Hadik did not hesitate. He dispatched Major Ukelevics (of Infantry Gyulay), along with Major-General Lobkowitz—bringing five companies of carabineers, together with the Modena Cuirassiers. All this while, Lt.-Col. Heberstein stuck to his guns hard-by Pauschütz and held it against any Prussian encroachment. All of this to gain time for the reinforcements to reach the allied left.
Brentano, once he was joined by the new men, attacked the bluecoats and forced them back to Löthain again. Allied cavalry galloped in, led by Lobkowitz. The impetus of this charge broke up the Prussian horse formations and even the infantry fell back; gradually. The cavalry charge netted several guns, along with 200 men left by the retreating bluecoats. Rebentisch came to the rescue. His men provided cover for the unsteady infantry to rally behind. Stiffened by the presence of Rebentisch’s men, the bluecoats launched a counterattack which struck hard at the enemy and temporarily regained some of the lost ground as well as four cannon. Major-General Franz Graf von Schallenberg, leading an entourage of Major-General Franz Karl Podstadtsky and Major-General Vitzthum’s men, came barreling in with four squadrons of Serbelloni Cuirassiers, with two others of the Brettlache Cuirassiers, and the Hohenzollern Cuirassiers (the lone Imperialist unit). This decisive stroke swept the bluecoats back.
The allies not only recovered the ordnance they had just sacrificed, they captured five more 12-pounders and a howitzer. Rebentisch, however, pressed by the revitalized allies, fell back towards the line of earthworks that Finck had prepared behind his front in case of need. Prince Lobkowitz, emboldened by the string of little allied successes here, was given very timely assistance in the person of General O’Kelly with three full battalions of infantry, joined by Gemmingen’s men, unleashed against the fortified line between Schletta and Korbitz. But the Prussians withdrew hastily upon their fortified lines, and their enemies, exhausted as well, withdrew as darkness put an end to the whole action, except for isolated little altercations that roared up mostly round the little villages in the vicinity and were quickly extinguished until it was nearly 2300 hours. The intensity of the sustained artillery duel is difficult to exaggerate. Hadik’s ordnance, for instance, had shot off some 3,669 rounds, while the Prussian pieces likely fired just as many.
Although the forces engaged by both sides in the battle had been substantial, much of the Austrian infantry, on the Right Wing of the allied force especially, had kept to their line of Angstberg-Kanitz. This fact alone likely caused Finck to conceive the enemy would resume the quarrel the following day with a renewed determination to drive off the bluecoats.11 To strengthen his main post in case of such an event, Finck ordered Rebentisch to rejoin his main force behind entrenched works. This move left only a weak Prussian screen force over by Löthain.12
With the dawn, there was some sign that the contest might be renewed, but the day slipped away with no action. It had been a hard-fought fight. Hadik gave out his losses as 1,353 men and 60 officers on the day of Löthain. Lobkowitz got a high honor: the Knight’s Cross of the Maria Theresia Order. Prussian losses were reported as 1,300 men and 43 officers.13 The loss of the allies was approximately 1,545 men, and 72 officers. Finck, who had acquitted himself well, was rewarded with the Order of the Black Eagle.
Hadik was blamed for not having gained a complete victory. The charge was brought up by Serbelloni, and he was initially supported in this dubious claim by Zweibrücken. September 28, Zweibrücken formally relieved Hadik of his command, pending the convening of a formal board of conduct. But Zweibrücken, who did not hesitate to claim a victory, had self-serving motives: he was happy someone else’s head (and not his own) was on the chopping block. Serbelloni’s motives were also self-serving: to get rid of one of his hated rivals.
