. After nightfall, apparently gripped by the possibility that Soltikov might indeed trap him in Poland, Dohna rose and made at best pace on Pniew. Here the commander heard Soltikov was likewise aiming. Some had t
heorized that the change in command would mean the adoption of a new offensive scheme. But such was not the case.61 The Prussians shifted towards Neustadt, there to prevent the Russians from outflanking them. For their part, the greencoats made a determined effort to exploit any weaknesses in Frederick’s dispositions.

  As Dohna withdrew across the Warta, on July 6, he sent off Colonel Hordt with his Free Regiment and 200 hussars, aiming on the right bank of the Warta into the rear of the Russians, pointing at Zerstorungszug. Hordt pressed over towards Bromberg, sacking the magazines at Rogasik, Znin, and arrived near Bromberg on July 8. A group of Cossacks and 1,000 Russian soldiers were present there. The Cossacks took to the road when Hordt appeared, but the infantry valiantly resisted until virtually every man was dead or wounded. At Bromberg, Hordt found abundant stores of flour, brandy, fodder, and 75,000 bushels of corn. But he withdrew quickly, being chased by the riled up Russians. At Friedland, Hordt turned on his pursuers, in which Major Knobelsdorf led a charge against the enemy. Then Hordt, having destroyed Russian magazines of approximately 61,254 bushels of grain, with the pursuit blunted, returned to Landsberg and Cüstrin on August 3.62

  Meanwhile, on July 16, the Russians moved out from Sumerschka. On June 17, Soltikov was at Bentschen.

  By now, it must have been apparent to his subordinates that Dohna could no longer perform his duties as commanding general. He had marched and countermarched, trying to draw Soltikov to a disadvantage, with negligible results. Dohna’s ineffectual maneuvers, which included a very vague attempt to pin Soltikov against the Vistula and away from Prussia, make for pathetic reading. The failure unquestionably was due to lack of leadership, for the quality of the Prussian strike force was very good with excellent junior officers. Perhaps Dohna was not entirely to blame for what happened on this expedition for he was a stricken man. Wobersnow was of about the same vintage, but generally in better health.

  In the event, Dohna paused on the Warta, uncertain what to do next. In early July, Soltikov, veiled by the Cossacks, suddenly made for Brandenburg, specifically, Crossen.63 There he expected to find the Austrians waiting, Daun or Laudon, with much needed provisions. The effects of the lost supplies at Posen were indeed appearing. Soltikov pushed his men hard, hoping to get between Dohna and Brandenburg. The Prussian reaction was predictable. Dohna rose and raced off after the enemy, he rapidly outpaced them, with fewer men and less to tote (the Prussians were running low on provisions as well). On more than one occasion, Wobersnow urged Dohna to strike at the Russians while they divided into columns and thus unable to form an adequate front, but the Prussian commander let the opportunity to do so slip away time and again. In the middle of July, Dohna reached Brandenburg, just ahead of the forward elements of Soltikov’s army. He was relieved to be again in front of the enemy, for at the moment there was no other covering force on that side of Brandenburg.64

  While Prince Henry and Dohna had been thus occupied, in Silesia Fouquet had also been engaged in harassing the foe. His target was Moravia, where the Austrians had been building up magazines, the latter just across the border. Fouquet moved into that province from his post at Leobschütz. He arrived thereabouts on April 16, but found their former owners had absconded and he had little choice but to withdraw. Arriving back at Leobschütz on April 21, Fouquet discovered DeVille, who had pushed into Silesia.65 The latter attempted to break through Fouquet’s defenses. But the latter proved too tough a nut to crack. He had wasted about a week there when Frederick, who had gathered reinforcements for Fouquet at Landshut, rolled into Leobschütz to try to decimate DeVille. The latter had taken up post at Hermmansdorf for the moment. In the case of a prepared position, was it conceivable that DeVille’s force could be chopped to pieces? It was not! The alert foe rose (May 1) from his position, and broke for home. The king gave chase, but only managed to clip DeVille’s men as they retired through the pass at Zuckmontl with some gunfire. The hussars hacked the enemy’s rearguard to pieces, taking 100 prisoners, but DeVille did manage to get away. His narrow escape understandably concerned Daun, who had just installed a strong garrison at Prague and wondered if Prince Henry’s probes further westward and Frederick’s presence at the frontier meant another invasion. These fears, of course, were entirely unfounded, and the sole purpose of the Prussian movements was to delay Austrian operations as long as possible.

  Daun was trying to maneuver to rendevous with the Russians. In order to spring the Prussian king from Landshut, the marshal planned to move to Lauban (on the border between Silesia and Saxony); here the Austrians could cut off Frederick from Prince Henry, and vice versa. Vienna had informed him about the outcome of Tillier’s mission with the Russians, although this was tempered by the knowledge, brought to headquarters by Lacy, that the Austrian leadership lacked faith in what their allies from the East would actually do. Marshal Daun did not want to be kept hanging this time. He kept his men busy with training for the inevitable fight, while the king chafed at the bit to draw him out for a battle. Then, finally after an encouraging letter from Maria Theresa, Daun marched westward (June 26). He was aiming for the upper Quiess and a planned link-up with the Russians.

