TSR2
Page 4
Max speed
Mach 0.98
Empty weight
Not stated
Max AUW
49,600lb (22,500kg)
A general-arrangement drawing of the Vickers-Armstrongs N.113 Scimitar development of March 1957. Damien Burke
While these had all been aimed at the RN, Vickers could see the possibilities in offering such an aircraft to the RAF, so in parallel it had produced another brochure, entitled N.113 Development, Tactical Bomber for the Royal Air Force. This described a subtly different development, the Type 565, another two-seat aircraft powered by RA.24 Avons and with the large 500gal (2,270L) slipper tanks and extra pylons. The Scimitar’s four cannon would be deleted to make room for extra internal fuel. The canopy was initially sketched as being smoothly curved, unlike the ‘double bubble’ of the slightly later Type 567, but later drawings of the 565 incorporated the 567’s canopy. For navigation, target identification and attack there would be a moving-map addition to the existing Doppler, a search radar based on the AI.23 being used on the English Electric P.1 and, perhaps most radically, a partly automatic flight control system that could fly the aircraft through an atomic attack release manoeuvre (the Low Altitude Bombing System – LABS). Adding a navigator/ observer greatly relieved the pilot’s workload, and was considered essential by the RAF in any case. As with the B.103 and DH110, however, final attack was going to be primarily based on a visual search within the vicinity of the target.
Up to 2,000lb (900kg) of weight was saved compared with the 567 by deleting the naval equipment such as folding wings and arrester hook, which gave improved performance all round. Take-off weight would be 48,500lb (22,000kg), with a combat radius of up to 740nm (850 miles; 1,370km) (high-altitude sortie, descending only to attack). Combat radius for a low-level sortie would be between 430 and 560nm (495 miles/795km and 645 miles/ 1,040km), depending on speed (the higher figure being for a sortie with much of the cruise carried out at 300kt (345mph; 555km/h) with one engine shut down to save on fuel). Cruising speed would be Mach 0.83, with dashes at Mach 0.93. The take-off distance would be within 1,500yd (1,370m) with rocket assistance, or 1,940yd (1,775m) without.
No specifics on fatigue life were mentioned, as tests were still under way on the existing Scimitar. However, it was built to be a tough beast, and the developed version would no doubt have held up well too. Weapons carriage was basically similar to that of the existing Scimitar, which suffered from the handicap of not having room for a weapons bay of any kind. Thus the wing pylons were the only possible place to put weapons, bringing associated heating and drag problems.
Vickers believed it could get the Type 565 into the air in 1959 and into service by mid-1961, at which time production of the Scimitar F.1 would be ending. Alternatively, the naval features could be retained, cutting back on development time and getting the aircraft into service nine months sooner at a cost of higher weight and reduced performance (8 per cent reduction in combat radius, 50yd (45m) added to take-off distance). Total R&D costs were expected to be £4 million (including £2 million for five development batch aircraft).
Take-off performance fully loaded was a concern, so Vickers took another look at the design. De-navalization and the new nose had moved the centre of gravity (c.g.) forward, and large external stores also tended to lower the c.g. Raising the nose for take-off would therefore take longer, and various means were looked at to improve the situation. These included redistributing weight within the airframe, moving the main undercarriage forward, increasing tailplane size, adding a tailplane flap or even adding an auxiliary system to raise the nose during the take-off roll. Reducing the aircraft’s unstick speed was also necessary, and to this end more options were considered, such as tilting the jet pipes downward a further 10 degrees, high-lift devices on the wing, and drooped ailerons with blowing. However, the only serious improvement would be achieved using rocket assistance, so provision was made for a ventrally slung rocket for assisted take-off (initially two Super Sprites but later a single Spectre), the rocket pack being jettisoned and recovered by parachute after use.
A second set of figures was produced for an improved Type 567. This would use integral fuel tanks instead of bag tanks (giving an extra 200gal (910L) of fuel) plus improved RA.24 Avons with 6 per cent better fuel economy and lighter weight. Take-off weight would now be 48,570lb (22,045kg) with a combat radius of up to 950nm (1,090 miles; 1,760km) for the high-altitude sortie and up to 670nm (770 miles; 1,240km) at low level. The take-off distance was much the same, but the actual ground roll was now reduced to as little as 1,070yd (980m) with rocket assistance.
