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TSR2

Page 20

by Damien Burke


  TSR2 development batch and pre-production

  There were to be no prototypes. Instead, as with the Vickers Vanguard and VC10, and English Electric’s own P.1B, all TSR2 airframes were to be assembled on production jigs. Production was to begin with a development batch of nine aircraft plus a structural test specimen, followed by preproduction airframes before full series production began. The ‘development batch’ procedure had been pioneered in the USA and was quickly taken on board by the MoA, though the claimed advantages soon proved to be illusory. Other nations’ aerospace companies never fell for the dubious attractions of this method of development, and the Americans, too, would soon back away from it. However, BAC was stuck with it and so, with no prototypes to work out the bugs, it was going to be a matter of getting the airframe right from the start.

  The development batch and preproduction airframes were, however, all to be built to a lesser standard than the intended production aircraft. The first two aircraft would be decidedly basic airframes, and by August 1963, the expected date of first flight, they had effectively become prototypes in all but name, with no radars of any kind (and thus no automatic terrain following), substandard engines, no AFCS, a manual fuel system and basic avionics. Aircraft 3 (XR221, actually the fourth airframe built, the structural test specimen being the third) was to be the first one with AFCS, radar and a nav/attack system. Much later, as the engine accessories bays became a problem, a redesign of the fuselage frames in this area to permit a larger bay meant that many of the development batch and pre-production airframes would be stuck with the smaller bay, and it would probably have been prohibitively expensive to modify them.

  Contract KD/2L/013/C.B.42(a)

  August 1963

  Pre-Production Batch (Aircraft 10–20)

  Aircraft

  Serial No.

  Delivery to

  10

  XS660

  A&AEE (clearance flying)

  11

  XS661

  A&AEE (clearance flying)

  12

  XS662

  A&AEE (clearance flying)

  13

  XS663

  A&AEE (clearance flying)

  14

  XS664

  A&AEE (clearance flying)

  15

  XS665

  RAF (Operational Development Squadron)

  16

  XS666

  RAF (Operational Development Squadron)

  17

  XS667

  RAF (Operational Development Squadron)

  18

  XS668

  RAF (Operational Development Squadron)

  19

  XS669

  RAF (Operational Development Squadron)

  20

  XS670

  RAF (Operational Development Squadron)

  The drawing office at Weybridge, circa 1960. The number of drawings necessary for this most complex of aircraft was far beyond initial predictions, and delays in drawing issue were a serious problem to begin with. The production of some components was begun using early drawings, and these components had to be successively modified as new drawings were produced. Brooklands Museum

  A single wing rib with the related full-size drawing behind it. The amount of integral machining necessary to reduce weight and cater for high thermal stresses was much greater than on previous projects, and contributed to additional delays owing to shortage of machines to do the work. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum

  Production locations

  Location

  Firm

  Components

  Weybridge

  Vickers

  Forebody and forward fuselage of d.b. a/c, final assembly d.b. a/c

  Hurn

  Vickers

  Forward centre fuselage

  Accrington

  English Electric

  Tailplane & fin

  Preston

  English Electric

  Rear fuselage, forebody & forward fuselage of production aircraft

  Samlesbury

  English Electric

  Wings, final assembly of production aircraft

  Warton

  English Electric

  Final assembly of 2nd static test airframe, flight test centre

  Itchen

  Vickers

  Equipment installation mock-ups

  Stevenage

  English Electric

  Reconnaissance pack

  Had funding and circumstances permitted, BAC believed that the first fourteen aircraft could eventually have been brought up to something approaching production standard, but the RAF would not have been able to get its hands on them for at least three years after delivery of the first production examples, and some, particularly the first two, could well have proved impossible to upgrade. Even with its best efforts BAC expected that only forty-one of the first fifty aircraft could ever be fully operational.

  Production was expected to peak during the period 1968 to 1970, with thirty-five airframes rolling off the production lines each year at their busiest, and the final batch being delivered in 1971/1972, assuming a final RAF order of only 138 aircraft. Had Australia ordered the TSR2, the plan was that the first twenty airframes would have stayed as the development batch and preproduction airframes. The first six production aircraft would have been destined for RAF trials, evaluation and development; the next eight would have gone to the RAF to form its first operational squadron (along with the previous six); the next six production aircraft would have been delivered to the RAAF, and then the remainder of production would have been three for the RAF and one for the RAAF until both orders were fulfilled.

  Vickers type numbers

  No.