A look into Hadik’s conduct soon displayed that he should not have been dismissed without just cause. The problems that had been placed at Hadik’s feet, like the delay in making his maneuvers during the whole Löthain affair, were shown to be without cause. In due course, a board of conduct inquiry dismissed the complaint.14
The Austrian marshal, even with the Hadik saga brewing, turned to deal with Prince Henry, determined now to extinguish him once and for all. September 22, Daun with escorts scouted out the latter’s positions in front of Görlitz, deciding on the morrow for an attack. About 2000 hours that night, Prince Henry—leaving only a handful of sentries to give the impression he was still in camp—stole out of the Landskron and swept the nearly 20 miles on Rothenburg; here he arrived early on September 23.15
Daun moved up to a jumping off position next morning, discovering to his chagrin that the foe had vanished during the night. Some of his irregulars found heavy Prussian baggage moving on the road to Glogau. But Daun thought that Prince Henry might just as likely to be aiming for Bautzen, and scurried back to cover his base there, relieved, though, to find no Prussians about. Frederick was on the move now as well. His men occupied Bannau on September 24, just closing the door to Soltikov’s advanced elements, but the Russians were in fact aiming for Glogau and not East Prussia. Realizing his error belatedly, the king rose and rolled across the Oder to occupy that place before the sluggish enemy could even get close. General Stoffelne had gone with an escort to plot a path for the march of the main army through Neustadt Pass on Glogau when his alert men discovered the bluecoats already on the Zobelwitz Height. He returned and told Soltikov that the wily Frederick had once again stolen a march on them and was again in front of them. The Russian commander then made for Breslau, but again he was foiled by the speed of his Prussian enemy. The king put down pontoons at Koben, crossed there and reached the road to the Silesian capital ahead of Soltikov.
He went to Söphenthal while the enemy, learning to his chagrin he was again too slow, withdrew on Neustadt. The Russians were now angry at Daun because of the latter’s complete failure in providing the necessary commissaries. The greencoats did attempt to capture a small hamlet between the Russian and the Prussian lines, called Herrnstadt. Here was a small Prussian garrison, and the first assault failed utterly. A while after, Russian troops summoned the small force to give up. When this was refused, Soltikov ordered his artillery to flatten the little place. Operations on this front had otherwise been pretty much quiet for a month now, and it was by then the last of October.
On October 24, Soltikov moved for Posen where his magazines were, leaving Laudon to march by Kalisch with his force to rejoin his own subordinates. Soltikov having departed, Goltz, Fouquet, and General Hans Paul Werner began to harass his retirement, compelling Laudon to keep on a constant guard. Proceeding through Czenstochow and Cracow, on the way Laudon lost nearly half of his army through desertion as well as on the hard march. After long delays, he finally made it in the end of November. By this point he had but 10,000 men left, so he made a mutually agreeable truce with Fouquet in Landshut. By then he had taken the latter, and held it until spring. While this was going on, Frederick moved off by Kösen to Glogau itself, and there sat down to rest his exhausted army. He detached Hülsen with most of the men (13,000 strong) to march for Saxony as fast as he could.
The king stayed thereabouts with the remaining 8,000 men to recuperate his men. Prince Henry, now in Saxony, hoped to hold the positions he occupied with the forces under his command, but the Imperialist-Austrian force did not prove so obliging.
Daun returned to Saxony on October 1, bringing his army back to more familiar quarters near Kesseldorf; now that it was becoming clear there would be no cooperative military operations between the Austrians and the Russians after all. For his part, the marshal set his sights on turning Finck out of Meissen, which would open the way for the allies to regain the road to Torgau and Wittenberg. Only on Finck’s right wing was there any hope for a successful effort in this endeavor. The main Austrian army was prepped for this major maneuvering. The host, consisting of 73 battalions, 67 grenadier companies, 90 squadrons and 294 guns—boasted a total of some 60,000 men. By this point, a number of critics were postulating opinions that Daun was m
erely husbanding his throng so carefully while letting others carry on the fighting as he was trying to keep it intact.
Daun moved out from a line from Lampersdorf to Blankenstein, while Hadik, with that whole recent “unpleasant” business behind him, arrived at Neukirchen. Prince Henry’s attention was also swinging back towards the Elbe and Saxony. Daun decided to beat his foes to the punch by taking his force and marching down the western bank of the Elbe to drive back Finck so he could regroup to oppose Prince Henry. The Imperialists were left to hold Dresden to keep it secure from the enemy. Finck chose not to hang around, and when the morning rose on October 2, Finck’s lines had been abandoned. The general pulled back towards Torgau. Prince Henry came roaring across the Elbe (October 3) and moved to link up with Finck at Strehla (October 8). But the sum total of this force did not much exceed 45,000 men.