Perhaps the most interesting of the whole slew of developed N.113 proposals was specification No. 566, for an integrated flight control system. Supermarine’s work on future aircraft had led it to the firm belief that rising complexity and speeds meant there was a need for a fully integrated flying control system encompassing autopilot, autostabilizer and power controls, with electrical signalling holding it all together. Sperry had created a system that handled much of this requirement, and which would be ideal for installation in an N.113 airframe as it allowed existing mechanical control runs to coexist with the integrated system. Unlike existing simple altitude/heading holding autopilots, this system would effectively have been able to fly complete manoeuvres had it been developed further. In ‘Direct’ mode it would act as an orthodox powered control system using existing mechanical linkages; in ‘Autostablizer’ mode it would use electrical signalling, and control surface movements would be subject to small adjustments superimposed on the pilot’s demands. Finally, in ‘Little Stick’ mode, the aircraft would be controlled by a small side-stick (rather like the General Dynamics F-16, only some years in advance), which would translate pilot demands into co-ordinated use of the control surfaces, the pilot never needing to move the rudder bar unless he wanted to introduce slip deliberately into a manoeuvre. Fully automatic instrument landing system (ILS) approaches could be flown on the system, and the intention was to develop it so that it could fly complex manoeuvres such as programmed climbs, steady turns to a preselected radius, automatic attacks coupled to the radar and a complete LABS attack.
Hawker P.1121
Hawker’s proposal was contained in a brochure entitled P.1121 Air Superiority Strike Aircraft, and referred to an aircraft already unsuccessfully submitted for OR.329. Hawker believed strongly enough in this aircraft to have continued its development using the company’s own money, even when it failed to win the tender for OR.329, and claimed that it could easily become a multi-role strike aircraft. As both the Saunders-Roe and Fairey designs to OR.329 had been briefly considered for the light strike role, Hawker certainly deserved to give it a go as well.
The P.1121 was an attractive swept-wing, single-seat multi-role aircraft, and a prototype was under construction, powered by a single reheated de Havilland Gyron engine fed through a chin-mounted intake. Either the Rolls-Royce Conway or Bristol Olympus would have been more suited to the strike role. Hawker was confident that the airframe could be developed into a variety of versions, one of which was a two-seat tactical bomber carrying Doppler, sideways-looking radar (SLR) in underwing pods and forward-looking radar. Relocation of the existing fuselage-mounted tricycle undercarriage to wing nacelles to allow space in the fuselage for extra fuel or bombs was possible. The brochure, however, concentrated on the single-seat P.1121 already under development. Navigation capabilities would be as limited as those of the single-seat Scimitar, with equal pilot workload problems.
Leading Particulars: P.1121
Length
66.5ft (20.27m)
Height
15.33ft (4.67m)
Wing span
37ft (11.28m)
Wing area
474sq ft (44.03sq m)
Wing aspect ratio
2.89
Wing anhedral
2 degrees
Tailplane span
19.25ft (5.87m)
Tailplane area<
br />
115sq ft (10.68sq m)
Tailplane aspect ratio
3.23
Tailplane dihedral
10 degrees
Engines
2 × 15,800lb R-R Conway
11R (25,700lb (11,665kg) in reheat)
Max speed
Mach 1.15 at sea level,
Mach 2.3 at 36,000ft
(11,000m)
Empty weight
27,365lb (12,420kg)
Max all up weight
49,690lb (22,550kg)
Carrying 1,500gal (6,800L) of internal fuel, a 2,000lb ‘Tactical Strike Weapon’ on a pylon under the port wing (balanced, as on the Scimitar, by a drop tank under the starboard wing), up to 600gal (2,700L) of fuel in underwing drop tanks, two nose-mounted cameras, and a pair of retractable rocket packs either side of the fuselage behind the cockpit housing twenty-five 2in rockets each (alternatively, four 30mm cannon in a pack), the Conway-powered P.1121 would have a normal AUW of 43,700lb (19,800kg), rising to 48,200lb (21,900kg) with full weapon load and extra drop tanks. Cruising speed would be Mach 0.85 at altitude and Mach 0.72 at low level with a burst of up to Mach 0.9, all in dry power. With reheat, low-level speed could be Mach 1.05, with an impressive Mach 2.1 at 36,000ft (11,000m). Take-off distance was not so impressive, at 1,950yd (1,780m), and hi-lo combat radius in strike configuration was up to 675nm (775 miles; 1,250km). In reconnaissance fit at high level and high speed, combat radius was reduced to 430nm (500 miles; 800km). With two 300gal (1,360L) and two 150gal (680L) drop tanks, one-way ferry range would be 2,170nm (2,500 miles; 4,000km).
