The War Within

by Woodward, Bob

  In the streets of Baghdad that day, the enemy had kept plenty busy. A string of explosions ripped through predominantly Shiite neighborhoods in the capital city, killing at least 43 people and capping a week in which more than 300 Iraqis and 18 American service members died violent deaths.

  * * *

  The next day, August 31, Casey's updated SECRET commander's assessment said, "Baghdad security continues to progress. Attacks up slightly as enemy challenges security plan. Buildings cleared in Operation Together Forward Phase II: 41,054."

  So Casey had cleared another 8,000 buildings in six days, yielding another several dozen detainees. But the operation wasn't "together" in any sense because the Iraqis weren't showing up, and it was hardly "forward" because the violence was upóas usual.

  Despite the 50 questions from Hadley that zeroed in on the essence of the strategy, the tough session with the president just two weeks before, and the increasing violence, Casey held firmly to his leave-to-win strategy. He continued to report that within the next 12 to 18 months, Iraqi security forces could take over the security responsibilities for the country with very little U.S. support.

  The violence unfolding outside the fortified Green Zone told a different story. Just after ten that morning, a bomb inside a vendor's cart at a bustling Baghdad market killed at least 24 citizens and wounded 35 others. South of the capital, a bicycle rigged with explosives killed another dozen people near an army recruiting center. And a car bomb near a gas station in Baghdad killed two civilians and wounded 21, including five Iraqi policemen. The New York Times reported that scattered throughout the city authorities found another 13 bodies.

  Chapter 11

  Seven members of the Iraq Study Group, including Baker and Hamilton, landed in Baghdad on August 31. They were given flak jackets and helmets and rushed onto attack helicopters for the five-minute flight to the Green Zone.

  They flew over the sprawling brown, low-rise housing and burned-out blocks of the capital city, with the helicopters shooting flares as a precaution against shoulder-fired missiles and a gunner leaning out an open window to scope out any threats in the city below.

  In the Green Zone, they were herded into a waiting fleet of armored Humvees, each with a medic seated in the back.

  The security measures, routine for most of the American occupation, were jarring to newcomers.

  The group met with Prime Minister Maliki first. The meeting took place in an ornate, ceremonial room in one of Saddam's former palaces. They sat in wooden chairs and were served tea.

  "It will be very useful for you to know that the Iraqi people are living in freedom," Maliki, surrounded by a large staff, said through an interpreter. "Never before in history have the Iraqi people lived in freedom. This is a treasure the Iraqi people will never give upÖ.

  "Success has been achieved," he said, adding, "There is trouble. This is natural. It happens in every democracyÖ.

  "There is progress, clearly seen in the decline in the number of explosions."

  The study group members looked at one another.

  "We have political stability," the prime minister continued. "Despite bloody scenes, progress is under wayÖ.

  "The terrorists used to be on the offensive. Now we are."

  This triggered some stirring in the wooden chairs, but no one challenged the prime minister.

  Asked about the security situation, Maliki said, "The real problem is Baathists. And we have steps that we will follow to weaken them further."

  More shifting in the chairs.

  Hamilton was taken aback. Maliki seemed seriously out of touch, or else he simply wouldn't acknowledge what was going on. He seemed programmed to say what he thought Americans would want to hear.

  Maliki acknowledged that the Iraqi army was trained and equipped better than the police. "The problem with the police is the presence of the Mokhaberat [Saddam's former intelligence service] and former regime loyalists," he said.

  It was a remarkable statement. He was referring to groups of Sunnis and Baathists, when the real problem with the police was its assistance to the Shia death squads.

  What would be the outcome of a vote in Iraq on the U.S. presence? Panetta asked.

  "We do not have public opinion polls in Iraq," Maliki said. "There are definitely those who talk about the Americans leaving. But it is the top-level people who will decide, and we want you to stay."

  The prime minister asked only one question himself, and it came at the end of the hour-long interview.

  "Are AmericansóRepublicans and Democratsódrawing close to withdrawal from Iraq?" he asked.

  "You'll have your answer on November 7," Baker said.

  Election day.

  * * *

  On September 1, the morning after their interview with Maliki, the members of the Iraq Study Group met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie. Rubaie, a Shia and a neurologist by training, had left Iraq in the early 1980s to study in Britain, returning after the American invasion. Rubaie said the Sunni insurgency had to be pursued and crushed. Baker asked about the Shia militias, adding, "They have not renounced violence, either."

  "Yes, but it's different. The militias are different," Rubaie said. "Moqtada al-Sadr is using violence, but he's using it to gain power within the government."

  "But they just killed 100 Iraqis yesterday," Baker said.

  "Yes, but this is different. He is expanding his power and authority in the government," Rubaie said.

  Baker asked if he was making a distinction between those who want to overthrow the government and those who use violence to seek power within the government.

  "Yes," Rubaie said.

  The Iraqi government's national security adviser was essentially condoning the violence of the Shia militias. It was a very sobering moment.