  Description

  571

  TSR2 development batch

  579

  TSR2 pre-production aircraft

  594

  TSR2 production aircraft

  595

  TSR2 trainer (proposed)

  Test specimens

  Mixed in with the production of components of the development-batch airframes were test specimens of various large assemblies, such as a complete forebody and wing, along with a complete airframe to be used for static strength testing by the RAE at Farnborough. The static-test airframe was produced as the third airframe on the line, and was to be structurally complete but lacking many of the internal systems required on a complete aircraft. Components that did not contribute to the overall strength were unnecessary, so it lacked items such as air-brakes as well. A second test airframe, destined for fatigue tests, was eleventh on the line, but was not completed before the project was cancelled.

  The first test-specimen forebody, the sixth of these particular items on the Weybridge line, was destined for escape-system and thermal tests, also with the RAE. The major challenge to crew comfort other than the shaking and vibration produced by low-level flight at high speeds was the heat generated by kinetic heating of the airframe. While much preparatory work had been done at RAE to investigate the most efficient means of cooling the crew compartment (including the use of a modified Bristol T.188 nose section), only a complete TSR2 forebody would enable the RAE to test and finalize the aircraft’s air conditioning system layout. The result was a system that worked well. During the limited amount of taxy and flight testing that was eventually carried out, the crew would be complimentary about the distribution of air, with no uncomfortable breezes or whistling noises as experienced with other aircraft. The temperature of this well-distributed air, however, was another matter. The fore-body was also used for escape-system tests, entailing canopy jettisoning in front of a blower nozzle and eventually the firing of a complete ejection seat.

  Production problems

  While work on the airframe was under BAC’s direct control and delays were being incurred almost immediately for a variety of reasons, mostly materials shortages, problems with rear-fuselage frame design and manpower issues (particularly in the drawing offices), the situation wa
s much more complex when it came to the various electronic systems to be incorporated in the aircraft. Most of these, as previously mentioned, were not under BAC control, but were Category 1 items ordered and supposedly controlled by the MoA, and the bureaucracy was firing spanners into the works at an impressive rate. By mid-1961, more than two years after the beginning of the project, some items still did not have a contract in place to cover their production. Others were only just beginning to be worked on after months of contractual negotiations whereby the Ministry deluded itself it was saving the taxpayer money, but was actually just introducing needless delays, and therefore increasing final costs. Most of the equipment that would make TSR2 a weapons system was already running up to nine months behind schedule, and this was pretty fairly matched by slippage on the airframe itself (though at the Weybridge end things were slightly better and the slippage was more like six months).

  Test specimen

  Component

  Purpose

  T1

  Complete airframe minus forebody

  Static-strength testing for RAE Farnborough once mated with T7

  T2

  Complete airframe minus forebody

  Fatigue-test airframe for BAC Warton once mated with T4

  T3

  Equipment bay

  Cancelled as handmade specimen created at Vickers Hurn

  T4

  Forebody

  Underwater pressure testing at Weybridge, then fatigue tests at Warton once mated with T2

  T5

  Forebody

  Air-conditioning and blower-tunnel tests at RAE Farnborough

  T6

  Partial forebody

  Escape-system proving for P & EE Pendine high-speed rocket track

  T7

  Forebody

  Static-strength test once mated with T1

  Test forebody T5 in the stage 2 jig at Weybridge, early 1963. One of several test nose sections built on production jigs, this one was used for air-conditioning and escape-system tests. It is currently preserved at the Brooklands Museum, not far from where it was manufactured. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum

  Time-consuming polishing of milled wing-skin planks. Despite instructions issued in 1961 to reduce the amount of polishing and therefore the time and expense involved, this sort of work continued until 1964 in some instances. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum

  In May 1962, as part of an overall progress review, BAC came up with a three-point plan to try to improve matters. First of all, it wanted the first flight to be made from Wisley rather than at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) at Boscombe Down, as it had originally wanted anyway. This would save a month of mucking about dismantling the first aircraft, transporting it to Boscombe, reassembling it and carrying out engine runs. With final assembly at Weybridge, the aircraft could have initial engine runs there just the once, then be transported intact to Wisley and fly from there to Boscombe to begin the initial flight-test programme. Secondly, ground-resonance tests, intended for the first aircraft, could be transferred to the second one, allowing the first to get into the air faster. Finally, prototype procedures could be applied to the first three aircraft. At that time every airframe was being treated in effect as a production airframe, and modifications and strict adherence to interchangeability standards was slowing progress. If the first three aircraft could be allowed to be effective ‘one-offs’ they could be flying much earlier, albeit to a lower design standard.

