TSR2
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On 14 January 1965 10,000 workers from Vickers and Hawker Siddeley marched through London to Hyde Park to demonstrate against predicted job losses that would result from cancelling the TSR2 and P.1154. At the same time Roy Jenkins was contesting the proposed cancellation of the TSR2 at a meeting of the Defence Council, due to the industrial consequences. However, the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, thought there was ‘… no chance whatever (sic) of achieving worthwhile economies on the Defence Budget unless the TSR 2 were cancelled.’ On the question of maintaining a TSR2 design team, he saw no value in this, since the next generation of aircraft was going to be vastly more expensive and beyond the ability of the UK to fund independently. On the same day, Lord Portal and George Edwards of BAC were at a meeting with the President of the Board of Trade. Asked what their preference would be if either TSR2 or Concorde had to be cancelled, both agreed that they would rather see Concorde go. That evening Mary Goldring was on TV again, on This Week, and asserted that the RAF did not need the TSR2 because such a sophisticated aircraft was unnecessary when we had Polaris nuclear missiles, but that the RAF needed the F-111 instead!
The next day an informal meeting was held at Chequers, with the Prime Minister dining with the Minister of Aviation and representatives from the aviation industry: George Edwards of BAC, Arnold Hall of the Hawker Siddeley Group, R.V. Smith of BSEL, D. Pearson of Rolls-Royce and C.E. Wrangham of Shorts. The cost and future of the TSR2 was the main topic of conversation in a meeting that went on until nearly midnight. George Edwards admitted that costs were high but pointed out that the limited production run hardly helped, and said that the TSR2 had ‘gone wrong’ because ‘it was the result of an over-sophisticated requirement laid down by the RAF which was itself under pressure to produce an all-purpose aircraft’. The only substantial suggestion for cutting costs that he could offer the government was to spread the buy over a longer period, a suggestion that was not viewed as likely to make any real difference. The PM assured the industry representatives that ‘there was no intention of rushing into decisions’.
On 18 January Denis Healey wrote to the Prime Minister about ‘International Cooperation in Research and Development’. The opening of this letter was revealing: ‘The cancellations of the TSR.2 and the P.1154 development contracts and, to a lesser extent, of the HS.681, should release valuable technical resources’. The letter went on to discuss the attractions of buying defence equipment off the shelf, without having to pay R&D costs, which the UK could no longer afford. However, carrying out no R&D would lead to the UK losing any technological bargaining and political power. Healey suggested that the only solution was to go into co-operation with a European power, and the French, despite less-than-perfect political relations, were the most obvious candidates. Joint R&D efforts with the Americans had not gone well; they simply did not need any help, and knew it. The Americans, however, were now offering a joint R&D agreement in which British and US firms would bid for projects and the best technical submissions would win. Healey was naïve enough to believe this could work, but did not consider that it was an agreement that could proceed until ‘… we have reshaped our defence budget and eliminated some of our current aircraft projects’.
By 25 January the government had made up its mind to cancel the P.1154 and HS.681 projects, opting to buy the F-4 Phantom and C-130 Hercules instead. Development of Hawker’s P.1127 (forerunner of the Harrier) would continue. The TSR2’s fate hung by a thread, with many within the government, and the RAF, recommending cancellation of this project too. Research began into the likely effects of a cancellation upon an industry already badly hit by the loss of other projects. The most serious job losses were considered to be those that could be lost at Preston, Weybridge and Luton, totalling up to 23,000 skilled workers, or around 7 per cent of the total employed by the aviation industry. On 9 February more than 5,000 Hawker Siddeley and BAC workers marched through London to protest at the cancellation of P.1154 and HS.681, carrying a coffin symbolizing the ‘murdered aircraft industry’. A debate in the House of Commons dissolved into chaos, and the government pushed through its plans with only five votes between them and defeat. The release of already authorized funds to enable BAC to continue production buildup was quietly blocked.
