The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes]
Page 59
The Cheik Islam (Şeyhülislam), or High Priest, had preceded his Imperial Master; but we saw him only at a distance as he ascended the marble steps that I have already mentioned, and passed in through the great entrance. He wore a turban of the sacred green, about which was wound a massive chain, or rather belt, of gold; and was mounted on a fine Arabian, whose bridle was held by two grooms.
Sultan Mahmoud is not a handsome man, and yet it is difficult to define wherefore; for his features are good and strongly marked, and his eye bright and piercing. His jet black hair, seen in heavy curls beneath the fez, which, like most of his subjects, he wears drawn down low upon his forehead; and his bushy and well-trimmed beard, add considerably to the dignity of his appearance, as well as giving to him a look of much greater youth than he can actually boast.
Source: Julia Pardoe, The City of the Sultan, and Domestic Manners of the Turks (London: Henry Colburn, 1836), 171–175.
See also: Battles and Treaties: Greek War of Independence; Empire and Administration: Janissaries; Sultans: Abdülmecid; Selim III; Primary Documents: Document 11
Further Reading
Hale, William. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
Pardoe, Julia. The City of the Sultan; and Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1836. 3 vols. London: Henry Colburn Publisher, 1838.
Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 2 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Somel, Selçuk Akșin. Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003.
Vatikiotis, P. J. A History of Modern Egypt. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
Woodhouse, C. M. The Greek War of Independence. London: Hutchinson’s University, 1952.
Zürcher, Erik-Jan. Turkey: A Modern History. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004.
Mehmed I (1381–1421)
A sultan of the Ottoman state who ruled from 1413 to 1421. Mehmet was a son of the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402), who was defeated by the Central Asian conqueror Timur at the Battle of Ankara in July 1402. The Ottoman army was routed, and Bayezid was captured. Timur did not execute Bayezid. The defeated and humiliated Ottoman sultan died in captivity in 1403.
Timur completed his conquests of Anatolia by seizing Smyrna (Izmir) in December 1402. Before returning to Central Asia, where he died in 1405, Timur strengthened the Turkoman principalities of Karaman, Germiyan, and Hamid against a possible Ottoman restoration. Mehmed, the prince of Karaman, was rewarded with a sizable principality and a large army. Bayezid’s sons were kept alive by Timur, who knew that they would have to fight among themselves before one could emerge as the successor to their father. Thus began a period of 11 years of war among Bayezid’s sons, which came to be known as the Interregnum, or Fetret in Turkish (Alderson: 6).
Initially the war for succession to Bayezid’s throne centered on Süleyman in Edirne, Isa in Bursa and Balikesir, and Mehmed in Amasya in northern Anatolia. Having established himself in Edirne and using his father’s gāzis and cavalry forces, which had remained intact, Süleyman was the most powerful of all contenders to the Ottoman throne. He consolidated his position further when he signed several peace treaties with the Christian states of Europe. Through territorial concessions, such as the return of Salonika to the Byzantine emperor in October 1403, Süleyman tried to gain the political and financial support of Serbia and the Byzantine state. His strategy was to consolidate his rule in southeast Europe and use it as a base to attack Anatolia with the support of his newly found Christian allies. Süleyman’s brothers, Mehmed and Isa, viewed Süleyman as the principal threat to their rule, although all three Ottoman princes accepted the suzerainty of Timur. Curiously, perhaps, it was neither Musa nor Isa nor Süleyman (whom Timur recognized as his father’s successor because the Ottoman prince was centered in southeast Europe and did not pose any threat to Timur’s empire in the Middle East and Central Asia) who emerged victorious after 11 years of civil war, but Prince Mehmed of Amasya.
