Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War
Page 76
Next was a piece of brilliant deduction. The king planned to drive a wedge between Daun and Lacy by outflanking the latter. This would compel Marshal Daun to either give battle or else retire. With a bit of pluck and the enemy’s cooperation by inactivity, the situation was yet salvageable for the Prussians and their fiery leader.
Prior to the move, Frederick called his subordinates together in his tent, and gave them appropriate instructions to each man of the part he was to play, after which he adjourned the meeting. At about 0400 hours, June 19, the army was on its way. The distance to Lacy’s lines was quickly covered, but it was discovered that Lacy, alerted by the presence evidently of the Prussian scouts, had taken alarm and had withdrawn southward upon Daun during the interval between the reconnaissance and the actual march. The camp was quite deserted. Daun recalled Lacy, to take position near Reichenberg with the mission of guarding his flank from Frederick’s designs. The latter wasting no time pressed forward scouting parties to pick and probe at the main Austrian position near Reichenberg, Guichard accompanied the king, who promptly rode out to investigate just how strong the lines of enemy works really were.
But when Frederick looked over the very formidable ensemble of palisaded defensive works, which the marshal with his vaunted defensive skills had fully prepared, he was aghast. The king came to the sober conclusion that an attack against such a post, and most especially with the small number of men at his disposal now, was hopeless of success. What is more, knowing the character of Daun, Frederick knew there was scant chance of an Austrian move to the offensive. Stymied, the troubled monarch paused to consider the next move.
It was at this impasse that news was received of what had happened with Fouquet at Landshut. This very disturbing news caused the king to fall back on Gross-Döbritz and Hohndorf. There was some concern that Daun might attempt to attack the withdrawing force while it was partially strung out and most vulnerable, but the fear proved groundless. The cautious marshal did not stir, although each day during the retreat he would ride forward himself to observe the Prussians and also send detachments to watch the roads to Silesia, to which he feared the enemy might be heading, holding the army in readiness to move out in case that did occur.
Frederick, for his part, ordered a siege train be readied and held in marching posture at Magdeburg, in preparation for a siege of Dresden, towards which he intended to move if he could get Daun rooted away. All of this while simultaneously sending scouts to confirm new intelligence that Lacy had once more been sent forth by the marshal to block the way into Silesia. The report was false, so in late June, failing everything else, the king decided to head for Silesia to confront Laudon. July 1, he dispatched the van in that direction, then about 0300 hours on July 2, the army moved out as a body. The new royal plan was a model of simplicity: he would either engage Laudon in battle or, failing that, he hoped to at least draw Daun into Silesia to support Laudon, leaving him free to go back and besiege Dresden.31
Meanwhile, the enemy scheme had required some degree of modification. Plainly the new Austrian plan as formulated by Laudon called for much larger armies to go into and conduct offensive operations directly within Silesia itself. In effect, this would neatly transfer the seat of operations from Saxony to Silesia, although, of course, there would be exceptions. Again and again, the weaknesses of the plan would manifest themselves. In spite of detailed planning.
Frederick, of course, was set. The Prussian army was divided into three distinct columns to make this new advance. The first two consisted of infantry and cavalry and the last was the baggage, supply train, and the artillery. The first column moved through Nieder-Ebersbach on to Röhrsdorf, the second past Bieberach and on towards Sella, while the slower-moving last column traversed Grossenhayn, and Zochau. The marching troops headed northeast some 20 miles on to a hamlet called Quosdorf, in the process crossing the Roder Water and the Pulsnitz Water—at the latter where one column crossed by Kraukau. The movement went smoothly enough, although in the thick woods along the line of march the bluecoats were harassed by enemy cavalry, but a few cannon kept them at bay. At about 1500 hours, after twelve straight hours of incessant, hard-paced marching, the Prussians finally drew rein at their objective.32 The new Prussian camp was near Quosdorf, with the left flank anchored at Zietsch, and the right at Kraukau.
