Meanwhile, back at the new Prussian battery at Burkersdorf the bluecoats began shelling the Austrian works upon the height above at 0400 hours, July 21.6 Many pieces of ordnance, chiefly from Frederick’s new battery, participated. The howitzers confined their attention to the rises, while the lighter cannon and field guns hammered away at the Austrian entrenchments in the valley near the Weistritz and Kletschkau. A regiment of Austrian horse was deployed thereabouts, and it was decimated along with the lines of defense erected there.
The Prussian fire was brutal on the formations of whitecoats directly before them, particularly on the 38th Infantry of De Ligne. The latter commander remarked that he had never seen anything like this maelstrom. Quite a number of the Austrian troopers were laid low in the course of the shelling, and the accompanying horses spread in panic in all directions. Even O’Kelly’s entourage scattered, leaving only the general and Colonel Ferrari to try to figure out what was going on over at Leutmannsdorf. They were reduced to spending a large part of the battle going back and forth between the Leutmannsdorf and the Leibelberg.
Finally, General O’Kelly recalled the cavalry formation in the valley after discerning the carnage among those units. His posts upon the height, by comparison, had suffered only slightly. There was a good reason for that. The rise was elevated, and the Prussian howitzer shells, mistakenly equipped with short fuses, often exploded in mid-air before they reached their intended target. The shelling thus inflicted little real damage at all, although the sounds of the enterprise were clearly heard all around and along the Austrian entrenched works, alerting the men therein in plenty of time to prepare for an attack. This latest blow was expected from the eastwards, across the Schweidnitz Wasser, against the steeper part of the rise and facing a rocky terrain, instead of the firmer, lower western end where Frederick had planned. There was one drawback to the plan. The enemy had the opportunity to take Möllendorf’s advancing troops in a flanking fire from their batteries if Wied’s attack had not tied them down on that end first. Failing this, between the pounding from the batteries on the Burkersdorf itself and the fire from Ludwigsdorf, Möllendorf would then face disaster. Royal plans were quickly reworked. There was now a modification of both haste and discretion added to the mix: Wied would attempt to storm Ludwigsdorf before Möllendorf went in against the Burkersdorf. If Wied failed, then the attack of Möllendorf could be called off for the moment. To keep the foe upon the Burkersdorf occupied while Wied did his duty, a diversion would be required.
This was Möllendorf’s “futile” bombardment of the pre-dawn, perhaps not so futile after all. Daun, some seven miles away in Tannhausen, could not figure out just where the Prussians were preparing to strike, or even how for that matter he could counter it (just as soon as the light was favorable for it). Daun sped off new groups of troops to help stiffen Burkersdorf and Ludwigsdorf and tried, through his staff present on those two heights, to see about the intentions of the Prussians. General O’Kelly on the Burkersdorf could offer no clue; but might, after an interlude; Möllendorf was in sight by then (it was well past dawn) but there was as yet no sign of his attacking anywhere. Cherneyshev, on the day of Burkersdorf, was drawn out between Seitendorf, through Seifersdorf, over on Bögendorf. His men had no function at all in the coming battle, just appear to back up General Ramin’s force (about 3,900 men strong) over by Reussendorf and Manteuffel (with some 6,000 men) over by Hoch-Giersdorf. The sum total of the bluecoats involved in the demonstrations before O’Kelly & Company, after all, was no more than 15 battalions, not counting the Russians.
Meanwhile, Guasco now emerged from Schweidnitz with part of his garrison and began making dangerous movements so as to threaten the bluecoat rear. Frederick, however, had been ready for this possibility. He now showed his main army (minus, of course, Wied and Möllendorf) to Guasco’s view. The latter grew so alarmed that he promptly retreated within the confines of the fortress again. The Prussian presence was menacing. Major-General Johann Christoph, Count von Wylich was on the right, while Major-General Franz of Anhalt-Bernburg was on the left in the Prussian formations in the immediate vicinity.
