The War Within

by Woodward, Bob

  Rice agreed that on inauguration day 2009, no new president, Democrat or Republican, was going to say the Bush administration had fixed the Middle East. But she thought that over time a democratic Iraq would emerge, Iran would be transformed or defeated, Lebanon would be free of Syrian forces, and a Palestinian state would exist. And none of it would be possible without some future victory in Iraq. "This president not just set it in motion," Rice said,

  "he's put in place now the foundation where it can come out in our favor.

  "We didn't come here to maintain the status quo. And the status quo was cracking in the Middle East. It was coming undone. And it was going to be ugly one way or another. And it just might as well have been ugly in a good cause.

  And now, with the emergence of Iraq as it is, it's going to be bumpy and it's going to be difficult but big. Historical change always is. There are a lot of things if I could go back and do them differently, I would. But the one I would not do differently is, we should have liberated Iraq. I'd do it a thousand times again. I'd do it a thousand times again."

  * * *

  Later, in the Oval Office, I asked the president if he too would do it "a thousand times again." "The decision to remove Saddam Hussein was the right decision," he said. "And I say it to [everyone] and to the American people often."

  What does the president worry about most in the national security area? Iran? Iraq? Afghanistan?

  "The rise of radical fundamentalism," Bush said, "that is fueled by nation states and/or carried out by these groups that are buried into, kind of, soft spots around the world, and that these people who are committed to harming America and our allies possess the capacity to use a serious weapon. They used airplanes last time on our soil. The idea of them having, you know, biological or chemical or nuclear capabilities is very frightening."

  I told him that Rice had put it this way: "Every day is September 12."

  "That's a very poetic way of putting it," Bush said. "But the biggest thing a president must fearóand a citizen must fearóis that our country becomes isolationist, saying it doesn't matter what happens over there. I think about the security of the country all the time.

  "Every day, sitting in this chair, you realize your biggest responsibility is to prevent America from being attacked again. It's the safeguard of the people. I also recognize that the long-term security, however, is going to be advanced by helping people realize the blessings of liberty. And to some in America, that sounds Pollyanna-ish. However, if you look at history, it's worked. It's worked. It's a powerful force. Liberty is transformative. And the great debate right now is whether or not, you know, Muslims can self-govern and whether it's worthwhile to try to help them become free societies. I believe strongly that free societies, or hopeful societies, which marginalize these extremists, they just wither, they wither away over time. And that's not to say there won't be killers, there won't be people out there. But there will be a lot less. The public will turn on them. Kind of the ultimate concerned citizens group."

  Josh Bolten ducked into the Oval Office and said the president had lunch plans that were being delayed.

  "Yeah. Get moving, will you?" Bush said to me. "How many more questions you got?"

  "Just a few," I said. Of course, I had hundreds.

  "You better hurry. I'm getting less indulgent, as you can tell. One, I'm hungry. And two, I've got a meeting."

  "Is there kind of a recentering of American power in the Middle East?"

  "Absolutely," the president said. "And it should be. And the reason it should be: It is the place from which a deadly attack emanated. And it is the place where further deadly attacks could emanate. And the idea of Iran having a nuclear weapon is a very dangerous notion. And the idea of people having the capacity, a nuclear capacity, and giving those to terrorist groups that could use them is a very deadly notion, as well."

  "And so we have military hegemony in the region, just as a practical matter?"

  "We've got freedom hegemony we're pushing. We're trying to get freedom moving," the president answered.

  Hadley interrupted, alerting the president to the implications of the word "hegemony," which means dominance or leadership and carries overtones of empire.

  "It's a loaded word, as you know very well," the president said.

  "It is a loaded word," I agreed.

  "It's a very tricky, Washington loaded word. It was very tricky, Woodward. Very tricky," Bush said.

  "No, no," I protested.

  "Yeah, it was. It was a Woodward tactic," Bush said.

  "If you listen to Secretary Rice on this subject," I said, "She is absolutely delighted that we have all these troops there."

  "Is it hegemonistic to have troops in Korea?" the president said. "I don't think so. Is it hegemonistic to have them in Japan? Was it hegemonistic to have them in Germany? No. The United States has got a troop presence at the invitation of governments to help provide security. Which, by the way, also helps provide the conditions for liberty to advance."

  EPILOGUE

  The outcome of the Iraq War, now in its sixth year, remains uncertain. General Petraeus has it right when he says that any gains are "fragile and reversible."

  Derek Harvey, the defense intelligence expert and early pessimist about the prospects for the war, had nonetheless become a cautious optimist by May 2008. As a strategic adviser reporting directly to Petraeus, Harvey saw much to suggest that the worst might be over.

  Prime Minister Maliki had removed 1,400 Shia from the ministry of interior for sectarian actions. Maliki still had a sectarian bent himself, but his actions suggested more evenhandedness. The number of vehicle bombs had dropped from a high of 130 a month in March 2007 to 30 a month in May 2008óstill a significant number. Most were detonated at checkpoints and killed far fewer people. Only occasionally did a vehicle bomb penetrate into large markets to inflict the massive casualties reminiscent of 2006ñ07.

