To the east the sultan pushed the frontiers of his empire by attacking Iran in 1533–1555. During this campaign Süleyman captured the cities of Tabriz and Hamadan. He then attacked Iraq and seized the city of Baghdad. After several successful campaigns against Iran, the Ottomans forced the Safavid dynasty to sign the treaty of Amasya on May 29, 1555, ceding parts of Iranian Azerbaijan and the southern Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire. Süleyman also ordered the construction of a naval force and appointed the legendary Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha as his chief admiral (kapudan-i derya). Hayreddin Pasha captured Tunis in 1533 and established Ottoman hegemony on the southern shores of the Mediterranean after defeating a Christian fleet under the overall command of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (r. 1519–1556) at the battle of Preveza at the mouth of the Gulf of Arta, in present-day northwestern Greece, on September 28, 1538. Finally, to the south, the Ottomans extended their rule in the Arab world by occupying Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, in 1547.
DECLINE OF OTTOMAN POWER
The decline of the Ottoman Empire began in the last three decades of the 16th century, but it did not happen overnight. The process of decline was already under way during the reign of Süleyman I, but it did not manifest itself to outsiders, particularly to the Christian states of Europe, until a century later. Several factors contributed to the decline of the Ottoman state. The rise of Ottoman power to world prominence was linked directly to a number of wise, capable, and courageous sultans who were actively engaged in administering their vast empire. Characteristic of the long period of decline was the growing detachment of successive Ottoman sultans from active participation in decision making. As the role of the sultan in administering the empire diminished, the power of the grand vizier and his cabinet increased, and the influence of the “slaves” recruited through devșirme was enhanced. The early Ottoman sultans had been trained to rule by serving their fathers as governors and commanders. They had to serve as provincial governors and often fought on battlefields against foreign armies. During the long period of decline, the practice of training the princes was abandoned.
The death of Süleyman I in 1566 was followed by the reigns of a series of weak and incompetent sultans who were dominated by their mothers, wives, and chief eunuchs. They were born and raised in the seclusion of the royal harem, detached from the realities of ruling a vast and complex empire. Surrounded by slave girls, who were brought to the harem from various parts of the empire, the sultans were converted into sexual machines, sleeping with numerous women and producing a large number of children, who imposed a significant financial burden on the state treasury. With the increase in the number of wives and children, Istanbul’s Topkapi Palace was expanded to accommodate the new members of the royal family. For the next century, as Europe began the long process of modernization and industrialization, the Ottoman state, confident of its power and superiority, fell into a deep sleep from which it awakened only after it was defeated in battles against European armies in the last two decades of the 17th century.
Beginning with the reign of Selim II (r. 1566–1574), the Ottoman monarchs began to disengage from participating in daily affairs of the government, delegating much of their executive power to their grand viziers and the cabinet of ministers. By marrying a daughter or a sister of the reigning sultan, grand viziers often converted themselves into members of the royal family and increased their influence and power over their royal masters. Surrounded by slaves and servants, sex and pleasure, the Ottoman sultans became increasingly isolated, ignorant, ineffective, and dependent on their officials to rule the empire. Without direct contact with reality, the sultans received reports on the state of affairs through the mediation of the grand vizier and the slaves who surrounded them. Royal mothers and wives also began to assume a greater role and more power. Enjoying direct access to the sovereign, they could exercise enormous influence on appointments to the highest governmental posts. The growing power of the women and the competition among them for influence in the harem perpetuated a culture of conspiracy and intrigue.
The period of decline was also characterized by the Ottomans abandoning the practice of killing the brothers of a new sultan (fratricide) to avoid internal strife and dynastic warfare. As an increasing number of male offspring of the sultan survived, government expenditure increased. Each prince of the royal family required his own retinue of wives, eunuchs, servants, and teachers, who were supported by the central treasury. Aside from the financial burden on the state treasury, the presence of male members of the royal family generated harem intrigues and internal instability. Factions were created around each prince, with his mother often leading the effort to ensure the survival and ascendancy of her son to the Ottoman throne. Contacts were established, bribes were paid, and promises of power and promotion were made to key palace officials and army commanders to secure their support for a contender.