With the Olympus 21R instead of the Conway the aircraft would be 140lb (65kg) lighter overall, capable of up to Mach 2.65 at 36,000ft (11,000m). The maximum combat radius would increase to 800nm (920 miles; 1,480km) and take-off distance would be reduced to 1,790yd (1,640m).
A general-arrangement drawing of the Hawker P.1121 of March 1957. Damien Burke
Hawker predicted production beginning in 1960, with an in-service date of mid-1961 and an R&D cost of £9 million, which included eight development batch aircraft.
Arguments against the early proposals
The RAF was altogether less than impressed with all of these aircraft, believing they had been foisted upon it under the guise of ‘making do’ in the grand British tradition of muddling through with whatever was on hand. Contrary to the various companies’ promises that these developed types could all be brought into service far faster than a new aircraft, and for much less money, enabling development of a more capable aircraft at a more leisurely pace, the RAF believed it would be stuck with these interim types if it accepted any of them, and never get what it really wanted. The RAF’s own updated predictions for a completely new aircraft that did everything it wanted was for an R&D cost of £15 million and an in-service date of 1964. To save perhaps two or three years off that target and a half to two-thirds of the cost (if the manufacturers’ estimates were at all believable), while ending up with an aircraft that simply did not do the job, was not an attractive option. What the RAF did not consider for even one moment was that it could be as woefully optimistic in its estimates as it believed the manufacturers were with theirs.
The major arguments against all four interim aircraft developments comprised a simple numbers game. Only the developed Sea Vixen met the GOR.339 requirement of a 1,000-mile (1,600km) radius of action, a figure the RAF claimed was based on various regional pacts and treaty obligations rather than being ‘plucked from thin air’, as some would later have it. Fixed targets could not be moved closer to existing bases just because your bombers were unable to go that far (the RN, of course, could often move a carrier closer to a target to begin with). Take-off and landing distances were generally unsatisfactory except with rocket assistance for take-off, but the two biggest problems were being able to find the target, and to survive while doing so. Finding a target to a high degree of accuracy was the key to attacking it successfully, and none of the naval proposals gave the RAF any confidence that the respective aircraft could reliably manage this. The RN had the luxury of mostly dealing with well-defined targets that showed up well on radar: ships at sea, or coastal installations. The RAF had no such luck, and ground clutter reduced the existing radars of these aircraft to little more than ranging radars. A new and much more sophisticated radar would be necessary at the very least. However, even if that problem was ignored, the fact that most of the aircraft were subsonic doomed them all.
In summary, then, each of these proposals was unacceptable. They could not get to the target area; if they could, they could not find the target; and if they could get there and find it they would probably be unable to bomb it because their external stores would have been cooked by the high-speed flight that all of them could only just manage. If they were delivered late, even by a year or two, enemy defences would have advanced to the point where their slow penetration speed would condemn them to being nothing more than target practice for an alert and well-armed enemy. The last line in the OR department’s appraisal of the designs was intended to have an air of finality about it that would bury the proposals for ever: ‘Not one of these aircraft could maintain beyond 1965 the viability of the Royal Air Force in tactical strike and reconnaissance.’
A general-arrangement drawing of the Folland Light Bomber of July 1957. Folland intended this to be a successor to the Canberra, but with combat radius of 540nm (620miles; 1,000km), a bomb load limited to 4,400lb (2,000kg) and a basic navigation and bomb-aiming system it was far from the sophisticated aircraft that the RAF wanted. Damien Burke
Despite that, one chink in the RAF’s armour had opened. The Hawker P.1121 was clearly superior to any of the naval aircraft, but still fell far short of meeting GOR.339. However, Hawker’s proposed developed two-seat strike version was viewed with some interest, and the company was asked to work on an improved submission. The possibility of a joint RAF/RN aircraft was also mooted by the MoS, but weight and size limitations precluded all but the smaller Hawker design from being a realistic possibility, and neither was capable of meeting all of the RAF’s needs. Another outside contender very briefly looked at was a small aircraft from Folland, but the range and bomb load of such a small aircraft immediately ruled it out of the running for GOR.339. The interest in a joint RAF/RN type was not lost on the Admiralty or Blackburn, and work began on drawing up a further improved version of the NA.39. The one gem among these early proposals was the integrated flight control system put forward by Supermarine/Vickers for the developed Scimitar; such a system would become a vital part of the TSR2.