  Violence was down so much in a few places that some U.S. soldiers were not receiving combat action badges because there was no fighting in their area. The Mahdi Army, responsible for much of the Shia sectarian violence, was fracturing in Harvey's view. Iran, which the United States was trying to hold at bay, seemed increasingly unpopular in Iraq. Several polls showed that 65 to 70 percent of Iraqis viewed Iran negatively.

  Harvey believed that fatigue had overwhelmed Iraq and an increasing number of citizens had simply grown weary of five years of war. Though anti-Americanism and doubts about the U.S. role remained fierce, support for al Qaeda had dropped significantly. He believed that the United States had been hurt in the region but al Qaeda had been hurt more. It was possible, he thought, that the Iraqi insurgency might become like the Irish Republican Army, capable of conducting urban bombings but not potent enough to cripple social, political and economic life.

  As always, there were caveats and lingering concerns. The Iraqi elections, scheduled for the end of 2008, could bring about a sea change in the provinces and Baghdad, Harvey believed. For example, the 41-seat Baghdad council had only one Sunni member. That could rise to as many as 18 Sunnis after the elections. Though it might suggest reconciliation, it ran the risk of triggering a Shia backlash.

  There was always the possibility of what Harvey called "wildcat hits," unexpected catastrophic events such as the assassination of Maliki or a massive attack on Americans, either on U.S. bases or in the Green Zone. Support for the insurgency continued to flow into Iraq through Syria and Jordan, and the Iranian-Syrian alliance, he believed, was stronger than ever. Iran continued its lethal and carefully calibrated efforts to support and train militias and supply them with advanced IEDs, the Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), which could pierce almost any armored vehicle.

  Harvey believed the critical task to defeat the will of the enemy and rebuild communities so that violent elements could not filter back in was monumental and far from complete in Iraq. Reminders that life was still far from normal occurred regularly, such as the June 17, 2008, explosion
that killed at least 65 people, the highest-casualty bombing in Baghdad in three months. Uncertainty was more constant than electricity.

  The ministries of interior and defenseóthe two best run in the Iraqi governmentóhad some 2,500 American advisers holding everything together. Without them, Harvey worried, they would increasingly return to their sectarian ways.

  Meanwhile, China, Russia, India, and the U.S. partners in Europe were salivating at what seemed like American exhaustion and over-commitment in Iraq. These countries seemed eager to pounce and exploit opportunities in the oil-rich Middle East, further weakening America's standing in the world.

  * * *

  The headline splashed across the top of The Washington Post on June 14, 2008, "Key Iraqi Leaders Deliver Setbacks to U.S.," encapsulated the constant uncertainty of the war. Maliki announced that negotiations over the status of U.S. forces in Iraq had "reached a dead end." Though talks would continue, he said, "We could not give amnesty to a

  [U.S.] soldier carrying arms on our ground. We will never give it." At the same time, Moqtada al-Sadr announced he was setting up a new paramilitary unit to attack U.S. forces, effectively ending his stand-down from the previous year. It was almost as if Maliki and Sadr were competing to see who could more aggressively push the American hand off the bicycle seat.

  Even if Iraq turned out well in the end, Harvey did not think it would rescue the Bush legacy. For too many yearsófrom 2003 to the end of 2006óthe president had not been frank about the costs, duration, and challenges of what had been undertaken in the Iraq War. As he shuffled from Washington to Baghdad and back, Harvey wondered about the president. "What was he really seeing, and why did it take so long for him to understand?"

  * * *

  As I complete my fourth book on President Bush and his wars, I keep returning to some key questions. Most important, how did Bush perform as commander in chief? Has the president set up and enforced a decision-making system worthy of the sacrifice he has asked of others, particularly the men and women of the U.S. military and their families? Has he been willing to entertain debate and consider alternative courses of action? Was he slow to act when his strategies were not working? Did he make the right changes? And did he make them in time? Was the Bush administration a place where people were held accountable? The seeds to some of those answers can be found in my 2002 book, Bush at War, which provided a detailed account of the months after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

  On the day of the attacks, the president's two public addresses were shaky, but over the next nine days he rallied his war cabinet and the nation. On September 20, he gave one of his finest, most confident speeches as president.

  Addressing Congress and 80 million Americans watching on television, he pledged to strike back.

  "We will direct every resource at our command," he said. "I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people." The applause inside the Capitol that night was thunderous and praise for the speech almost universal.

  Just two weeks after the terrorist attacks, Rice, then Bush's national security adviser, was receiving a briefing at the CIA on covert operations inside Afghanistan when the president called her. He wanted to know if the military was going to be ready to start bombing Afghanistan right away. She explained that there might be a delay.

  "Why? That's not acceptable!" the president roared.

  Their conversation was cut short by a bad connection. When Rice reached the White House, she sprinted to her office, where Bush was already calling from the residence. She repeated that the military was not fully ready.

  "That's unacceptable!" Bush said again. "Why is that?"

  Rice explained that the U.S. military didn't have bases close to Afghanistan. The intelligence was weak. Targets were scarce. And the weather was deteriorating.