This Prussian force was deployed behind the village of Strehla across to the Windmühlen-Berg (to the southwest of Laas). Daun had maneuvered to outflank and bag Finck near Meissen, but the wily Prussian had flown the coop. The marshal, on October 3, took up his headquarters at Lommatzsch. Hadik was at Riesa, and the noticeably separated main Austrian army was thus presenting a target for any ambitious bluecoats. The main Austrian body took up post between Striegnitz and Lommatzsch.
The Austrian right, under Brentano, was unbuckled upon Strehla, but Wunsch was able to descend from the heights of the Reuszenerberge and began to engage Brentano in a rather lively cannonade that culminated in an infantry exchange as well. Finck sent his subordinate some reinforcements, but Wunsch failed to see the urgency to employ them in the task at hand. He was correct. Brentano beat a retreat upon Riesa; while Hadik, staying ever alert, kept to Poppitz.
Daun, meanwhile, had heard word that Prince Henry was at hand. Word was filtering out that the prince’s men were very close by Meissen. The marshal sent word to Lt.-Col. Graf Strasoldo, in command at Meissen, that the bridge there should be dismantled as quickly as possible. The main Austrian host was moved up to Heyda (October 4), but there was no attempt to take the offensive. At that point, Hadik was still under the suspicion of incompetence, and precious time was wasted on Serbelloni’s unfounded accusations that would have been better employed in planning operations against the foe. Intrigue often interfered with military sense.
Prince Henry had discovered there was no go at Meissen, and immediately altered his line-of-march through Grossenhayn on Meschwitz. A temporary bridge was built and used there. Now Finck and Henry were in one mass. General Bülow was pressed off to Eilenburg (October 5), to cover the Prussian communications through Leipzig. Prince Henry was very sensitive on the issue of supply for his men, and ordered supplies be readied and brought from Magdeburg. On the military side of affair, the position of the bluecoats was open to being outflanked through the Hubertsburger Wald and its thick forest coverage. The opposing forces faced each other from early October across the confines of the valley region between Döllnitz and Jahna. October 6, the Austrians menaced. The main army suddenly took post from Riesa over to Oschatz. The latter was held by Brentano with his Croats, while Esterhazy was hovering near the Prussian right wing. Prince Henry placed a force on the Ottenberg, which jutted towards the Döllnitz River and Borna. Another force of bluecoats took post at Leobschütz. Interestingly, Prince Henry had few qualms about Daun’s advance, despite the admitted Austrian superiority of numbers, but he looked with some fear of Hadik descending upon Leipzig to cut him off from his communications. The main Prussian force wrapped about Strehla.
Not surprisingly, Daun vacillated, calling a council-of-war at Hof on October 8, and made no effort to make an attack upon Prince Henry’s lines that should have succeeded. Another council-of-war, convened the following day, settled the matter: the marshal refused to sanction an attack, citing the imminent appearance of the king’s men and lack of numbers on the part of the allies. Lacy, among many others, thought a golden opportunity was allowed to slip away.
What Daun did sanction was to send General Buccow in the direction of the Prussian right back towards the Elbe. It was the very move that Henry had feared in the first place. Buccow encountered a Prussian force at Lampertswalde, which beat a retreat after a heavy skirmish. This move uncovered Dahlen, while the Prussians countered by moving on Schildau. By October 13, Wunsch and General Rebentisch were ensconced at Schildau, with some 8,000 men. Buccow, with 15,000, made a thrust towards the town. Rebentisch withdrew on Torgau, and Brentano reached Cavertitz. This move immediately opened up the prospect of bagging Prince Henry’s whole command, since the Prussians were effectively cut off from retiring on the western bank of the Elbe. Henry hastily withdrew from his now exposed camp at Strehla (October 16).
The prince, troubled by the enemy’s continuing progress, took up a post extending from Septitz Heights through Torgau (October 17). Daun, nothing daunted, trailed after the Prussian, hitching into Strehla, where he thought he was in a good position to check the bluecoats, although the supply line had become overtaxed and the Austrians were forced to resort to gathering whatever provisions they could from the immediate vicinity. Prussian patrols located the marshal’s men between Laas and Görzig, with the Imperialists looming, and repeated urgings from the impatient Maria Theresa to force the issue before Frederick could intervene if possible, Daun was under pressure to act.
