At the eastern edge of the Long Tan rubber plantation, a small command and staff unit belonging to the 5th VC Infantry Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel Tran Minh Tam, along with the three battalions of the 275 VC Regiment, commanded by Senior Captain Nguyen Thoi Bung, were entering the plantation. Not far from them were Major Bui Quang Chanh and his troops of the local D445 VC Battalion, located in and around Long Tan village to the south. Also present was a reconnaissance element from the division, likely commanded by Le Huu Nghia.55 Other elements, including mortar teams, were taking up positions close to Nui Dat 2 and further south. Small reconnaissance patrols had been sent out earlier; all indications were that the Australians had left the plantation, and most of the Vietnamese were relatively relaxed. They would set about preparing for an ambush that would hopefully, in the next few days, destroy in detail an Australian patrol. Local intelligence indicated that the Australians were now sending out company-sized patrols, and the Viet Cong estimated that an ambush consisting of the 275 VC Regiment and D445 VC Battalion could pick off such a patrol with little risk to themselves; certainly they would need a larger force if they hoped to take on the Task Force base with any real prospect of success. The intended ambush was more of a political necessity as the COSVN Military Affairs Committee was keen to propagate a victory against the Australians – a major ally of the US.
Sometime during the mid-afternoon a helicopter from RAAF 9 Squadron piloted by Flight Lieutenant Max Hayes was on a leaflet mission. He flew over the supposedly deserted village of Long Tan and saw a number of people in and around the small hamlet. No one fired at the helicopter, and he dropped a bunch of leaflets that urged the Viet Cong to join the South Vietnamese Army, with promises of land as soon as they changed sides. Those in the village were almost certainly elements of the D445 VC Battalion who likely took little if any notice of the pamphlets other than using them to roll cigarettes. The Australian chopper banked away to find other places to conduct its propaganda war.56
* While just about all narratives to date regarding the Battle of Long Tan (including the Official History) state that B and D companies joined up at around 1 p.m., the signals provided in 6 RAR commander’s diary indicate that D Company was still moving towards the plantation at 1257hrs (12.57 p.m.) and 1332 hrs (1.32 p.m.). It is not until 1430 hrs (2.30 p.m.) that the log indicates that both B and D companies are located at 473674 – the position of the weapons pits found by B Company that morning.
12
‘I was surprised when he introduced himself as Frank’
1500–1540 hours
It was 3 p.m. when D Company moved out on rising ground away to the east across the shallow basin of the Suoi Da Bang valley. Lieutenant David Sabben recalled that there was a heavily used bullock-cart track that led directly into the heart of the plantation. It was defined by deep ruts in the mud, so they knew that the carts were ‘heavily loaded and we assumed, therefore, that they were loaded with all the weapons that had bombarded us. It was now thirty-six hours after the shelling, so the people on foot would’ve been long, long, gone.’1 Major Harry Smith ordered the company to move out in one-up formation (arrowhead configuration), following the bullock track. Lieutenant Geoff Kendall and his men of 10 Platoon were in the lead. Directly behind by about 100 metres was CHQ, while the other two platoons fanned out either side of CHQ to cover each side of the track, with Sabben’s 12 Platoon on the left and Lieutenant Gordon Sharp’s 11 Platoon on the right.2 It was the duty of each man to scan his arc of responsibility, with his weapon sweeping slowly from side to side in line with his vision as the company penetrated deeper into the plantation.3
Given that its objective was to track down the Viet Cong mortar teams, the patrol was conducted in a more fluid manner than was normal. The soldiers were not assigned to a specific sector, which enabled those back at base to coordinate other operations around them, including predetermined artillery harassment and interdiction (H&I) fire plans. The current operation, as recalled by Sabben, required them to advise the Task Force base of their position and direction so that battalion headquarters (BH) could reroute other patrols and change H&I fire plans to take into account their patrol movements. As such, it was entirely up to the commander on the ground to decide where he would go.4 For this reason it was also critical that Captain Maurice Stanley, as FOO, stay in contact with Major Smith at all times. It was his job to provide advice regarding artillery support to the company commander as required. He also needed to be sure of the company’s location, including the three platoons, and how far away they were from CHQ. These were crucial concerns for any FOO, and for the gunners back at the Task force base, who might be called upon to provide fire support to friendly troops in the immediate area of any contact.5
