With the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottoman Empire ceased to be the dominant power courted by all European powers. Along with the loss of territory came a significant reduction of revenue generated from tax collection, accompanied by unemployment for those who until recently had served the Ottoman government in areas now lost to European states. Thus the Ottoman Empire entered the 18th century in turmoil and decline. The past glory of its able and charismatic sultans had become, by 1700, an empty shell. Long wars against the Habsburgs, Venice, Poland, and Russia had drained the resources of the state, which could not even pay the salaries of its officials and troops. Consequently, corruption and nepotism became rampant. Against this disheartening and demoralizing background, the Ottoman elite once again appealed to a member of the Köprülü family to save the empire. Amcazade (Amjazade) Hüseyin Pasha became the grand vizier in September 1697 and embarked on another series of reforms aimed at reducing the financial burdens of the state without imposing heavier taxes on the peasantry. But as would happen again and again over the next 200 years, the new chief minister ran into formidable opposition from the traditional elite, who forced him to step down in September 1702 (Shaw: 1:226).
CONFRONTING THE HABSBURG MONARCHY AND RUSSIA
Once again the process of decline accelerated. Taxes remained uncollected, and government officials and troops were not paid their wages. The treasury was drained, and corruption spread to all levels of the civil administration. The reigning sultan, Mustafa II (r. 1695–1703), spent much of his time in Edirne and did not even realize the severity of the political and economic crisis in the capital, where the troops who were being sent on a military campaign to the southern Caucasus refused to obey orders unless they were paid. With the army taking the lead, artisans, shopkeepers, merchants, and students from various religious schools joined in a rebellion in July 1703. Mustafa II responded by dismissing his grand vizier, but the rebels, emboldened by the concessions from the sultan, began a march from Istanbul to Edirne. The sultan himself led his army against the rebels, but a fatal clash was avoided when the troops marching with the sultan defected and joined the rebels, forcing Mustafa to abdicate in favor of his brother, Ahmed III (r. 1703–1730).
The Ottomans tried to buy time and reorganize their army by keeping the empire out of war. Every effort was made to increase the revenue generated by the central government and reduce state expenditures. The memory of recent defeats and the humiliating Treaty of Karlowitz were still fresh in the minds of many Ottoman officials, who wished to avoid another military debacle. The Ottoman refusal to initiate a military campaign, however, emboldened the Russian czar, Peter I the Great (r. 1682–1725), who attacked and defeated a European ally of the sultan, Charles XII of Sweden, at Poltava in the summer of 1709. The Russians then moved their forces against the Ottoman Empire.
Fortunately for the Ottomans, the Habsburgs did not provide any support to Peter. When princes of the Romanian-populated principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia reneged on their promise to provide support for his troops, Peter, who had crossed the Pruth (Prut) into Moldavia in July 1711, was forced to retreat. As the Russian army was about to cross the Pruth on its return journey, however, the Ottoman forces struck and surrounded the czar and his troops. The founder of modern Russia and his army were at the mercy of the Ottoman grand vizier, who could have annihilated them in one blow. Recognizing the severity of his situation, Peter promised to surrender his cannons, return the Ottoman-held territories he had occupied, and remove the forts he had built along the frontier with the Ottoman Empire. In return the Ottomans allowed Russian merchants to trade freely in their territory and agreed to mediate a peace treaty between Russia and Sweden (Shaw: 1:231; Hurewitz: 1:39–40).
One of the most important implications of the Russo-Ottoman war was the change in the political structure of the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The secret negotiations between the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia and the Russian government convinced the sultan that he should remove the native princes and replace them with governors (hospodars) appointed directly by him (Jelavich: 101–102). New governors were selected from among the Greek Phanariote families of Istanbul, who played an important role within the Ottoman state as dragomans (interpreters and translators) because of their diplomatic and linguistic abilities, which included a knowledge of Turkish and several European languages (Jelavich: 102). As these new governors rose to power, the native populations in Wallachia and Moldavia began to develop a deep resentment toward the ascendancy of the Greek language and culture in their administrative system (Shaw: 1:231).