After 0800 hours, General Wied, whose force had been split up into three separate columns, marched up against the enemy works atop the Ludwigsdorf from the eastern, lower, end of the rise. He encountered a desperate resistance from the advanced forces of the Prince de Ligne (commanding the Austrian works upon the rise), protected as they were by strong lines of defenses. A most terrible tussle was required but at last the enemy gave way after heavy losses, retreating back upon the pommel of the rise, where de Ligne had his main body massed. Some scattered Croats in that immediate region were then attacked and driven back under pressure. At this point, Wied’s progress ground to a screeching halt, at least for a time. Brentano had scurried headfirst to approach the Prussians now erupting against Ludwigsdorf and Leutmannsdorf. This was the movement that stopped the Prussian advance, led most notably by the Austrian 27th Infantry of Baden-Durlach. The latter unit was sturdy enough to anchor the Austrian lines, which came under intense pressure now from Ramin’s 25th, and which charged “in the right storming column, it captured the northern battlements at Ludwigsdorf.”7 The Prussians finally surmounted the works, sending the Austrians reeling back upon Michelsdorf. However, Wied was unable to press on ahead for the moment. His losses had been heavy.
Nevertheless, after a brief interval, General Wied would undoubtedly have launched his main effort straight ahead, had he seen any hope of success. He was probably still even considering it, in spite of the prospect of almost certain disaster. Then Colonel Johann Christoph Count von Wylich und Lottum, one of his more enterprising officers, discovered a small valley cut by a hollow on the flank of this position. Through this dip, Lottum emerged in the rear of de Ligne’s works, hard about Ludwigsdorf, while General Wied directed a diversionary stroke from the front to the Austrian lines. Lottum’s formation quickly made its presence felt, pushed forward by the 22nd Infantry of Schenckendorff, and de Ligne, caught from behind and with Wied surmounting his front now, was forced to beat a retreat from that post to avoid being surrounded. As a result, one of the Prussian goals on the day of Burkersdorf had been achieved.
Meantime, General Möllendorf, who had been using his spare time reconnoitering the field and region he would have to traverse on his mission, awaited news of Wied’s attack. He had been himself scouting round for a road by which he might steal a march to get into the western, rear, of the Austrian position before him, but, alas, no such thoroughfare had been discovered. All that was available turned out to be a mere track (a “Schaffstritt,” sheep track), which could only be used by two-legged creatures in its upper reaches. Hence no horses, artillery, or even light field guns for that matter, could be brought along. But the pass did promise transit to the western, and therefore lower, reaches on the west side of the Burkersdorf.
To oppose the force that Möllendorf was bringing forward, De Ligne gathered what men he could to defend the Austrian lines thereabouts. In short order, De Ligne was given instructions to vacate the whitecoat positions right there, and only on the summit was the Austrian force able to stay. There a force of Austrians, led by Captain Brady, was deployed to make a stand.
Some of the bluecoats did their best at the front to hold the attention of the enemy ensconced in the redoubt on the summit. While this was taking place, a small force of Prussians, “a hundred volunteers under Captain von der Hagen broke through the entanglements and battlements of Burkersdorf.”8 This had the potential to turn into something special, and it would soon enough. The resistance was determined. Hagen was killed a short time after the attack began from a bullet to the head. The initial stroke was beaten back, but the bluecoats rallied and renewed the assault a few minutes after. This one, too, though better mounted, was still beaten back by the desperate whitecoats. However, the Austrian position became untenable when the wooden works they were occupying on the day of the battle caught fire, perhaps even courtesy of
their owners. This development put Brady into a real bind. Still, the whitecoats had fight left in them.
At last, however, Möllendorf succeeded, even knocking out a stubborn little Austrian force that had planted itself squarely in his path. By about 1200 hours, the deed was a done deal, as the remaining Austrians, their wooden works blazing round them, emerged into the open, with their hands up in the air. Brady happened to be among that number.
That happened to leave the only viable Austrian defense worthy of the name north of the Weisteritz Valley. Prussian shells had fallen thereabouts, all right, but the Austrian posts in that immediate area had the advantage thereabouts. With no clear-cut choice, the Prussian king redeployed his artillery accompaniment, which commenced shelling these Austrian positions with as much vigor as possible. This new effort inflicted substantial losses on the forces of O’Kelly & Company ensconced in that immediate area. The whitecoats had pressed forward some reinforcements to help stiffen Daun’s army in its remaining posts in the Weisteritz Valley. The newcomers got to Wüste-Waltersdorf in order to allow the affected Austrians to disengage from the area. As the Austrian force retreated, O’Kelly’s men, as we have already noted, took off towards the rear. The rest of the whitecoats would not be far behind as it worked out.