Aside from palace intrigue, the decline of the empire was caused by a financial crisis triggered from afar. The “age of discovery” in the 15th and 16th centuries provided European maritime powers such as Spain with access to enormous reserves of silver from South America, which flooded the European markets and gave rise to massive inflation. The introduction of silver coinage increased Europe’s purchasing power at a time when capitalism was replacing feudalism as the dominant mode of economic production. The rise of capitalism in Europe corresponded with massive migration of cheap labor from rural communities to the emerging urban centers. As European urban centers grew in size, the demand for raw materials and foodstuffs increased, forcing European merchants to tap into the Ottoman market. Raw materials and food stuffs from the Ottoman Empire fed Europe’s urban centers and the emerging industries on the continent. The introduction of considerable silver coinage into the Ottoman economy brought with it massive inflation, forcing the Ottoman government to debase the coinage, further draining basic agricultural goods that were exported to European markets in return for cash. The change, however, benefited the former timār holders turned landowners, who used their access to European markets as a means of building a strong economic base. The debasement of the Ottoman coinage, however, undermined the financial power and security of the ruling elite, who received a fixed salary from the state treasury. To compensate for their financial loss, government officials began to search for ways to turn their positions into a means of generating financial gain.
The economic and financial decline of the empire was exacerbated by the significant diversion of trade from traditional land routes to new sea routes. Historically, the vast region extending from Central Asia to the Middle East served as a land bridge between China and Europe. The taxes and the customs charges collected by the Ottoman government constituted an important part of the revenue generated by the state and contributed significantly to the financial power and economic prosperity of the empire. The Portuguese rounding of the Cape of Good Hope and subsequent establishment of a direct sea route to Iran, India, and East and Southeast Asia, however, allowed European states and merchants to bypass Ottoman-held territory. They could export European goods and import various products from Asia without paying taxes and customs dues to Ottoman authorities. The sea routes were faster and cheaper. They also undermined the Ottoman Empire’s central role in world commerce and trade. Taking its cue from Christian states of Europe, the Safavid dynasty in Iran did everything in its power to avoid exporting precious goods such as silk to Europe via Ottoman transit routes. By building a navy and removing the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf, the Safavid monarchs inaugurated a policy of exporting their silk through newly built seaports and refused to provide the Ottomans with any share from this lucrative trade.
Another important factor in the long period of decline was a demographic explosion in the Ottoman Empire. By all indications, between 1500 and 1700 the population of the empire grew at a rapid rate, which corresponded with the end of territorial expansion. After the death of Süleyman I, Ottoman conquests came to a gradual halt. Although Ottoman armie
s attacked and occupied the island of Cyprus during the reign of Selim II in 1570, the empire did not gain significant territory in eastern Europe. Historically, Ottoman territorial expansion had allowed a large number of Turkish tribesmen from Anatolia to cross the water and settle on the European continent, colonizing Christian European countries in the name of spreading the domain of Islam. This colonization provided Turkish nomads with access to pasture lands for their animals and Turkish peasants with arable land for agriculture. With the end of territorial expansion in Europe, however, access to new territory ceased, and with the rapid growth in population, the empire began to experience the new phenomenon of landlessness and unemployment. It is not surprising that the 16th and 17th centuries witnessed the spread of mass rebellions and uprisings against the central government that quickly attracted wide popular support.
While the Ottoman Empire declined from within, the European states that had been defeated by the Ottomans for several centuries began their rise to power and prosperity. The rise of absolutist states in Europe capable of maintaining well-trained and well-equipped professional armies on the battlefield was a major development. Europe now had the equivalent of what the Ottomans had enjoyed for centuries through the janissary corps, namely, a permanent killing machine that owed its existence and financial survival to the will of a monarch. Triumphant in most battles they had fought against Christian Europe, the Ottomans showed little interest in studying and observing the fundamental political, technological, social, and economic transformations that Europe was undergoing.