  * * *

  Later that day, the group met with Barham Salih, a Kurd and deputy prime minister of Iraq. Salih was a balding man in his mid-40s, with a mustache, wire-rimmed glasses and an easy smile. After leaving Iraq in 1979, he had earned engineering and statistics degrees from universities in Wales and England. For years he represented the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in London and Washington. And even as he worked in the fledgling Iraqi government, his wife and two children remained at their home in Maryland. Salih spoke almost flawless English and was a smooth operator. Many at the American embassy asked the study group members, "How's Barham?" They acted as though he were an American. The Kurd clearly had won over officials at the embassy.

  Salih noted that Sunni and Kurdish leaders who didn't want the United States to leave tended to blame Iran for everything. They knew that argument would appeal to Americans.

  "Iran doesn't want to break up Iraq," Salih said. "Iran wants a weak Iraq. It wants the U.S. stuck in a quagmire. When the world relied on Saddam to balance Iran, it led to polarization and genocide in Iraq. Now the Iranians are worried about a democratic, federal Iraq and its impact on their regime. Terrorism and all the problems we face can be resolved, but Iran and Syria continue to work to destabilize us.

  "The source of the problem is Syria and Iran. The Syria-Iran alliance must be broken. Syria needs to be taken out of the equation. The Syrians are getting the Iraqis killed. They are allowing terrorists across their borders. They are allowing Baathists safe haven in Syria."

  Salih was very at ease as he offered his advice, speaking almost as if he were a U.S. official. "If we win in Iraq, we transform the Middle East," he said. "The mission is doable, but it requires tough choices. Iraq is not Somalia. It is the epicenter of the Middle East. The United States has sufficient political and military allies in Iraq to prevail."

  Salih was providing the narrative the Bush administration wanted to hear: We can do this. There's progress. But Iran is screwing everything up.

  Still later that day came a session with Abdul Qader al-Obeidi, the Iraqi minister of defense. Obeidi, a Sunni Arab, had been a general in the Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein. He had once told parl
iament that he had been demoted for opposing the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The study group members had heard repeatedly in advance what a great guy he was. Military officials said he was the take-charge type, no-nonsense, always professional. If there was any criticism of him, it was that he was too technocratic; he didn't play politics.

  He was upbeat during the interview.

  "We are in the first stages of the [Baghdad security] plan," Obeidi said. "The results are better than expected.

  Entering Sadr City will be a problem because they have lots of weapons there and clever leaders. Other regions of the city have similar problems. We will address them in the futureÖ. I have faith that the security will be in place and that the minister of interior will be able to maintain security and develop the capacity of the police."

  "Yesterday," Lee Hamilton said, "54 people were killed in Baghdad and 196 injured. Headlines in America will focus on this violence. That causes support among Americans to drop, and that support for the war has continued to drop in America."

  "The main sources of violence are car bombs, explosive devices and indirect fire," Obeidi responded. "Since the end of 2004, terrorist attacks have dropped." This clearly was not true. "Terrorists have not been able to take on a police station. Terrorist operations are not quality operations. They tend to target civilians and innocent people."

  Obeidi said he broke down al Qaeda into two groupsóthose from outside the country who do nothing but kill and those from inside the country, "whom we can come to an agreement with. The biggest source of violence in Iraq is disagreement over politics, because all politicians have armed groups."

  He then joked that it would help if they killed more politicians. "The politicians are killing innocent people," he continued. "What happened yesterdayóthe 54 killed in Baghdadóis a response from one politician to another politician. It is not terrorism."

  It was a startling observation. Much as Mowaffak al-Rubaie had seen no problem with Sadr's killing of people for political ends, the Iraqi defense minister saw the recent killings as just part of the political process.

  Panetta had begun to sense a theme: Shias did the Shia thing. Sunnis did the Sunni thing. And they all had their militias to protect them. It became increasingly clear, not to mention entirely depressing, that many Iraqi leaders accepted violence as a legitimate and necessary tool of politics.

  * * *

  The next morning, September 2, the group headed to the heavily fortified U.S. embassy to hear an assessment from CIA officials. When asked about the Iraqi government, the operatives said it was remarkable and commendable that Iraqi government employees show up for work at all, given the threats and violence they faced.

  The CIA station chief told them, "Maliki was nobody's pick. His name came up late. He has no real power base in the country or in parliament. We need not expect much from him. We continue to be amazed that the Iraqis accept such high levels of violence. Maliki thinks two car bombs a day, 100 dead a day, is okay. It's sustainable and his government is survivable."

  The official also worried about the Ministry of Interior, which ran the national police: "The Ministry of Interior is uniformed death squads, overseers of jails and torture facilities. Their funds are constantly misappropriated."

  The bottom-line judgment: "We won't lose so long as we are in Iraq, but how long are we willing to stay? For sure, it falls apart if we leave. By nature, I am an optimist," the station chief said, but then added he was not very optimistic about the situation.