  Daun was active. He made for Mark-Lissa, arriving there on July 6. In response, Frederick hitched into Schmöttseifen (July 10). The king had tested his new horsed-artillery regiment at Trautenau, where he had gone to check on the enemy’s whereabouts. Both armies spent time improving on already formidable works, but in front of Fouquet the enemy, learning of Frederick’s departure, were on the move again. DeVille picked and poked at Landshut’s defenses while Fouquet was preparing to attack. Irascible DeVille hung tough; not enough to make him retire homeward, which would have entailed heavy equipment losses.66

  Daun was not so upset with DeVille as to order him to Mark-Lissa. Nonetheless, poor Fouquet brought his men to Schmöttseifen, leaving General Goltz at Landshut with a small garrison. Behind the frontier, the enemy struck again as soon as they learned of the departure of Fouquet. Harsch’s men appeared suddenly in the defiles near Landshut and made for the post. Goltz blocked the hills at the passes; Harsch dislodged him from one post (August 31) only with much effort. The bluecoats sealed off the penetration. Some ordnance, handily placed on the next rise, battered Harsch’s men so savagely that their advance stalled. The hussars took care of the Austrian horse. It was enough! Harsch gave way, retreating back again behind the frontier.

  Fouquet, learning of the enemy’s advance, took the greater part of his men and retraced his steps. General Johann Friedrich Stutterheim was left with the rest at Schmöttseifen. But the Prussians near Landshut were not again troubled that season. In the meantime, the Prussian monarch had been trying just where he thought the Russians were going to strike this year; at Brandenburg again, which was most likely, or into Silesia, where Soltikov stood a far better chance of linking up with the Austrians. Daun’s major concern was to shield the heart of the Austrian Empire from Frederick’s probing thrusts. While he regarded the Russians as useful allies, the marshal was just not willing to take risks on their behalf. Soltikov expected that while his army was near at hand, then Daun had the duty of keeping it supplied.

  Chapter Thirty

  Battle at Züllichau1

  On July 17, Dohna, who had been retiring before the enemy, reached the village of Züllichau, on the eastern bank of the Oder. He barely occupied it before the Russians could. The situation was critical. Dohna had been unable to stop or even retard the progress of the Russian advance and the situation on the Eastern side was worsening. As for the king, he was furious when he learned of the complete, miserable failure of the campaign in Poland, but, in fairness, he could have expected little more.

  “A mediocre general in his cups would not have been able to handle an army more erratically. Your—Polish—Campaign rightly deserves to be printed as an eternal example of what every intelligent officer must strive to avoid. You have done every silly thing which can be done in war and nothing whatever which an intelligent man can
approve,” adding as a final line, “I tremble to open my letters from you.” Such were the words addressed to the commanders of the Eastern Front armies, intended primarily for Wobersnow and not Dohna it would appear.2

  Frederick was also quick to realize in what a bind this left him. He must do something, or Brandenburg (and Berlin) would be at Soltikov’s mercy. July 20, the king ordered off Wedell, who had spearheaded the Prussian infantry at Leuthen, to go to eastern Brandenburg, take command of the forces there. In the guise of a ‘dictator’ of sorts, Wedell would do something against the Russian threat. Something meant attack when and where he found them. Had the commander been Seydlitz or Moritz of Dessau, the issue might have been different, but Frederick can hardly be blamed for his selection of Wedell. He had little clear-cut alternative. Winterfeldt, Schwerin, Keith, Moritz, Retzow, were all either out of action or dead. It is true that Wedell performed well enough at Leuthen, but the plain fact was he had never commanded so much as a corps, let alone an army, before this.

  July 22, Wedell was in Züllichau. A set of orders accompanied him addressed to the generals present thereabouts from the king himself. The communiqué told them in no uncertain terms to obey Wedell as they would the monarch himself. Frederick had calculated trouble from the senior officers over the appointment of the younger Wedell over their heads. A grenadier battalion and hussars accompanied him. The army he took command of consisted of 19,600 infantry (30 battalions), 7,800 cavalry (63 squadrons), and 56 heavy guns, total of 28,000 men. In retrospect, Wedell may have been overanxious to try his hand.3 Having been ordered to do all he could to halt Soltikov’s forward progress, Wedell wasted no time trying to do just that. Did Wedell have to attack when he did? He had ten days’ rations in his supply wagons. So there was no apparent reason to hurry with the attack,4 other than the king’s impatient attitude. But a quick strike it would be. His subordinates reasoned the best chance of defeating the enemy lay in catching them on the march and at the most vulnerable, and Wedell realized in the back of his mind Frederick was not very tolerant of failure, if the events ended that way.5