Meanwhile, Daun, at last discovering the foe on the move, ordered off Lacy with 20,000 men to impede their operation. Lacy’s orders were largely of a discretionary nature; he was instructed to do all that he could “with safety” attempt. This meant the edict was largely open to interpretation. Daun himself would rise and follow in Lacy’s footsteps, using short-cuts to try to bar Frederick from entering Silesia.33 But the extent of Lacy’s involvement was to send off a few mounted detachments, although he was vigilant enough to keep a close eye upon the Prussian movements. Lacy set up an encampment near the Pulsnitz Water at Lichtenberg, just close enough to keep the Prussian camp under observation but at the same time not close enough to be in danger of attack.34 The following day, July 3, Frederick gave his exhausted men a well-deserved day of rest, the army now being posted between Quosdorf and Kraukau. He took a small escort and went off to snoop out Austrian movements to the southwards. Some ten miles away arose a group of knolls, the principal one being the Keulenberg, from which point of vantage the surrounding country could be well viewed.
Looking southward was the village of Radeberg (not to be confused with Radeburg) some ten miles distant, to the left front lay the town of Pulsnitz and nearby the stream bearing that name. Beyond that, the camp of Lacy could be seen, to the left front Bischofswerda was just barely visible way off in the distance. Close-by on each corner and rear were Kamenz, Grossenhayn, Königsbrück, etc. The region, in sum, was largely one of woods, cut by small streams and swamps, and divided by villages and towns. Here Frederick saw clearly Lacy’s set up, and decided to try once again to strike him while Daun was away.
There were valid concerns, however. The Prussian army was notoriously bad at possessing/keeping maps (updated or otherwise) of most of the campaign areas, and the king consequently knew little of the nature of the terrain through which his troops would have to pass. Of necessity, they must traverse swampy, sodden ground, through country filled with lakelets and extensive undergrowth. Inevitably the Prussians encountered serious difficulties bringing the big artillery teams forward, over the right paths and as quickly as possible. The pace of transit was unusually slow, and there was a space of about 20 miles before Lacy’s lines could even be encountered. The latter was certainly no fool. He had irregulars out in those intricate woods forward of his works, and soon received warning of the approach of the foe even before they could draw near. The Austrians lost some 200 men during these encounters.35 A couple of Austrian riders got very close to the person of the Prussian king, but he was quickly rescued from his peril.36 Yet another instance where a chance action could have profoundly altered the course of history were Frederick injured, captured, or killed.
In the event, as midnight, July 4, arrived, the bluecoats were once more broken up into three columns and the men trampled forward through the stifling heat of an early summer morning. The first cluster hitched by Steinborn on to Lomnitz, the second strode through Königsbrück and on to Grose-Nauendorf, while the third moved through Schmörkau on to Mitelbach. This was to take the enemy in front and flank, opposed by horsemen (the Kaiser Hussars) who would not take a stand, but when Frederick’s men emerged upon Lacy’s camp, they found it unoccupied and discerned that the alert Lacy had escaped their icy grip37 for the second time in less than a month. Lacy’s timing was impeccable, as usual.38 The latter was even then making for Bischofswerda at best pace. (We might add that Lacy drew full benefit from the difficult terrain through which the bluecoats had to pass, which considerably slowed down their progress.) There was no immediate option left to the Prussian king but to encamp at the heights (at Neues Dorf) that Lacy had just abandoned. Frederick himself summoned Guic
hard up to Pulsnitz hastily as he could, then made his headquarters there spending the time at hand contemplating the next move. Guichard did not reach Pulsnitz with the main body of his men until 1130 hours.
In the meantime, the king had received word that Daun, most surprisingly in view of his usual slow nature, was already well ahead of him and of his army. That very night the marshal and his 60,000 men rolled into Bautzen. He had started off in great haste from Reichenbach as soon as possible and with a supreme effort had thrown his army between the bluecoats of Frederick and the troubled province of Silesia. Lacy, for his part, had occupied Bischofswerda, more hoping this time around to clash with the great Prussian enemy with some help. Frederick, therefore, decided to head northward soon as he could and, veering half-right, he could make a half circle maneuver and thus swing past the flank of Daun’s army. This would again expose the way into Silesia, now one of his top concerns, although he hoped to go against Dresden as soon as he was able.