A rare shot of XR219 and XR220 together in the hangar at Boscombe Down. With XR220 just weeks away from flying, desperate efforts were under way to try to cut the cost of the programme, even if it meant reducing the aircraft’s capability. BAE Systems via Warton Heritage Group
Final cost-saving efforts
On 27 January BAC and the MoA had come to an agreement that BAC would try to come up with a fixed-price offer to complete the TSR2 programme, based on a reduced specification (as detailed in Chapter 4). The Air Staff had accepted surprising reductions in the aircraft’s performance, and on 3 February the Air Staff met again to take a long hard look at what else could be shaved off the TSR2 programme to try to make it more affordable, even if only in the short term. They also looked at some of the problem areas that threatened to cripple the project. The most obvious of these was computer capacity, and the upgraded Verdan D9D-1 was chosen as the lowest-cost option. Though it gave little room for any future expansion, its improved capacity compared with the D9D did at least mean that the existing (previously downgraded) nav/attack requirements could actually be met. Fuel jettison had to stay, as did the engine accessories bay redesign. Temporarily dropped to save money were the trainer version, arrester hook, AJ168 (Martel) missile carriage, rocket pods, twin-suspension HE bomb carriage, the HE lay-down attack, IFF on the development batch aircraft and the Selcall and telebriefing facilities.
The Weybridge-manufactured fuselage of XR225 arrives at Samlesbury for final assembly in March 1965. This was to be the first of the development-batch airframes to be assembled and then flown from Samlesbury to Warton. BAE Systems via Warton Heritage Group
The CA called a meeting with the Air Staff on 12 February 1965 to discuss these further economy measures on the TSR2 programme. The Air Staff, if truth be told, were now no longer entirely supportive of keeping the TSR2, and realized they had a difficult balancing act to perform. If they agreed to further reductions in performance or equipment sufficient to make the aircraft affordable, the RAF could be lumbered with an aircraft that did not meet its requirements. The TFX, however, was becoming more attractive with each passing day.
The result was that the Air Staff rejected measures to reduce the number of development-batch aircraft (which would only lead to an extended and more-expensive flight test programme); the carrying out of nav/attack system trials in the UK instead of Australia (adverse weather was expected to lengthen trials and wipe out any savings); plus a whole host of minor modifications, such as deleting the moving map from the pilot’s cockpit. The previous administration had, in July 1964, also asked BAC what savings would result if the aircraft’s top speed was reduced to Mach 1.7. These could have been substantial, as the lower temperatures alone would allow much less use of high-cost materials, a simpler intake system, much reduced engine operating temperatures and so on. The Air Staff, however, insisted on the magic Mach 2.0 figure, citing the savings as being insufficient compared with the operational disadvantages.
The requirement to transmit linescan information while airborne was, however, deleted, along with the requirement for associated ground stations. This saved £2.76 million (the Army’s requirements, after all, were now the least of the RAF’s worries). Possible additional savings could be had by refurbishing three of the development-batch aircraft once trials were complete, to save building three new airframes, saving £6 million in production costs. The need for a trainer version was also reconsidered, it being suggested that up to £10.25 million could be saved by dropping it entirely. On the whole, though, even these savings would be minuscule when weighed against the cost of the entire project.
The Ministry then wrote to BAC on the 20 February to ask if the company could come up with any further chan
ges that, while leaving ‘an aircraft capable of fulfilling an effective operational role’, would yield major savings in development, production, or both. By this point BAC’s Value Engineering programme and preceding cost-saving suggestion scheme had been in place for months, and numerous ways of saving costs had already been examined. Many had already been incorporated, and others were still under consideration as to their merits. (It was often the case that a modification to reduce cost would increase weight, for example.) There was no magic fix that BAC had been sitting on, and no major saving to be made. BAC now felt under extreme pressure to get a second and third aircraft into the air, in the hope that a demonstration of progress in flight-testing would put the project on firmer footing, but it was not to be. Once again the delivery of flight-capable engines was delayed, by as much as six weeks, postponing any flight of a second aircraft until late March at the earliest; and to top it all a crack had been discovered in XR220’s jetpipe.