Despite the Ottoman peace with Russia, the internal court intrigues continued. The advocates of peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire triumphed when a new treaty was signed between the two powers in June 1713. The czar promised to abandon the territories he had occupied on the northern shores of the Black Sea, withdraw his forces from Poland, and allow Charles XII of Sweden to return to his country (Shaw: 1:231). The Russian retreat only emboldened the anti-Venice war party, which began to advocate for fresh military campaigns to recapture the Morea in southern Greece. While the Ottoman forces attacked Venetian positions and regained control over the Morea in 1715, their advances against Croatia forced the Habsburgs to ally with the Venetians and declare war on the sultan. Once again, war with the Habsburgs proved to be disastrous for the Ottomans, whose forces were routed at Petrovaradin in August 1716. The Ottoman defenses collapsed, and they lost Temeşvár in September 1716, followed by Belgrade, which was taken by the Habsburgs in August 1717. These humiliating defeats undermined the position of the war party at the court and allowed the sultan to appoint his closest adviser, Nevşehirli (Nevshehirli) Damad Ibrahim Pasha, as his new grand vizier in May 1718.
Peace negotiations resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Passarowitz on July 21, 1718. The Habsburgs received the Banat of Temeşvár and northern Serbia, including Belgrade and Oltenia (Wallachia west of the river Olt) (Jelavich: 68). They also received assurances that their merchants could operate freely in the sultan’s domains. Moreover, Catholic priests regained old privileges that allowed the Habsburg emperor to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire by acting as the champion and protector of the Catholic community (Shaw: 1:232–233). The Treaty of Passarowitz dealt a deadly blow to the self-confidence of the Ottoman ruling elite. The Habsburg victory attested to the military, technological, and organizational supremacy of European armies. It was now essential for the Ottoman Empire to avoid continuous warfare, establish a peaceful relationship with European powers, and use this opportunity to rebuild its shattered economy and demoralized army.
THE TULIP PERIOD
The new grand vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, purged the sultan’s inner circle and installed his own men in key positions within the royal harem. To focus the sultan’s attention on sexual desires and personal fantasies, he ordered the construction of a palace named Saadabad (Place of Joy), which was to serve as the center for various royal entertainments. Designed after the Palace of Fontainebleau (Chateau de Fontainebleau) outside Paris, Saadabad emerged as the model for other palaces later built by the wealthy members of the ruling elite along the banks of the Bosphorus. Ibrahim Pasha himself built a palace on the Anatolian side of the Strait. It contained gardens and fountains in the French style. The tulip emerged as the popular flower of the time, which later came to be known as Lale Devri (the Tulip Period) (Quataert: 43–44). During late-night garden parties, turtles with candles on their backs moved through the tulip beds, while entertainers, including poets and musicians, performed their latest lyrics and songs for a bedazzled audience that included foreign dignitaries and diplomats (Shaw: 1:234). If the lower classes could not afford to build palaces with gardens and fountains, they could still enjoy the increasing number of coffeehouses that served as centers of public entertainment (Shaw: 1:234).
Ibrahim Pasha understood that the empire needed to use diplomacy as the principal means of resolving confli
ct, reserving warfare as the last resort. He also appreciated the need for collecting information on European political and military affairs. He dispatched Ottoman ambassadors to European capitals, where they served not only as diplomats, but also as informants, visiting factories and hospitals and reporting back to him on the latest European fort-building techniques and other innovations. Observing the latest developments and advances in Europe, these diplomats soon recognized the need to borrow selectively those innovations that could help the Ottoman state to catch up with its European rivals. One of these innovations was the first printing press, introduced in the Ottoman Empire in 1727 and immediately opposed by the religious establishment and the scribes, who feared that it would put an end to their relevance in society. The grand vizier silenced the opposition by promising that the printing press would only be used for nonreligious publications, particularly in the arts and sciences (Shaw: 1:236–237).