As for Marshal Daun, hearing word that Burkersdorf and Ludwigsdorf were lost, he ordered a general withdrawal back upon his anchor post at Tannhausen. He kept most of his men, following the action, between the left wing on the Wüste-Giersdorf, and the right wing of the whitecoats leaning on Wüste-Waltersdorf. The king did not pursue, but kept up a duel with the enemy until about 1600 hours. The ordnance then fell silent at last, and the Battle of Burkersdorf ended.9 As an action, Burkersdorf lacked the intensity of heated battles like Torgau. There were no massed formations valiantly throwing themselves against other massed formations behind entrenched works. Both sides fought more in the nature of small task forces that clashed against each other in almost unconnected actions.
Nevertheless, this signal victory made a Prussian siege of Schweidnitz inevitable. The bluecoats had captured right around 1,000 prisoners, along with 13guns (eight 3-pounders, two 6-pounders, one 12-pounder, two howitzers) in the battle. There were also about 320 killed, and 420 wounded, besides some 700 deserters. Prussian losses were approximately 1722, of whom some 85 percent were from Wied’s corps.
Daun pulled in his outposts after the battle, and issued orders to prepare to withdraw. About 2100 hours, July 21, the marshal rose and crept back towards the mountains behind; all moved on Wüste-Waltersdorf to Tannhausen. The Austrian army was in complete order and fully able to stand again. But the singular fact remained, Daun had been defeated and all without any Russian assistance whatsoever. Frederick’s confidence had immediately been raised, most appropriately.
With the planned deed accomplished, Cherneyshev marched (July 24), taking with him a generous gift of some 15,000 Ducats [13,500 talers] and a sword studded with precious diamonds, besides Frederick’s warmest thanks, moving home towards Russia. Ironically, on that same day, the Austrians discovered, too late for them, that the Russians were making for home. Just like that, it was back to being a war largely between the Prussians and the Austrians over the control of coveted Silesia.
Events elsewhere were conspiring along those lines. Back at St. Petersburg, upon her accession, Empress Catherine had considered, in a detached calculating manner, renewing the war with Prussia, which may have proven a popular step for the Austrians. There were many considerations in this matter. In retrospect, Peter’s enterprise upon Denmark had proven to be his undoing. He had certainly performed a number of enterprises that had antagonized the sensibilities of many influential people in Russian society as well as the army. But Peter, there can be no question, miscalculated how completely the Russian people were set on getting rid of him at the earliest opportunity. Catherine, as she was both pregnant (by another man) and clearly in a subordinate role to the new, very unpopular czar, turned out to be much easier to generate support for than her husband had assumed would ever be practical or even possible.
Intrigue was a natural part of life at the Russian court, and it was in this particular genre that Catherine thrived. Apparently, even as early as March 1762, there was a conspiracy brewing to simultaneously depose Peter and install Catherine on said throne. The savvy Prussian monarch could not have failed to take notice of the events enveloping his fellow ruler in Russia, but, fortunately, he seemed to have at last learned something from his sharp treatment of Czarina Elizabeth. Frederick kept his tongue now, when it really counted, advising Peter to do his best to smooth things over with his energetic spouse. The Prussian king, in the back of his mind, no doubt anticipated that Catherine might just “intrigue” her way right on to the throne. This through the auspices of her lover, Gregori Grigorevich Orlov, and his compatriots.10
In the event, the Russian army could be turned around and sent marching back towards Germany, and some of the senior generals, like Soltikov, expected that to happen. But the time of year was already nearly August, and the greencoats could never return to campaign effectively during the rest of the 1762 Campaign. Besides, the Prussian king had urged Peter to placate, rather than oppose, his wife, and the king’s quarrel had largely been with Elizabeth. In the end, Russia did not reenter the war, but neither did she become an active ally to the Prussians.