About 0300 hours, July 5, Frederick rose from Pulsnitz with his advanced guard and marched some 14 miles on Kloster-Marienstein to the north, where he rested it for some time awaiting the arrival of the rest of the army, trailing behind. A pause for the rest of the day was made; next morning at 0300 hours, Frederick was rolling again, in three columns this time, heading eastwards. His intentions were to cross the Spree, leaving Bautzen to his right on the southward side. Then he put his men into a well-prepared post to the northeast of Bautzen itself. He desired to get there as fast as he could and pushed the men hard for that end, which made the soldiers miserably hot because, in addition to the forced pace, they were also carrying full field packs and equipment. The day started off very warm and it was soon getting hotter, these conditions caused the sand to rise in clouds. However, there was no wind, and that made the day ever worse for both sides, Prussians and Austrians alike.
There were many impediments on the way that the bluecoats had to overcome. Before each successive column, Frederick had had pontoons built so the marchers could cross the numerous ponds and streams in their path. Instructions had been circulated that the men were not allowed to drink on the march, as it might cause those who did to overheat and become seriously ill. As it grew more stifling, some of the men, as they crossed over these bodies of water, would drop down often by the dozen to get a drink of water, in spite of the “fear of punishment” whether the elixir was stagnant or fresh. The sergeants were obliged to rain down blows upon the men, but the officers “were compelled on this day to be more lax in discipline, which, at other times, was punished by death.”39 Nevertheless, the “harvest” wrought by that march speaks for itself. During the course of the rigorous maneuver, 105 Prussian soldiers collapsed and died of sunstroke, and the survivors were utterly drained by the time it was complete.40 The effort, as it worked out, would be all in vain.
Daun had started off at about the same time as Frederick, heading east as well, although the pace of his army was even more rapid. The Austrians were aiming for Görlitz, and the army moved along at an even more grueling pace than the Prussians. Daun lost about 200 men who died of sunstroke en route, and 300 more were seriously injured. The cruel pace in this instance was effective in winning the race for position. Before the enemy’s van got far, and as the bluecoats reached the Spree, the king’s scouts sent information that the marshal’s camp was abandoned and that the enemy were moving eastwards as well. Frederick’s reaction was immediate. He ordered the army to alter the crossing of the Spree towards Bautzen so as to bring it within marching distance. The necessary maneuver was made, and by that evening the Prussians were within a few miles of Bautzen.
This caused the Prussian right to be deployed up to the Spree and the left at Doberschütz—just about two miles on the north. During the night of July 6–7, Ziethen was sent to Bautzen to grab hold of it. He at once galloped down the bank of the Spree where the town was located; Bautzen was under control of some of Lacy’s cavalry, although they were “persuaded” to forthwith depart. Major Zetmar, in charge of some Prussian hussars, made an unwise charge at one of Bautzen’s bridges, but he was quickly reinforced by some more Prussian forces. Together the effort was so successful that the Austrians were unable to contain the progress of the Prussian advance. Word then reached the king that Lacy himself was now at hand, and fully prepared to confront him at Bischofswerda, only some ten miles west of Bautzen.
This advance (consisting entirely of cavalry) had already drawn near Bautzen, and the Prussians wondered with great curiosity why he would be so bold as to send his advance so far in advance, where he would be unable to render it support. This was just not Lacy’s character. Frederick also heard that his outposts were being attacked intermittently by this same body, and decided to strike, as his plan was again upset, against Lacy the following day in the hope of drawing Daun to support him.41 This was aimed principally to pick on the Austrian light cavalry. If these screen forces could be shaken up, this might contribute to Lacy leaving the bluecoats alone altogether.