Critics on the allied side knew few bounds. The blunt Flemming wondered out loud whether Daun would fight at all, and even why Lacy and the subordinates did not press the issue. A wag was said to have sent a nightcap to the wife of the marshal,16 and Maria Theresa bemoaned the fact Saxony might have to be sacrificed anew on the twin altars of caution and sluggishness.17 Granted, the lack of stable provisions might have helped deter Daun from acting. In the end, however, the delays could only help the beleaguered Prussians.
Prince Henry sent Finck to Eilenburg with a force to counter Buccow at Schildau. Marshal Daun moved his headquarters up to Belgern, and awaited the appearance of Zweibrücken before he acted. The latter crossed the Elbe close by Dresden, a fact which became known to the worried Prince Henry. He ordered back Finck from Eilenburg, while the tardy Marshal Daun, deciding to again try to turn the Prussian right, moved to Schildau (October 22) with that express purpose in mind. Buccow was reinforced to above 20,000 men and the Duke of Arenberg assumed command of the force. Arenberg was almost directly in Prince Henry’s rear.18
His goal was to cut the enemy’s lines-of-communication while tending towards Wittenberg, from where he hoped to bar the bluecoats from crossing the Elbe. The Austrian force plowed through Dommitzsch on October 24. Prince Henry wrote to the king he was going to maintain his communications with Leipzig through Düben, as long as the enemy permitted it, and the only forces moving towards Grossenhayn would be reconnaissance units. Nevertheless, Henry was settled on keeping his new post as long as possible. Meanwhile, on October 25, Austrian advanced units from Brentano struck at Elsnig, against Krockow’s men. The latter promptly brought reinforcements for an attack at Vogelgesang, which secured that post, although Brentano retained Dommitzsch and other allied forces began to encroach upon the Prussian positions. The situation was looking bleak.
Fortunately, a chance capture of an Austrian officer was made about this time by one of Prince Henry’s patrols. The man had in his possession papers which revealed not only the numbers/position of the Austrian forces, but that they were short of food and ammunition. Now armed with this useful intelligence, Wunsch struck upon a resourceful plan. He proposed to Prince Henry that Arenberg was in a vulnerable post, which the Prussians should take advantage of. The general would himself make his way down the east side of the Elbe leading some ten squadrons and six battalions to reestablish contact with General Rebentisch, who would meet up with him at Wittenberg. Finck, meanwhile, would sweep upon Arenberg from the south. The two forces would then strike at once. Caught between two fires, the Austrian detachment should be shredded by the maneuver.
Wunsch moved out at on
ce. On October 26, he pressed to Grosstreben. The following day, the general, full of confidence, pressed into Wittenberg. Guides at once were sent to see Rebentisch, who was up to Gräfenhaineichen. Rebentisch’s command and Wunsch united in one force at Kemberg on October 29. Prince Henry detached an additional party under General Wedell to Roitzsch to strike Arenberg in the flank. In the meanwhile, the mood at the headquarters of Marshal Daun was in particular rather upbeat, as it should have been all along.
In the early afternoon of October 29, the Prussians moved out against Arenberg with every intention of exterminating the Austrian detachment, and but good. With the fortuitist break for the bluecoats of stumbling upon unexpected intelligence, it seems rather ironic that Arenberg almost simultaneously received faulty information that Rebentisch was commencing to pull back upon Leipzig to cover it. This, if true, would significantly reduce the size of the Prussian attack force. Even worse, in order to contain the “departing” Rebentisch, Arenberg kept a command of men under General O’Donnell at Düben to cover it against Rebentisch. This was at a time when the Austrians really needed every man they could get under the circumstances. The rest of the force was set for action, though. Brentano kept very close to Dommitzsch, to contain the Prussians preparing to debouch upon their offensive.
The Duke of Arenberg shook his command into motion about 0300 hours traversing Pretzsch, between the dark Elbe and the thick Dübener-Heide on October 29. General Finck should have been apprised of this movement almost immediately, but, in fact, it was nearing 0800 hours, before Prussian scouts brought in word that Arenberg was marching. Less than an hour later, the Austrians, emerging from cover, began engaging Wunsch-Rebentisch in the nearby open ground. O’Donnell, no fool, realized that Rebentisch was nowhere near at hand, and, about 1100 hours, he started back tracking to join Arenberg. Wunsch kept a part of his force concealed in the forested roadway from Kemberg on to Schmeideberg, which prevented Arenberg from guessing the enemy’s true strength.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 65