As they pushed their way through the outlying areas of the plantation, old and disused trees with undergrowth gave rise to new plantation trees and a more orderly landscape of avenues of trees, providing long views in one direction but reducing visibility in others – maximum visibility was about 250 metres.6 Sabben remembered moving into the cool of the plantation. Though it was still dry, clouds were gathering above, a little heavier and darker than usual; the men were anticipating heavy rain later in the afternoon.7 Kendall radioed back to Smith that they were about 150 metres into the plantation and had come up to a point where the ‘track separated in a Y – the left-hand track stuck with the edge of the rubber which was [mostly scrub] and the main track continued into the centre of the rubber’.8
Smith advanced up to 10 Platoon and saw a smaller track break off, going for a short distance in a north-east direction before turning in a south-east direction running generally parallel with the main track, straight through the plantation towards its distant eastern edge; each track now running roughly parallel was separated by about 300 metres. The plantation here was still about 2000 metres deep to the east, and just visible through the lines of rubber trees to the north-east lay the jungle-covered Nui Dat 2; to the south-west and north-west lay an impenetrable forest of bamboo, leading back to the stream.9 Smith reported to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend, seeing signs of scattered clothing and odd bits apparently dropped in a hurry. Townsend asked Smith which way he thought the Viet Cong had retreated, and Smith informed his superior that he would toss a coin, then jokingly said, ‘Go west, young man, but in this case I’ll go east.’10
Smith renewed the advance but now in two-up formation, bringing forward 11 Platoon. Kendall and 10 Platoon followed the northern branch, while Sharp and 11 Platoon followed the southern branch, which was on slightly higher ground; both were heading into the heart of the plantation. Each platoon was now itself in two-up formation with two sections forward and one section back.11 Behind was CHQ and not far behind that was Sabben with 12 Platoon. Company frontage and depth were about 400 metres. At this point all platoons and CHQ were in visual contact.12
The men of B Company were in a hurry to get back to base. Lieutenant John O’Halloran recalled how their pace quickened the closer they got – they were keen to see the last concert of the day and then take R&C leave to Vung Tau.13 Corporal Robin Jones remembered that the platoon set off, ‘happy to be on our way, thinking about something to eat as it had been mid-morning the previous day since we had eaten anything substantial. Leaving the rubber we crossed the Suoi Da Bang stream and made our way past the area of an enemy mortar base-plate position.’14
Back in the plantation, the forward sections of 11 Platoon had come up to another sunken bullock track, this one running north–south and cutting across their path. The left forward section of 11 Platoon was commanded by Corporal John Robbins (6 Section), while the right forward section was commanded by Corporal William Moore (5 Section). Corporal Jeff Duroux (4 Section) was behind with platoon headquarters. Sergeant Bob Buick recalled moving slowly. Robbins’ section had crossed the north–south track, which was relatively straight and wide enough for a bullock-cart to pass through the plantation. There was a two-strand
barbed-wire fence on the western side of the track about half a metre high. Tracks and fences are obstacles that impede progress and require caution when trying to negotiate them. At this point the terrain sloped slightly downhill to the north, to the left of 11 Platoon, and the hill crested about 75 metres to the right. It was a gentle slope, but even so, when the men were on the track it limited their visibility to the south and any Viet Cong would have experienced the same problem when moving north along the trail towards 11 Platoon. By now Lieutenant Sharp had got 6 Section across the track and was advancing 5 Section to secure the other side. The platoon commander and his radio operator, Private Vic Grice, now crossed the track, with Private Barry Meller and Sergeant Buick some 20 metres behind them.15
Lance Corporal Barry Magnussen, 2IC (second-in-command) of 5 Section, recalled being in the lead with two scouts, privates Allen May and Doug Fabian. They, like the command group, had just crossed the track when to their right moving along the track they saw a small group of Viet Cong. Magnussen was with Private Ian Munro, his section machine gunner. Neither could fire at the Viet Cong as the platoon scouts were in their field of fire.16 The Viet Cong had literally walked into the middle of D Company as it was crossing the same track. Private May recalled seeing what he thought was a ‘bunch of kids . . . then I realised that these kids had weapons . . . Doug Fabian and myself both opened up on these people’.17 Buick, who was about to cross the track, recalled vividly many years later looking up and seeing all of a sudden on his right about six Viet Cong dressed in greens almost among them. He recalled that they ‘were going along quite nonchalant. They weren’t bloody interested at all and I thought, “Hang on, these guys are walking straight into the middle of the company!”’18