As the new Ottoman sultan ruling a unified empire, Mehmed removed the controversial religious leader Bedreddin and dismissed the gāzi leaders who had supported his brother, Musa, sending them into exile in Anatolia. To appease the Byzantine emperor, Manuel, Mehmed returned Salonika and all Byzantine territory around Constantinople. He also signed a peace treaty with Genoa and Venice. Mehmed’s strategy was to restore the power of notable Ottoman families and religious leaders at home and rebuild the army before engaging it in another military adventure. He soon realized, however, that his peace strategy could be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness, particularly among the leaders of various Turkoman principalities (beyliks) in Anatolia, who had gained a great deal from the defeat of Bayezid in 1402. Mehmed attacked the Turkoman principalities of western and southwestern Anatolia, recapturing most possessions that Murad and Bayezid had taken from Karaman and that Timur had restored to them after his victory at Ankara (Shaw: 1:42). The Ottoman sultan could not, however, continue his military campaigns in Anatolia because of several internal revolts that challenged Ottoman authority in Europe. The first of these was led by the followers of Şeyh Bedreddin, who had been sent into exile by Mehmed. The controversial religious leader did not curtail his activities while in exile. He fled Ottoman territory and soon landed in Wallachia, where he was received with pomp and ceremony and sufficient support to mobilize his followers in Europe, many of whom were recruited from among the Turkish nomads who had moved recently from Anatolia. Inspired by his popularity, the Şeyh’s followers in Anatolia began to organize local revolts to challenge the Ottoman state. While the revolts in Anatolia were suppressed, the situation in Rumeli (the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire) deteriorated when Şeyh Bedreddin raised the flag of open rebellion in Dobrudja in present-day Romania. To make matters worse, a man claiming to be Prince Mustafa, the lost son of Sultan Bayezid, who had been held in prison by Timur, surfaced and immediately staged a rebellion with the support of the Byzantine state and Wallachia (Shaw: 1:43). Encouraged by these rebellions, the Venetians attacked and destroyed the Ottoman fleet at Gallipoli on May 29, 1416 (Inalcik: 18). Mehmed sent one army against Düzme Mustafa (the False Mustafa) and another against Bedreddin, scoring a quick victory against the former, who was defeated and forced to flee to Constantinople. In the autumn of 1416 Ottoman forces crushed Şeyh Bedreddin’s revolt (Inalcik: 18). Bedreddin himself was captured and shortly after executed, on December 18, 1416 (Finkel: 34–35). With the challenge from False Mustafa neutralized, Mehmed turned east and completed his conquest of western and southwestern Anatolia. He already had annexed the Turkoman principalities of Hamid in 1414, Aydin in 1415, and Menteşe (Menteshe) in 1416. Teke and Antalya were now added to the Ottoman domains (Shaw: 1:44). Though determined to pursue his victories in Anatolia, Mehmed was forced to return to Europe, where he carried out a series of raids against Wallachia, forcing Prince Mircea to accept Ottoman suzerainty and capturing the important strategic town of Giurgiu (Yergögü) in 1419 (Inalcik: 18). Mehmed died in 1421 and was succeeded by his son, Murad (Murad II).
See also: Battles and Treaties: Ankara, Battle of; Empire and Administration: Timur; Sultans: Bayezid I; Murad II
Further Reading
Alderson, A. D. The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.
Finkel, Caroline. Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Basic Books, 2005.
Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Inalcik, Halil. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600. Translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.
Marozzi, Justin. Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2006.
Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 2
vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Mehmed II (1432–1481)
An Ottoman sultan who ruled first from 1444 to 1446, and again from 1451 to 1481. He was born in Edirne, then the Ottoman capital, on March 30, 1432. His father was Murad II (r. 1421–1444, 1446–1451). The identity of his mother is uncertain. As a child he was sent to Amasya in northern Anatolia, where his half brother, Ahmed Çelebi (Chelebi), the oldest son of Murad II, served as the governor. After Ahmed Çelebi died in 1437, Mehmed, who was five years old, succeeded his deceased brother as the governor of Amasya. In 1439 Mehmed traveled to Edirne for his circumcision. Afterward he was appointed governor of Manisa in western Anatolia. His brother, Alaeddin Ali, who had served as the governor of Manisa, was appointed governor of Amasya. Alaeddin Ali was Sultan Murad’s favorite, and he had been groomed to be the next sultan, but he was assassinated in the spring of 1443. The death of Alaeddin Ali made Mehmed the sole heir to the Ottoman throne. In the summer of 1443 Mehmed was ordered to travel to Edirne so that he could learn the daily responsibilities of ruling the Ottoman state.