His alternatives, those of gaining Silesia and of besieging Dresden, could each likely be attained by this move, as Daun would be busy. A day of rest was allowed on July 7, in spite of Lacy’s maneuvers. The king took advantage of the rest and sped off to the west with an armed escort (1,500 men from two regiments of hussars and two of dragoons) to investigate Lacy’s progress, under General Ziethen. About six miles west of Bautzen—at the little village of Gödau—Ziethen’s men fell in with a force of fresh Austrian cavalry, from Lacy, driving it off on Rothen-Naostitz after a spirited engagement, capturing 300 prisoners in the process.42 Frederick could not realize that Lacy had practically all of his cavalry in that immediate area and was coming up with his main body even then.43
Soon the enemy horse was back in greater strength, and the king was forced to put out a supreme effort to drive them away for a second time. Again Lacy’s men made the effort, the cavalry being stiffened by the arriving infantrymen. Now it was necessary for the king in his turn to order forward a battalion with some artillery to stay the surging foe, and a counterattack netted about 100 Austrians as prisoners. However, the men he had ordered up by rider were still some five miles distant and he had therefore no proper infantry support. At this stage, several regiments from Lacy’s thoroughly aroused army came on the scene, to give aid to their riding companions. Soon another struggle was taken up at close quarters. It was fortunate for the Prussians that there was a pause now as both contenders drew apart. Frederick’s men, under the weight of superior numbers, were on the point of being driven in. The pause gave a chance to reassess the changing situation and to rest, but still more importantly allowed time for the reinforcements ordered up to reach the hard-pressed fighters. The newcomers, immediately upon arriving, unlimbered their guns, but a few shots were sufficient to convince these men to beat a retreat.
Frederick, no doubt shaken by the experience, returned to camp, minus 200 men lost in the heavy skirmish. Lacy had suffered about half as many men lost. Daun, meanwhile, had not given his army pause to rest on this march. This was without any doubt the most grueling march he ever called upon his soldiers to make, some 30 miles from Bautzen on Görlitz; a herculean effort as it worked out. For two days the marshal’s fatigued men struggled along bad roads to reach the latter, which they eventually did, on the evening of July 7. All of this while Frederick with his army was mercifully resting at Bautzen.
Lacy, following the skirmish, now had his army strung out between Göbau and Bischofswerda, and did not attempt to advance further against the bluecoats. He waited thereabouts for events to unfold. Frederick spent July 8 repeating the pause, at the same time devising a new plan. There was scarcely a chance of overtaking Daun now even by forced marches so Lacy would be the better target for a dawn attack next morning (July 9), in the hope of pulling Daun off his step and coming back to help his subordinate. At about dusk, evening of July 8, Prussian drummers called the men to form rank, discreetly so that Lacy could get no advanced
warning from his scouts. An elaborate smoke screen was employed, the men going so far as giving off marching tunes in the darkness, thus giving off the impression to Austrian scouts that nothing more than a pursuit of Daun was afoot. Frederick had split his army into three groups, each of which were to converge upon Lacy’s army from different directions and utilizing different roads.
The different columns were to burst in upon the enemy simultaneously. The upper and the lower columns were composed entirely of infantry, the center one consisting of Ziethen’s cavalry; all kept as silent as they could and were told to stay concealed in the thick woods they were traversing. It was hoped the Prussians might pull off a sneak attack. Defeating Lacy would go a long way toward making up for the wearied marches of the very recent past. Again, it was all in vain. Wily Lacy was alerted by the irregulars that the foe was at hand, in spite of Frederick’s measures. Sharp-eyed scouts had not been fooled. Columns of men had been detected coming in (Daun and his men were nowhere close), and instantly Lacy ascertained what was taking place. He shook his army into preparation to depart, and by 0100 hours, July 9, was streaming at full speed for Bischofswerda. He thus escaped the Prussian grasp for the third time since mid–June.44