Interviewed by Mary Goldring on BBC2’s Encounter on 25 February, Roy Jenkins said of the TSR2: ‘People say the whole future of the aircraft industry depends on it. I don’t quite agree’, and ‘Manufacturing for a solely British market, at present research and development costs, is out. If you do this, you get into a TSR2 position, in which you are staggering under the weight of the development costs you are carrying for a small production line.’
After delays in completing its rear fuselage, XR225 was moved into the marry-up jig at the end of March 1965. Nearly-complete Lightning F.6 XR752 is on the right. Lightning production for Saudi Arabia would soon become BAC’s lifeline. BAE Systems via Warton Heritage Group
More trouble with Mountbatten
At the beginning of March a second visit to the USA was made by another joint MoA/ MoD team to investigate the TFX further, and particularly the proposals on the Mk 2 version. A week after the team’s return, on 19 March, a report by the Joint Service Group on Requirement for TSR2/TFX Type Strike/Reconnaissance Aircraft in the RAF was delivered. The report’s conclusions were as follows:
Numbers – The front line needed is the same for the TFX Mark 2 as for the TSR2. If we had the TFX Mark 1 we might in the long run need rather more, though we could not without closer analysis say exactly how many. With either mark of TFX we might be able to reduce the training provision – by three aircraft in the case of a front line of 74 – though further study would be needed to confirm this.
Training in the USA – Initial figures we have received from the Americans suggest that there would be little difference in costs, although training in the USA would involve dollar expenditure.
Deployment – All the front-line TSR2 or TFX aircraft to be based in the United Kingdom would be provided to meet reinforcement commitments. If they were all deployed permanently overseas we could not make do with any fewer in total, and we shall have to accept financial and other disadvantages greatly outweighing the advantages.
The basic assumptions of the report were that the aircraft would not be fully assigned to NATO and none would be based in Germany (thus allowing a reduction to 110 aircraft instead of 158). By this point it was clear that the Joint Service Group had turned to the TFX as its preference. The TSR2 was described as being ‘bound to be unreliable’, the Buccaneer was described in similar terms, the ‘relatively simple’ Phantom was expected to be the most reliable (based upon manufacturer’s information), and the TFX nearly as reliable as the Phantom (based entirely on manufacturer’s predictions; BAC was never given such blind faith in its predictions). The TFX was expected to have dual controls, and therefore there would be no need to develop a trainer variant; in the event the F-111 never had a dual-control option.
The Chiefs of the Defence Staff all agreed to endorse the report and its basic conclusion that the RAF still needed a supersonic strike aircraft, whether it be TSR2 or TFX, and informed Healey of this on 23 March. However, Mountbatten had been on an overseas tour, leaving his deputy to deal with things in his absence. On his return he examined the report himself, and made no comment to the other staff chiefs. However, he then approached Healey himself and, plunging in a final dagger, urged him to consider once again that the RAF could have the Buccaneer, and that TSR2 (or TFX) was really not at all necessary. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy, was absolutely enraged, considering this ‘… a grave breach of Chiefs of Staff propriety, and of frankness and fair dealing. If CDS dissented from the clear agreement reached unanimously by the Chiefs of Staff Committee in properly constituted session, the very least he should have done was to give his colleagues immediate and explicit notice of this … before he express any opinions to Ministers.’