  "I'm ready to go," he later told me. "Sometimes that's the way I amófieryÖ. I can be an impatient person." On the eve of that first war, he was riddled with impatience.

  In another instance, on October 25, 2001, after the bombing in Afghanistan had begun, Rice went to see the president. She reported that several members of his war cabinet were worried that the progress in the initial weeks was too slow. She suggested that he solicit their views at the NSC meeting the next morning. "I'll take care of it," he told her.

  At the next day's meeting, Bush said, "I just want to make sure that all of us did agree on this plan, right?" He went around the table asking everyone to affirm allegiance to the plan. He asked if anyone had any ideas, but as I later wrote after interviewing everyone who had been in the room, "In fact the president had not really opened the door a crack for anyone to raise concerns or deal with any second thoughts. He was not really listening."

  * * *

  I first interviewed President Bush in the Oval Office on December 20, 2001, three months after the terrorist attacks. The war in Afghanistan appeared to be going well, with the overthrow of the Taliban regime and promising efforts to deny sanctuary to al Qaeda. Bush was jaunty and full of self-confidence. At 55, he was a young president, filled with certainty. He directed an aide to his desk to pull out three sheets with short biographies of al Qaeda leaders, each with a color photo. He showed how he had crossed through the pictures with a large "X" as each suspected terrorist leader was killed or captured.

  "One time early on, I said, 'I'm a baseball fan. I want a scorecard.'" He was going to have a body count.

  And he had major goals. "We're going to root out terror wherever it may exist," he said. He talked of achieving

  "world peace," and of creating unity at home. "The job of the president," he said, "is to unite the nation."

  * * *

  President Bush once said to me of the path he'd chosen, "I know it is hard for you to believe, but I have not doubted what we're doing. I have not doubtedÖThere is no doubt in my mind we're doing the right thing. Not one doubt." It wasn't so hard to believe. He repeatedly told me that his certainty was an asset. "A president has got to be the calcium in the backbone," he said. "If I weaken, the whole team weakens. If I'm doubtful, I can assure you there will be a lot of doubt. If my confidence level in our ability declines, it will send ripples throughout the whole organization. I mean, it's essential that we be confident and determined and united.

  "I don't need people around me who are not steadyÖAnd if there's kind of a hand-wringing going on when times are tough, I don't like it."

  He spoke a dozen times about his "instincts" or his "instinctive reactions," summarizing once, "I'm not a textbook player, I'm a gut player."

  After I recounted these details in Bush at War many readers and a number of reviewers and columnists thought I had portrayed Bush as a strong, inspirational leader. But my account also showed that he didn't want an open, full debate that aired possible concerns and considered alternatives. He was the "gut player," the "calcium-in-the-backbone"

  leader who operated on the principle of "no doubt."

  "His instincts are almost his second religion," I wrote. In the Afghanistan War, he had laid down the marker that his convictions would trump nearly everything and everyone else.

  During an interview at his Crawford ranch on August 20, 2002, he had laid out his thinking about an Iraq war, which was still seven months away.

  "As we think through Iraq," Bush said, "we may or may not attack. I have no idea yet. But it will be for the objective of making the world more peaceful."

  "I will seize the opportunity to achieve big goals," he said, and on his own he brought up North Korea. He had identified it along with Iraq and Iran as an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address earlier that year. He made it clear that Iraq and North Korea were linked in his mind. Bush leaned forward in his chair and spoke about his gut reaction to the North Korean leader.

  "I loathe Kim Jong Il!" the president bellowed, waving his finger. "I've got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people. And I have
seen intelligence of these prison campsóthey're hugeóthat he uses to break up families, and to torture people. I am appalledÖIt is visceral. Maybe it's my religion, maybe it's myóbut I feel passionate about this." He said he'd been advised not to move too fast on North Korea, but he added, "Either you believe in freedom andÖworry about the human condition or you don't.

  "And I feel that way about the people of Iraq, by the way," he said, adding that Saddam Hussein was starving the Shia in outlying areas of Iraq. "There is a human condition that we must worry about."

  But the president made it clear that he didn't think much of diplomacy. "You can't talk your way to a solution to a problem," he said, and the United States had the responsibility to lead. That triggered "resentment toward us," and caused people to say, "Bush is a unilateralist; America is unilateral." He added, "I've been to meetings where there's a kind of 'We must not act until we're all in agreement.' Well, we're never going to get people all in agreement about force and use of force." International coalitions or the United Nations were probably not viable ways to deal with dangerous rogue states, he said. "Confident action that will yield positive results provides kind of a slipstream into which reluctant nations and leaders can get behind."

  Again, his blind faith in his instincts meant more than the concerns of his war cabinet and the international community.

  My second book on Bush, Plan of Attack, recounted the president's decision making during the 16 months from November 2001 to the invasion in March 2003. During this period, Rumsfeld and the Central Command commander at the time, General Tommy Franks, gave the president a dozen detailed briefings on the invasion plan. Every meeting was about how to go to war. There was no meeting to discuss whether to go to war. The president had never questioned its rightness, and its rightness made it the only course.