  Later that day, the group met with Bayan Jabr, Iraqi's minister of finance, who had a reputation as a malicious, underhanded sectarian leader. When he was asked about corruption within the government, Jabr brushed the question aside, saying, "Corruption used to be a problem in previous governments, but now it's under control. We have an audit board."

  It was an absurd statement. The Americans knew it. The Iraqis knew it. Members of the study group certainly knew it.

  * * *

  The members gathered at the U.S. embassy the next morning, September 3, to meet with Lieutenant General Pete Chiarelli, Casey's deputy and the commander of all U.S. ground forces in Iraq. Chiarelli, a Seattle native with two master's degrees, had served a year in Iraq as a two-star division commander. A total of 160 men and women in his division, the 1st Cavalry Division, had been killed. Chiarelli had long been a leading proponent of soldiers embracing the local people, helping rebuild, hooking up sewer lines and kicking down fewer doors. The "point of penetration," he argued, was armed social work. Given the Iraqi culture of revenge and honor, killing and arresting Iraqis only made things worse, further alienating an already alienated population.

  Most generals are monotone models of calm disconnect, speaking in PowerPoint modeócool and composedóusing sterile statistics. But Chiarelli was passionate, forceful, emphatic.

  "We could go into Sadr City," he said right off the bat, "but the Iraqi government has to make an unequivocal commitment to go after Sadr City. We cannot do it alone." It was essential to understand the population, he added.

  "Iraqis care about security, electricity, water, sewage and health care, in that order."

  The current environment was too sectarian, he said. "When the U.S. government changes, you don't worry whether or not your electricity will be cut off. Iraqis have to worry about that." Living conditions were appalling. "Trash in Sunni neighborhoods is waist high. Electricity is less than two hours a day. Banks are closing because the finance minister orders them to close. The government ministries, the service providers, are contributing to the conditions that lead to violence." It was astonishing the many steps the Shia-led government would take not to help certain people, he said.

  "If this government doesn't get its act together to win the confidence of the people, it will fail," the general said.

  "Otherwise, you have to create a security force" of army and police so big that we set up "the creation of another strongman" like Saddam.

  Well, Baker asked, isn't chaos worse than having a large security force?

  "We have taken the Iraqi army as far as it can go," Chiarelli said, "without the support of its own government." The Shia and Sunnis have to learn how to govern together, he added. Reconciliation held the key to success.

  Gates's question was one he asked frequently: What about the consequences of catastrophe in Iraq? Leading the witness, he said he thought the geopolitical implications of failure in Iraq far exceeded those of failure in Vietnam.

  "The comparisons of strategic importance are not even close," Chiarelli agreed. "Iraq is a war of the future, and you have to understand the nonkinetic aspects, which are more important than the use of force."

  Chiarelli reiterated the quality-of-life issues, which he felt were central to success. He had seen the practical benefits of "full-spectrum operations," meaning that his soldiers didn't stick only to typical infantry tasks but also worked on civil projectsówater and sewer lines, restoring electricity, opening schoolsóthat won favor with the population. The unemployment problem, perhaps as high as 40 percent, was a threat to his soldiers, Chiarelli said. Conversely, when his men had studied the municipal water supply systems and solved some of the water problems in Baghdad, it had a noticeable impact.

  He said that Moqtada al-Sadr had built his support in part by controlling key ministries such as transportation, health and agriculture. Chiarelli knew that game well: Control the services, control the people.

  After the general left, the members commented on how direct and impressive he had been. Baker and Hamilton wondered aloud if they should recommend to President Bush that Chiarelli be given a fourth star and Casey's job.

  Bill Perry later took Chiarelli aside privately. The administration and Pentagon line was that they did not need more troops. But Perry wanted the straight scoop from a commander on the ground.

  "This isn't working," Perry told Chiarelli, noting that the two Together Forward operations had failed to secure Baghdad.

  Chiarelli agreed. />
  "If I were the secretary of defense," Perry said, "and I were to come over here and look at the situation, I would say this isn't working and we don't have much more time. Politically, time is running out on us. So I'm willing to give you another four or five brigades to secure Baghdad. First of all, would that help?"

  "No," Chiarelli replied, Perry recalled.

  "I'm prepared to do it. What's your answer?" Perry pressed.

  "No," Chiarelli said. "Unequivocally, no."

  "And then he gave me a long list of reasons," Perry said. The list boiled down to the fact that this was not a military problem but rather a political one, and it must be solved by the Iraqisótheir people, their army and their policeóand not by the U.S. military.

  Leon Panetta recalled that Chiarelli told the group, "We're not going to win this thing militarily. We're only going to win it when we provide jobs to people, when we meet their basic needs, when we clean the trash up, when we deliver water, when we deliver electricity. Until we do that, we're fighting a losing war."

  Chapter 12

  Next, the study group met with Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, who was in charge of training the Iraq army, and Major General Joseph Peterson, who commanded the units training Iraqi police.

  Dempsey said they had trained the targeted number of Iraqi military, but without national reconciliation it was useless. "If they don't make that progress by the end of the year," he said, "there are not enough troops in the world to provide security."