The fire from May and Fabian, which was quickly followed by fire from Buick, wounded one Viet Cong and forced the others to take cover ‘out of sight in the light rubber and tall grass that was about half a metre high in the “dirty rubber”’.19 The enemy patrol, almost certainly from 275 VC Regiment, had walked between the last man of the right of 6 Section (leading section) and the leading man of 5 Section just coming up, with a gap of about 50 metres. They were soon retreating, having picked up their wounded comrade, and heading east off the track; the wounded Vietnamese soldier was later found dead close by. Buick remembered that the Viet Cong never returned fire but just took off, running past the right side of 6 Section towards the small tapper’s hut used as the collection point for the latex tapped from the rubber trees. This hut would figure prominently in the battle that soon broke out all around.
First contact – it was 3.40 p.m. Just north and to the rear of 11 Platoon, Kendall and his men of 10 Platoon heard the firing break out a few hundred metres to their right. He moved the platoon away from the track and listened as the 11 Platoon contact moved from patrol contact to section attack to platoon attack.20
It was not only the Australians who were surprised by the sound of small-arms fire. The North Vietnamese commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tran Minh Tam, chief of staff of the 5th VC Infantry Division and deputy divisional commander, was based at Nui Dat 2, while his second-in-command, Nguyen Thanh Hong, a staff officer of the division, was located in the small deserted hamlet of Ap Phuoc Hung about 2 km north-east of Long Tan village and 3 km east of the battlefield.21 The commanders had earlier assessed that there were no enemy troops within kilometres of the plantation or the village of Long Tan. Surprise, which was their greatest ally for the successful large-scale mobile ambush planned for the following days, had dissipated within a matter of seconds.
Back at Nui Dat, A Company was finally entering the base after its gruelling but successful three-day patrol. Waiting for the men were a number of replacements for the battalion, including two for A Company, 2 Platoon, privates Phil Murray and Laurie Bodey. When the company returned, recalled Private Bodey, they reported to the platoon sergeant and were surprised when he ‘introduced himself as Frank [almost certainly Sergeant Frank Alcorta] (not as sergeant this or that). However, I didn’t have time to dwell on it because he quickly introduced me to my new section commander, Corporal [Louie] Stephens. The corporal told me to take over “that camp stretcher in that tent” as he sprinted off to the showers, nude except for a towel around his waist and an OMC [Owen machine carbine] over his shoulder.’22 Another reinforcement for A Company, Private Mick Greenwood, was luckier than his mate Private Col Whiston. Both had spent about six weeks together in Vung Tau doing general duties, waiting to be assigned. On 16 August, Private Whiston was moved up the line to Nui Dat and assigned to D Company, 11 Platoon; he arrived just in time to go out on his first and last patrol. Private Greenwood arrived on 18 August, just in time to be thrown into the battle to help relieve D Company.23
Not far away was US lieutenant Gordon Steinbrook, who with his battery had recently arrived at Nui Dat to provide heavy artillery support to 1 ATF with six 155mm howitzers. He had been allocated to 6 RAR as an FOO and was having a few beers with some recently made mates from the battalion at what went for the officers’ bar. He had earlier recalled how the US and Australian military viewed quite differently the status of FOOs:
All the [Australian and New Zealand] FOOs were captains or senior first lieutenants, the most experienced and capable officers of their batteries. Not only that, the FOO assignment was sought after as ‘the job to have’. In contrast, FOOs in the American artillery were usually junior lieutenants, and the job itself was regarded as the most dangerous and least desirable of any. As I moved in with the infantry, therefore, it came as quite a shock to find that the Aussies and Kiwis assumed I must be the ‘chosen one’ from the battery to have gotten such a coveted assignment. Mistaken as they were, moving in with the Aussies and working for a New Zealand artillery battery proved interesting and unforgettable.24
As he chatted with his mates, the first of the New Zealand battery fire missions was about to fire against the small group of fleeing Viet Cong. It would not be long before a runner from battalion headquarters would come looking for them to tell them that D Company had run into something big – but for now he and the others enjoyed their beers, unaware of the battle that was about to break out just 5 kilometres east of the base.