The 1957 Defence White Paper
Amidst all the work on GOR.339 came the Defence White Paper of 4 April 1957 from Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys, a man smitten with the possibilities of missile and rocket technology since World War Two and the shocking Nazi V2 rocket attacks upon Britain. The White Paper admitted that: ‘It must be frankly recognized that there is at present no means of protecting the people of Britain against the catastrophic consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons’, and that ‘it is unhappily true that the only existing safeguard against nuclear aggression is the power to threaten retaliation in kind’.
As a result almost all of the nation’s other defence commitments were to be pushed aside, and the reorganization of the armed forces to present a deterrent posture would override everything else. The size of the armed forces would be reduced by around 50 per cent (although RAF and Army units would be armed with atomic weapons to increase their striking power). Overseas forces would be reduced where possible, and conscription would end by 1960. Only a limited fighter force would be needed, for it would be dedicated to defending the nation’s deterrent forces. There was, after all, simply no way a few hundred guns, or the new anti-aircraft missiles then becoming available, could guarantee that some Soviet bombers would not get through to the nation’s cities. Most of the gun sites would be abandoned, and their controlling bunkers would become local-authority emergency control centres
so that the destruction of central government would not leave the surviving populace entirely ungoverned. The nation’s antiaircraft defences would henceforth be concentrated around the only targets worth defending, the V-force airfields.
An artist’s impression of the Hawker P.1121. This particular illustration was later amended to cater for political sensitivities, and in a reissue of the brochure a year later the mushroom cloud was conspicuously absent! BAE Systems Heritage via Brooklands Museum
Advanced manned aircraft projects were to be cancelled, because missiles would take on their job in the near future. Of the various fighter projects under way, only English Electric’s P.1 project (shortly to develop into the highly successful Lightning) would survive, being deemed to have progressed too far to be abandoned, and to be valuable as a short-term high-performance fighter until sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems replaced it. The RAF’s future supersonic large bomber project, the Avro 730 to OR.330, did not get such a reprieve and was cancelled. In its place would come the Blue Streak intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with the American Thor IRBM, somewhat unkindly, if accurately, described by one member of parliament as a ‘complete load of rubbish’, filling the gap until Blue Streak was available. (Blue Streak itself was later cancelled owing to development difficulties and rising costs.) With Thor itself not expected to be available for at least another year, the V-force would also continue in the deterrent role.
The RAF’s OR department, already worried by attempts to foist unsuitable and mostly naval aircraft upon it to meet the future light bomber/tactical strike aircraft requirement, was badly shaken. It was clear to the department, and to most outside observers, that developments in anti-aircraft missiles and radar technology would not be one-sided, and would soon make the V-force’s mission nothing more or less than sheer suicide. Moreover, a missile-only offensive air arm was a pipe dream and folly of the worst kind. A missile did not have the flexibility to hit targets such as fast-moving concentrations of troops and vehicles, and a nuclear missile had no use whatsoever in a ‘limited’ (non-nuclear) conflict. Work continued on getting GOR.339 through the labyrinthine paths of bureaucracy that all aircraft projects had to follow. Luckily the MoS, led by Aubrey Jones, had a rather different vision of future defence needs than Sandys’ MoD, otherwise Britain’s aviation industry could have vanished practically overnight instead of just being badly mauled. At English Electric the chill wind of the 1957 Defence White Paper had been felt in the weeks leading up to its publication, and the company had been careful to look at the implications for Project 17. The first result was that the company referred to a strategic role only obliquely, in case its brochure ended up at the MoD and got the project killed overnight for daring to suggest a new supersonic strategic nuclear bomber. English Electric would later quietly backpedal on a possible fighter version, too, for the same reason.