In 1444 Murad II abdicated the Ottoman throne. Murad was succeeded by Mehmed, who ascended the throne as Mehmed II. Murad’s abdication caused a power struggle within the Ottoman government. When a new Christian crusade, organized by Hungary and supported by the pope, the Byzantine emperor, and Venice, commenced, the factions within the Ottoman ruling elite concluded that the young Mehmed II could not lead the empire at a time of such serious crisis and appealed to Murad to reassume the reins of power. Murad II remained on the throne until 1451. After Murad’s death in February 1451, Mehmed ascended the throne for the second time.
Upon ascending the throne, Mehmed II ordered his army to prepare for the siege and assault of Constantinople. Many Muslim rulers had dreamed of capturing Constantinople. As early as 674 the Umayyad caliphs, who ruled a vast Islamic empire from their capital in Damascus, Syria, had attacked the city. They tried for the second time in 717–718, but failed again (McCarthy: 69). Although the Byzantine state was now devoid of its ancient glory and power, Constantinople held significant strategic, financial, and symbolic value. The city connected the Black Sea to the Aegean and provided the shortest and easiest land route from Anatolia to the Balkans (McCarthy: 69). It also separated the Anatolian possessions of the Ottoman state from its southeast European provinces (McCarthy: 69). As long as it remained in the hands of the Byzantine state, the city could be used as a base for attacks against Ottoman armies and to blockade shipping from the Black Sea to the Aegean. Economically, Constantinople was an important center of commerce and trade, the most important stop for the traders and merchants who carried goods from Central Asia, Iran, and Anatolia to Europe. The city was also home to important merchant communities, such as the Venetians and the Genovese, who functioned as middlemen between the economies of Asia and Europe.
Finally, the symbolic aspect of conquest was as important as its strategic and economic value. The city was known as the Rome of the east, and the Greek rulers of the Byzantine state carried the title of caesar (McCarthy: 69). For the Ottoman rulers, who lacked the noble blood of the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad and the imperial lineage of the Byzantine emperors, the conquest of Constantinople would add a great deal of prestige and legitimacy (McCarthy: 69). Indeed, it would promote them from the status of a prominent regional player to that of a superpower, while at the same time filling the coffers of the state treasury and providing more fuel to the Ottoman war machine. From the very beginning of their empire, the Ottoman sultans had viewed Constantinople as the greatest prize they could acquire. The symbolic significance of the city was reflected in the concept of Kizil Elma (red apple), an expression the Ottomans used to speak of Constantinople as the most important prize in their drive to create a world empire (Finkel: 48). By plucking the red apple, the sultan could end the reign of Byzantine emperors who had offered protection to numerous pretenders to the Ottoman throne, stirring up internal conflicts and civil wars that had undermined the security and stability of the Ottoman state (Tursun Beg: 33).
Portrait of Sultan Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople. (DeAgostini/Getty Images)
Despite all these potential benefits, several powerful Ottoman officials opposed the attack. The most prominent among them was the grand vizier Çandarli Halil (Chandarli Halil). Mehmed disliked the aging statesman for the role he had played during his father’s abdication, when the young Mehmed had temporarily ruled as the sultan, only to be deposed with the encouragement and support of the janissaries and Çandarli Halil (Tursun Beg: 32). Confident of his power and influence inside the government, Çandarli Halil now opposed the dream that the young sultan had cherished since childhood. Mehmed enjoyed the grand vizier’s vehement opposition to the project, for it had already tarnished his reputation by allowing opponents at the court to label him as the agent of the Greek emperor and the alleged recipient of bribes from the Byzantine court.