Simultaneously, the king sent word to his post at Neisse to forward the guns and equipment thereabouts in preparation for his long anticipated siege of the enemy forces now shut up within the Schweidnitz Compound.11 He then moved his men forward to take up posts for this endeavor. Dittmannsdorf was made his headquarters, and the bluecoat army was put into a half-moon position southwest of the fortress—some ten miles off in the distance—between Seiferba and Juliansdorf. Marshal Daun was, as we know, at Tannhausen, another ten miles southwest and about 20 from Schweidnitz. The latter was now reduced to trying to come up with a plan of his own to foil the Prussian designs upon the fortress. His army was deployed from Donnerau and Gross-Giersdorf, through Tannhausen, leaning over on Falkenberg. The whitecoat right was entrusted to Marshal Lacy, who was by now engaged in some sniping back and forth with the Prussian general Wied.
In this position, the marshal made himself as secure as possible. Daun could not claim ignorance of the importance of keeping a tight grip upon Schweidnitz, if at all possible. July 25, Kaunitz wrote to the marshal a communication conveying the absolute urgency of keeping fast hold upon the Schweidnitz Fortress. The ambitious Frederick had to be denied the place. If the fortress fell, the Austrians would be driven out of Silesia. There would be no further means or forces at hand to prevent this from happening. In response, Daun ordered entrenchments erected to prevent the very aggressive Prussian king from attacking his main post. This seemed to preoccupy the marshal’s time rather than the more important task of trying to relieve Schweidnitz.
Meanwhile, Frederick drove forward with his preliminaries against the place with a great will. He appointed the finest of his officers in that sort of work, Tauentzein (memorable from his staunch defense of Breslau in an earlier time) to head up his siege forces. Tauentzein was given a force of men, about 12,000 strong (composed of 21 battalions and 20 squadrons), with great expectations being looked for. The batteries of Tauentzein were of 28 24-pounders, 50 12-pounders, 20 50-pounder mortars, and 12 7-pounder howitzers.12 That being stated, the king fully anticipated the fall of the fortress within a few short weeks. Then the confident Frederick could proceed to clear out Silesia of the enemy and then go help Prince Henry over in Saxony. As soon as the required equipment could come forward, Tauentzein at once set to his task. August 7, he had his first parallel dug, which commenced the siege.13 This first effort of the siege was some “nine hundred paces from the Jauernicker Fort” at northwest Schweidnitz.14 The king about this time recalled Bevern from out near Glogau to escort the supply trains coming in from Neisse against light parties of the enemy.
&
nbsp; As for the Austrian garrison shut up in Schweidnitz, they at least had an abundance of provisions and supplies within the walls of the compound; in the short term. This could only help them in the defense of Schweidnitz. As for the Prussians engaged in besieging the place, they suffered to a great degree in the initial phases of the siege, especially in view of the very energetic garrison there, from the effectiveness of their own efforts to render Schweidnitz as impregnable as possible in the days when they had the fortress. The measures that their engineers had devised were thus turned against them by Guasco & Company.
In the event, the bluecoats opened (and maintained) a fierce bombardment of Schweidnitz, but Guasco himself made a determined resistance with his own resources. He defended the fortress with a tenacity and vigilance that might, under different circumstances, have caused even Frederick to admire his efforts. While the besieging forces were laboring on their works, Guasco’s garrison tried their best to interrupt the enterprise. Guasco’s force, although handpicked, was largely composed of homogenous groups, none of which had enough members to establish even a unit identity. In fact, apparently language alone was a great barrier within the ranks of Schweidnitz’s garrison.15 A number of different tongues were understood by the defenders, which, in combination with the above factor, served even further to separate the men into little groupings. German was, of course, the major language used, but there were also French, Italian, Hungarian, Czech, even English, among the rest. Intrigue and cliqués could not help but thrive under these conditions. For example, Major-General Ernst Friedrich Giannini, the immediate commander of the Austrian field forces within the place, was at odds with Guasco. Giannini disliked the commandant intensely, and made no secret of it. Worse, Guasco was fully aware that Giannini had shared several negative communications with Marshal Daun concerning the conduct of the siege.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 104