A crisis in Iran and Ottoman intervention in that country’s internal affairs brought the Tulip Period to a sudden end. Ottoman-Iranian relations had remained peaceful following the campaigns of Murad IV and the signing of the Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin (Kasr-i Şirin) in 1639. In October 1722, however, an Afghan army, which had rebelled against the Safavid monarchy in Iran, sacked the Iranian capital of Isfahan and deposed the reigning shah, Sultan Hossein (Roemer: 6:324). The sudden collapse of the Safavid state created opportunities as well as anxieties for the Ottomans. The sultan and his grand vizier could use the vacuum created by the disintegration of the Safavid state to occupy Iran’s western provinces and increase the revenue collected by the central government. But Ahmed III was not the only sovereign determined to conquer this valuable territory. Having triumphed over Sweden, the Czar Peter I was determined to profit from the sudden disappearance of the Safavid dynasty in Iran, a country that could serve Russia as a land bridge to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the riches of India.
In 1724 the Ottoman Empire signed a treaty with Russia in which the two powers agreed to partition the northern and western provinces of Iran. Despite early victories in Iran, however, the Ottomans soon ran into trouble after Iranian leader Nader Qoli (soon to become Nader Shah) struck back and pushed Ottoman forces out of western Iran in 1730. The decision to start a new campaign against Iran ignited an urban rebellion in Istanbul. The leader of the revolt was Patrona Halil, a member of the janissary corps, who denounced the sultan and his grand vizier as incompetent and corrupt. The rebels succeeded in forcing the sultan to dismiss his chief minister and eventually order his execution. The revolt, however, did not subside. Emboldened by their initial success, the rebels demanded the abdication of the sultan in favor of another member of the Ottoman ruling family. Without any power to resist the rebels, the palace deposed Ahmed III and replaced him with Mahmud I (r. 1730–1754). A few weeks later the new sultan invited Patrona Halil to the palace, where he was murdered by royal guards. His followers and supporters were also put to death. The war with Iran continued, with attacks and counterattacks from both sides until 1746, when the two Muslim empires agreed to sign a peace treaty that restored the borders stipulated by the treaty of Qasr-i Shirin in 1639.
THREAT FROM RUSSIA
For the next two decades the Ottomans refused to become engaged in another costly military campaign, either in Europe or in the east against Iran. With the end of the wars with Russia and the Habsburgs, the Ottoman Empire entered a long period of peace. During the last years of Mahmud’s reign, as well as the reigns of the next two sultans, Osman III (r. 1754–1757) and Mustafa III (r. 1757–1774), the Ottomans declined to play a role in the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) (Jelavich: 68). Even the murder of the Iranian monarch, Nader Shah, in 1747 could not entice them to invade their old Shia nemesis to the east. Instead of using the long period of peace to reorganize the central administration and the army, however, the Ottomans fell into a deep sleep again. They were awakened from it in 1768, when Russia, under Catherine the Great (r. 1762–1796), embarked on an aggressive campaign to establish its rule on the northern shores of the Black Sea.
After several initial successes against the Russians, the Ottoman forces suffered a devastating defeat in summer 1769. The victory allowed the czarist forces to occupy Wallachia and Moldavia. A Russian naval force also attacked from the west and sank the Ottoman fleet, which had anchored at Çeșme (Cheshme), in 1770. After six years of war and intermittent negotiations, the Ottomans signed the peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (Kuchuk Kaynarja) with Russia on July 21, 1774. The treaty forced the new Ottoman sultan, Abdülhamid I (r. 1774–1789), who had come to the throne after the death of Mustafa III, to accept the independence of Crimea. In 1783 the Russians annexed Crimea and established themselves as the dominant naval force in the Black Sea.
The loss of Crimea did not end the conflict with Russia. War between the two powers erupted again in 1787. A year later the Habsburgs also declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Once again the war dragged on for several years, with the Ottomans receiving support from Sweden and Prussia. By 1791, when the sultan signed the Treaty of Sistova with the Habsburgs, the Ottoman forces were exhausted. The defeat at the hands of the Russians in 1792 forced the Ottoman government to sign the Treaty of Jassy (Iaşi), which allowed Russia to expand its territories along the northern shores of the Black Sea.
GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS
The new sultan, Selim III (r. 1789–1807), who had watched the abysmal performance of his armies against Russia and the Habsburgs, embarked on a new campaign to reform the Ottoman military organization. He introduced the Nizam-i Cedid (Nizam-i Jedid) (literally meaning New Order) army units, which were organized and trained in accordance with European military techniques. The first modern military hospital was also completed a year later, and in 1795 the first military engineering school was established. Events unfolding in Europe began to cause anxieties for the sultan. The French Revolution, which began in 1789, and the subsequent execution of Louis XVI in 1791 shocked the Ottomans, who viewed the French monarch as a friend and an ally. Even more worrisome was the occupation of Egypt by a French expeditionary force headed by Napoleon Bonaparte in the summer of 1798. The French invasion forced the sultan to seek the support of Russia and England. After defeating the French at Acre and suffering a defeat at the hands of the French at Abukir, the Ottoman-English alliance forced Bonaparte out of Egypt in 1799. Ottoman-French ties were restored in 1806, when Russia moved its forces against Wallachia and Moldavia.
In 1807 growing opposition to Selim’s reforms brought the religious establishment, the janissaries, and the antireform elements within the government together in a united front. When the revolt broke out, Selim hesitated and did not use his new army to crush the rebellion. Emboldened by their initial success, the rebels demanded the deposition of Selim and the accession of Mustafa IV (r. 1807–1808) as his successor. The pro-Selim provincial notables (āyāns), however, refused to accept defeat and mobilized their forces against the new sultan and his supporters in Istanbul. The powerful āyān, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (also known as Bayrakdar Mustafa Pasha) of Rüsçuk (Ruschuk) (present-day Ruse in northeastern Bayraktar), who supported Selim, attacked Istanbul to remove Mustafa and reinstate the deposed sultan. Mustafa responded by ordering the execution of Selim and his cousin, Mahmud, the two male members of the Ottoman royal house who could replace him. The executioners succeeded in their mission to murder Selim, but Mahmud managed to escape and find refuge in Alemdar Mustafa Pasha’s camp, where he remained until Mustafa was deposed and he could assume the throne.
Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) was a reform-minded sultan, who had supported the governmental reforms introduced by the ill-fated Selim III. In 1808, however, he was exceedingly weak and needed more time to consolidate his position vis-à-vis the conservative forces that had overthrown Selim. Once he had secured the throne, the sultan embarked on his own ambitious plan of governmental reforms. These reforms were introduced in the context of even
ts that were transforming the fundamental nature of Ottoman society.
RISE OF NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS
Starting with Serbia in 1804 and Greece in 1821, nationalist revolutions erupted among the Christian subjects of the sultan. In each case the nationalists were supported by one or more European powers, which intended to use antigovernment uprisings as a justification to intervene and undermine Ottoman power and authority in the Balkans. The Ottoman system was built on the principle of dividing the population of the empire into separate and distinct religious communities, or millets. The millet system had worked well in an era when religious identity reigned supreme. Ironically, the preservation of national cultures within the framework of religious communities allowed distinct ethnic and linguistic identities to survive. By the end of the 18th century, under the influence of the French Revolution, a modern intelligentsia imbued with nationalistic ideas began to challenge the ideological hegemony of the traditional religious hierarchies, which had historically collaborated with the Ottoman regime.
As a multiethnic, multilinguistic, and multireligious empire that recognized the supremacy of religious identity, the Ottoman state failed to develop an antibiotic for the bacteria called nationalism. Despite the Serbian revolt that forced the Ottomans to grant autonomy to a small Serbian principality in 1814–1815 and the Greek revolution, which succeeded in establishing an independent Greece in 1832, Mahmud was determined to reassert the authority of the central government by building a modern army. As long as the janissaries survived, however, the antireform forces could always rely on their support to challenge the authority of the central government. The sultan therefore abolished the janissary corps in June 1826, but he could not create a new and strong army overnight. The absence of a well-trained army undermined Ottoman attempts to maintain rule over Greece. But if the loss of Greece struck a devastating blow to Ottoman prestige and power, it was the revolt of Mehmed Ali (Muhammad Ali), the governor of Egypt, that brought the empire to the verge of extinction.
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