The first signs of Ottoman military weakness appeared at the beginning of the 17th century on the battlefields of eastern Anatolia as a rejuvenated Iranian state under the charismatic Shah Abbas I (r. 1587–1629) attacked and defeated Ottoman forces in Azerbaijan and the south Caucasus. The Iranians moved at blazing speed, catching Ottoman garrisons in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus by surprise and capturing the cities of Tabriz in 1603 and Nakhchivan in 1604 (Eskandar Beg Monshi: 2:830–833; Sykes: 2:178). Shortly thereafter Yerevan (Erivan) and Kars were sacked (Eskandar Beg Monshi: 833–836; Sykes: 2:178). Using Armenia as his base, Shah Abbas invaded and occupied the entire eastern Caucasus as far north as Shirvan (Sykes: 2:178; Naima: 264–265).
The crisis caused by the campaigns of Shah Abbas coincided with the death of Mehmed III (r. 1595–1603) and the accession of Ahmed I (r. 1603–1617), who mobilized a large force against Iran (Naima: 249–251). The Iranians, however, scored an impressive victory against the larger Ottoman force in September 1605 (Sykes: 2: 178). In addition to Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, the Safavids captured southeastern Anatolia and Iraq. The defeat undermined Ottoman rule in Anatolia and the Arab world. Kurdish and Turkoman tribal chiefs defected, and a series of revolts erupted, particularly in Syria, where the Kurds staged an uprising against the Ottoman state (Shaw: 1:188).
Despite their best efforts to counter the Iranian threat, the Ottomans could not dislodge the Safavid forces from eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan. Military campaigns against Iran exhausted the Ottoman treasury and did not result in decisive victory. With no prospect of an enduring peace, the Safavids established closer diplomatic and military ties with the Christian powers of Europe. Shah Abbas began to coordinate his attacks against Ottoman borderlands in conjunction with campaigns waged against the Turks by the Habsburgs and Venice.
The Safavids were assisted in their campaigns by a series of internal revolts known as celāli (jelāli), which disrupted trade and commerce and ignited political chaos and social anarchy in Anatolia and parts of the Arab world. Iran’s successful military campaigns emboldened celāli rebels, as well as Kurdish and Arab tribal chiefs, who had never been fully incorporated into the Ottoman political system and acted as independent rulers in their respective districts. Chaos and anarchy forced the rural population to flee the land. As trade and agricultural production were disrupted, taxes collected by the central government declined significantly.
During the reign of Murad IV (r. 1623–1640) the Ottomans tried to restore peace and order in Anatolia and remove Iranian forces from Iraq. After several long campaigns against Iran, the Ottoman army captured the city of Baghdad and re-established Ottoman control over Iraq, which lasted until the end of World War I. On May 17, 1639, on the plain of Zohab (Zuhab) near the town of Qasr-i Shirin in present-day western Iran, the Ottoman Empire and Iran signed a peace treaty that ended nearly 140 years of hostility between the two Islamic states. The treaty established the Ottoman sultan as the master of Iraq, while the Safavids maintained their control over Azerbaijan and southern Caucasus (Hurewitz: 1:21–23).
KÖPRÜLÜ VIZIERS
When Murad IV died in February 1640, he was succeeded by his brother Ibrahim (r. 1640–1648), who had lived his entire life in the royal harem and had no training or experience in ruling an empire. While Ibrahim became increasingly infatuated with the pleasures of the inner palace, his mother, his tutor, the grand vizier, the chief eunuch, and janissary commanders vied for power and influence. When Ibrahim was murdered and his son, Mehmed IV (r. 1648–1687), ascended the Ottoman throne, the new ruler remained a pawn in the hands of his grandmother, his mother, the grand vizier, and the chief eunuch.