Throughout the closing days of March the actual implications of cancelling TSR2 were looked at in some detail by the government. The major concern was that of the supersonic transport project, Concorde, which would be directly affected insomuch as it was to be powered by a similar engine and faced many of the same airframe heating problems as TSR2. Existing estimates at the time were of a further £10 million needing to be spent on the development of the Olympus engine for the TSR2, which, given the direct benefits to the supersonic transport’s powerplant, would result in a similar figure being added to the airliner’s development costs. BAC had warned that its own overheads would have to be spread over other projects if the TSR2 was to be cancelled, and this would affect costs of the BAC One-Eleven and VC10 airliners. The French made it plain that cancellation of TSR2 could seriously affect Olympus 593 development, but were brushed off. Indeed, one internal memo suggested that the losing the TSR2 would only result in a closer relationship with the French, presumably on the Anglo-French advanced-trainer project. Also, the results of cancelling P.1154 and HS.681 were now evident in terms of redundancies and unemployment, and, to the government’s surprise, these were not as bad as had been forecast. It appeared that not only had Hawker Siddeley managed to retain more staff than expected, but those it had made redundant had, for the most part, been able to find alternative employment relatively easily. If a similar pattern was followed by BAC after cancellation of the TSR2, the resulting unemployment loading on the state would not be as bad as once feared.
Another view of XR225 being craned into the Samlesbury factory; its rear fuselage can be seen in the background, under the main undercarriage bay. BAE Systems via Warton Heritage Group
XR221 practically complete, undergoing electrical and functional checks at Weybridge in March 1965. BAE Systems via Warton Heritage Group
On 26 March the American Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, made the following firm offer to Denis Healey:
Contingent upon your contracting by 1 October 1965 for 110 F-111A aircraft, as presently configured, with TF-30 engines and Mark I avionics, we will sell such aircraft at an average unit flyaway price equal to the average unit development and production cost of the entire F-111A program but not to exceed $5.95 million per aircraft. This is based upon delivery of the 110 aircraft between August 1967 and December 1969.
Support, ground equipment and spares costs were not included in this figure. This sealed the deal as far as the Air Staff were concerned. At those prices, for the same number of aircraft, buying F-111 would save the RAF £300 million. While TSR2 was still technically preferable on a few criteria (primarily better low-level radius of action, navigational accuracy and reconnaissance capability), that extra £300 million was a killer.
With cancellation imminent, at Samlesbury the rear fuselages of the first two pre-production aircraft, XS660 and XS661, were structurally complete and undergoing equipment installation, while XR225 was being married up to its rear fuselage, seen in the background. BAE Systems via Warton Heritage Group
The axe falls
The events immediately leading up to the cancellation, and the manner in which it was announced, were quite unlike the treatment given to any defence project before; or since. Two cabinet meetings on 1 April decided the fate of the TSR2. The 10am meeting discussed the various options
for continuing, reducing or cancelling the TSR2 project, and how the capability of the aircraft could possibly be fulfilled by other types including the Buccaneer, Phantom and TFX. The meeting ended with an agreement to reconvene later in the day. The second meeting was at 10pm, and while some of the cabinet argued that postponement of any decision should be made until a review of overseas commitments showed whether there was still a requirement for this type of aircraft, the balance of opinion was in favour of cancelling the TSR2 entirely and securing an option on the TFX. The Americans would be invited to convey terms formally on the purchase of the TFX, along with an assurance that there was no firm commitment actually to purchase any aircraft just yet. The TSR2 project cancellation would be announced in the Chancellor’s Budget Speech on 6 April.
At 2.30pm on 5 April 1965 a cabinet meeting was held to decide the arrangements for the cancellation announcement. BAC would be informed at 2.30pm on 6 April, while a public announcement would come in the form of a relevant section during the Budget Speech. The actions necessary to ensure a smooth dismantling of the project were also reviewed, and it was decided that a single month would be an unrealistically short period in which to run down the project, and that it could take up to three months. Work on the aircraft’s electronic systems would be reviewed at a later date, in case they had any application on future projects, such as the Buccaneer Mk 2 or the Phantom. At 5.30pm Denis Healey signed up to the option to buy the F-111A from the USA. This had been slightly renegotiated, and now gave the UK until 1 January 1966 to make up its mind. Later in the day telegraphs were sent to each overseas embassy, warning British ambassadors that the project’s cancellation would be announced the next day, with notes on the reasoning behind the cancellation and a cautionary paragraph that included the words: ‘It is not a decision to cancel the British aircraft in favour of an American one’, though, of course, it was precisely that.