In preparing for the final assault on Constantinople, Mehmed constructed an Ottoman navy to impose a blockade on the city. A fortress called Rumeli Hissar (European Fortress), armed with siege cannons, was built on the Bosphorus to destroy any ships that might try to run the blockade and supply the city’s starving population with fighting men, weaponry, and provisions from Black Sea colonies (Tursun Beg: 33–34). By the spring of 1453 the Ottomans had assembled one of the largest and most formidable land forces the ancient empire had ever seen. By then the population of the city had decreased significantly, as many of its residents had fled before the assault began. Those who remained behind fought heroically and repulsed several Ottoman assaults, but they were fighting a losing battle against one of the world’s best armies. On May 29 the Ottoman troops broke through the city’s walls and defenses. The last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI, who was fighting with the city’s defenders, was killed during the battle. In accordance with the established practice of the day, a city conquered by assault was subjected to plunder by the conquering army (Inalcik: 26). As the Ottoman troops swept through the city, the sultan walked into the Hagia Sophia (Aya Sofya or St. Sophia), the church built by the emperor Justinian in the sixth century CE, and declared it a mosque for Islam, proclaiming, “Hereafter my capital is Istanbul” (Inalcik: 26). After allowing his army to pillage the city for three days, the sultan ordered the reconstruction of his new capital (Inalcik: 26).
To establish himself as the new emperor who had inherited the Byzantine Empire, Mehmed had to create a government that could serve as the exclusive instrument of his will. For the Ottoman state to be recognized as a world power, its capital had to represent not only power and prosperity, but also openness and tolerance. Therefore the Greek population, which had been decimated, was invited to return, and the Greek Orthodox Church, under the leadership of its patriarch, was allowed to remain and prosper under the protection of the sultan (Shaw: 1:58–59). The sultan also invited the Armenian patriarch to settle in his new capital (McCarthy: 129). In order to attract Muslim religious leaders and scholars, Mehmed ordered the construction of Fatih Mosque overlooking the Bosphorus (Shaw: 1:60). By the end of his reign, the construction of new mosques, schools, and bazaars had restored much of Istanbul’s past glory and prosperity.
With the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed received the title Fatih (the Conqueror). To ensure the loyalty of the officials and commanders who surrounded him and to remind all those at the court who was in charge of the empire’s affairs, he ordered the execution of Çandarli Halil and the expropriation of his wealth. The message was loud and clear. The sultan was the sole master of his empire and did not tolerate any opposition or criticism of his decisions. The government officials were servants of the sultan; they obeyed and executed his orders and did not enjoy the right to interfere and undermine the royal decrees and decisions.
Mehmed also ordered the construction of a new palace to represent the new style of leadership. Built on land overlooking the Bosphorus, the new palace, which was nam
ed Topkapi (Cannon Gate), allowed the sultan to live in privacy and seclusion (Shaw: 1:59; McCarthy: 70). Before Mehmed, Ottoman sultans intermingled with their officials, army commanders, and even soldiers. The design of Topkapi, however, made the Ottoman sultan less accessible to his government, the army, and the populace. Several buildings and many layers of palace hierarchy stood between a visiting dignitary or ambassador and the sultan. The eunuchs and the divān, or council chamber, where the grand vizier and his ministers met, were some of the layers that blocked direct access to the sultan.
Having established himself as the most powerful Muslim sovereign, Mehmed shifted his focus to those Christian powers that blocked Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, namely Hungary and Venice. The Hungarians intended to use their influence on Serbia, which had been resurrected in 1444, to maintain and expand their power in the Balkans. For the Ottomans, there was no alternative but to confront Hungary by bringing Serbia under their direct control. In two campaigns, the first in 1454 and the second in 1455, Mehmed tried to impose Ottoman rule on Serbia, but he failed to capture Belgrade in 1456. When George Branković died, the conflict between the Ottoman state and Hungary resurfaced. After another series of campaigns in 1459, Mehmed finally occupied much of Serbia, but the problem of Hungarian involvement in Serbian internal affairs persisted until the reign of Süleyman I, when the Ottomans finally occupied Belgrade and used it as a land bridge to attack and defeat the Hungarians.
As for Venice, Mehmed moved his forces to the Morea in 1459, establishing Ottoman control over the region by 1460 (Tursun Beg: 43–44). The Ottoman position in the region, however, remained tenuous because Venice continued to hold such important strategic fortresses as Modon and Coron, which were supported from the sea by the Venetian maritime forces. Taking advantage of the collapse of Byzantine power, Venice also established itself on the Isthmus of Corinth, in present-day southern Greece, using it as a land bridge to push northward and threaten the Ottoman forces from the rear. The result was the renewal of wars with Venice that would continue until 1479, undermining Mehmed’s attempts to establish Ottoman control over mainland Greece.