In 1656 the financial crisis, political chaos, and the failure of the Ottoman navy to lift the Venetian siege of the capital finally forced the sultan to appoint Mehmed Köprülü as grand vizier, thus inaugurating the rise to power of a family of Köprülü ministers who tried to restore the authority of the Ottoman state by imposing peace and order and introducing badly needed reforms. The son of an Albanian father, the first Köprülü grand vizier, Mehmed Köprülü, had served many masters and patrons both within the palace and in various provinces, acquiring a reputation for competence and honesty. He and his son, Köprülüzade Fazil Ahmed, who succeeded his father in 1661 and dominated Ottoman politics until 1676, crushed the celāli revolts in Anatolia and re-established the authority of the central government in the provinces. Both father and son pursued a foreign policy aimed at checking the Habsburg intervention in Transylvania and defeating the alliance of Catholic forces known as the Holy League, which had been organized under the leadership of the pope. When Christian and Ottoman forces clashed near the village of St. Gotthard in August 1664, the Ottomans were defeated and lost many more men and much more equipment than did the troops of the Holy League, which included Habsburg, Spanish, and French units. When the peace treaty was negotiated at Vasvár, however, the Habsburgs agreed to evacuate their troops, and Ottoman rule over Transylvania was once again secured.
When Köprülüzade Fazil Ahmed died in 1676, his brother-in-law, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, succeeded him. The new grand vizier pursued the policy of the two previous Köprülüs, focusing his energies on checking Russian advances on the northern shores of the Black Sea and crushing the Habsburg’s military machine. Convinced that the Habsburg military was on the verge of collapse and encouraged by the French, who viewed an Ottoman invasion as essential to their victory in the west, Kara Mustafa Pasha moved with a large army against Vienna in June 1683. By July the Habsburg capital was under Ottoman siege. The Habsburg emperor had, however, organized a coalition that included Jan Sobieski of Poland, the pope, the Spanish, and the Portuguese. In a fierce battle on September 12, the Ottoman forces were routed and 10,000 men were killed on the battlefield (Finkel: 286). The Ottoman army disintegrated and lost any semblance of discipline, leaving behind its heavy cannon and badly needed supplies (Shaw: 1:214–215). The shocked Kara Mustafa Pasha tried to rally his army in Belgrade, but it was already too late. His enemies in Istanbul had convinced the sultan that his chief minister was solely responsible for the humiliating debacle at the gates of Vienna. On December 25, 1683, the grand vizier was executed (Finkel: 287).
MILITARY DEFEATS IN EUROPE
The execution of Kara Mustafa Pasha only exacerbated the political and military crisis. Without a commander capable of rallying the troops, and facing a shortage of equipment and supplies, th
e Ottoman forces fell into disarray. Worse, a new Holy League was formed in 1684 that included the Habsburgs, Venice, Poland, the pope, Malta, Tuscany, and later Muscovy (Russia). After making repeated attempts to regain the territories they had lost, in November 1698 an Ottoman delegation began to negotiate a peace treaty with representatives of the Holy League powers (Abou-El-Haj: 89). According to the Treaty of Karlowitz, signed in January 1699, the Habsburgs remained in control of much of Hungary and Transylvania, while the Ottomans maintained their rule over the Banat of Temeşvár (Temeshvár), a region extending across present-day western Romania, northeastern Serbia, and southern Hungary. Poland received Podolia (Podole), a region in present-day western Ukraine south of Volhynia extending between the rivers Dniester and Southern Bug. Russia received the territory north of Dniester. It also established its rule over Azov a short distance from the Sea of Azov, an inland sea off the southern shores of present-day Russia and Ukraine. Venice emerged as the master of Dalmatia, a region in present-day Croatia along the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea; the Morea (the Peloponnese) in present-day southern Greece; and several strategic islands in the Aegean (Sugar: 200). According to the terms of the treaty, the sultan was also forced to guarantee freedom of religion for his Catholic subjects.
The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes] Page 4