  A wing under construction at Samlesbury. This is the starboard half, with the apex section on the left of the photo. A new milling machine had to be developed for the large milled skin panels for the wing, as existing machines could not handle large enough planks of alloy. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum

  The wing of XR219 in the stage 2 jig at Samlesbury, with major structural assembly complete. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum

  At Weybridge, Redifon had delivered the five-axis moving cockpit simulator, but when it was installed and first run it had promptly failed to work correctly, and had to be returned to Redifon for major redesign work. Much of the simulated flying was to be carried out on this simulator, so several months of delay on this score was the last thing anybody needed. Happily, many of the effects of this delay could be negated, as the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories (CAL) in the USA had agreed to let BAC use their Lockheed T-33 variable-stability aircraft for some simulation work, which duly began in late October (during the Cuban Missile Crisis) and proved a very useful exercise. Meanwhile, the world had come terrifyingly close to nuclear war. At the height of the crisis Bomber Command’s V-force aircraft were on the very brink of launching to undertake a grand tour of the Soviet Union.

  By November 1962 the Americans and the Soviets had stepped back from the abyss, tensions were easing, and TSR2 production was still running well behind schedule. The BAC plan to get back on schedule by the fifth airframe was in tatters. The merger of the two companies within BAC was still not complete in terms of day-to-day working, and it was only in mid-1962 that they had begun to use a unified drawing numbering scheme, for instance. With the scheduled delivery of the first rear fuselage section to Weybridge set for January 1963, BAC suggested that this could go ahead even if the section was incomplete, and it could be completed at Weybridge, with simultaneous marrying-up of the section to the Weybridge half and equipment installation. It was not the most sensible of plans, taking workforce away from Preston and running the risk of fuel tank leaks that could need substantial rectification work back at Preston, and work continued to get the first airframe’s rear fuselage completed before transportation. The structural-test specimen was also running several months behind schedule, and this would mean that the first aircraft would fly before any structural tests had been performed. To try to get back on track, a night and day shift was in operation at both ends of the BAC operation, with work continuing seven days a week. Preston would soon introduce a three-shift system to try and improve matters further.

  By early 1963, with the UK covered with snow and in the grip of the coldest winter since 1795, there was no sign of the first aircraft being completed, let alone being within months of its first flight. The Americans had cancelled the Skybolt nuclear stand-off missile intended for the V-force, and it now seemed likely that TSR2 would take on a limited strategic role, delivering larger nuclear bombs to distant Soviet targets to fill the gap until the UK had Polaris submarines. By now the V-force was on its last legs in terms of being able to penetrate Soviet defences successfully, and would have to shift to low-level operations. An RAF study, however, found that low-level operations would reduce the 3,130hr fatigue life of an Avro Vulcan B.1A to a mere 270hr, and wear the aircraft out entirely within just three years if strengthening modifications were not made. Handley Page Victors would fare rather better, but it was clear that the V-force as a whole was not going to last long.

  The company’s latest cost estimates had also risen again, and George Edwards was about to be hauled over the coals at the MoA. There was concern that the project was being ‘gold-plated’, that it was overmanned (an inevitable result of extra shifts put on to try to make up some lost time), that financial monitoring efforts were not only totally inadequate but also pointless without associated financial controls, and that nobody was in overall control of the TSR2 project at BAC. While there was a supposed project manager in Henry Gardner, in reality only George Edwards could exercise overall control, and he did so sporadically, when crises arose and when his health permitted. Gardner had little or no control over production issues, and was all too often concentrating his time on design issues. When the MoA tried to pin Edwards down with an incentive contract (guaranteeing a first flight by August 1963 in return for incentive payments, and with penalties if this was not managed) he agreed, but only if the break clause was removed (thus making cancellation of the project impossible). Of course the Ministry could never agree to such a deal, and Edwards knew it. There was also, finally, concern that
BAC relied far too much on Weybridge experience while ignoring input from the Preston end. At Weybridge over the last few years most experience had been on civil projects (and Gardner himself was more of a guidedweapons man), whereas Preston had ongoing military experience on the Canberra and Lightning. Neither Ministry had any confidence remaining in the Vickers-originated senior management at BAC, and they had been given the lead position on the project ahead of English Electric precisely because their were expected to perform better than English Electric’s management! Needless to say, a certain amount of ‘I told you so’ was evident at BAC’s northern outposts.

  The wing of XR219 in the stage 3 jig at Samlesbury in March 1963, with apex panels and structure being fitted. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum

 

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