13
‘. . . then all hell broke loose’
1540–1610 hours
Everyone behind 11 Platoon heard the scattered firing. At CHQ, Private Bill Akell recalled on hearing the first shots that ‘we all went to ground of course, the standard thing to do on contact’. He and likely almost everyone one else thought, ‘Well, we’ve made contact with a couple of enemy, they’re going to nick off, and we’re just going to move on and continue the patrol. That seemed to be the standard way the Viet Cong operated at that time . . . fleeting contact with the enemy.’1
Private Terry Burstall of 12 Platoon was bringing up the rear and recalled covering about 200 metres into the plantation when he heard fire from the first contact. He and the others went to ground, as they were trained to do in such circumstances, but he wasn’t overly concerned and turned to look at Private Harley Webb, a new reinforcement who had joined the company a day or two before, saying, ‘That’s a good start on your first patrol.’2 Webb just looked at him with a forced grin. Another of Lieutenant David Sabben’s platoon, Private Alan Parr, recalled: ‘We heard the contact out to our right front. Then everything fell silent again . . . If we’d been carrying the signal set for Lt Sabben we might have had some idea what was going on as 11 Pt would have called Coy HQ about the contact.’3
Indeed, Lieutenant Gordon Sharp had radioed back to CHQ, telling Major Harry Smith that he had made contact with enemy troops who were not in black pyjamas but in khaki – this usually meant members of a main force. Sharp asked permission to pursue them, and Smith agreed. Smith at 3.40 p.m. relayed to battalion headquarters to inform Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend: ‘Contact with 6 to 8 enemy dressed in greens at YS478873 possibly wounding one. Enemy fled east.’4
Sharp’s platoon now changed i
nto line formation, with 6 Section commanded by Corporal John Robbins to the left, 4 Section and Corporal Jeff Duroux in the centre, and 5 Section with Corporal Bill Moore on the right; the platoon headquarters was about 15 metres behind 4 Section. With 11 Platoon now in an extended line, they swept forward to catch up with the retreating enemy if possible, the platoon front stretched out to about 250 metres. Smith radioed 10 Platoon to maintain its direction and rate of advance and for 12 Platoon to its rear to close up with CHQ. FOO Captain Morrie Stanley conferred with Smith and confirmed the position of the dispersed company on his map. At 3.42 p.m., Stanley called in an artillery strike from his New Zealand battery against position 482668, about 500 metres east of first contact; this would hopefully disrupt the enemy’s line of retreat.5
Just as the New Zealand battery opened fire against the fleeing Viet Cong, the tired and weary men of A Company, with their three Vietnamese detainees, were finally putting down their gear and ‘their’ bananas. No one paid much attention to the rounds being fired as they were likely just another routine fire mission. However, the Australian entertainers, who were playing their second concert of the day, were affected by the sudden sound of anger, with some giving a tentative laugh and others jumping with fright.6
The Battle of Long Tan Page 11
